Selig Harrison
Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy
Friday, June 10, 2005
12:00 PM
Does North Korea have a unified policy toward the United States? As Kim Jong Il wields power, how is North Korea's nuclear program developing? What outcomes can we expect out of the six-party talks?
Selig Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy and a senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, just returned from North Korea, where he saw a factionalism in the nation's nuclear outlook. He was online Friday, June 10, at Noon ET to discuss a nuclear North Korea.
A transcript follows.
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Pasadena, Calif.: Do you think that even in private Kim Jong Il's advisers every disagree with him? Do you think any of them ever say to him, "I disagree" or "We have to look at this differently?" Everything I read about North Korea suggests that there isn't much diversity of expression, even at the highest reaches of its leadership.
Selig Harrison: I don't know the answer to this question but my impression is that Kim Il Sung did engage in give and take with his advisors. This was stated to me by one of these advisors, Hwang Chang Yop, who defected in 1997 and depicts Kim Jong Il as much less willing to entertain criticism and discussion than his father.
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Boston, Mass.: How receptive is the administration to the idea of a new freeze agreement like what Kang Sok Ju spoke about with you?
Selig Harrison: The administration is unwilling to consider a freeze and continues to insist on the complete North Korean dismantlement of all of its nuclear weapons capabilities as the first step in a denuclearization process.
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Washington, D.C.: Why does there seem to be so little concern about North Korean nuclear proliferation in other countries? I can understand why South Korea is worried about pressing things too far, but what is in it for the European countries to stick to buying off North Korea when everyone knows that the regime there will never adhere to such an agreement? Relatedly, is there any discussion in other countries regarding North Korean human rights abuses?
Selig Harrison: Both the countries of Northeast Asia and most members of the E.U. view the North Korean nuclear weapons program as a response to the Bush Administration's September 2002 National Security Doctrine affirming the U.S. right to pre-emptive military action where countries are perceived to pose a potential threat. North Korea wants nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the U.S., in this view, and both N. Korea's northeast Asian neighbors, with the exception of Japan, and the countries of the E.U. do not regard the potential acquisition of a nuclear capability by North Korea as a threat to them.
Regarding human rights, yes, there is considerable discussion in Europe, especially France, concerning N. Korea human rights abuses and this has slowed down the E.U. engagement approach to North Korea.
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Vancouver, Wash..: We know that any potential deal struck with North Korea through the six-party talks must be one which is absolutely and 100% verifiable from the viewpoint of the Bush administration, which means extensive, broad and intrusive inspections. The level of verification of the '94 Framework amounted to a few cameras and even fewer inspectors who were allowed access to a very limited area in one processing plant.
The intrusive inspections required by the Bush administration would be both a massive loss of face and absolutely out of the question for a North Korean regime which relies on secrecy, underground tunnels, and complete isolation in order to keep its grip on power.
Isn't it true that the 6-party talks do not in realistic terms have a single solitary chance of reaching a compromise which could satisfy both parties? And does that not mean that they are only a delaying tactic designed to give North Korea added time to develop more nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles with more range?
In essence, why is the United States participating in talks which they surely know cannot succeed and which only serve the purpose of the North Koreans? Is it all a dog-and-pony show to give their South Korean allies the impression of effort so that they can claim to have exhausted the diplomatic route before insisting on further economic sanctions or a blockade?
Selig Harrison: In my Washington Post Op-ed article published today, I presented my finding from my recent trip that North Korea is no longer willing to discuss a dismantlement of its nuclear capabilities until North Korea and the US normalize economic and political relations. The issue of verification will not arise until a denuclearization process is negotiated and at this stage the two sides are so distrustful that this is very unlikely in the foreseeable future.
It is certainly true that the longer the U.S. delays the normalization of relations with N. Korea, the more distant a nuclear settlement will be. I believe that N. Korea would be prepared to phase out its nuclear weapons program under adequate inspection if -- if - the U.S. moves toward complete normalization of economic and political relations comparable to those established with other communist states for many years despite differences in systems between the U.S. and these countries.
