Iraqis Prepare For Vote on Constitution

Violence By Insurgents Escalates in Days Before Referendum

Dr. Bernard Finel, a professor of military strategy and operations at the National War College, was online Thursday, Oct. 13, at 1 p.m. ET to discuss insurgent violence in Iraq and the impact of the security situation on Saturday's referendum on the Constitution.

The transcript follows.

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Dr. Bernard Finel: Welcome all. I look forward to answering your questions over the next hour or so. I do need to mention, however, that all of my opinions are solely my own, and do not reflect the views or positions of the National War College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense. With that out of the way, on to the discussion.

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Harrisburg, Pa.: Insurgents are hearing rallying cries and are pouring into Iraq. The constitution is but one specific goal they hope to destroy. Is the effort to create a constitutional government in Iraq slowly stabilizing the country, making it less stable, or is this something that only time will tell?

Dr. Bernard Finel: Only time will tell. It depends on how the constitutional referendum turns out -- do Sunnis vote? If so, pro or con? Is there violence? Do the winter elections come off successfully? Do ideologues or compromisers dominate the new government? And so on.

I do think the Administration is correct in pointing out that violence on the eve of the referendum is probably temporary, though I do have concerns when this argument is spun around to claim that violence is actually a good thing, i.e. "Escalating violence shows that the extremists are getting nervous because the tide is turning against them."

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Annandale, Va.: How exactly does a piece of paper defeat an armed resistance? How is your track record on Iraq? Did you predict a vibrant insurgency, or were you with the Wolfowitz crowd?

Dr. Bernard Finel: It depends on how many people accept the legitimacy of that piece of paper. Ultimately, the insurgency will go on as long as there are Iraqis willing to kill and die to achieve their political goals. That is not a novel insight, of course, but the question is whether and how such things as constitutions and elections either serve to strengthen or weaken support for violence. And that will depend on both process issues -- is the system fair, transparent, responsive, etc -- and substance issues -- can the next government find ways to meet the concerns of the tacit supporters of violence and reduce and marginalize the actual perpetrators? So paper does nothing, but paper that sets in motion a process of political development can be helpful.

My record on Iraq is mixed. I supported the war, though in the end would have like to have given inspections a bit more time. I suspected that an insurgency might arise, but I though the Administration was correct in trying to go in light initially in order to avoid the impression of a massive occupation. That said, I do think the Bush Administration was much too slow in responding to escalating violence, and I think a much larger troop presence once it became clear that the security situation was problematic would have been helpful. So, I don't know, does that put me the "Wolfowitz crowd" or not?

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Annapolis, Md.: Hi-

Since the current language in the Iraqi constitution will empower provincial councils, thus reducing centralized power, does this increase or decrease the likelihood of civil war?

If the country splits into a Kurdish north, Sunni central, and Shiite south, and each group has a well armed militia, doesn't this create an environment in which civil war is unlikely?

Or is there an imbalance in the strength of each region in terms of defending itself?

Or, might civil war ensue because Iran would like to see the Sunni central disappear entirely?

Dr. Bernard Finel: The existence of well armed militias strikes me as adding significantly to the risk of out and out civil war. It is an unstable system. None of the players is likely to be able to defend a well-defined boundary. Offensive actions to disarm security threats and seize contested towns will create dynamics favorable to the use of force. So I think a stable, deterrence situation is unlikely to emerge. That said, it is not clear to me to what extent the Iraqi government might be able to encourage the militias to disarm ultimately when/if it can provide genuine and lasting security. So I think we'll have to see how this plays out.

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Virginia Beach, Va.: Dear Dr. Finel,

Even with the last minute changes in the draft constitution, it is pretty unclear how the Sunnis will achieve any sort of political relevance. They lack the population to win enough seats to veto or make changes, they lack the demographics to own majorities in critical oil producing provinces, and they appear to be the targets of a joint U.S.-Iranian campaign to marginalize their interests. Prince Faisel himself noted that it appears we have willingly surrendered Southern Iraq to the self-same Persians they fought a 10 year proxy war to stop (SCIRI and the Badr Brigades are little more than Iranian proxies).

