No Closer to Success in Iraq

"Some senior officers have privately complained about Petraeus' direct access to President Bush. . . .

"Late last year, there was even a move among some senior military officers within the Pentagon to reshape Petraeus' role during this month's congressional hearings, relegating his voice to just one of many heard by lawmakers.

"Pentagon officers wanted to emphasize potentially competing views, particularly from Petraeus' immediate superior at the time, Navy Adm. William J. Fallon, commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East. Fallon was forced to resign last month over differences with the White House. He has privately advocated a speedier drawdown in Iraq. . . .

"The White House has rejected congressional calls for Fallon to appear. Fallon will remain a Navy admiral for several months, and Democrats would like his views to be more widely known."

Steve Coll writes in the New Yorker about Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Richard A. Cody's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee last week: "In normal times, when an active four-star general implies in public that the Army is under such strain that it might flounder if an unexpected war broke out, or might require a draft to muster adequate troop levels, he could expect to provoke concern and comment from, say, the President of the United States. Some time ago, however, George W. Bush absolved himself of responsibility for his Iraq policy and its consequences by turning the war over to General David H. Petraeus. . . .

"To buy time in Iraq, Petraeus has lately argued within the Pentagon that the Army must buck up and accommodate his need for heavy troop deployments, despite the strains they are creating, and he has publicly fostered an unedifying debate about how to most accurately assess failure and success in Iraq, as if such an opaque and intractable civil conflict could be measured scientifically, like monetary supply or atmospheric pressure.

"There is, of course, empirical evidence of declining violence in Iraq, which has coincided with Petraeus's command. The additional troops he requested have certainly been a factor, but not even Petraeus can say how much of one. At best, during the past year he has helped to piece together a stalemate of heavily armed, bloodstained, conspiracy-minded, ambiguously motivated Iraqi militias. Nobody knows how long this gridlock will hold."

Coll concludes that "the Army is running on fumes, but Petraeus and his fellow surge advocates are driving flat out in Iraq, with no destination in sight."

Thom Shanker writes in the New York Times: "Army leaders are expressing increased alarm about the mental health of soldiers who would be sent back to the front again and again under plans that call for troop numbers to be sustained at high levels in Iraq for this year and beyond.

"Among combat troops sent to Iraq for the third or fourth time, more than one in four show signs of anxiety, depression or acute stress, according to an official Army survey of soldiers' mental health."

One result of the Petraeus Pause: "The percentage of troops sent back to Iraq for repeat deployments would have to increase in the months ahead."

Yochi J. Dreazen writes in the Wall Street Journal (subscription required) about Lt. Col. Gian Gentile, a history professor at West Point: "He argues that Gen. Petraeus's counterinsurgency tactics are getting too much credit for the improved situation in Iraq. Moreover, he argues, concentrating on such an approach is eroding the military's ability to wage large-scale conventional wars. . . .