Book World Live

But as John Ferling makes clear in Almost a Miracle, his comprehensive and engaging new history of the Revolution, that day of national happiness was nowhere near. Ferling's book is a sprawling account of the military side of the war, an oft-told story that still rarely fails to engage. The American victory, as Wellington said of Waterloo, was a close-run thing, and the details of the clash of the world's mightiest empire with a guerrilla force of rebels remain compelling. (Review: Faint Echoes, Aug. 12, 2007)

John Ferling, author of "Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence," fields questions and comments about his new book and the American Revolution.

A transcript follows.

Historian John Ferling is the author of nine books on the American Revolution and early American wars.

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John Ferling: Good afternoon everyone. The temperature in Atlanta is over 100 degrees today, but fortunately I am at the computer in my air conditioned study and eager to chat with you about the Revolutionary War, and about my new book which is a history of that conflict.

Just a quick word first about how I came to write ALMOST A MIRACLE. My book A LEAP IN THE DARK (2003) was a political history of the American Revolution, and I wanted to write a companion piece that would be a military history. In addition, no professional historian had written a history of the War of Independence in almost half a century, so I thought the time was right. Finally, I thought the story of the war in the South had been largely ignored in earlier general histories, and I wanted to try to set the record straight on that score.

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Schenectady, N.Y.: It has been argued that the outcome of the Revolutionary War was inevitable and that all Washington had to do was avoid defeat. Do you agree and, if not, why not?

Thank you.

John Ferling: I don't think that the American victory was inevitable. In fact, I believe that Britain could have, and should have, crushed the rebellion in 1776. In the New York campaign in 1776, General Washington made so many mistakes that it was a miracle that he did not lose his entire army. Had he suffered a decisive defeat hard on the heels of the loss of two American armies that year in the Canadian theater, it is difficult to see how the United States could have survived beyond that year.

The northern states, as Thomas Jefferson said, had largely won their independence by the end of 1777. But the woes of the southern states were just beginning. By 1781 the war was stalemated. If victory had not been won that year, the war's outcome would likely have been determined by a European peace conference, and the settlement proposed by a set of monarchical nations would not have been a good one for the republican United States.

The book's title comes from General Washington's farewell to the Continental army. He said that America's victory was "little short of a standing miracle," and I think his comment was dead on target.

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Wheaton, Md.: Probably the biggest maricle was Washington's army surviving the winter at Valley Forge. It seems unimaginable, the hardships they endured. Had they not survived, the Revolution would not have, either. Do you agree?

John Ferling: I think Valley Forge was important. A far better army came out of Valley Forge in June 1778 than had marched into it in December 1777. It was crucial, too, for solidifying Washington's position as commander in chief. He was virtually untouchable politically after Valley Forge. On the other hand, I don't agree that the army nearly collapsed or that America verged on having to end the war during the Valley Forge winter. After the great victory at Saratoga in October, two months before Valley Forge, it was generally presumed that France would enter the war. It was also thought that with French assistance, the war could be won, and probably fairly quickly. During the Valley Forge winter I think most Americans believed that they were too close to winning independence to throw in the towel.

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Arlington, Va.: Professor Ferling, "A Leap in the Dark" was one of the finest histories I've ever read and, although I'm only 100 pages into "Almost a Miracle," it seems to be its equal. So first let me offer you my congratulations. My question: The French and Indian War was such an influence on the colonials who would later assume command of the Revolutionary Army. Can you discuss what kinds of lessons Washington et al., took from that war? Did they learn primarily military tactics, logistics, leadership, etc.? Thank you.

John Ferling: Thanks for your kind words about my earlier book. I agree with you that the French and Indian war was an important "school" for many who served in the War of Independence. Men such as George Washington, Philip Schuyler, Israel Putnam, and John Stark learned much about themselves in that earlier conflict, but they also learned how to organize and manage an army, train and discipline men, lead others, and relate to the needs and desires of the civilian population. Virtually every high ranking American officer in the Revolutionary War had served -- often for several years -- in the French and Indian War. But it was not just the French and Indian War that was a training ground. Many southerners who emerged as leaders in the fighting in the Carolinas in particular had first served in the Cherokee War in 1760-1761, a brutal struggle that provided something of an education in guerrilla warfare.

