Book World Live

Tim Weiner
Author, "Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA"
Tuesday, July 24, 2007 3:00 PM

But Weiner, a New York Times correspondent who has covered intelligence for years, cannot be accused of kicking the agency when it is down. It is his thesis, amply documented, that the CIA was never up. He paints a devastating portrait of an agency run, during the height of its power in the Cold War years, by Ivy League incompetents, "old Grotonians" who lied to presidents -- an agency that, more often than not, failed to foresee major world events, violated human rights, spied on Americans, plotted assassinations of foreign leaders, and put so much of its energy and resources into bungled covert operations that it failed in its core mission of collecting and analyzing information-- Covert Action ( Book World, July 22, 2007)

Tim Weiner fields questions and comments about his book, "Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA."

Tim Weiner is a Pulitzer prize-winning reporter for The New York Times. This is his third book.

Join Book World Live each Tuesday at 3 p.m. ET for a discussion based on a story or review in each Sunday's Book World section.

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Tim Weiner: Before we start, I'd like to begin with a word of thanks to the Washington Post for inviting a reporter from The New York Times in for this chat. Thanks, too, to the readers of the Post for participating. Let's go!

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Freising, Germany: In recent years, questions have been asked about the differences between a military spy service and a civilian spy service.

You write, that when the OSS was formed, "-The Generals] were appalled by -Donovan's] idea of making a spy service out of a scattershot collection of Wall Street brokers, Ivy League eggheads, soldiers of fortune, ad men, news men, stunt men, second-story men, and con men".

Is the nature and the corporate culture of the CIA still defined by these early civilian recruits? How does this compare with other secret services like the KGB-FSB or MI6?

Tim Weiner: The Pentagon never liked the idea of an independent civilian spy service and did its utmost to strangle the baby in its cradle after World War Two. The result was a stunted CIA. The hostility of Secretaries of Defense -- Mr. Rumsfeld under Ford and Bush 43, Mr. Cheney under Bush 41 --has wounded the corporate culture CIA over the past three decades. As to the mix of "brokers, eggheads, soldiers of fortune, ad men, news men, stunt men, second-story men, and con men" in the OSS, the CIA in its first decades was a lot more diverse and a lot more multilinguistic than today. Its ranks were filled with Russians, Slovaks, Czechs, Hungarians, more than a few Asians and other rootless cosmpolitans who wanted to fight communism and serve the United States in interesting and unusual ways.

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Arlington, VA: I've never read a book about the CIA, but this one is definitely on my list. One question, and it relates to the story about the American Ambassador to Guatamala: was the CIA trying to warn her that her bedroom was bugged by the military, did the CIA neglect to notice her husband and children when they told her she was a lesbian?

Tim Weiner: Here is how Ambassador McAfee tells the story in "Legacy of Ashes:"

"The chief of station came into my office and

showed me a piece of intelligence, which came from a Guatemalan source, suggesting that I was having an affair with my secretary, whose name was Carol Murphy," Ambassador McAfee remembered. The Guatemalan military had bugged the ambassador's bedroom and recorded her cooing endearments

to Murphy. They spread the word that the ambassador was a

lesbian. The CIA station [without commentary and with a straight face-author's note] transmitted this piece of intelligence-later known as "the Murphy memo"-to Washington, where it was widely distributed.

"The CIA sent this report to the Hill," Ambassador McAfee said. "It was clearly malice. The CIA had defamed an ambassador by back channels." The ambassador was a conservative person from a conservative family, she was married, and she was not sleeping with her secretary.

"Murphy" was the name of her two-year-old black standard poodle. The bug in her bedroom had recorded her petting her dog. The CIA station had shown a stronger affinity for its friends in the Guatemalan military than for the American ambassador.

"There was a division between intelligence and policy," Ambassador McAfee said. "That's what scares me."

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Reston, Va.: Thanks so much for fielding our questions!

