"The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global"

Historian and commentator Fawaz Gerges was online Monday, Oct. 10, at 1 p.m. ET to discuss his book, "The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global," which examines the jihadist movement and al Qaeda's role within it.

Since September 11, "jihad" has become a common term associated with Islamic extremism and al Qaeda. But Gerges argues that al Qaeda and its global aims are actually in the minority within the jihadist movement, which primarily concentrates its efforts on the Muslim world. Why did Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda decide to focus on the West? Where is the concept of jihad headed in the coming years?

The transcript follows.

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Arlington, Va.: Very interesting book with a unique perspective that should help us understand more about the jihadist. I wanted to ask you if you have a clearance to access classified information and how would that have affected you understanding of the jihadist? Thank you.

Fawaz Gerges: No, I had no official clearance and I did not seek one. I wanted to understand Islamists and jihadists by talking to them and reading their discourse and manifestos. Moreover, I did not want to prejudice my own intellectual integrity by having contacts or links with any government agency. Of course, I read most governmental reports on Islamists and jihadists; but I do so as an independent scholar to enrich my understanding. Having a clearance would not have added much to my knowledge of Islamists. The bottom line is that I believe that researchers and scholars must maintain their intellectual integrity and independence and keep a healthy distance from the seats of power.

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Kyme, Conn.: Do you believe our invasion of Iraq has served to recruit more people to anti-American organizations, including terrorist groups, or do you believe the war in Iraq is helping to defeat terrorism?

Fawaz Gerges: The consensus among American, European and Arab intelligence services as well as independent scholars is that the American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq has increased the flow of recruits to militant organizations; Iraq has replaced Afghanistan as a recruiting tool and ground for jihadist action. I would go further and argue that the Iraq war has given Al Qaeda a new lease on life; it has supplied Al Qaeda with more ammunition to use in its war against the far enemy - the United States. The Iraq war has also radicalized mainstream Arab and Muslim public opinion and deepened anti-Americanism throughout the world, not just in Muslim lands. As a senior Al Qaeda operative put it, by invading Iraq the United States fell into our trap.

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Philadelphia, Pa.: Curt Weldon claims that terrorists groups, from Hammas to al Qaeda to Hezbollah, have unified into one superorganization. I should think it would be difficult to get groups with dissimilar specific goals to agree to work together. Is he correct and these groups have found a common cause and are working in coordination with one another?

Fawaz Gerges: One of the major arguments advanced in my book - The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global - is that there exists no jihadist superstructure, no unified Islamist front. The jihadist movement is splintered and fragmented along ideological, geographic, personality and social lines. In fact, I show that the 9/11 attacks cannot be understood except by appreciating the fissures and cleavages within the jihadist movement, particularly the divide between local jihadists and international jihadists. I spent a great of time and space showing how in the late 1990s Al Qaeda tried to hijack the jihadist movement and change its direction and destination. The overwhelming number of militants, local, as opposed to international, jihadists opposed the globalization of jihad and taking war to America. Since 9/11 the local-international divide among jihadists has become wider and deeper; now a bitter civil war is raging among jihadists and Islamists. The outcome of this civil war will likely determine the future prospects of international jihadists like Al Qaeda, which do not seem very promising. Neither Hamas nor Al Qaeda sees eye-to-eye on the dominant issues of the day; they possess differing interests and strategies.

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Philadelphia, Pa.: There is a tremendous amount of discussion about Al Qaeda trying to obtain nuclear weapons - if they succeeded, would they use them? Is Al Qaeda an apocalyptic terrorist group?

Fawaz Gerges: In the 1990s, Al Qaeda leadership was evenly split regarding the need to obtain nuclear and nonconventional weapons. According to an insider account by one of the theoreticians of Al Qaeda, bin Laden did not take side in this split and did not invest much capital in trying to acquire nuclear weapons, even though his defense minister, Abu Hafs, a hardliner, argued in favor of finding ways to acquire nuclear weapons. Abu Hafs and his men did not get too far.

Do I believe that Al Qaeda would like to obtain nuclear weapons? Of course, Al Qaeda would like to do so. The question is, will it be able to acquire or develop nuclear capabilities in light of the crippling military blows it has suffered since 9/11? At this point, it is unlikely, though it would be foolish to dismiss the possibility out of hand. And yes, I think that Al Qaeda could and would use noncoventional weapons if bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Zarqawi were to obtain them.

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Alexandria, Va.: Is the Lebanese group Hezbollah a jihadist organization?

Fawaz Gerges: This is a very good question.

In my book, The Far Enemy, I focus on the so-called Sunni-oriented, doctrinaire jihadis - those ideologues who have used violence against both their own governments (the near enemy) and Western targets (the far enemy. I did not examine the so-called irredentist jihadis, who struggle to redeem land considered to be part of the House of Islam from non-Muslim rule or occupation, like Palestinian Hamas and Jihad, and Lebanon's Hezbollah, or Party of God.

So yes, Hizbollah is an irredentist jihadist organization which differs ideologically from a doctrinaire jihadist group like Al Qaeda.

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Miami, Fla.: Mr. Gerges, you are a person of immense knowledge in this area of the world I believe the average American knows quite little about. Do you believe that there was a great deal of hubris amongst our political elites in invading a country (Iraq) that was now obviously not a threat to us and is now in fact a sort of testing ground if you will for would be jihaddist. Also in your honest unvarnished opinion what can we expect as an end result from this futile exercise.

Fawaz Gerges: Thanks for your kind words.

Now we know that there was no "operational" relationship between Al Qaeda and the Baathist regime in Baghdad. The Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, had nothing to do with 9/11.