Have we accepted an Iranian domination of the world's largest known oil reserves as a favorable outcome of the Iraq war?

Dr. Bernard Finel: I am not sure I agree with much of the premise here. Several issues. First, the Sunni have political relevance as long as the failure to meet their demands raise the specter of continued violence and civil war. Second, just because Iran may support certain groups, does not mean it controls or wholly owns those groups. There are dozens of cases in history of proxies ultimately following policies antithetical to those of their patrons. Third, in this particular case, the sort of indirect control by Iran you fear is likely to be quite weak simply because of the massive economic pressures of oil supply and demand. If you were a Iraqi Shiite, even if Iran had helped you, and even if you looked to Iran as a sponsor, would you be willing to, say, reduce production in order to aid Iran in trying to coerce the United Nations over its nuclear program? Maybe, maybe not.

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Manchester, U.K.: How will the U.S. view Iraq as an Islamic State? What relationship can it have with a nation which rules by Islamic Sharia?

We see that Iraq is not going to be a secular state. The Charter makes Islam a state religion. Is this the freedom we wanted to give to the Iraqi people? Then why don't we have same relations with Tehran? They have an Islamic constitution and an elected President?

Dr. Bernard Finel: Clearly the weakness of the secular parties is a disappointment to the Bush Administration. That said, as long as Iraq remains more-or-less democratic, I doubt the United States would have much problem in having a normal relationship with a country which rules by Sharia law. Iraq's treatment of women will not likely be worse than, say, Saudi Arabia's. And I don't think most Americans would be particularly inclined to be upset by a draconian criminal justice system if one is established. Frankly, those of you across the pond tend to be more touchy about how states do things domestically than Americans generally.

Iran is a different issue. The problem with Iran is not religion. This is a country and regime that (a) seized our embassy and has never properly apologized, (b) sponsors and supplies terrorists, and (c) is currently pursuing problematic policies in the nuclear arena.

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Arlington, Va.: If this constitution does not pass, what is the next step? Starting over on the draft? How long could the process take? Thank you.

Dr. Bernard Finel: I am not sure there is a clear answer. What I think we have to remember is that the constitution-drafting process and timing was not driven by Iraqi timetables, but rather by American concerns to make progress in order to stabilize the situation in order to potentially allow a reduced U.S. presence. So I suspect we'd see a complex interaction of Iraqi factional politics and American strategic calculus to determine next steps. I hope this does not come off as too cynical, but I doubt the Administration wants to go into next year's midterm elections in the U.S. without either a solid government in place in Iraq or some sort of light at the end of the tunnel for U.S. involvement (or at least U.S. casualties).

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Washington, D.C.: There is a wide range of opinion on when U.S. troops may begin withdrawing from Iraq. How is the training of Iraqi forces going? What impact have recent offensives in Western Iraq had on the insurgency, and on the security situation in Iraq?

Dr. Bernard Finel: The training of Iraqi forces is a complex, complex issue. It is quite common to see reports of X number of Iraqi battalions trained, or Y number performing below standards, and so on. Digging down to understand what all the means and implies takes a lot of assumptions. Clearly, there has been some success in recruiting and organizing significant numbers of Iraqi forces. There seems to be some success, as well, in creating units that are actually likely to show up for a fight with some skills in ground combat. The ability of Iraqi forces to mount sustained, coordinated operations with minimal American support, however, is limited. And the ability of Iraqi units to interoperate with American forces is limited as well. So, while Iraqi units are not ready for large-scale combat operations, they may well be getting to the point of being able to provide effective security in a wide variety of cases. Is that enough? Well, it depends on how deep the roots of the insurgency are. To the extent that the provision of basic security allows the U.S. to set in motion a process of withdrawal, one could easily see a virtuous cycle that improves the security situation. On the other hand, if support for the insurgency is not driven primarily by concern over the American "occupation," but rather by sectarian or other factional divides, then the Iraqi military might not be able to handle the situation, which would create a vicious cycle of disillusionment with the government and dragging out the U.S. commitment.

