Violence Ends Pakistan Standoff

Dozens Die as Military Raids Radical Mosque

Craig Cohen, deputy chief of staff at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was online Wednesday, July 11, at 2 p.m. ET to discuss the deadly military raid at Pakistan's Red Mosque -- which ended an eight-day standoff with anti-government, pro-Taliban forces -- and the impact it will have on President Pervez Musharraf's control of the U.S.-allied country.

Firebrand Cleric Killed in Red Mosque Raid (Post, July 10)

The transcript follows.

Cohen is a fellow in the International Security Program and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at CSIS. He currently is directing research on how to improve U.S. and U.N. capacity to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to conflict and collapse in large aid recipients -- with a focus on Pakistan. Previously, he managed a working group on reconstruction and stabilization operations and authored the report "Measuring Progress in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations." Prior to joining CSIS, he worked with the U.N. and nongovernmental organizations in Rwanda, Azerbaijan, Malawi, and the former Yugoslavia.

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Craig Cohen: Hi everyone -- first time doing this, so welcome...

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Washington, D.C.: It is surprising that Pakistan, rather than of Saudi Arabia, has become the root cause of most of terrorism in the world. Why does the U.S. continue to support its government? Why can't the U.S. take military action against terrorists being sheltered inside Pakistan?

Craig Cohen: Sorry about the delay. This is a good question to kick things off. The U.S. government supports Musharraf's regime because it feels it is the best chance America has to promote stability and sideline extremism. The question is whether this is as true now as it was after 9/11. The U.S. military doesn't take overt action against terrorists inside Pakistan for a few reasons. One is that it's not always easy to locate them. Also a military strike would also likely result in loss of Pakistani civilian lives, which would cause big problems in Pakistan. Pakistan is a sovereign country, so the U.S. works through the Pakistani government -- the problem is that the government doesn't really have sovereignty over the border region.

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Freising, Germany: It sounds like the militants in the Red Mosque were highly trained and in possession of a large quantity of arms, including RPGs. I've read that the leaders of the Red Mosque were sympathetic to the Taliban. Is there any evidence that some of the militants inside the mosque actually were members of the Taliban?

Craig Cohen: The first question is whether the Taliban are still a coherent organization with command and control. I suspect this may exist, but it's much smaller than when they controlled Afghanistan. The problem, though, is that there are many Taliban sympathizers -- Lal Masjid, for instance, had issued a fatwa that Pakistani soldiers who died fighting al-Qaeda and Taliban were not shahid, or martyrs. This is a big deal -- when I was in NWFP last year, I heard this during a few of my interviews. It essentially is saying the Pakistani state is acting against Islam, in the eyes of these folks. So the mosque is a sign of growing "Talibanization" of Pakistan. People have compared it here to David Koresh -- but it's more like David Koresh with 10 percent of Americans as Branch Davidians. That's a big difference...

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Lahore, Pakistan: In reaction to the "martyrdom" of the Red Mosque zealots, radicals in dozens of seminaries dotting Pakistan's landscape will seek revenge on the state. To stem this, an increasingly authoritarian Gen. Musharraf will resort to force, in the process exacerbating the current tension and violence that has become the lot of the hapless Pakistani nation. The most tragic victim of this phenomenon of religious extremism vs. state authoritarianism is likely to be the faltering political process leading to the establishment of a liberal, Democratic dispensation in Pakistan. The United States can make amends for its embrace of military dictators in the past by insisting -- in word and deed -- on the holding of genuinely free and fair elections.

Craig Cohen: I agree with some of what you've written here. There probably will be a backlash, and Musharraf may have to use force. I suspect though that he will be much more reluctant to use force in Karachi or Peshawar than in sleepy Islamabad only a few blocks from ISI HQ. What's interesting is what it took to actually precipitate this action: a string of escalating provocations since January -- abducting women, setting up a sharia court, issuing a fatwa against a government minister, kidnapping police, street battles, killing a Pakistani soldier, etc. The threshold for action is considerable. I suspect that this won't have much of a chilling effect versus militants. ... I agree with you about free and fair elections. The U.S. government has been saying the right things on this, but we'll see how things will play out.