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Wheaton, Md.: What is the point of these talks? North Korea has already proven they will not honor any agreement and proceed with their nuclear program.
Selig Harrison: This question is based on inaccurate information. North Korea faithfully observed the inspection provisions of the 1994 nuclear freeze agreement and gave the full access stipulated in this agreement to both US arms control inspectors and IAEA inspectors. The Bush Administration alleges that North Korea has conducted a secret weapons-grade uranium enrichment program but this is yet to be proved and the administration's credibility has been greatly undermined by the distortion of intelligence relating to WMD in Iraq.
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Lyme, Conn.: There seems to be a campaign to portray the North Korean government as irrational. Do you perceive the North Korean government as acting rationally? If so, are the North Koreans officials aware of their image within our country, and, if so, do they care?
Selig Harrison: I believe that North Korea's perceptions of a security threat by the U.S. are rational based on the fact that the U.S. has staged a pre-emptive war in Iraq in order to achieve regime change. Regarding North Korea's perception of its image in other countries, the regime is very insular, with only a handful of officials who have had overseas exposure in-depth. However, the regime is beginning to understand the importance of public opinion in the west as evidenced by its decision to admit an ABC news team this week.
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Washington, D.C.: How secure can we be that North Korea isn't selling nuclear weapons to terrorists? It seems to me that's the biggest threat Kim Jong Il poses, as opposed to the possibility of him firing nukes at neighboring countries.
Selig Harrison: You are quite correct that North Korea's possession of reprocessed plutonium as a result of the abrogation of the 1994 nuclear freeze agreement has created the potential danger of the transfer of fissile material to third parties. North Korea has offered to negotiate a formal agreement barring such transfers but whether it would be possible to get a verifiable agreement with adequate inspections is questionable and yet to be tested by the Bush administration, which refuses to negotiate directly with North Korea.
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Annandale, Va.: How much control does China have over North Korea? Are they actually playing a more forceful role than they appear to be?
Selig Harrison: As explained in my Washington Post Op-Ed article published today, Koreans have historically resisted Chinese domination. China understands the sensitivity of its relationship with North Korea and the strength of Korean nationalism even if the U.S. does not. Moreover, China disagrees with the U.S. approach to a settlement with North Korea and would like to see the U.S. move toward the normalization of relations with North Korea and negotiate a freeze of the plutonium program at this stage, with more comprehensive denuclearization pursued in tandem with the movement to normalization.
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Monterey, Ca.: Time and again, the Bush administration has displayed an amazing inability to negotiate with anyone who disagrees with them -- let alone an outright adversary like North Korea. "My way or the highway" is pretty much their motto. So it was no surprise -- though it was still a shock -- when the Bush administration's first response to North Korea's request for direct talks was "there's no way were going to give them that...that's just what they want!"
This, along with provocative "Axis of Evil" name calling and unilateral abrogation of Arms Control treaties have, it seems to me, provided full justification for North Korea's heretofore paranoid response and only increased the tensions and likelihood for some kind of overreaction. Do you agree?
What are the reasonable intentions and legitimate demands of North Korea that are all but nullified by the black and white thinking of the current US "leadership?"
Selig Harrison: The provocations of the Bush Administration with respect to North Korea, especially the advocacy of regime change by the president himself in Bob Woodward's "Bush at War" have produced provocative responses by North Korea that have aggravated the atmosphere of distrust between the two countries.
As pointed out in my Washington Post Op-ed article today, North Korea is divided between hardliners and pragmatists. The pragmatists have been seeking since 1991 to promote a nuclear deal with the US in return for the full normalization of economic and political relations. This goal is certainly a legitimate and understandable goal for North Korea and the failure of the US to move toward normalization despite the extraordinary gesture of N. Korea in 1994 in freezing its nuclear program has strengthened the hardliners in North Korea and undermined the pragmatists. I don't think it's legitimate for North Korea to have violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to which it had been committed, but North Korea, like many other countries believes that the US has not fulfilled its part of the NPT bargain in Article 6 by joining with other nuclear powers in moving toward nuclear arms reductions.
