Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Associate Editor
Tuesday, May 15, 2007
1:00 PM
Readers joined Post associate editor
Defense Skirts State in Reviving Iraqi Industry (Post, May 14)
The transcript follows.
More coverage of The War Over the War | War Over the War discussion transcripts
Chandrasekaran, the author of " Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone," is spending this year on a special assignment focused on chronicling U.S. government efforts to stabilize Iraq.
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Rajiv Chandrasekaran: Hello everyone. Back again for our weekly War Over The War chat. Thanks for all the questions you've submitted. I'll start answering...
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Richmond, Va.: Did you have an opportunity to read the Opinion piece by L. Paul Bremer in this Sunday's Washington Post Outlook, and the associated chat he hosted yesterday? What did you think of his defense of the decisions to disband the Iraqi Army (or as he puts it, not recall the Iraqi Army after it self-disbanded) and to undertake De-Baathification of the government?
washingtonpost.com: What We got Right in Iraq (Post, May 13) | Discussion Transcript: L. Paul Bremer Punches Back at Iraq Critics (washingtonpost.com, May 14)
Rajiv Chandrasekaran: I did. I'm an Iraq junkie and I'm especially interested in all that Bremer has to say.
At the same time, I don't want to get into a back-and-forth with him. I do think it's good for everyone to hear his point of view. The Iraq policy discussion is too often boiled down into a black-and-white debate when it's really all about shades of gray, about tradeoffs between a bad decision and a less-bad decision.
As many of you know, there are strong counter-arguments to what Bremer stated in his Outlook piece and in his chat yesterday. I try to capture them in my book.
In short, however, I think that a significant number of officers from the old army would have reported for duty had they been summoned. Not all of them should have received positions in the new military -- they would have had to be screened first -- but they all could have been registered and paid stipends. It would have been seen by Iraqis as a more honorable way of treating them than what the Coalition Provisional Authority did.
On de-Baathification, I think it's telling that many senior Iraqi and U.S. government officials recognize that elements of Bremer's order need to be revised.
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Springfield, Va.: Mr. Chandrasekaran, I'd be interested in your assessment of Paul Bremer's assertions in his op-ed piece and his online chat yesterday -- particularly his assertion that there were at least 100 highly qualified top-level officials on the CPA team in Iraq, but also his other self-justifications.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran: See the above answer.
As for the list of 100 officials, it's worth understanding who they are beyond Bremer's one-line description of them. Just because someone is listed as a Defense Department employee doesn't mean he or she was the best-qualified person to do the job.
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Bethesda, Md.: I feel that the main problem of the current Iraqi government is the fact that it doesn't generate any deep support in the country. For the government to make progress on the issues facing Iraq, issues like going after militias or negotiating an oil-sharing law, it's going to need deep support to make perhaps unpopular decisions. But lacking deep support, I just don't feel that the government is going to be able to make progress.
Right now, the only people I see in the country that have a deep level of popularity among their constituents are the Iraqi religious politicians. I'm convinced that if we want anything to get done, sooner or later we'll have to hand the country over to them. Your thoughts? The current government lacks legitimacy. People may have voted for the parties in power, but I don't think they feel particularly strongly towards them.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran: I agree that the lack of legitimacy is a very significant problem for Iraqi political leaders. If members of the government were held in higher esteem among their respective factions in society, those leaders would be able to convince their supporters to accept difficult compromises. Instead, just the opposite is happening: Political leaders are pandering to their constituencies. The problem is particularly acute among Sunni Arabs. Imagine what sort of progress we might see on elements of national reconciliation if only there were Sunni Arab politicians who had any sway with their community, but unfortunately Iraq's Sunni Arab community is so diverse, so riven by rivalries, that nobody has risen above the fray. On the Shiite side, the only leaders with any stature, as you point out, are religious ones. But simply handing power over to them neglects the interests of the millions of less-religious Shiites.
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Gulf Shores, Ala.: Isn't there anyone in Iraq who has some authority and wants the killing to stop? It is hard for me to believe that with all the civilian deaths, Iraqis themselves are not outraged. Do you think that the uprising between the various factions would have happened if, after the fall of Baghdad, we had handed the Iraqis the country and left?
Rajiv Chandrasekaran: I don't think the killing will stop until both sides recognize that their perceived strength is not commensurate with their actual strength. There are still many Sunni Arab extremists who believe they will be able to reclaim power through violence; and there are still many Shiite Arabs who think they can eliminate, or at least permanently neuter, the Sunnis. Until both sides recognize that they have to find an accommodation with the other, the killing won't stop.
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Richmond, Va.: Any updates on the search for a "War Czar" by the Bush administration?
Rajiv Chandrasekaran: None that I've heard of, but I haven't been poking around on this front. You should ask Peter Baker or Mike Abramowitz when they participate in the next Post Politics Hour.
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Boston: I thought back to your article about State/Defense conflicts in Iraq when I was reading David Ignatius' piece about Admiral Fallon meeting with top Sunni and Shiite government officials in a push for reconciliation. Why do we think a military leader has the political capabilities to solve problems of political reconciliation? Why are we now seeming to rely on General Petraeus's assessment in September of the military surge as a critical checkpoint for our continued presence in Iraq when the root problem is political reconciliation? Do we honestly think a military commander has it in his DNA to ever call for a reduction in forces in the face of violence that even Bush admits will never go away at some level?
