Readers joined Washington Post military reporter Thomas E. Ricks on Tuesday, Jan. 15 at noon ET to discuss the debate in Washington among government, military and intelligence officials about what course to follow in Iraq.

The transcript follows.

More coverage of The War Over the War| War Over the War discussion transcripts

Tom Ricks' Inbox

Ricks has covered the U.S. military for The Washington Post since 2000. Until the end of 1999 he had the same beat at the Wall Street Journal, where he was a reporter for 17 years. His book, " Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq" was published in July 2006.

____________________

Thomas E. Ricks: Hello again. I'm surprised that you haven't all migrated to the economic chat room. Supposedly the Iraq war is over. I just don't think so. Yes, security is improved. But the basic questions about the future of Iraq--such as how political power is to be distributed and exercised--are not yet settled.

_______________________

Buenos Aires, Argentina: Supporters of the war say things have improved in Iraq because the Administration's strategy -- the surge -- is working. Critics say things have quieted down because the Iraqis finally are taking seriously the threat from Democrats to pull out. Who's right, in your opinion?

Thomas E. Ricks: Hello, Buenos Aires!

I think both are right. The surge is working tactically -- that is, it has improved security. It has yet to succeed strategically -- that is, to produce the political accommodation or reconciliation that was its goal.

To break it down further, I think there are three reasons security has improved. One is the increase in U.S. troop numbers and more importantly moving those troops out into the population and making protecting that population their top priority. A second reason is that ethnic cleansing largely was completed in Baghdad. A third is the decision of many Sunni tribes to turn on al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Why have those Sunni tribes turned? One theory is that they recognized that the U.S. is going to leave Iraq sooner or later, and that they needed to cut the best deal they could -- or organize themselves militarily to withstand a hostile Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad.

_______________________

The U.S. Homeland: How much money does the U.S. have to borrow from China every month to pay for Iraq? Is the U.S. military still hunting for alleged Sept. 11 conspirator Osama Bin Laden, or for the U.S. military-grade anthrax terrorist?

Thomas E. Ricks: On Osama, yes. On anthrax, dunno.

On the borrowing: China is the second-largest holder of U.S. securities, totaling $699 billion. (That includes U.S. government debt, U.S. corporate debt, and U.S. equities.) Out of that total, China's holdings of U.S. Treasury securities amounts to $388 billion.

Oddly, that second number is probably close to the total cost of the Iraq war so far.

_______________________

Richmond, Va.: The two party's candidates are lining up like this: Democrats will take our troops out of Iraq (though Clinton will leave some people in their for a while), and the Republicans can see leaving them in for a long time (McCain says "100 years if necessary"). So, will the drawdown or status quo really make a difference, or will Bush find some way to wrap up this war before the election so that it doesn't become an issue for either side?

Thomas E. Ricks: I really doubt the war will be over by the end of the Bush Administration. I had breakfast yesterday with an Army officer who just got home from 15 months in Baghdad. I've known him a long time and have found him to be a calm, clear thinker. He said the situation there is a lot more tenuous than people back here seem to think.

_______________________

Freising, Germany: I've got a question about the so called "blood feuds" between Arabs, which have set the Sunni Arabs opposing al-Qaeda against the Sunni Arabs aligned with al-Qaeda. Are these blood feuds, which apparently last for generations, considered only to be between Sunni Arabs, or are there blood feuds between Sunni and Shiite Arabs? Have blood feuds been declared against U.S. and Western troops? If these blood feuds are such a fundamental and long-lasting fact of Arab life, they could turn out to be somewhat of a two-edged sword, don't you think?

Thomas E. Ricks: This is more a comment than a question, so I will just pass it on. At any rate, I really don't know enough about Arab culture to speak intelligently to this.

_______________________

Minneapolis: Tom, why do so many people think the surge is creating more security when the Mahdi Army is still on a six-month break? Don't we have to wait until that six months is up until we know?

Thomas E. Ricks: Well, in Iraq, everything is conditional. Six months of peace from one faction ain't bad, especially if he indicates a willingness to renew it.

_______________________

Fairfax, Va.: This is probably a basic question, but how much longer does the "surge" last? I recall last year there were reports of the military being at a "breaking point." Will violence ramp up as those additional troops are withdrawn (assuming they are withdrawn)?

