Aug. 16, 1992: A trip through northern Bosnia leaves me grimly pessimistic, convinced that the situation in what was Yugoslavia is far worse than the United States and Western Europe yet realize.
Sept. 28, 1997: Henry Kissinger minimizes what already has been achieved in Bosnia and advocates a course of action that could not only result in a possible resumption of hostilities but also undermine America's commitment to European security.
May 8, 2000: We ignore millions who are refugeees in their own countries.
June 12, 2001: This month's summit meeting of NATO leaders comes at a crucial time for the alliance. The common values NATO fought for in Bosnia and Kosovo are threatened by renewed ethnic violence. The impression exists that NATO is no longer fully committed to staying the course in the Balkans and making our joint investment in peace and self-sustaining stability work.
Oct. 28, 2001: Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or -- if you really want to be blunt -- propaganda. But whatever it is called, defining what this war is really about in the minds of the 1 billion Muslims in the world will be of decisive and historic importance.
Nov. 14, 2001: Now that the American-led effort in Afghanistan has achieved its first significant success -- the removal of the Taliban from Kabul -- four ingredients are essential to prevent the country from slipping back into anarchy of the sort that followed our last success there in 1989.
Jan. 2, 2002: The Sino-American relationship will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world during the next cycle of history, much as the U.S.-Soviet relationship dominated world affairs for most of the last half of the 20th century. Getting it right is vital for our national interests.
April 1, 2002: In Afghanistan, American strength and skill will win every military engagement. But those victories will be worth little in the long run if they are not followed up by a successful nation-building effort.
Aug. 27, 2002: The road to Baghdad runs through the United Nations Security Council. This simple truth must be recognized by the Bush administration if it wants the international support that is essential for success in Iraq.
Sept. 7, 2002: The U.S. should at least try to get U.N. Security Council approval before going after Iraq.
Jan. 23, 2003: The administration is now caught in a dangerous dilemma, partly because its military and diplomatic tracks are out of sync and partly because of its failure to maintain America's historical leadership role in its core alliances.
July 1, 2003: Newt Gingrich certainly has a way with words -- so much so, in fact, that even when he makes some thoughtful proposals -- in this case, for State Department reform -- his overheated attack rhetoric still overshadows his positive ideas.
April 4, 2004: There is one underlying constant: the failure of the world to recognize and confront the evil that is occurring, and to deny it the chance to unleash its full fury.
July 19, 2005: Had we not intervened -- belatedly but decisively -- a disaster would have taken place with serious consequences for our national security and the war on terrorism.