Transcript

Sunni-Shiite Conflicts Spread Through Arab World

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Anthony Shadid
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, February 12, 2007; 12:00 PM

Beirut-based Washington Post reporter Anthony Shadid was online Monday, Feb. 12 at noon ET to examine the Arab world's spreading Sunni-Shiite conflicts, the increasing tension about them in the region's more stable nations and their basis in and impact on U.S.-Mideast policy.

Across Arab World, a Widening Rift (Post, Feb. 12)

The transcript follows.

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Anthony Shadid: Good afternoon. It's a pleasure to join you all. I see there are a lot of questions already here, so I'll go ahead and get started. It's probably going to be tough to answer each one, but I appreciate everyone taking the time to write.

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Anycity, Smalltown: If geography and my living there serves me correctly, Egypt, and Egyptians are not Arabs -- they are Northern Africans. They will be quick to tell you this as well. Speaking Arabic does not make one an Arab. No wonder many people consider this publication a rag. Now I truly know why. More fodder for the bird cage.

Anthony Shadid: Identity is, of course, a fluid thing -- often felt differently by Coptic Christians and Muslims -- but I think most Egyptians would disagree with you. Cairo would be an odd place to headquarter the Arab League, too, if that was the case.

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Washington, D.C.: Anthony, mabrouk as always on an informative story. As someone who has lived in Egypt, I agree with you anti-Shiism does not really resonate with most people. So the question is: what accounts for the modest amount of hostility/fear that you encountered in your reporting? Do the regime and its press organs have that much power to sow dissension where hardly any existed before?

Anthony Shadid: I do think that, as you put it, the regime and press organs are playing a role. I was struck in the reporting by how political this conflict is and, in some ways, convenient to regional political aims -- as a way to confront Iran, as a way for countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia to reassert themselves, as a way for the United States to build an ostensibly Sunni Arab alliance of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Of course, when this stuff hits the streets, it can take on a more instinctual feeling, and I think Egyptians' lack of contact with Shiites sometimes increases the misunderstanding.

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Fairfax Station, Va.: Marhaba Anthony. I was based in Beirut in the early-mid seventies and then 1980-81 again. I unfortunately saw the destruction of a major part of the "Paris of the Middle East" from the sectarian violence and eventual civil war. While the Beirut situation had many complexities as well, how much of it was related to Sunni-Shia, and although Beirut took on the external perception of Christian vs. Muslim could it have been the modern day beginning of the sectarian violence between the sects? Thanks for your insights.

Anthony Shadid: The conflict these days in Lebanon is rarely Christian-Muslim. Many Christians are divided between supporters and opponents of Hezbollah. In fact, to a really remarkable degree, it's become a Sunni-Shiite feud, although again, these sectarian differences fall into a very political polarization. In that, the differences become a convenient tool for the leaderships fighting the battle. Everyone plays the sectarian card here, but I'm struck at the degree to which government supporters are betting on the restraint of Hezbollah fed by its fear of a sectarian civil war. They won't say it publicly, but it is talked about.

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Atlanta: Do you think the Shia-Sunni conflict is more political than religious?

Anthony Shadid: Yes, I do. In some ways, you could argue this is one of the most visible manifestations of the war in Iraq.

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Annapolis, Md.: Fred Kaplan recently published an analysis at Slate.com in which he posited the theory that the Bush administration has been promoting a regional Sunni-Shiite rivalry. Here's an excerpt:

"Thus was sparked the latest U.S. strategy of herding the Sunni Arab states (especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan) into an alliance against the growing Shiite threat (Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah)."

What do you think of Fred Kaplan's analysis? Is the Bush administration trying to fan the flames of the Sunni-Shiite rivalry across the entire Middle East?

washingtonpost.com: The Bush administration's cockeyed strategy to promote Sunni-Shiite conflict (Slate, Feb. 4)

Anthony Shadid: I read the piece quickly, but I remember agreeing with it. And I think this point has been openly talked about by the administration. Again, I'm writing off the cuff here, but I believe my colleague, David Ignatius, explored it as well. This goes back to my point that this remains a conflict shaped fundamentally by politics, often opportunistic. The problem, of course, are the long-term implications, and I think that's what unsettles so many people here. I believe I mentioned in the piece an Egyptian columnist warning of "a sectarian holocaust." I'm not sure how you'd define that, but the fears in the region of this conflict getting out of hand are very real. And, time and again, I hear people telling me that while they dismissed the idea of a sectarian divide even a few years ago, they've had to rethink it lately

washingtonpost.com: Rice's Strategic Reset (Post, Jan. 26)

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Washington, D.C.: Isn't it indeed in the best interests of the U.S. for this rift to happen? I'd rather al-Qaeda attack Shiites than the U.S.