Thomas E. Ricks: You should be a foreign correspondent! I was just discussing this question with my smart and talented editor, Carlos Lozada. Those are the right questions to ask this spring as the U.S. troop numbers come down by about 5,000 a month, if they go according to plan.

_______________________

Vienna, Va.: Hello Mr. Ricks. I don't know if you ever read George W. Allen's excellent book "None So Blind" (written before Sept. 11) but in his book he listed as one of the critical failings of the Vietnam War the lack of a cohesive counterinsurgency program, such as that successfully conducted by the British in Malaysia from the late 1940s into the 1950s. This combined intelligence, military and political assets and initiatives at all levels of command and control.

To me, this stands in stark contrast to the ad hoc approach in Iraq of on the one hand creating Sunni "Awakening" organizations at the grassroots level, while on the other hand facing a mainly Shiite government that is highly distrustful of this effort by U.S. Forces. In addition, the so-called Reconciliation Act is described by some in Iraq as a punitive law (I have read that some remaining Sunni members attending Parliament walked out).

Please excuse the history essay, but aren't these disconnects (top-down versus grassroots) more a harbinger of potential failure, rather than a cause for optimism in avoiding a resumption of sectarian strife, given that military deployment schedules will force the reduction of U.S. forces in the near future? Or is this attitude too pessimistic?

Thomas E. Ricks: Again, more a comment than a question. I haven't read the Allen book but will keep an eye out for it.

One of the comments I heard from Vietnam vets during the first few years of the war was that they did counterinsurgency better than it was done in Iraq. I think only in the last year have we seen a genuine counterinsurgency strategy developed and implemented in Iraq.

And yes, one of the things I keep hearing from officers in Iraq is that things still could fall apart badly.

_______________________

San Clemente, Calif.: Thank you Mr. Ricks for the discussion today. I really enjoy it when you do these chats and I only wish you could do them more often. The latest revelations about bad behavior by the bad boys at Blackwater -- gassing U.S. troops at a checkpoint and destroying evidence from the Sept. 16 massacre -- prompted me to reread the article you wrote in September, " Private Security Puts, Diplomats, Military at Odds."

There have not been any really bad incidents involving Blackwater since the State Department put them on a short leash, which begs the question "why wasn't it done sooner?" Is the Defense Department satisfied now and ready to put the matter to rest? The whole event seems to have gone down a rabbit hole. On C-SPAN, when asked if any of the "shooters" would be held accountable, Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis turned a sickly green and started mumbling about "gray areas." Is he telegraphing the answer?

Finally, three of the most stunningly incompetent boobs overseeing Blackwater -- Cookie Krongard, Kevin Barry and Richard Griffin -- all have resigned, though not before reportedly getting large cash bonuses for doing a heckuva job. Do you think any more heads at State will roll (or at least deserve to)? The extent to which the Department of State was so indifferent to Blackwater's abuses of ordinary Iraqis still seems breathtaking.

Thomas E. Ricks: One of the oddities of the US war in Iraq is that there has been no one in charge. Even now, we have a bifurcated command structure, with Ambassador. Crocker overseeing the U.S. civilian effort and Gen. Petraeus overseeing the U.S. military mission. The lines of authority only meet 6,000 miles away, in the White House.

This command arrangement violates the military maxim of "unity of command." Crocker and Petraeus appear to work very well together, but that is a band-aid solution. The structure also violates the basic counterinsurgency principle of having one official oversee and guide the entire campaign. David Galula, the Clausewitz of counterinsurgency, recommends that not only there be one person in charge, but that that person be a civilian, because ultimately everything must be judged in political terms, even military operations.

I suspect that as long as we have this screwy structure, things like Blackwater will fall between the cracks.

_______________________

Angers, France: Hi. Apart from the hoopla of campaign slogans, how much room will the next administration have to fashion policy regarding Iraq? Thanks for your reporting, which my family considers the best and most responsible.

Thomas E. Ricks: You are welcome! I am impressed by how many questions are coming from overseas today--Argentina, Germany, France. Odd that the American public seems to be turning its attention away.