The recent offensives are necessary, of course. You cannot just let the insurgents take over towns or execute officials and do nothing. But they are temporary. The US lacks the troops to occupy all of Iraq effectively, and Iraqi forces are not really capable yet of acting alone. The result is that you can "clean out" an area of insurgents, but the minute you leave you effectively lose control. That is the nature of insurgencies. They are political, not primarily military, problems.

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West Palm Beach, Fla.: Dr. Finel,

My caveat is that I am a former Arabic linguist within DoD and my views do not reflect those of my former employer(s).

Here we have a land that for years has had three centers, one in the north, one in the center, and one in the south, with part of the latter being cut off by the British to form Kuwait and a source of oil supply for their dreadnoughts.

The British installed their king after the Ottomans left. He was murdered and then we had the Baathists take over.

At no time in the recent history of this land have the people sought an alternative democratic government to replace what they have.

Now we come along, invade their land, imprison their despot and try to force a democracy on them.

Regardless of the vote on Saturday, do you really believe that democracy, as we know it, has a chance to thrive in Iraq?

Dr. Bernard Finel: No country had a democracy prior to its first democracy. If having a history of democracy were necessary for democracy, no democracy would ever emerge. In this world, there are poor democracies and rich ones, multi-ethnic and homogeneous, large and small, religious and secular, etc. So does democracy have a chance to thrive in Iraq? I think so. Is it likely given the security situation, the factionalization, the apparent lack of any genuine unifying figure? Probably not. But Iraq's problem with democracy is in its circumstances today, not its history.

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McLean, Va.: Dr. Finel -- We all know how dangerous and misleading historical analogies can be, but try this one on for size. It seems to me that the comparison of Iraq to Vietnam is quite mindless, since the differences between the two situations far outweigh the surface similarities. But the real parallel which isn't mentioned very much is Lebanon -- we have separate religious communities, a constitution/political structure that encourages continued division rather than resolving those divisions, and covetous neighbors who may be interested in fighting their own internecine battles on Iraqi soil. What say you?

Dr. Bernard Finel: Maybe. But which Lebanon are we talking about? The pre-1975 Lebanon that was a commercial and cultural center? The civil-war era Lebanon? Or the current Lebanon, struggling to right itself? If the point of your analogy is that all of those are possible options, then yes, I think it is an interesting case to consider. If your point is that Iraq is doomed to collapse like Lebanon did in 1975, well, then I think the argument is too deterministic.

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Austin, Tex.: Have the War Colleges changed their curriculum to address the 21st Century Asymetric Warfare that we are experiencing in Iraq and Afghanistan? (As are other Nations in various theaters)

What are is the Military doing prepare and train or National Guard troops are being deployed to Iraq? (My cousin, a 40 year old construction worker and a Sargeant in the Kansas National Guard was called up last month for a one year tour in Iraq.)

Dr. Bernard Finel: Yes, they have. As you might imagine, this is an issue that preoccupies many of us in the military education community. Now, saying that the curriculum has changed does not mean we necessarily have it right.

The training of all American military units has changed pretty dramatically over the past decade. Even in the 1990s, it was clear that the United States was less likely than before to be involved in a straight-up fight against a comparably armed peer competitor. So, today's training tends to focus on complex environments, which include civilians, NGOs, media, and allies of various capabilities. Our problems come not from a lack of effective training at the tactical and operation level, but rather from the difficult of integrating tactical and operational skill with strategic plans in the context of a difficult security environment. In short, our troop are well trained and led, but there is only so much you can accomplish with military force in places like Iraq (or Afghanistan for that matter).

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Elsinore, Denmark: With all the caveats in the questions and answers, I feel I must add that I failed to refer to French toast as "Freedom Toast" in the run up to the war.

But more seriously, do you think that the U.S. actions during and after the war have done any lasting damage to relationships with our allies in Europe or will the various governments in question move past the current disputes and be able to respond to mutual challenges collectively?