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Philadelphia, Pa.: I find it interesting that many soldiers essentially signed for the military for a set term and when the term was up they left and went back to their families and their jobs. Often this was necessary as their families needed them. How did the revolution impact families and how did the military work with the problem of rotating soldiers?

John Ferling: In the first two years of the war, men enlisted for only one year. That was no way to wage a war, as General Washington repeatedly told Congress in 1775 and 1776. Indeed, few of those men reenlisted, leaving Washington to recruit a new army in the face of the enemy army. After the string of defeats in the New York campaign, Congress finally awakened to reality and, beginning in 1777, men were asked to enlist for three years or the duration of the war. The evidence suggests that the composition of the army changed dramatically once Congress went over to a standing army concept. Previously, the men in the army had represented a reasonably good cross section of America's male in inhabitants. But from 1777 onward a far greater percentage of the men tended to be single, propertyless, and from the lower socio-economic strata of society. A substantial percentage (up to twenty-five percent from some states) were immigrants.

As these men were in the service for the long haul, they were separated from loved ones for extended periods. During the winter months, however, when fighting slowed or stopped altogether, the Continental army was generous with furloughs (if for no other reason than it meant fewer mouths to feed during times of scarcity).

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Logan Circle, Washington, D.C.: What could the English have done differently to win the war? And if England had held on to the colonies would America have become the tail wagging the English dog?

John Ferling: Before the fighting began, the ministry of Lord North discussed how to win the war. They did not always come to the right conclusions, but they correctly understood that it was essential to win quickly before France and possibly Spain entered the conflict. But they seemed to forget that necessity once the war began. I think the British had adequate manpower in America, and certainly adequate naval power, to have won the war in 1776 and 1777. But General William Howe was a poor choice to command the army. A more aggressive and resolute commander could have succeeded. Howe's successor, Sir Henry Clinton, recommended the appointment of a supreme commander -- something akin to General Eisenhower in World War II -- who could have coordinated British strategy between the North American theaters and the Caribbean. London not only never made such an appointment, it should have seen the need for such a commander even before the war commenced.

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Richmond, Va.: I just recently finished reading "The Winter Soldiers" by Ketchum (first published in 1973). The author makes the interesting point that Washington had been so decisively defeated in New York in the Summer of 1776 (and particularly the loss of the fortifications on either side of the Hudson River at Ft. Washington and Ft. Lee in November of that year) that had he simply done nothing instead of attacking at Trenton and Princeton, or if either one of those battles had gone the other way (and they were both apparently very, very close calls) the Revolution would've definitely been over. Your thoughts please.

John Ferling: Washington's Trenton-Princeton campaign, which was one of the most brilliant ever waged by an American commander, was crucial in two ways. It enabled the American rebels to recruit a new army in 1777. (Without those victories, it is difficult to imagine that many would have wanted to serve in an army that had suffered defeat after defeat.) Some in Congress and the army were beginning to question Washington's abilities as well, so that in the long run his victories over the course of a bit more than a week in December 1775 and January 1776 may have been crucial to his own survival as commander in chief.

That said, I think the war would have continued into 1777 even had Washington not achieved those victories. Congress had already decided to recruit a standing army and, I believe, it would have continued the fight with what it thought would be a better army.

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New York, N.Y.: Many people do not realize that the British essentially try to win the war with three separate attacks. First they sought to put down the revolt, which was concentrated in the Northern states. When that failed, they thought if they could divide the country into two, that it would fall, and they attempted to attack and occupy the middle states. When that failed, they thought they could starve the country by attacking the productive Southern states. I understand your book does a good job detailing the lesser known battles in the middle and Southern states. Would you please tell us about how those efforts went and of their importance?