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London: How concerned are you that elements in Pakistan's security apparatus may be in league with extremists in Pakistan's Islamist movement -- despite President Musharraf's commitment to tackle Islamic radicalism?

Craig Cohen: This is the question that always is asked when considering how reliable of a partner Pakistan is on the "war on terror." The conventional wisdom is that Pakistan distrusts that America will have the staying power in Afghanistan and eventually will walk away from its newfound friendship with Pakistan. For this reason they have maintained "assets" who could help the government in Afghanistan or Kashmir if it felt squeezed by India's influence in Afghanistan. This may be true. It also may be merely that personal relationships exist between Taliban and the ISI from back when they were on the same side in Afghanistan (which happened to be America's side for a while as well versus the Soviets)...

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Washington, D.C.: Craig: The David Koresh/Branch Dravidians analogy is a great one, especially the point that it is as if 10 percent of Americans were Branch Dravidians. What if anything can we in America do to help Pakistan "wean" their "Branch Dravidians" from the "David Koresh" cult of fundamentalist Islam. Isn't this a really big crisis? And if it really mattered to our lives here, shouldn't we be spending far more attention on Pakistan than we do currently?

Craig Cohen: Thanks. I think we have to be very careful here. On one hand, this is not our country and it's very far away and we probably only understand a very small part of it. It's like someone from the District going up to New England where I'm from and telling people what to do -- folks wouldn't care for that very much. Well, imagine what it's like on the other side of the world. So the Pakistanis will be very sensitive to any U.S. action that sounds like we're dictating anything.

On the other hand, as you point out, it matters to our security, and it matters to all those who believe in the spread of openness and prosperity. I think education should be a much greater part of our aid package to Pakistan. The administration has moved some in this direction, but it's still only a drop in the bucket -- the overall tenor of our aid to Pakistan is overwhelmingly short-term security. We need to provide opportunities to young people in a way consistent with their culture and religion.

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Acronym soup!: Help! NWFP? ISI HQ? Not all of us are up on our acronyms! Could you please spell out on first reference for a poor lost reader?

Craig Cohen: Apologies. NWFP is the Northwest Frontier Province (Pakistan is comprised of four provinces). It is out on the western border with Afghanistan. ISI is the intelligence services of Pakistan. HQ is headquarters!

One thing that was amazing to me about Pakistan when I was there in 2006 for about a month is how different it was in each part of the country -- Lahore picks up its Punjab character, Peshawar is more like Afghanistan, Karachi is a huge mess of a port city. There's so much dynamism in Pakistan: its economy is booming (7 percent growth for five years). It's not that everyone are Taliban or al-Qaeda. It's also a reason why I think a military dictatorship can't last -- it's too much to "control"...

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Fairfax, Va.: There was another attempt on Musharraf's life recently. What would happen if he were to be removed from power? Should we all be concerned about the nuclear weapons falling into terrorists' hands?

Craig Cohen: Another important (and common) question. ... My sense is that if Musharraf were killed, either one of two things would happen: The military would step in and put in place another military leader who would carry on much as Musharraf has, or Benazir would try to use it as an opportunity to return and press her cause for leadership. I'd be less concerned that there would be chaos and nukes in terrorists' hands. Of course there is an element of unpredictability with any violent changeover; it's in everyone's best interests to avoid it. This is one reason why I believe the U.S. government's reliance on Musharraf and the military places us in a difficult spot...

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Kalamazoo, Mich.: Hi Craig. Boy, the Taliban certainly appears to be resilient. To what do you chiefly attribute their staying power? Is it zeal, a sympathetic populace, a lack of military and political pressure on them, etc.? It just amazes me that these goofballs, who aren't that far removed the Dark Ages, continually can challenge us like this. We're basically fighting a bunch of baboons, but one must give them some props for remaining on the stage.

Craig Cohen: Hmm. Many are considered pious Muslims and lead simple lives, and that's admired by many Pakistanis. Also, of course, that they stand up to America, which is popular in much of the world. They are seen to have Pakistan's interests at heart in Afghanistan. ... Mao said something like "insurgents swim like fish in the sea" -- these folks have the implicit toleration of many of the communities in which they live. I don't think most Pakistanis want to live under Taliban-style rule, but neither do they want to live under America's rule.

