Russians Elect Putin Successor

Washington Post Moscow bureau chief Peter Finn was online Monday, March 3 at 10 a.m. ET to examine the results of Russia's presidential election and its impact on U.S.-Russian relations, continuing fallout from Kosovo's declaration of independence and more.

Read Finn's reports and find full coverage of Russia's elections.

The transcript follows.

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Peter Finn: Greetings from Moscow where a wet snow has been falling on and off all day. Your reporter has a bad flu so I hope you'll be forgiving if any answers seem like the result of a fever. Let's get started.

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Harrogate, U.K.: The British Sunday Times reports that president-elect Medvedev strongly has criticized the Russian judiciary, saying it must be reformed to put an end to "legal nihilism." As a conscientious lawyer, is there a chance that as president he will call for a review of contentious cases? I am thinking particularly of the manipulation of the judicial system which led to the imprisonment, following a show trial, of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, and the new unreal charges now being cynically brought against them.

Peter Finn: This is one of a number of broadly similar questions about Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, the Yukos Oil Company executives who are serving prison terms after trials that critics charged were politically motivated. It's worth remembering that Alexander Voloshin, former head of the presidential administration, resigned when Khodorkovsky was arrested. Medvedev replaced him, and to date Medvedev has shown no willingness to question the prosecution. Whether he might harbor private doubts and act on them, I frankly don't know, but I doubt he will do anything quickly as his first priority.

If it is to be a genuinely Medvedev presidency -- as distinct from Putin ruling from the prime minister's office -- he will take some time before making any controversial decisions that break with the Putin era. Re-examining the Khodorkovsky case or releasing them certainly would be that. There are reports here that Voloshin has been advising Medvedev and might take a position in the new presidential administration. We'll see. But that might augur well for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev.

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Lincoln, Neb.: In my opinion, Medvedev easily could win the election even if there were a bona fide opposition and a free press. Why then has Putin and his party done everything they could to rig the election in Medvedev's favor? Are they afraid of a Russian "Orange Revolution"?

Peter Finn: This really is a question a lot of people have puzzled over. It's widely acknowledged that Medvedev would have won -- as United Russia would have won the parliamentary elections last December -- in any circumstance. Putin is genuinely popular, and that rubs off on the party he backs and Medvedev. Why then the stifling of the opposition, the biased media coverage, the electoral laws that make it difficult for opponents to challenge?

I think the Orange Revolution in Ukraine had a profound effect here, and engendered some degree of paranoia that Russia could be destabilized. And the Orange Revolution is routinely portrayed as an external plot, not the popular feeling of those Ukrainians who came out on to the streets. I think after that, nothing was to be left to chance here, and stability above all was the governing principle. Whether things will change, and whether Medvedev can show more self-confidence in his appeal remains to be seen, like almost every part of what is to come in his presidency. We don't know how he will govern.

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Miami: Has the expansion of NATO -- and talk of Georgia and the Ukraine joining the organization -- along with possible U.S. missiles in the Czech Republic or Poland and U.S. recognition of Kosovo resulted in a resurgent Russian nationalism that has helped Putin stay in power?

Peter Finn: I think Putin has remained popular for many reasons, not least the increased prosperity of the country and the sense among many Russians that they are doing better, that their country is stable, and that the future -- for the first time in a long time -- looks better. Expansion of NATO is a sore point here, especially the prospect that Ukraine might join. It is hard to underestimate the effect that will have in the country because, of the bonds that Russians see between the two countries. A nationalist backlash to NATO expansion, as well as host of other issues -- including missile defense -- runs deep  and Putin effectively has galvanized Russian public opinion on these issues. But they are issues, I believe, that most any Russian leader would find himself taking a similar position on. Medvedev may adopt a milder tone when addressing the West and articulating Russian interests and concerns, but I don't expect any substantive change on major questions such as NATO, missile defense, Kosovo, etc. It will be interesting to see what Putin says when he attends an upcoming joint NATO-Russia meeting in Romania, one of his last international events.

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Durham, N.C.: Quick question: Do we know if Bush has called Medvedev to congratulate him? I know several of the European countries already did this.