John Ferling: Since I discussed some of the issues that you raised in answering earlier questions, let me go at it by mentioning that Britain switched strategies beginning in 1778. Before then, it focused largely on isolating New England and suppressing the rebellion in those four states. In 1778 it resorted to a Southern Strategy. Britain sought to reconquer Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia. Had it succeeded, it would probably have come out of the war with a vast American empire than swept from Canada through the trans-Appalachian West, and also included the four southern provinces (plus Florida, which it had acquired in the French and Indian War) and several sugar islands in the Caribbean. Moreover, the United States would have consisted of only nine states and it would have been surrounded by the British empire. And I think Britain came closer to achieving their aims than most people any longer realize.

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Charlotte, N.C.: Why has it taken so long for historians and the public to finally recognize the importance of the war in the South? Thirty years ago, one might have thought most of the war was fought in New England.

John Ferling: I suspect that several factors probably contributed to the Revolutionary War in the South being largely ignored for such a long time. Until well into the 20th century, most graduate programs in history were at northern universities and most of the historians who were produced by those institutions were from the north. In addition, another war -- the Civil War -- subsumed the Revolutionary War in the minds of most southerners who were interested in history. Thankfully, however, numerous excellent books on aspects of the war in the South have appeared in the last few years. Thoughtful historians such as Lawrence Babits, John Buchanan, Carl Borick, Walter Edgar, Don Higginbotham, and David Wilson have turned their attention to the fighting down South, and the magesterial PAPERS OF NATHANAEL GREENE, which is now complete, is a treasure trove for those wishing to study this war below Virginia.

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Alexandria, Va.: Professor Ferling...

It's a pleasure to "speak" with you today sir!

I've read "A Leap in the Dark", "Setting the World Ablaze", the biographies of Washington and Adams and have enjoyed them all. As a member of the "Neighborhood Friends of Mount Vernon", I'm a tremendous admirer of the Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army and our first President.

I also believe there is one of Washington's aides that has not gotten the recognition he is due: Nathanael Greene.

Do you address the accomplishments of this under-appreciated general in "Almost a Miracle"?

John Ferling: I came to a much greater appreciation of General Greene as I wrote this book, and I agree with you that he has been overlooked. His conduct of the war in the South in 1781 was extraordinary. In fact, I think only Washington's Trenton-Princeton campaign would measure up to it, and even then Washington's campaign lasted only a week, whereas Greene's was conducted over a period of nine months. Greene succeeded in effect in driving his opposite number, General Cornwallis, out of the Carolinas and into Virginia, which set up the climactic moment of the war, the siege of Yorktown. Washington walked away with all the credit, but in a very real sense it was Greene that made Yorktown possible.

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Washington, D.C.: About a generation ago, I went to graduate school to study Colonial America. I was particularly interested in the Revolutionary period. The more I learned, the more I wondered why guys from the backcountry, particularly in the South, fought -- what made them feel they had common cause with Bostonians hampered by the British blockades, or even, generally, what made them feel "American" all of a sudden instead of British or even Virginian. (I'm not talking the intellectual and political leaders here; I'm talking about the illiterate farmboys who died of measles in New York before they saw any shooting, miles from where they normally lived.) Years of studying the nitty-gritty of the social, economic, and political history of the time -- years of poring through letters and wills and local court records -- and the closest answer I could come up with is that young men the world over and in all times like to leave home, run around with foreign women, and make things go "boom," and the Revolution gave these guys a chance to do that. In the interim, I haven't been keeping up with the scholarship as well as I might have done, so I'm taking the short cut of asking you: Are there any better theories out there?

John Ferling: Well, I suppose adventure was a lure for some, and certainly, as in many wars, societal pressures to bear arms was a key factor in enlisting. Smooth-talking recruiters can't be dismissed either. Beyond a doubt, many southerners, like their counterparts up north, were drawn to enlist because of the cash and land bounties that were offered. In addition to those personal factors, many men, I think, really believed in what the American Revolution supposedly stood for. Thomas Paine, in COMMON SENSE, wrote of independence giving Americans the opportunity to control their own destiny. Some read into Paine (or republican ideology) that independence would provide a greater likelihood or rising socially and economically according to one's merit. Paine also said that the establishment of an independent American republic was an opportunity to start the world anew. He called it the "birthday of a new world." Many believed that was what the war and the rebellion were all about.

