A Change in Tactics, Not Strategy

Michael Abramowitz, Robin Wright and Thomas E. Ricks write in The Washington Post: "When President Bush goes before the American people tonight to outline his new strategy for Iraq, he will be doing something he has avoided since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003: ordering his top military brass to take action they initially resisted and advised against.

"Bush talks frequently of his disdain for micromanaging the war effort and for second-guessing his commanders."

Mind you, Bush has apparently now beaten and cajoled and reassigned the brass into submission: "Pentagon insiders say members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have long opposed the increase in troops and are only grudgingly going along with the plan because they have been promised that the military escalation will be matched by renewed political and economic efforts in Iraq."

But, as Abramowitz, Wright and Ricks point out: "In going for more troops, Bush is picking an option that seems to have little favor beyond the White House and a handful of hawks on Capitol Hill and in think tanks who have been promoting the idea almost since the time of the invasion."

So how did it come to pass? Well, during White House deliberations, "How to look distinctive from the study group became a recurring theme.

"As described by participants in the administration review, some staff members on the National Security Council became enamored of the idea of sending more troops to Iraq in part because it was not a key feature of Baker-Hamilton."

And: "In the end, the White House favored the idea of more troops as one visible and dramatic step the administration could take."

Michael Hirsh writes for Newsweek: "Most top U.S. military officials -- even members of George W. Bush's administration such as National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley -- did not recommend a 'surge' or escalation of U.S. troops into Iraq when they were interviewed by the Iraq Study Group last fall, says group member Leon Panetta, a former White House chief of staff under Bill Clinton."

As I noted in my December 18 column, Bush repeatedly used the generals to give him political cover during the mid-term election campaign, and got quite righteous in his critique of those who would not do likewise.

Here, for instance, is Bush describing his decision-making process on April 6: "I'm not going to make decisions based upon polls and focus groups. I'm going to make my decisions based upon the recommendations of our generals on the ground. They're the ones who decide how to achieve the victory I just described. They're the ones who give me the information.

"I remember coming up in the Vietnam War and it seemed like that there was a -- during the Vietnam War, there was a lot of politicization of the military decisions. That's not going to be the case under my administration."

The New Domino Theory

Glenn Kessler and Jonathan Weisman write in The Washington Post: "President Bush gravely warned House Democrats yesterday that America's credibility would be shattered if the United States pulled its troops from Iraq, forcing close ally Saudi Arabia to look elsewhere for protection and potentially destabilizing Egypt, the region's most populous country, according to participants in the meeting. . . .