If the CIA has largely failed at its mission (i.e., the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence), do you think other US spy agencies can step in and better execute that mission?

And at what point does the CIA, its sullied reputation at home and abroad, and its failure to successfully execute its core mission render it value-substracted? Has this point already passed?

Tim Weiner: As an American citizen, I firmly believe the CIA has to be strengthened in its core missions of gathering and analyzing intelligence. That means we have to get good at espionage -- not covert action and overt paramilitary missions. Secret action without intelligence is a fool's errand, as we have learned to our sorrow. I would start with a crash program to enlist tens of thousands of college students in Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, Pushto, Urdu, and Korean language classes, and courses in the history and cultures of the countries where those languages are spoken.

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Reston, Va.: Tantalizing thesis. I can't wait to read the book!

In your opinion, have other US spy agencies fulfilled their mandates with more success than CIA? Or is your perception of the IC in general akin to your opinion of CIA?

Tim Weiner: The job of Director of Central Intelligence (1947-2005, r.i.p.) proved impossible. No one mortal could serve as CEO of the CIA and chairman of the board of US intelligence. General Hayden is the first man given a chance to be DCIA, and early signs are good. But the record of overall IC management is bad. In part this is because the SecDef controls the money that runs the inteligence community. In part it is because the job is overwhelming.

As an illustration, the title of my book comes from a tongue-lashing that President Eisenhower gave his DCI, Allen Dulles, in January 1961, the end of Ike's days in office. At the last, Eisenhower exploded in anger and frustration.

"The structure of our intelligence organization is faulty," he told Dulles. It makes no sense, it has to be reorganized, and we should have done it long ago. Nothing had changed since Pearl Harbor. "I have suffered an eight-year defeat on this," said the president of the United States.

He said he would "leave a legacy of ashes" to his successor -- JFK. And four months later came the Bay of Pigs.

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Harrisburg, Pa.: Is it true, in order to hide the CIA's budget from foreign powers, that Congress used to hide its appropriation under the Bureau of Public Roads line item in the budget?

Tim Weiner: The CIA's budget is buried in false and mislabeled line items in the Pentagon's budget. In 1961, the new sign on the highway leading out to CIA headquarters (newly opened that year) read "CIA next exit." This displeased the new Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, who lived just down the road at Hickory Hill. He was livid, and after several increasingly furious calls the sign was replaced by one reading "Bureau of Public Roads."

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Tysons Corner, VA: Have other US intelligence agencies--the DIA and NSA--done a better job of accurate foreign intelligence gathering than the CIA?

Did the former KGB do a better job of intelligence gathering than the CIA? After all, the Russians did find out about our atomic bomb.

Thank you.

Tim Weiner: I prefer to answer your second question since I am far from the world's greatest expert on NSA and DIA. The KGB was ten times bigger than CIA, and infinitely more brutal. Their job was much easier -- they were penetrating our open American democracy, we were trying to penetrated a closed communist society. Did they get more information? Sure? Did it matter in the end? Less than one might imagine.

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Silver Spring, Md: Your best chapter is chapter 32. Most of the chapter is based on information given by the Greek Journalist Elias Demetracopoulos. It is obvious, even for the casual reader, that you have purposely excluded his name from your great book.

Tim Weiner: This chapter concerns the CIA's role in the disastrous events that led to the 1974 war in Cyprus between Greece and Turkey -- two NATO members, both trained and armed by the United States. I tell the story in the words of US Foreign Service and intelligence officers who were directly involved. Mr. Demetracopoulos is an honorable man but I prefer to tell this tale through American eyes.

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San Pedro, Calif: I'd be interested in your understanding of the handling of

the aluminum tubes case in the run up to the Iraq war.

