Torture's Smoking Guns

Had they embarked on a serious inquiry into the legality, morality or even utility of torturing terror suspects, members of the Bush administration would have had no alternative but to conclude that what they were authorizing was illegal, unconscionable, and ineffective to boot. But soul-searching, evidently, was not a high priority.

The people closer to the operational level did, however, spend plenty of time making sure their asses were covered.

And the result is documentary evidence that perhaps some day will serve as Exhibit A that White House officials at the highest levels explicitly endorsed tactics that by any reasonable standard constituted torture, violated domestic and international law, and cast aside the respect for basic human dignity that has so long been central to our values as a country.

Joby Warrick writes in The Washington Post: "The Bush administration issued a pair of secret memos to the CIA in 2003 and 2004 that explicitly endorsed the agency's use of interrogation techniques such as waterboarding against al-Qaeda suspects -- documents prompted by worries among intelligence officials about a possible backlash if details of the program became public.

"The classified memos, which have not been previously disclosed, were requested by then-CIA Director George J. Tenet more than a year after the start of the secret interrogations, according to four administration and intelligence officials familiar with the documents. Although Justice Department lawyers, beginning in 2002, had signed off on the agency's interrogation methods, senior CIA officials were troubled that White House policymakers had never endorsed the program in writing. . . .

"As early as the spring of 2002, several White House officials, including then-national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and Vice President Cheney, were given individual briefings by Tenet and his deputies, the officials said. Rice, in a statement to congressional investigators last month, confirmed the briefings and acknowledged that the CIA director had pressed the White House for 'policy approval.'

"The repeated requests for a paper trail reflected growing worries within the CIA that the administration might later distance itself from key decisions about the handling of captured al-Qaeda leaders, former intelligence officials said."

"'The CIA believed then, and now, that the program was useful and helped save lives,' said a former senior intelligence official knowledgeable about the events. 'But in the agency's view, it was like this: "We don't want to continue unless you tell us in writing that it's not only legal but is the policy of the administration." '

"One administration official familiar with the meetings said the CIA made such a convincing case that no one questioned whether the methods were necessary to prevent further terrorist attacks. . . .

"But others who were present said Tenet seemed more interested in protecting his subordinates than in selling the administration on a policy that administration lawyers had already authorized."

Warrick notes what appears to be, at best, half-hearted pushback from some corners of the White House.

"Rice last month became the first Cabinet-level official to publicly confirm the White House's awareness of the program in its earliest phases. In written responses to questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee, Rice said Tenet's description of the agency's interrogation methods prompted her to investigate further to see whether the program violated U.S. laws or international treaties. . . .