Anthony Shadid: It's hard to see your point here. We're dealing with a region facing the prospect of three civil wars, two very sectarian in nature. Untold numbers of innocents are dying in Iraq. A confrontation looms with Iran, with repercussions potentially felt from Afghanistan to Lebanon, and American standing in the Middle East is at its lowest point in perhaps a generation. Apart from very real humanitarian considerations, it's hard to see how that scale of conflict is in the interest of anyone.

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New York: Back in April of 2003 Phebe Marr stated: "There really isn't traditional enmity or hostility between Sunni and Shiite communities in Iraq. They have coexisted for time immemorial in Iraq." To what extent is the current hostility between Sunnis and Shiis in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East an unintended byproduct of U.S. policies?

Anthony Shadid: I want to be careful not to understate sectarian divisions in Iraq (or, for that matter, elsewhere) that preceded the war. In the Arab parts of the country, the Shiites suffered unrelenting horrors, particularly after the 1991 uprising. Those sectarian divides, while sometimes subsumed in more political ideologies, did color politics there. I think what strikes me, though, is that in Iraq and, to a lesser degree, Lebanon, the social fabric is being torn apart. The lines that separate the sects are hardening. Intermarriage, for instance, was common in prewar Iraq. A question of one's sect was often impolite. In Lebanon, a former prime minister converted, very briefly, to win a better inheritance for his daughters. I see the sectarian divide playing out most spectacularly on that level, feeding prejudices and stereotypes that, while long there, were rarely pronounced with the ardor that you hear today.

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Great Crossings, Ky.: Would withdrawing the majority of U.S. troops to a standby position in Kuwait and sending the remainder to bolster efforts in Afghanistan really make the situation in Iraq any worse? It seems as though the Sunni-Shia sectarian violence could not get much worse. With our troops in position to stop outside intervention from other regional players, we could focus on stopping al-Qaeda and the Taliban on their home turf while allowing the inevitable outcome to develop in Iraq.

Anthony Shadid: As I read this, I realized that I just don't know the answers to a lot of the questions people are sending in. What would happen if the Americans withdrew? I don't know, although it's hard for me to see a long-term reconciliation in Iraq as long as the U.S. military is present. I may be wrong. Could the violence get worse there? It certainly could, probably much worse.

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Philadelphia: How much of the Sunni-Shia acrimony in Iraq do you attribute to British colonialists' cultivation of Sunnis as a collaborative elite, and how much to earlier historical factors? I tremendously respect your work. You're among my very favorite foreign correspondents, and your insights are particularly valuable because of the geopolitical salience of the Middle East.

Anthony Shadid: Thank you for the kind words. I think your question goes back to the one I was discussing earlier. There is no question that Sunni Arabs, particularly an urban elite, were in control of the military and state apparatus in Baghdad when the British left. But again, to define it solely in sectarian terms would be a mistake, as well. Ideologies -- from the left to Arab nationalists -- often crossed sectarian lines. And I think only now do we see politics almost exclusively defined in Iraq around a sectarian axis. But as I said earlier, too, I think the most devastating impact is how this conflict is playing out on a social level. Politics are notorious for deals. Reconciling the more social elements may prove much more difficult.

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Lusby, Md.: On the whole, do you think the Shia are treated equally with Sunnis in the Muslim world?

Anthony Shadid: No, I don't. I think there's a remarkable degree of misunderstanding out there, and in places like Lebanon, Shia are still the victims of chauvinism, much of it driven by perceptions that they remain part of a lower economic class.

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Princeton, N.J.: Let me point out that in a similar situation in Vietnam, most of the predictions as to what would happen if our troops were withdrawn were dead wrong -- see The Domino Theory. The correct question is, however, can we do anything to change the outcome, or more precisely, do we have the faintest idea of how any of our actions affect the outcome?

Anthony Shadid: You make a perfectly valid point. And I myself would hesitate to make a prediction. I think one of the great legacies of the war in Iraq -- beyond the breathtaking loss of life there -- are the unintended consequences of the U.S. invasion itself. Today's story speaks to one of them. The situation in Iraq speaks to many others.

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Washington, D.C.: Saudi Role and the Shia Crescent. Isn't one of the big reasons for Saudis to take an active role -- not only in Palestine but the region -- their fear of a geographic crescent surrounding them with heavy Iranian (Shia) influence? I don't think we should look at this as a U.S. conspiracy to create a sectarian divide.

