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The Pariah President
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"U.S. officials are warning that if the talks remain stalled, there isn't an easy Plan B, such as a new U.N. Security Council resolution to replace the one that expires at year's end and now provides the legal mandate for American troops. . . .
"Iraq has been regarded as such a success story in recent months that many have forgotten that all the old cleavages still exist -- Sunni vs. Shiite, Kurd vs. Arab, regional autonomy vs. central government. With growing uncertainty about the future of U.S. forces in the country, these tensions are returning with a vengeance."
Mary Beth Sheridan writes in The Washington Post: "The Iraqi cabinet called Tuesday for reopening negotiations over a draft agreement to keep U.S. forces in this country beyond 2008, but U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates immediately expressed 'great reluctance' about more talks.
"The apparent stalemate comes just 10 weeks before the expiration of the United Nations mandate that authorizes the presence of the 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq. Without a new legal agreement, 'we basically stop doing anything' in the country, Gates told news service reporters in Washington."
Ned Parker and Saif Hameed write in the Los Angeles Times: "Only the country's Kurdish bloc is publicly backing the current accord, while Shiite Muslim and Sunni Arab allies of the U.S. remain wary of endorsing the draft, which had been described by Americans and Iraqis as in its final form."
Alissa J. Rubin and Katherine Zoepf write in the New York Times: "Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was traveling in Latvia, issued a stark warning to the Iraqis to think hard before rejecting the agreement. In some of the sharpest comments to date from the American side, he said that Iraqi Army and police forces would not be able to counter insurgent and terrorist violence after Dec. 31 without the help of the American military. The Iraqis, he said, 'will not be ready to provide for their own security.'"
Bruce Ackerman and Oona A. Hathaway write for Slate: "With the threat of an Iraqi parliamentary veto monopolizing the headlines, it is easy to forget that Bush is proposing to shut Congress entirely out of the process. He is claiming the unilateral right to commit the country to his agreement.
"This claim has no constitutional merit, as we've explained previously. It is particularly problematic when Americans will soon be choosing between two presidential candidates who have taken positions that are at odds with the Bush agreement. In claiming unilateral authority, a discredited administration is trying to secure its legacy by striking at the very heart of the democratic process--and, ironically, making the Iraqi government look more democratic than our own. . . .
"Only one thing is clear. The agreement is intended to make it harder for a potential Obama administration to carry through on its pledge to end combat operations within 16 months, not three years. This is hardly a move the Democratic majority in Congress would approve, precisely why the administration is refusing to recognize lawmakers' constitutional prerogatives."
Spencer Ackerman of the Washington Independent predicts: "When the definitive history of the Bush administration's prosecution of the Iraq war is written, its attempt to force the Iraqi government to sign a bilateral agreement authorizing an indefinite occupation will stand as its final massive blunder. . . .
"What happened? Most important, the administration again miscalculated the depth of Iraqi hostility to the occupation. It especially miscalculated the degree of pressure placed on Iraqi leaders by their people not to sign away the country's independence, especially with provincial elections set for next year.
"But as a matter of basic strategy, the administration didn't realize that it boxed itself in. By opting against renewing the U.N. Security Council mandate authorizing the occupation -- which will expire Dec. 31 -- it had no choice but to accept any deal by the time the mandate expires. . . .