The area out on the Afghan border is really difficult terrain. The central government in Pakistan never never has really controlled this area -- they have 80,000 troops out there now, but they're not really in control. Mostly they're in the barracks after the peace deals they struck last fall. And fighting a counterinsurgency is not easy -- look in Iraq. ... What is worrisome is that U.S. soldiers will have a tough time so long as the Taliban have safe haven in Pakistan. RAND's Seth Jones did a good study that was published in Survival that looked at counterinsurgency operations over time all over the world -- much more likely to succeed if you can cut off the base of support.

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New York: Pakistan consistently has succeeded in bargaining for U.S. financial assistance for promised shorter-term cooperation without actually ever completely delivering -- almost like the dance of the veils -- where the U.S. keeps purging money but never actually ends up getting what it wants. How can the U.S. ensure once and for all that the Pakistani institutional support of extremists and the use of terror as an instrument of state policy stops (without necessarily compromising for short-term gains with payoffs in dollars and F-16s)?

Craig Cohen: Great question. I guess I see it that the deal essentially was struck after 9/11. Musharraf was told "you're with us or against us," he made the turn away from the Taliban, he gave us all the access we wanted to fight the war in Afghanistan, and he's said the right things on counterterrorism. In return, we've provided more than $10.58 billion in overt funds since 9/11. Very little accountability to this money. Coalition Support Funds reimburse the Pakistani government for its role in the war on terror. They submit receipts, but it's essentially a monthly payoff of $80-100 million per month. We give them budget support, which is essentially a direct cash transfer into their budget. Remember that Pakistan is ranked something like 141 out of 190 in Transparency International's Corruption index. ...

Unfortunately, I'm not sure if there's a "once and for all" solution with Pakistan. Some in Congress have wanted to condition aid on counterterrorism cooperation, or on democracy, but if you are going to condition aid you have to be prepared to walk away. The notion of the U.S. walking away brings back memories of times in the past when we've done so, and poisons the relationship. I like the idea of spreading the money around to different partners rather than merely channeling everything through the central government. I think in the long term, if we continue to invest in Pakistan's prosperity and openness, it will yield dividends. The tricky part is that in the short-term, you have to make sure U.S. national security is not compromised -- and this may take the use of hard power (the New York Times ran a piece on an aborted military strike from 2005 a week or two ago). Once you do that, we could stir up the hornet's nest...

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Lyme, Conn.: Our military, reported on today's television news, had several opportunities to attack al-Qaeda in Pakistan -- yet a dispute between the CIA and the Defense Department called off the attacks. It was the administration's decision that the attacks would have created a backlash that might have caused Musharraf's government to be toppled. Yet, might crippling al-Qaeda have helped Musharraf create less of an opposition seeking to oust him? What are your thoughts on this?

Craig Cohen: Good question, speaks to my last point concerning the NYT story. I think a small, targeted strike in Pakistan would not topple Musharraf. We've probably done this in fact, though I'm not sure what we've officially admitted to. The Predator drones have fired missiles -- like in Bajaur in January 2007. Even in the past few weeks, I believe NATO engaged in hot pursuit across the border. What was different about the NYT story was that it was a massive assault that was planned and involved hundreds of American intelligence and military officers. This probably would have resulted in the deaths of many Pakistani civilians and probably would have been read as an invasion of sorts in Pakistan. It would have been wildly unpopular. Would it have brought down Musharraf? Maybe. Would it have captured Osama bin Laden, and if so, would it have been worth it? These are tough calls.

I'll tell you what worries me, though. What happens if there is a terrorist attack here in America that tracks back to Pakistan like with the July 7 subway bombings in London? I think there will be quite an uproar here for U.S. troops to move across the border into Pakistan -- the line will go something like, "how can we rely on Musharraf to keep us safe, etc." ... Then there is trouble -- to me that's a real nightmare scenario, U.S. troops in Pakistan. We think Iraq has been difficult...

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Washington, D.C.: The reaction was not as strong as one would expect in a city like Karachi or Lahore. There were no mass protests against the government, and mostly people supported the government for taking out these mullahs. In Pakistan, religious parties never have won more than 5 percent or 6 percent of the seats. Do you think it shows that the extremist are mostly in the NWFP area, and not throughout the country?