According to news reports, the office of the Energy

Department that reviews nuclear technology intelligence

discounted the idea that the tubes could be used for

uranium enrichment, but a CIA analyst who lacks the

credentials of the physicists at Energy argued against their

conclusion and kept the 'threat' of the tubes alive. But the

White House also bungled the issue. Condoleeza Rice

testified before Congress that she never read the official

assessment of the tubes--purportedly the only physical

evidence of Saddam's reconstituted nuclear program--

before making her "mushroom cloud" statements. Was it

really handled this poorly?

Tim Weiner: It was handled that poorly, and worse yet.President Bush presented the CIA's case in his State of the Union speech

on January 28, 2003: Saddam Hussein had biological weapons sufficient to kill millions, chemical weapons to kill countless thousands, mobile biological weapons labs designed to produce germ-warfare agents. He had recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Bush continued: "Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production."

All of this was terrifying. But none of it was true.

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Arlington, Va.: The early chapters of the book make it seem like George Kennan was instrumental in creating the CIA. I had not heard that before. Am I overinterpreting?

Tim Weiner: Kennan was a chief intellectual author in the creation of the clandestine service of the CIA -- the people who do dirty dangerous work abroad. He authorized with his signature some of the earliest covert-action programs. It's all documented and footnoted in the book -- all on the record. A quarter-century later Kennan called his work on the creation of the CIA's clandestine service "the greatest mistake I ever made." But in the late 1940's, he was very gung-ho.

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Arlington, VA: Tim:

I am really impressed by the number of primary sources you were able to gain access to. How important was the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in your research? Also given the prodigious amount of research that obviously went into the book, how long did it take for you to write it?

Tim Weiner: Thanks for the kind words. I have been thinking about the CIA and the ideas and issues in this book for 20 years. The laws governing the declassification of documents work in fits and starts. But by 2005, when I started to write, there was a critical mass of documentation available. Steve Coll, the Post's former managing editor, said the existence of Legacy of Ashes as an on-the-record book was a testament to the enduring transparency of the American political system. He was right about that.

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Arlington, VA: I'm about a 1/3 of the way through the book and the one fact that continues to amaze me is the total lack of oversight by Congress in the first couple of decades of the CIA's history. Do you feel that the Congress currently has enough oversight over our intelligence activities?

Tim Weiner:"Oversight" is a Janus word -- it contains its opposite meaning. A few Senators and Congressmen (notable Richard Russell of Georgia and George Mahon of Texas) personally oversaw the CIA in the 1950's and early 1960's. That was not enough. Congress from roughly 2000 through 2006 all but abdicated meaningful oversight of CIA. It may return. It never has worked successfully, and that is largely the fault of inattentive Members. It needs to work a great deal better than it has, for the CIA's sake above all.

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Northern Virginia: You say Eisenhower was unimpressed by the CIA. But Ike used the agency to overthrow government in Guatemala and Iran. I don't get it

Tim Weiner:

Tim Weiner: The Iran and Guatemala coups came in the first 18 months of Ike's presidency. He was impressed -- but CIA officers exaggerated the success and ease of these coups. Later in his presidency, and especially after 1957, Ike grew very skeptical of the Agency's ability to carry out its central missions -- knowing the enemy, preventing another Pearl harbor, and providing the President with strategic intelligence: the information he needs to create a long-range strategy for the US.

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Washington, DC: In your estimation, who were the best and worst presidents with regard to managing and utilizing the CIA's resources?

Tim Weiner: One and only one President understood the secret operations of the CIA -- what they could and could not do for the US. That would be George Herbert Walker Bush, who ran the Agency in 1976. Most presidents get their ideas about the CIA from movies, books, Washington corridor chitchat and -- God forbid -- the newspapers.

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Washington DC: I have read about 2/3rds of "Legacy of Ashes" and have to tell you that it is an extraordinary book and a fascinating read. I would recommend it to anyone interested in foreign affairs and current history. I was surprized by the review in the Post on Sunday which said you found nothing to like at the CIA. My read is very different -- that you in fact had good things to say about several senior CIA officials, who were trying to do the right thing in difficult circumstances. So I did not understand that critique. Are there, in fact, any heros in this saga?