Peter Finn: Quick answer: I don't think so, although I noticed a statement out of Washington. I imagine a phone call will follow pretty quickly. It was interesting to see Gordon Brown of Great Britain call quickly, given the poor state of British-Russian relations. There is obviously some sense in London that perhaps there can be a new beginning with Mr. Medvedev.

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Arlington, Va.: Russia's resurgent wealth and accompanying bellicosity would seem to ring a bit hollow unless the elite put some real resources into the manufacturing sectors and introduce some real military reform. Can we tell yet to what degree the elite will allow this kind of investment, or whether Medvedev will be able to introduce the needed reforms?

Peter Finn: Medvedev as first deputy prime minister for the past couple of years has been in charge of dramatically boosting spending and improving troubled sectors, such as education, health care, housing and agriculture. That's likely to continue, but now he will be ordering the prime minister (Putin) and his ministers to do it. That kind of spending is likely to increase, and some of those sectors are in such bad shape that it will take some time to see real changes. Medvedev seems skeptical of the state's increasing role in Russia's economy and also has said he may replace state officials with independent directors in state-controlled companies.

I think he has a sense that the economy has to diversify, that it cannot always rely on the high price of oil to fuel growth, and that much of that diversification must be driven by the private sector, not bureaucrats. Whether he can overcome the statist impulses of the past few years remains to be seen. Economic growth, as he has acknowledged, also is impeded by a culture of corruption, where a start-up businessman faced endless extortion. Putin also railed against this, but in the end seemed unable to reverse it.

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Arlington, Va.: Dobryi vecher. Of course I do not recognize the Russian presidential election as anything resembling a free and unfettered election that the West would consider legitimate, but I would have to take issue with you (or The Post's) characterization of Medvedev as a "shadowy" figure. We are talking about a man whose professional life, or most of it, has been spent in the post-Soviet world. He has been discussed as a possible successor to Putin for at least three years. He has been the chairman of one of the largest, wealthiest companies in the world. Perhaps there are unknowns about him, as there are with any leader, but why pull out this chestnut? Compared to the amount we knew about Vladimir Putin when he was anointed by Boris Yeltsin as his successor, Dmitry Medvedev's life has been an open book.

Peter Finn: I'll agree with you that it perhaps wasn't the best choice of word for the headline -- suggesting, as it did, something sinister when the thrust of the article was that there is much we don't know about him, what he thought about the increased restriction of political competition under Putin and how he might differ as president.

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Fairfax, Va.: I don't get it. Is Putin stepping down now, or eventually? Is Medvedev the heir-apparent or will there be some kind of co-presidency/prime ministership now?

Peter Finn: You're not alone in not getting it! Medvedev will become president on May 7 when Putin's second term ends. Medvedev and Putin have agreed that Putin then will become prime minister, a subservient position under the constitution. Prime ministers have been hired and fired at will by Russian presidents. Whether this is a temporary situation while Medvedev consolidates his rule, or a mechanism for Putin to continue to rule and eventually return to the Kremlin, or some kind of new power-sharing arrangement, we don't know. I don't think it will last, whether the ending is voluntary or stems from a clash. I tend to think -- and it's purely speculative on my part -- that Putin eventually will move on when he is confident that Medvedev is unchallenged and unchallengeable within the elite, which has a number of powerful factions.

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Warsaw, Poland: Do you think that Medvedev's experience in management (Gazprom) will impact Russian policy, or the way they about policy?

Peter Finn: I think Medvedev's background as a lawyer and chairman of Gazprom endows him with great management skills. What we know less about are his political beliefs and how they will affect his term as president. On major issues -- the Yukos prosecution, changes in electoral law -- we don't know where he stood in any Kremlin debates, if such occurred. Curiosity now is centered on how his presidency will differ, and if it will differ from Putin's. But as I said earlier, any major shifts will be slow in coming -- perhaps not until he is at least a year or two into his presidency.

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New York: Putin loyalists are fond of saying that anyone opposing the current regime is a tool of the U.S. and the West. Of course, this also was said of Sakharov, Brodsky and Solzhenitsyn. Can you estimate what percentage of the Rus-sian population supports the dissidents of today?