To answer your question, I suspect that any future administration will have surprisingly little room for maneuver, because the new officials will be inheriting a history and a series of decisions. But my bigger worry is that while the transition of power is underway, and new officials go through the confirmation process, U.S. policy simply goes on hold for six to nine months. That is a long time in a war.

_______________________

Arlington, Va.: Assuming the Shia and Sunni play nice for a while and the external terrorists are held in check and we withdraw from Iraq in the next two or three years -- what would happen with the other regional powers (thinking Iran, Saudi, Syria) if shortly thereafter the Shia started really oppressing the Sunni minority? Would anyone (Saudi, Syria) care enough to act militarily?

Thomas E. Ricks: I don't know. But I think it is unrealistic to expect U.S. troops to be out of Iraq in three years. I expect we will have troops there for a looong time.

_______________________

Kansas City, Mo.: This is a serious question: What prompted the surge? The 2006 election, problems on the ground? I thought it was conservatives who thought the 2006 election hinged on Iraq and believed a change in course was needed.

Thomas E. Ricks: I think what prompted the surge was the realization by top Bush administration officials in late 2006 that if they stayed the course on their approach, the war was going to end very badly.

So after the election, you saw not just Defense Secretary Rumsfeld fired, but a new team of commanders -- Admiral Fallon at Central Command, Gens. Petraeus and Odierno in Iraq.

And they implemented a radically different strategy.

_______________________

Rockville, Md.: If only people remembered Vietnam, they would know that most of the war was taken up with the periods between battle seasons. It was not nonstop fighting. Few fought in the rainy season. But it did move to a conclusion. Also, we might find an Iraqi solution that does not fit our definition of a strategic victory. Perhaps that will suit us -- all but the few who need to lose for political reasons or are just being stubborn. But I will stick to one of my older slogans -- "if you can not imagine what will happen, it will happen in a way you can not imagine." Best wishes!

Thomas E. Ricks: Here's a comment.

_______________________

Kingston, Ontario: Mr Ricks: Is it your sense that the U.S. embassy in Baghdad has any real insight into or influence over the political maneuverings in the country? While all the attention goes on what the terrorists and insurgents do, the Americans' allies are perhaps just as much of a problem. They have their own agendas and are using the U.S. for their own purposes.

Thomas E. Ricks: Hello, Canada! Are you in the Canadian Defense Forces war college in Kingston?

My impression is that U.S. officials in Iraq have a far better understanding of events than they did a few years ago. I used to hate going into the Green Zone because of all the nonsense I'd hear. (I mean, reporters were risking their lives to cross the city, go through an entrance where bombs were being detonated, and then listen to a briefer who never went outside tell us how safe the city was!)

By contrast, last May I was in the Green Zone listening to one of Gen. Petraeus' advisors describe the taxonomy of Sunni and Shiite violence, and I thought, "This guy not only understand the situation in Baghdad better than I do, he is articulating it better than I can." That was a novel feeling.

That said, yes, we still often are playing catch-up ball. But I think, that Americans understand that everyone in Iraq has their own agendas. Why should we expect them not to?

_______________________

Philadelphia: Mr. Ricks, can you offer any observations of the military at this point regarding the (seemingly obvious) disconnect between their experiences and those of the general U.S. population in regards to Iraq/Afghanistan? Potential repercussions?

Thomas E. Ricks: I am not sure what you mean by this -- could you elaborate?

Thanks.

_______________________

San Clemente, Calif.: I have some Marine friends, noncommissioned officers. In their letters to me they sound almost giddy at their success in Anbar. They say they are getting tired of handing out candy and soccer balls and are ready to get over to Afghanistan. Is there some disconnect in the assessment of the situation between the troops and their officers, or is it an Army/Marine thing?

Thomas E. Ricks: Anbar is different. I think it always has been and always will be.

Anbar has gone from being a hellhole of violence to quieter than Baghdad. The biggest worry for Marines there seems to be boredom.

But how long will be the Sunnis of Anbar wait for a political breakthrough? I remember an officer in the 1st Cavalry Division telling me that one ex-insurgent leader told him that as soon as his group was finished fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq, it would turn its weapons on the Baghdad government.

_______________________

Hamilton, N.Y.: If the surge really has proven anything. isn't it that a unity government isn't going to happen? It seems to me that everyone (the U.S., al-Qaeda in Iraq, Shias, etc.) is just waiting until we can pull out. Or am I just a cynical schmuck?