In the southern backcountry, I think many Scotch-Irish hated the British for their exploitation of Ireland. Many Presbyterians hated the idea of an established church, which of course existed in all the southern colonies. In addition, many in the backcountry saw American independence as the first step in liberating themselves from the hegemony of the tidewater section of their colony. In this sense, as Carl Becker, a famous historian in the early 20th century put it, this was not only a revolution for home rule, but to determine who would rule at home.

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College Park, Md.: Was Alexander Hamilton an important figure in the war or did his importance mainly come after the revolution?

John Ferling: Alexander Hamilton became an aide to General Washington in the winter of 1777 after serving as an artillery officer first in a New York unit, then in the Continental army. The war was important for Hamilton more than he was crucial for the outcome of the war. He came to Washington's attention, of course, Washington saw that Hamilton offered him many useful talents. Later, Hamilton would say that Washington was his aegis to success. Hamilton's position as an aide placed him at Washington's headquarters, where he met influential congressmen and state leaders who would be important to him later on. Finally, Washington gave Hamilton a field command in mid-1781, and with that Hamilton gained glory in a military action at Yorktown.

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Port Royal, Va.: After reading the comments and review, I am going to purchase your book.

From other knowledge: Wasn't the Revolutionary War was as much a civil war as anything else? Without the local support and consequential harassment, prosecution, and almost genocidal treatment of those pro-British, could we have ever had won the war? Which might bring us to the interesting conclusion, we might never had won the war had we applied the Bill of Rights, which had not yet been written.

John Ferling: Most contemporaries saw it as a civil war. It was British fighting against British until July 1776 when the British-Americans became "Americans." In addition, Americans fought one another. This was especially true in the mid-Atlantic states and in the South. All along, but particularly from 1777 onward, the British sought to recruit Loyalists for their army. They formed what they called provincial units, which consisted solely of Loyalists, save for the leading officers, who might be British regulars. At one point in 1780, in fact, there were actually more Loyalists serving in the British army than American patriots serving in the Continental army.

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Alexandria, Va.: I have to admit I have not read your book, but according to the POST review it sounds as though it perpetuates the romantic myth that the American Revolution was won by clever American militiamen from behind trees shooting at stupid redcoats marching in lockstep in the open. Which of course, is nonsense.

I have read a great deal about the American Revolution and George Washington often found the militia more of a hindrance than a help and as for guerrillas, there were just as many guerrillas on the Loyalist, pro-British side, both in the South and in New York colony.

In fact, it was only when Washington managed to create a professional regular military force with the aid of such European advisors as Baron von Stueben was he finally able to meet the British on equal terms and ultimately cause them to withdraw from America.

Saratoga was not a guerrilla victory. Trenton and Princeton were not guerrilla victories. Cowpens was not a guerrilla victory. The final victory at Yorktown was a successful old-fashioned formal European-type siege of a fortress.

But these myths die hard. Why there are even those who think that South Vietnam fell to Viet Cong guerrillas, rather than to a conventional 20th century armored invasion of North Vietnamese regular troops!

Irregular troops can be a nuisance, but they can't defeat regular military forces unless the home government loses the will to support them. A lesson that we are hopefully now learning once again with the surge in Iraq.

John Ferling: As you will see when you read the book, I think you will see that I didn't romanticize the role of the militia. However, I did try to correct the notion advanced by Washington in particular that the militia was by and large useless. They not only played a crucial role in pacifying the homefront, but I doubt that the British regulars who fought American militiamen at Bunker Hill or in the two Saratoga engagements, or the Loyalists who tangled with militiamen at Cowpens, would have been inclined to agree with Washington.

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John Ferling: I want to thank you for your questions. It has been fun for me and hopefully for you too.

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