The Dems should not allow themselves (and the country) to be fall into this "September assessment" trap. Instead, they should say Petraeus is a fine military man and we appreciate his views on military matters, but this is a political problem that only Iraqis can solve. Otherwise, this farce of a debate will continue with no end in sight while more U.S. troops die in what really is a defensive posture instead of focusing them purely on offensive action against al-Qaeda. Do you agree with the idea of a "September assessment" trap?
washingtonpost.com: Running Out of Time in Iraq (Post, May 15)
Rajiv Chandrasekaran: I don't think the assessment that both Democrats and Republicans plan to make in September will be focused solely on Gen. Petraeus's views of the progress of the Baghdad security plan. I believe members of Congress and others in Washington, on both sides of the aisle, will look at the situation more broadly. They will look, perhaps most significantly, at what progress, if any, Iraq has made with political reconciliation. Remember, the troop surge was designed to facilitate political compromise. If that doesn't happen, any incremental security improvements on the streets of Baghdad won't really matter in the long run.
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Chiapas, Mexico: Sir, what is your perspective on what happened to water reconstruction in Iraq? CNN reports $2 billion was allocated for clean water but got diverted to security. Many are now sick for lack of clean water. Thank you for your opinion.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran: The U.S. government has spent more than $1 billion on providing clean water and sewage systems in Iraq. The exact figure can be found on the Web site of the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction.
Some money has been diverted from providing clean water to improving security, but I am not sure exactly how much.
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Juneau, Alaska: Hi Rajiv -- to what degree has the war in Iraq radicalized the Mideast Muslim population? How much of a boon has it been for recruitment of al-Qaeda-type organizations?
Rajiv Chandrasekaran: I believe that significant numbers of Muslims across the Middle East have been radicalized by the war in Iraq. How many and just how radicalized, I cannot say with certainty, and I doubt anyone can. But it is worth noting that thousands of Arabs have traveled to Iraq to fight U.S. forces in the past four years.
In my conversations with non-Iraqi Arabs, the conflict in Iraq angers many of them even more than the situation in the Holy Land.
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Houston: The Vice President recently stated that being in Iraq is vitally important to protect American safety and interests. He also stated (as did the president) that we will leave immediately if requested by the Iraqi parliament. How do we reconcile those statements?
Rajiv Chandrasekaran: It seems that the vice president and the president believe -- as do many others -- that the Iraqi parliament will not vote to ask U.S. forces to leave anytime soon. Yes, there are some members who are circulating a bill to do so, but I don't think it will generate the critical mass necessary for passage. Remember, many Sunni Arabs want the Americans to stay because they're worried about Shiite militias. The mainstream Shiite parties want us to stay because we're helping to go after Sunni extremists -- and we're helping to protect the Shiite leaders. And the Kurds want us to stay too.
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Chicago: Who is a greater threat to the stability of the Iraqi government, al-Qaeda or the Shiite militias -- backed by the two of the most powerful parties in the Iraq Government, mainly SCIRI's and Sadr's blocs? Could al-Qaeda actually take over the country? Because most supporters of the War make it seem like the militias are a minor problem, when the generals on the ground repeatedly say the exact opposite. Isn't the stated goal of the "surge" to give the sides breathing space to make political decisions? Where does al-Qaeda fit in the process? Is that just a tactic to confuse everyone?
Rajiv Chandrasekaran: Both entities are a threat to stability, and what makes finding compromise difficult is that both sides -- al-Qaeda in particular -- are so extremist that it's hard to envision a peaceful compromise. There is another common factor: Both sides are fractured and diverse. There's no single al-Qaeda commander in Iraq to which every militant is loyal. Same goes for the militias, although there is far more command-and-control with the Badr organization. If there is to be peace in Iraq, extremists on both sides have to be offered a chance to put down their weapons and receive some sort of emolument -- a job, a payout, etc. Those who opt not to compromise will have to be targeted by the Iraqi government's security forces.
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Mt. Lebanon, Pa.: Sitting here reading you and "Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam - or how NOT to learn from the past." You're too young for the Vietnam discussion, but aren't you curious? Maybe our country has been over this ground before -- and perhaps it's our manifest destiny to refuse to learn from history. Thanks much from a Vietnam-era draftee/veteran.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran: I am curious and I've been trying to read as much as I can on Vietnam. There are similarities, but there are also key differences. If Iraq slips into a full-blown civil war that engulfs its neighbors, I think the consequences for the United States -- and the world at large -- will be far more significant that South Vietnam falling to the North.
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Bethesda, Md.: Did some secret message go out to the architects of the Iraq war and occupation that now was the time to rehab their images? Perle was making the rounds a week or so ago, and now Bremer with his version of "everything I wanted or did was a good idea -- it's just everyone else who screwed things up." Personally, I find it extremely distasteful that these efforts started while we are still in the middle of the mess they created.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran: I think this current round of self-justification is a reaction to the George Tenet book. We'll see more of it as other administration insiders write their own accounts of history.
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Chicago: One hears a lot of criticism for al-Maliki, but do you think the U.S. actually could get rid of him and supplant another Prime Minister? Or have events and the ability of the U.S. to effect change passed them by?
Rajiv Chandrasekaran: It's hard to see how the United States could engineer a parliamentary coup without having Maliki's successor tagged as an American lackey, which would fundamentally illegitimize him in the eyes of his countrymen.
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West Orange, N.J.: Exactly what legal or fiscal provision do the Sunnis want that the Shia refuse to give? Is it a single-digit difference in the share of oil revenues, or is it tantamount to giving Sunnis parity or majority control? Is agreement now closer or further than six months ago?
Rajiv Chandrasekaran: It's not just oil revenue, although that's a big part of it. The Sunnis also want a rollback of de-Baathification provisions; they want thousands of Sunnis released from detention; they want more positions in Maliki's cabinet; and they want a rewrite of the constitution to ensure they are not disadvantaged if the Shiites decide to set up their own regional administration in the southern part of the country. I don't see imminent agreement on any of these core issues.
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Rajiv Chandrasekaran: Thanks for all of your excellent questions. We're out of time, but please return next Tuesday at noon for another Iraq policy chat.
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