Thomas E. Ricks: We are in unexplored territory. The theory of the surge was that it would have led to a political breakthrough by now. That hasn't happened. So what next? If a breakthrough didn't happen when we had troops all over the streets, will it happen as we cut troop numbers?

Or will the prospect of a Democratic president force the Shiite government to nail down a compromise?

I don't know. But I think this year is going to be the most interesting one in the war.

_______________________

Arab culture: Isn't our fundamental problem in the Middle East -- and specifically in Iraq where we have invested so much of our blood, treasure and reputation -- the fact that we don't understand Arab culture well? For instance, how can we predict when an Iraqi army will be able to defend the country internally and externally when we don't have a good understanding of basic Sunni-Shia conflicts that divide the country or how/when they can be resolved to the degree to have a functioning army (separate and more fundamental to the question of equipping and training any army)? Does the irony of your response strike you as symbolic of our troubles in Iraq and the Middle East?

Thomas E. Ricks: This is mainly a comment. But I do want to say that my previous response on Arab culture wasn't mean to be ironic. I've lived in Afghanistan and traveled all over the Middle East, but I don't know enough about Arab culture to comment intelligently.

I do think the U.S. government -- and especially the military -- has a better feel for tribes and culture than they did four years ago. Equally important, U.S. officials have stopped trying to change the culture and instead try to work with it -- for example, empowering sheikhs.

_______________________

Thomas E. Ricks: You guys are making me feel ignorant today. There are a bunch of questions about oil, electricity and civilian Iraqi society that I just don't feel equipped to answer. (Despite my ability to cite data on Chinese investment in U.S. government securities -- that was just lucky, because this morning I got a U.S. government reporter on the issue.)

So, to all those people with questions about Iraqi infrastructure issues, I'd recommend asking my colleague Karen DeYoung the next time she does a chat. Or a member of our Baghdad bureau if one of them does one.

_______________________

Chicago: Tom, have you read "A Savage War of Peace" by Alistair Horne? Do you see any parallels between the Algerian war of independence and the current conflict in Iraq?

Thomas E. Ricks: Oh yeah, that book is a favorite of mine. The parallels are scary. In both cases, a Western military chased guerillas and terrorists in an urban and rural Arab society. Both began in very ham-fisted ways. Both wars alienated their domestic publics, especially as news of tortured detainees seeped out.

But over the last year we've had a major point of departure. In Algeria, the French military intensified harsh tactics, and won the battle of Algiers while losing the support of the French people. In Baghdad, the U.S. military changed tactics and began protecting the people.

_______________________

Ottawa, Canada: In the article today about Afghanistan it's mentioned that there is a division between the U.S. and Britain over the best way to handle an insurgency. This disagreement apparently started in Iraq. How important are the disagreements between the U.S. and its allies, and will they spill over into Afghanistan?

Thomas E. Ricks: Another Canada question!

I think the disagreements are pretty significant. I think Afghanistan may be the place that really tests the future of NATO -- whether it will be an effective organization, or a modern version of the League of Nations.

_______________________

Kingston, Ontario: Re the Iraqis having their own agendas ... yes, of course they do, but didn't it take the U.S. a long time to grasp that? There was that silly talk from the White House about waiting for the Iraqi Jefferson and Madison. However, what prospect is there that a Shia-dominated Iraq ever could play the role of anti-Iranian counterweight that Bush expects? What really is needed is a Sunni strongman in Iraq. Oh, wait a minute ...

Thomas E. Ricks: I think that what U.S. officials would love to see is someone emerge who transcends sectarian differences. An Iraqi version of Nelson Mandela, if you will.

Failing that, I think they privately are hoping that local Iraqi politics will begin to produce a new generation of political leaders who can move beyond the mentality of exiles who were savaged by Saddam Hussein.

But yeah, that can take a long time.

In the afterworld to my book "Fiasco" I talk about your strongman scenario. It worries me.

_______________________

Thomas E. Ricks: Thanks for all your questions. I am outta here.

_______________________

Editor's Note: washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions. washingtonpost.com is not responsible for any content posted by third parties.