We also know that Iraq did not possess nonconventional weapons.

These findings show that Iraq did not represent an imminent threat to the United States. If you compare the situation now to the pre-invasion one, a few conclusions come to mind:

A - Now a large terrorist base is being constructed in Iraq

B - Iraq is slowly and gradually becoming a recruiting tool for jihadist action

C - Iraq is the second most important theater for Al Qaeda

D - Iraq stands on the brink of a full sectarian strife

E - Tens of thousands of Iraqis and thousands of Americans have been killed

F - Is America more secure as a result of the invasion of Iraq?

G - Will the next generation of international jihadists come from Iraq?

H - Anti-Americanism has become hardened throughout the region and America's status and credibility have suffered considerably worldwide

I - There is a danger that the conflict in Iraq could spillover into neighboring oil-producing states like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait

On the positive side:

A - The Iraqi dictator is out of power

B - Iraqis are struggling to build a viable political process

C - In the next decade or so, Iraq could begin to recover from the current social and political upheaval and turmoil

A balance sheet: The risks are real that the American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq could have serious security repercussions on the United States, Iraq and its neighbors.

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Fairfax, Va.: I've been told by several Muslims that the extreme Muslim/terrorist culture only respect and respond to force - that to get rid of terrorists, we must show them harsh and swift force. Do you think that the way of fighting terrorist organizations, the way the U.S. has always said "let's sit down and talk" rather than fighting them the way they fight, by their rules, has fueled them?

Fawaz Gerges: In my book, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, I show the dominant responses to Al Qaeda by Islamists, local jihadists and Arab and Muslim public opinion. One of the major conclusions is that Al Qaeda was met with universal opposition and rejection by leading Islamists and Arab and Muslim public opinion makers.

I show how Al Qaeda was and is internally encircled, and how the Iraq war provided Al Qaeda with a new short lease on life. The most effective means to defeat Al Qaeda, once and for all, is to complete its internal encirclement and work with Muslim civil societies to hammer a deadly nail in its coffin. We are fighting the wrong war. Al Qaeda cannot be defeated on the battlefield because bin Laden does not field a conventional army that can vanquished. We must work with Muslims to isolate, undermine and expose the bankruptcy of bin Ladensim and militant jihadism in general.

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Munich, Germany: I've read recently that most of the 9/11 highjackers were from the underdeveloped and highly tribal parts of the Hijaz and Asir regions of Saudi Arabia, and that instead of being fanatical Wahhabis, they were actually opponents of the Al-Saud-Wahhab government, citing corruption and fraternization with infidels as criticisms.

Why then does the government of Saudi Arabia have such a difficult time in publicizing the growth and danger of Islamic terrorism?

Fawaz Gerges: Excellent question!

Many people do not realize that bin Ladenism represents a rupture and discontinuity with the traditional Wahhabi-royal family alliance. Historically, Salafism-Wahhabism allied itself with the ruling Saud family and Western states, including the United States. It is worth mentioning that in the 1980s the United States and the Saudi royal family assembled and financed a large army of Arab and Muslim volunteers and veterans in Afghanistan. Bin laden was Saudi Arabia's point man during the Afghan jihad.

The rupture within Salafism-Wahhabism occurred after 1991 following the American intervention in the Arabian Peninsula to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait. The royal family's decision to sanction the permanent stationing of U.S. troops in the kingdom enraged the religious sensibilities of many Salafis and Wahhabis like bin Laden and led them to rebel against both the House of Saud and its American "masters." American intervention in the Arabian Peninsula was the catalyst that set bin Laden and his radical Saudi cohorts on their current journey. Yet little is being said on the nuances and complexities of this journey.

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Fallbrook, Calif..: How much of this militant Muslim Population reaction is the result of the "Zionist Expansion" in to pre-1967 borders of Palestine by Israeli Squatters? And now the threat to the Muslims Sacred Mosque in Jerusalem?

Fawaz Gerges: Thank you for your question.

Palestine is a key to the whole story. Although bin Laden and his cohorts manipulate and exploit the Palestine question to their own political ends, Palestine resonates in the Arab and Muslim imagination. Resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will repair the broken bridges of trust between Muslims and Westerners, particularly Americans; it will also pull out the rug from underneath the feet of militants like Al Qaeda.

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Arlington, Va.: What are the parallels between the Al-Qaeda approach of fighting the far enemy in order to erode the support for the near enemy (i.e. Arab regimes and Israel) and Israel's (and implicitly America's) approach to fighting the far enemies (e.g. Iraq, Iran, etc.) in order to erode the support for the near enemy (i.e. Syria, Lebanon (through Hezbollah), and Palestine)? Has not Al-Qaeda undertaken and learned this approach from the West since it is not intrinsic to the Islamic Middle East?

Fawaz Gerges: Many thanks for all your critical questions. You have raised important points about the fault lines that exist between the United States and the Muslim world. These fault lines are driven by politics, economics, and geostrategic, not by culture and religion. Of course, bin Laden would like us to believe that the current unfolding struggle is civilizational and existential. But he does not speak for Islamists, let alone Muslims.

One of the conclusions reached in my book is that bin Laden and his cohorts' grand failure has not been on the field- battle; rather, their grand failure has to do with their inability to mobilize the ummah (Muslim community worldwide) behind their global jihad movement. Muslims have not joined Al Qaeda on masse; there is no swell of support for Al Qaeda among Muslims. It is this failure that gives all of us hope about the future relations between Muslims and Americans.

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washingtonpost.com: Thank you all for joining us today.

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