Anthony Shadid: I think you're right, and I think recent Saudi assertiveness in not only Palestine but also Lebanon could be read that way. But the United States benefits from a Sunni Arab alliance that feels, to some degree, threatened by the ascendance of a Shiite Iran and the power of its allies in the region. This isn't a local phenomenon. The region is locked in a proxy battle for influence between the United States and Iran, and these divisions are intertwined with it.

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Re: Could things in Iraq get worse?: Maybe they could get better? Or is that impossible?

Anthony Shadid: I really don't know, and I haven't been there since October. But during that time, I was stunned by the sheer magnitude and the multiple layers of the conflict and the seeming inability -- or lack of desire -- by the parties, all parties, to end it.

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Bethesda, Md.: Dear Mr. Shadid: Thank you for this and your other excellent articles on the Arab and Muslim world. I have a comment and a question. I recall in 2002 it seemed ominously obvious that we were going to invade Iraq. There were many forces both ideological and political designed to make Bush a "wartime president" well past the Afghan invasion, and this card was played right through the 2004 election. We now learn that a separate office in DOD created "intelligence" to suit a preconceived notion about a link between Saddam and al-Qaeda that didn't exist. As you know, Cheney has insisted that a Prague meeting took place between Iraqi intelligence and Mohammed Atta. I was stunned and furious with Cheney's response when asked recently about the lack of evidence of that such a meeting ever took place when he said: "I haven't seen any evidence that the meeting didn't take place" In other words, prove that something didn't happen! He says he believes and insists it did happen even though there is no proof of it! This and all the stories they planted in the New York Times and Weekly Standard and other papers about WMD and then conveniently and assuredly state that "so and so is reporting" to make it sound independent and accurate.

Now, I see some of the same warning signs there with regard to Iran. The Iraq invasion has been a disaster for most Iraqis and for our standing in the world. What is happening here? Do Arab leaders believe we're planning to attack Iran? Is this something they privately desire and know that only this president will likely do? Thank you very much. Keep up the good work.

Anthony Shadid: Thanks for the kind words. I have to say, there is a deep sense in the region that a conflict with Iran is looming. It's often said with a sense of inevitability, that the decision is in either the hands of the United States or Israel. What seems most powerfully felt is the worry over what the repercussions of that conflict would be. I mentioned that in an earlier discussion, but I think it's clear to most people in the Middle East that an outbreak of hostilities would not be confined to Iran.

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Chicago: Great article, but it was depressing to read the common perception that the U.S. and Israel (and Britain and the West, etc.) must be causing this strife because they are the ones to benefit from it. That type of reverse logic seems so prevalent in the Middle East. It must be crushing. Do you agree? How can we change that mindset?

Anthony Shadid: I think the United States and Israel do have a stake in what's happening. When it comes to the United States and Israel, arguments in the Arab world are sometimes overly reductionist, and sometimes take the place of critical analysis. But both countries have what they perceive as their interests in the region, and those interests are very much shaped by the direction and depth of the sectarian divide and its implications.

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Laurel, Md.: Who, if anyone, would be a good, impartial, and respected peace-broker who could help quell the Sunni-Shiite strife going on in Iraq right now?

Anthony Shadid: That's a good question, and I really don't know the answer.

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St. Mary's City, Md.: What would be the benefits and drawbacks of letting the Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq form separate countries? My understanding is that Britain and France lumped the two populations together after World War I, like they did in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

Anthony Shadid: I know that's often said -- that Iraq is a colonial creation -- but I think that glosses over the historical presence of a region known as Iraq that long predates British control. Again, I think partition is an easy answer that's very, very difficult to see working. The sectarian conflict is perhaps the greatest there now. But there remains struggles between Shiite militias and between factions in Anbar. Baghdad, while increasingly segregated, remains a city with occasionally blurred borders. Where would the lines be drawn in Diyala Province or south of Baghdad? Who knows what would happen if there was an attempt to do it, but my sense is that more borders would probably lead to even more bloodshed.

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College Park, Md.: Have you seen any examples from any Sunni Arab political or religious leaders to reach out to the Shia community in hopes of strengthening unity?

Anthony Shadid: There are a lot of attempts by figures in each community to reach out, often offset by particularly harsh statements that come in between. Some of the Saudi clerics have been pretty inflammatory in this regard. I do think there is a growing awareness and fear of where this is headed, and these attempts at reconciliation might pick up. But again, as a fundamentally political dispute built on more traditional rivalries, it will be shaped by whatever deal, or lack of a deal, results.

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Anthony Shadid: I want to thank everyone for their time. I didn't get to all the questions. Sorry about that. But I look forward to doing this again soon.

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