Tim Weiner: There are a number of heroes in this book, and thanks so much for saying so.

John McCone, director of central intelligence from 1961 to 1965, was the unacknowledged hero of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. His role in providing both warning of the crisis and in providing a path for resolution were crucial. JFK and RFK were unwilling to share an iota of credit with McCone, a staunch Republican.

Another is -- cover your eyes, old lefties - Richard Helms. Helms fought the good fight to establish ***an espionage service devoted to gathering intelligence*** instead of running paramilitary operations and propping up crooked colonels and stealing elections.

There are many others -- the courageous Howard Hart, who served in Iran and Pakistan, among other places; the late Dick Lehman, who struggled to make Allen Dulles pay attention to intelligence analysis; and Dick Kerr, who helped keep the CIA together in the late 1980's and 1990's. You'll even find more than a few kind words for SecDef Bob Gates, the DCI in 1991 and 1992.

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Washington, DC: I know that the much ballyhooed release of the CIA's "family jewels" came after your book was finished. Did anything that was revealed in them surprise you or had you already come across much of it in your research?

Tim Weiner: The Jewels were mostly paste. There are a few real gems among them, especially two memos by James J Angleton relating to a 20-year program to train and arm foreign secret police forces.

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Lyme, Conn: What is the general flow of intelligence information between the CIA and the White House? I find it fascinating that recent accounts are that the material reaching the President today seems to reach him in far different routes than previous Presidents. Would you agree with these accounts, or do these routes change dramatically among Presidents?

Tim Weiner: Every President differs in his desires for how he wants his intelligence served. Something Richard Helms once said comes to mind: "If we are not believed, we have no purpose." After the 2002 WMD debacle, it was hard for this White House to believe in the CIA. That may be why President Bush said in 2004 that the CIA was "just guessing" about events in post Saddam-Iraq.

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McLean, VA: If the Agency is so terrible, why should any decent people want to work there. And if no decent people want to work there, how will things ever improve?

Tim Weiner: The CIA is NOT terrible.

The mission -- to know the enemy, to present surprise attack, to gather strategic intelligence -- is crucial to our nation. The CIA needs to improve its performance on some essential fronts: recruiting, training, and retraining people who don't look like they just got off the bus from the University of Southern North Dakota.

A smart White House would create a crash program to educated many thousands of 18-to-25 year olds in how to speak Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, Urdu, Pushto, and Korean; to know the history and culture of the countries where those languages are spoken, and to go serve their country as soldiers, diplomats, and spies.

The CIA has been misused and abused by Presidents. It has had some pretty poor directors over the years. Congress has been little help. CIA's budget is one percent of the Pentagon's, which is still the 800-pound gorilla in the room of American intelligence.

We need to create a first-rate spy service -- devoted to espionage, not targeted killing. We need to get good at it. We are by my count in the 11th year of a five-year rebuild at CIA. A great spy service has been five years over the horizon since 1947.

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Washington DC: I know "Legacy of Ashes" is on the best sellers list, but I find it intriguing that you are criticized from the right for being too harsh on the Agency and criticized from the left for thinking the CIA can still play a useful role in the post-9/11 world. Would you comment?

Tim Weiner: In the cold war the left criticized the CIA for what it did. From 1991 to 9/11 the right criticized the CIA for what it could NOT do. After 9/11 everyone criticized the CIA.

We are a superpower. We project our power over the horizon. We need eyes to see - spies, not billion-dollar satellites. We need to know the enemy, and the only way to know another man's mind is to talk to him. In his native tongue. That is the role of CIA after 9/11. It was the role of CIA before 9/11 too.

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Tim Weiner: Thanks to one and all -- Kim O'Donnel at washingtonpost.com, who made this happened, the reporters and editors at the Washington Post, and all you readers out there -- for a great chat. best, tw.

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