What Are They Up To Now?

"Several members of Congress complained yesterday that the administration was too slow to share the intelligence and warned that it undermined future cooperation with the White House. . . .

"U.S. officials said the delay was necessary because they feared that any detailed public comment immediately after the Israeli raid could have provoked Syria to retaliate militarily. As time has passed, a senior intelligence official said, the administration concluded that the risk had decreased and disclosure might actually help sensitive negotiations with North Korea on dismantling its nuclear program."

Here, via the Arms Control Wonk blog, is the transcript of a detailed briefing held by senior officials yesterday, who spoke only on condition of anonymity. Here is the CIA video presentation.

David E. Sanger writes in the New York Times: "[A]fter a full day of briefing members of Congress, two senior intelligence officials acknowledged that the evidence had left them with no more than 'low confidence' that Syria was preparing to build a nuclear weapon. They said that there was no sign that Syria had built an operation to convert the spent fuel from the plant into weapons-grade plutonium, but that they had told President Bush last year that they could think of no other explanation for the reactor. . . .

"It is unclear how the Syrians planned to get the uranium they needed. Once they got it, the reactor would have had to run for roughly 18 months before the fuel was 'cooked.' And then to turn it into weapons-grade plutonium, it would require reprocessing, presumably outside the country unless Syria found a way to build its own plant."

As for U.S. involvement in the attack: "A senior administration official, briefing reporters with the help of the two senior intelligence officials, said for the first time that the White House had extensive discussions with Israel before the airstrike in September. The official said the White House had raised the possibility of confronting Syria with a demand that it dismantle the reactor or face the possibility of an attack.

"But that idea apparently never gained traction with the Israelis or some in the administration[my italics], and in the end, the official said, Israel cited satellite evidence to declare that the Syrian reactor constituted 'an existential threat' to Israel because it might soon be ready for operation. The senior administration official, who was a central player in Mr. Bush's deliberations, added that Israel's attack proceeded 'without a green light from us.'

"'None was asked for, none was given,' the official added."

As Sanger writes: "The crucial question now is how the North Koreans will react. Some officials said that they hoped the announcement would embarrass the North into admitting to nuclear proliferation activities, while others said it could prompt the North to walk away from the negotiating table -- and collapse the deal Mr. Bush was hoping to reach by the end of his presidency. In return for North Korea's declaration of all its nuclear activities, the United States would lift sanctions and begin to negotiate the North Koreans' reward for turning over their fuel and weapons."

Either way, "even some senior officials of the administration acknowledge that they are likely to leave Mr. Bush's successor with a North Korea with roughly 10 nuclear weapons or fuel for weapons, up from the one or two weapons it had when Mr. Bush took office in 2001."

Who Won?

Jonathan S. Landay writes for McClatchy Newspapers: "A senior State Department official said there was a debate in the administration over whether to release the intelligence.

"Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was among those opposing the release, said the official, who requested anonymity to discuss internal administration disputes. 'I don't think she saw the value of it' in pushing diplomacy to end North Korea's nuclear programs or advancing U.S. goals in the Middle East, he said.