Dr. Bernard Finel: I don't know. Since you are in Europe, you tell me.

Just kidding. I don't think we have done any lasting damage to our relationships, unless somehow the Bush Administration's rather unique notion of what constitutes diplomacy becomes the norm for the United States. Not to be too blunt about this, but the Administration greatest failure, in my opinion, has been its tendency to judge every issue individually on its merits. Now, that may seem like a principled way of doing things, but in the final analysis you can't get your way on everything and trying to do so compromises your foreign policy. So yes, the Kyoto Accords were pointless and probably economically costly, but we could have thrown our European allies a bone on that one in exchange for greater support on Iraq perhaps?

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Anonymous: Dr. Finel, Thank you for your insight today. I keep seeing small bits of media reporting small-level talks or at least the attempts to negotiate between the insurgents and the U.S.

Is there any truth to these efforts and if so, how could they possibly play out without damaging each respective party's cause?

Dr. Bernard Finel: I don't know anything more than appears in the press on this issue (and if I did, I probably could not tell you about it anyway). But that said, one would hope that there was at least some attempt to reach out to groups whose behavior you might hope to modify. Is there any point in talking to al Qaeda in Iraq? Probably not. They are implacable and we ought not give them legitimate by talking to them. But if you can find a group that has some legitimate grievance, then I think you have to seek to separate them from the rest of the insurgents and find a way to give them a seat at the table. I am sure there are some Iraqi groups that want nothing more than the U.S. to leave. Well, the U.S. wants to leave ultimately. So why not talk about how we might work together to achieve that shared goal.

My understanding however, is that the potential for all of this is quite limited. Ultimately, it will be up to the Iraqis themselves to try to bring about some sort of reconciliation.

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Sparta, N.J.: You say that Iran "is a country and regime that (a) seized our embassy and has never properly apologized"

Just curious, but has the U.S. ever "properly apologized" for launching the 1953 coup that brought the Shah's father back to power in Iran. And putting a whole country under a dictatorship seems to me a just a tad more likely to upset them than holding a few hundred people hostage.

Yes, that's 50 years old, but the hostage crisis is 25 years old. Or are only Americans allowed to have long memories?

Dr. Bernard Finel: I wasn't actually making a normative judgment. I was just suggesting that our current problems with Iran have little to do with being a religious state, and much to do with history and recent events.

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Vienna, Va.: Dr. Finel,

There is little coverage of the views of the Turks on the emergence of a semi-autonomous Kudish state and a weak Shiite dominate Iraq. Given the long term internal Turkish problems with the PKK, will Ankara continue to remain uninvolved in Iraq or will there be either covert or overt Turkish reaction especially if Iran or Syria increasingly become players? Bottom line, over the long term can we see Turkish involvement in Iraq?

Dr. Bernard Finel: Yes. I think that is right, which is why, interestingly, we have an incentive to work with the Sunnis in supporting a united Iraq, despite the fact that the Sunnis are largely the folks supporting the insurgency.

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McLean, Va.: How could the U.S. leave Iraq without causing civil war or a terrorist haven?

Dr. Bernard Finel: "causing civil war or a terrorist haven"? I don't know that I accept the causal argument here. It is likely that one of those options would result from a rapid U.S. withdrawal? Yes, perhaps. Would we have "caused" it? Only indirectly. In 2003, we went to war to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. (We had other reasons too, but that was a biggie.) As it turns out, he didn't have them. We got that wrong, but in the end, all we caused was the collapse of Saddam's regime. That was a good outcome. The guy was a criminal. At this point, the question is, are U.S. interests best served by a continued, indefinite presence in Iraq? Or might we be better off starting to withdraw and trying to mitigate the problematic consequences? I really don't know that answer, but I think that stating the problem as pulling out = causing terrorism is problematic.

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Dr. Bernard Finel: Okay everyone, we have to end now. Great questions throughout. I enjoyed chatting with all of you and I hope my answers were worth your time (even with all the caveats and qualifications).

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