Craig Cohen: Fair point. I agree that the Pakistani government acted responsibly and competently with the Lal Masjid raid. They were patient, they brought in the religious clerics to negotiate. The militants discredited themselves when Abdul Aziz tried to escape dressed as a woman after declaring a willingness to be a martyr. And then the government took action to enforce the writ of the state. It helped Musharraf's standing with most Pakistanis in Washington, in China, etc. Even Benazir said it was the right thing to do.

I don't think 'extremists' are mostly in NWFP. I think views that we would find "extreme" here in America -- say, that al Qaeda did not carry out 9/11, are shared by a good deal of Pakistanis -- there has been some recent polling on this by Steve Kull. This doesn't necessarily mean these folks advocate violence. As for the Islamist parties' chances of winning elections, you're right, they've never polled well, and this even when the leaders of the centrist parties (Benazir and Nawaz Sharif) are in exile.

The opposing argument, of course, is that elections sometimes issue surprises. Look at Palestine -- often considered one of the most secular Arab societies, etc., and Hamas wins and we're caught off-guard. Now, I'm not saying Pakistan is Palestine -- very different situations -- but you never know. ... I don't think this is an argument for not supporting free and fair elections though. It just complicates things, particularly because Pakistan is a nuclear state. ... The MMA politicians I met when I was in Pakistan on the lower levels were pretty practical and non-ideological.

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Karachi, Pakistan: Should Pakistan not be allowed to live under "one-party (i.e. military) rule" for a little bit longer? China, Singapore, Chile and South Korea matured under dictatorships. And Japan, India, etc. blossomed under one-party rule. Each got to a certain level of political "maturity" before "free-and-fair" elections were held. On the contrary, in Gaza, Lebanon and Iraq, "free-and-fair" elections have created nightmares.

Craig Cohen: Good question! Well, ultimately, this is for the Pakistanis to decide. I think you're right that "free and fair" elections do not always lead to peace and harmony. In fact, there's some good research out there that indicates that pushing for elections too early actually can promote conflict. On the other hand, it strikes me that Musharraf has a pretty narrow basis of rule and, it is shrinking every day. Now perhaps the Red Mosque raid will instill confidence in him around the country, but between the Chaudhry-inspired protests, the Corps Commanders having to issue a declaration of support, inflation rising, etc., these aren't good signs. Is a smooth and peaceful political transition possible in Pakistan? I hope so...

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Kalamazoo, Mich.: Hey, look Cohen, who's kidding who -- the goal here is to make sure we don't have any more airplanes flying into buildings. Decent, hard-working people went to work in those towers on Sept. 11 and a few hundred of them had to leap to their deaths while almost self-combusting from the heat. You strike me as the type who forgets that. No real American gives a hoot about the tribal and political issues over there. If Musharraf isn't the guy, then we go to Plan B. But we can't have them projecting anything outside of the Pakistan/Afghanistan border. Good men are dying while you and I type this -- don't ever forget that either.

Craig Cohen: Sorry you feel that way -- I agree that our national security has to be our number one concern. It's not a black-and-white world though. It's not like Musharraf or "Plan B" simply pushes a button and the problem goes away. Like Secretary Rumsfeld famously said, are we killing more terrorists than we're creating? We could kill a lot of folks in Pakistan, but that won't necessarily make us safer. I have the utmost respect for our military and civilians who put their lives on the line every day for us.

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Twin Cities: Our foreign policy leaves me in a dizzy: We created the Islamic mujaheddin Frankenstein monster to fight the "evil" Soviet empire, and now that monster is coming back to haunt us. Has there been a rethinking in our long-term foreign policy that we must deal with threats differently (peacefully/multilaterally/or some other way) than assigning labels and creating new monsters?

Craig Cohen: Good question. This is sort of the point I've been trying to get at: that our leaders are often caught in such a short timeline of decision-making, we can fail to look ahead and see the problems lying off on the horizon. Yes, we need to deal with the problems we face today, but we can't lose sight of those looming around the corner. Any leader -- whether George Bush or Pervez Musharraf -- faces this dilemma.

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Craig Cohen: Okay, folks, have to run. Thanks so much for all those who stuck with this, and sorry to those who submitted questions I didn't get to answer. Have a good one..

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