It is certainly legitimate and understandable for North Korea to press for a peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice agreement that ended the Korean War and to seek an end to the U.S. economic sanctions that still remain in place 50 years after the end of the Korean War. The U.S. resists a peace treaty because it fears that this would accelerate pressures in South Korea for U.S. force withdrawals. It is a legitimate demand of nationalist forces both in North Korea and in the South to seek the end of the U.S. military presence in Korea. But I have advocated that the U.S. should link its withdrawal with North Korean arms control concessions that would remove its forward deployments that now pose a hypothetical threat to South Korea.
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Washington, D.C.: What is the current status of the Sunshine Policy? And how is that affecting the U.S. strategy towards South Korea and towards North Korea?
Selig Harrison: The Sunshine Policy is being actively pursued by the current South Korean president, Roh Moo Hyun, much to the displeasure of the Bush Administration which is seeking to restrain South Korean economic aid to North Korea. The most unfortunate example of the U.S. attitude is the effort to limit the movement of South Korean companies into the new Kaesong industrial zone in North Korea by pressing for the enforcement of export control restrictions that would prevent South Korean textile companies from using the most advanced computer technology.
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Winthrop, Ma.: Given Iraq and the long standing conflict with the USA, isn't in the best interests of Iran, N.K. and maybe Syria to develop Nukes if they believe they can get away with it? They all believe(at least the governments) that there systems of government are right and proper, and the U.S. is clearly the major potential threat to their existence by any rational judgment. So in context, developing nukes is the only rational and moral choice the leaders of these countries could make, baring a really high dollar offer by the West?
Selig Harrison: I do not believe that the development of nuclear weapons is in the best long-term interest of North Korea but as you say, it is understandable for North Korea to perceive a nuclear deterrent as necessary in the context of the present U.S. pre-emptive war policy. I do not believe that North Korea would be irrevocably committed to a nuclear weapons capability if the U.S. reversed course and moved toward the normalization of relations that Bill Clinton had envisaged. The development of militarily operational nuclear weapons by North Korea would stimulate nuclear weapons development in Japan and South Korea and is thus, highly undesirable for the U.S. and the countries of the region.
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Los Angeles, Ca.: What are your thoughts on economic strangulation? Why wouldn't that create a regime collapse?
Selig Harrison: The history of North Korea has conditioned the populace to accept great privation and I don't think a policy of "economic strangulation" would bring about a collapse. It would merely aggravate the human suffering that already exists in North Korea, partly as a result of the continuance of U.S. economic sanctions 50 years after the Korean War, and in part by the over-centralized and autarkic economic policies that the regime has only recently begun to modify. In addition, the North Korean leadership was revered under the late Kim Il Sung and his mystique continues to give the regime of his son widespread acceptance among the population. Comparisons with eastern Europe are invalid as a result of historical factors, powerful nationalistic feeling, accentuated by the perception of the U.S. threat, and by Confucian traditions that facilitate the acceptance of the regime's controls.
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Washington, D.C. How is it that you are able to travel to North Korea?
Selig Harrison: The late Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times and I became the first Americans to visit North Korea and to interview the late Kim Il Sung following the end of the Korean War in May, 1972. As a result of my interview with Kim Il Sung then and a subsequent interview with him in 1994, I am better known to the North Korean leadership than most other Americans and therefore receive more favorable consideration when I request a visit than others whom they do not know.
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Washington, D.C.: Has North Korea tested a nuclear device? If not, isn't it possible that they do not have the capability at this point to construct such a weapon? Is North Korean government is simply trying to extort aid?
Selig Harrison: No, North Korea has not conducted a nuclear test. On my April visit there, General Ri Chan Bok, the North Korean representative at Pan Mun Jom, told me that "we do not need to conduct one because our nuclear deterrent is already functional and we do not want to conduct one because of the fallout in neighboring countries." I would be surprised if they do conduct a test because it would aggravate an already difficult relationship with China.
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