Peter Finn: Very few. The opposition is internally divided and seems incapable of uniting, and this of course is an element in their inability to draw any significant popular support. Whether the prospect of extinction can galvanize them is an open question. Whether they would be allowed to become effective if they showed some inclination to do so is also pertinent, given the generally hostile reaction here to those who oppose the authorities. That will be one of the more interesting things to watch under Medvedev: Will there be some relaxation of the tight control of political activism, particularly activism that challenges the authorities? We shall see.

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Aldie, Va.: Mr. Finn, what are your observations about restrictions on the press in Russia? As a reporter do you feel compelled to take personal precautions that wouldn't be necessary in other countries?

Peter Finn: Restrictions on the press generally apply to those parts of the Russian media that the Kremlin believes are critical to mobilizing the electorate. Firstly, and most importantly, television -- which with the partial exception of REN-TV is embarrassing, even to some who work there. There are very good newspapers, magazines and of course Ekho Moskvy, the very lively radio station, which, ironically, is owned by GazpromMedia. Some of the most open and bracing political discussion in Russia is now on the Internet. It's not a uniform picture of censorship, in other words, but those parts of the media deemed critical by the Kremlin are tightly-controlled or staffed with people who know only the most slavish coverage is acceptable.

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Columbia, Md.: As practical matter, to what degree do you think that the incoming president-elect be will be able to name -- and thereafter lead -- his (i.e., Mr. Putin's) government (e.g. the "Power Ministries": Interior, Defense, Federal Security Bureau, etc.)? Or do you think his role is/will be to "wow" us in the West with his obvious personal charm when he visits Paris, Berlin, London, Tokyo and Washington, leaving the day-to-day task of running (ruling) Russia to Mr. Putin?

Peter Finn: I think there is no certainty on any questions about how Medvedev will act, or what kind of power he will exercise. It is his constitutional right to name the government, but obviously -- at least at the beginning -- he will be working with Putin. Will he inform him who he wants in the power ministries? I don't know. Eventually, as I've argued earlier, he will stamp his own personality on the system. How long that will take I don't know, and I could be completely wrong. That's why Russia will remain a fascinating place to cover. People will be puzzling over the Medvedev-Putin relationship for some time.

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Arlington, Va.: In 2000, Russians were assessing Putin's rise to power with the observation that this was the historic pattern, and that there would be about 20 years of authoritarianism before democracy would be given another real opportunity in Russia. Do many Russians still believe that they are on this schedule, or has that horizon become still more distant?

Peter Finn: The Kremlin has argued that Russia is on its own path to democracy, and that it is a difficult task after 75 years of totalitarianism and what it calls the chaos of the 1990s. The invocation of the Yeltsin years to explain if not excuse some of the political control Putin ushered in has passed its use-by date, I would argue. The Putin years are ending, and it becomes self-serving to keep talking about the 1990s and Yeltsin. We are now into a Medvedev presidency. The country is stable and much richer. The questions is, will Medvedev allow greater political pluralism?

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Trinidad: Is there anything Vladimir Putin can or will do to change the constitution so he can solidify his power?

Peter Finn: Putin consistently has said he would not change the constitution. That first chance came up when a third term for him was mooted. He didn't. And now he says he will not change it to strengthen the office of prime minister vis a vis the president. I think we should take him at his word on this.

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Paris: What proportion of ordinary Russians are aware of Bush administration policies concerning military agreements with states near or bordering Russia, and Vladimir Putin's objections to those agreements? In general, do many Russians consider the policies of the Bush administration vis-a-vis Russia to be provocative in nature?

Peter Finn: Russians are quite keyed into these issues. Russians are suspicious of the U.S. and hostile to policies on NATO, missile defense and, most recently, Kosovo. Anti-Americanism has grown in the four years I have been here.

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Riga, Latvia: While wealth has grown in Russia and nascent middle- and upper classes have appeared (in addition to the very wealthy elite), mass poverty and material deprivation are still a problem. Has Medvedev shown any interest in this issue? Would his policy leanings be more neoliberal or socialist (or something else)?

Peter Finn: I think Medvedev has spent much of the past two or more years working on issues such as housing, health care and demography, and I think he sees improving the economic well-being of Russians as a major priority. He's probably more liberal than many in the Kremlin on economic issues.

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Peter Finn: The hour is up and I must go. I thank you all for your questions and apologize to those whose questions I didn't get to. Hope to do this again soon. Poka!

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