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Deposition of Bill Gates
August 28, 1998, Part A, Page 1

On Wednesday, April 28, 1999, the official transcript of the
deposition of Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates was released.

	6	                  Plaintiff, 	)
	7	         vs.	)   No. CIV 98-1232(TPJ) 
			)   (Morning Session)
	9	                  Defendant. 	)            
10		)                              
14	BILL GATES, a witness herein, taken on behalf of the
15	plaintiffs at 9:09 a.m., Friday, August 28, 1998, at
16	One Microsoft Way, Redmond, Washington, before
17	Kathleen E. Barney, CSR, pursuant to Subpoena.  
		Kathleen E. Barney, 
24	CSR No. 5698
		Our File No. 1-49006
			450 Golden Gate Avenue
	5		Box 36046
		San Francisco, California  94102              
6		(415) 436-6660
	8		80 Business Park Drive
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	9		(914) 273-9800   
13		One Microsoft Way              
			Redmond, Washington  98052
14		(425) 936-3103
16		125 Broad Street
			New York, New York 10004
17		(212) 558-3546
22		120 Broadway
			New York, New York 10271-0332        
23		(212) 416-8275    
			MICHEL CARTER, Video Operator    
	2			         I N D E X
	3	WITNESS	         EXAMINATION BY             	PAGE
	4	Bill Gates	         Mr. Boies	279
	8		365	E-mail from Bill Gates to Paul	299
			366	E-mail from Don Bradford to Ben	310
10			Waldman
11		367	E-mail from Ben Waldman to Greg	315
			368	E-mail from Bill Gates to Ben	316 
13			Waldman
14		369	Series of e-mails, the first of	327
				which is from Joachim Kempin to
15			Bill Gates
16		370	E-mail from Don Bradford to various  350
			371	Series of e-mails, the first of	354
18			which is from Paul Maritz to Bill
				Gates and Bob Muglia
	1		       BILL GATES,
	2	a witness herein, having been duly sworn, was deposed
	3	and testified further as follows:
	5		 EXAMINATION (Continued)
	6	BY MR. BOIES:  
	7	       Q.	Good morning, Mr. Gates.  
	8		Are you going to be a witness at the
	9	trial of this matter?
10		MR. HEINER:  Objection.
11		THE WITNESS:  I don't know.
12	       Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  Do you intend to be a
13	witness at the trial of this matter?  
14		MR. HEINER:  Objection to this line of
15	questioning.  The witness list comes out next week
16	and there is a court order in place on this.
17		MR. BOIES:  I'm entitled to ask the
18	witness whether he intends to appear at trial.  You
19	people have certainly done that with witnesses.  I
20	think it is a common question.  If you instruct him
21	not to answer, you can instruct him not to answer.  
22		MR. HEINER:  I haven't done that.  I've
23	posed an objection.
24	       Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  Do you intend to be a
25	witness at trial?
	1		A.	I don't know.
	2		Q.	All right.
	3			MR. BOIES:  And the purpose, obviously,
	4	was because if we knew whether he was going to be a
	5	witness at trial, that might shorten and change the
	6	examination.  It's a common question.  I don't know
	7	why you object to it.
	8		Q.	Mr. Gates, when did you first become
	9	concerned about the competitive threat that Netscape
10	posed to Microsoft?
11		A.	I know by late '95 we were thinking of
12	Netscape as one of our many competitors, so I think
13	it would have been around then.
14		Q.	When did you first become concerned
15	about the competitive threat that Java posed to
16	Microsoft?
17		A.	Well, Java as a computer language does
18	not pose a competitive threat to Microsoft.  There is
19	some runtime work that various people, companies are
20	doing with different APIs, including Sun, that
21	represent platform competition.  So you have to be
22	careful about how you talk about Java.
23		Q.	Do you talk about Java as a competitive
24	threat to Microsoft, Mr. Gates?
25		A.	There's a lot of documents and
	1	understanding inside Microsoft that Java the
	2	language, which if you take the term Java on the face
	3	of it and then in some context that it refers to,
	4	that that is not a competitive threat.  In fact, we
	5	are the leading vendor of Java language development
	6	tools.  Sometimes in the right context when people
	7	use that term, they're talking about various runtime
	8	activities.  But, you know, you have to look pretty
	9	carefully at the context.
10		Q.	My question right now doesn't go to
11	what various people within Microsoft have said or
12	believe.  My question goes to what you have said.  Do
13	you refer -- have you referred to Java as a
14	competitive threat to Microsoft?
15		A.	The Java runtime activities are a
16	competitive threat to Microsoft.  Java itself is not. 
17	So if I use the term Java that way, I'm careful to
18	make sure people know I'm talking about the runtime
19	piece.
20		Q.	Have you sometimes as a shorthand
21	referred to Java, as opposed to what you now say as
22	the Java runtime activities, as a competitive threat
23	to Microsoft?
24		A.	I may have if I made it clear what I
25	meant.
	1		Q.	And by making it clear what you meant,
	2	can you explain what you mean by that?
	3		A.	To draw the distinction between Java
	4	the language and the runtime activities around Java,
	5	the APIs being created there by various companies.
	6		Q.	Have you received e-mail from people
	7	that described Java as a competitive threat to
	8	Microsoft?
	9		A.	Well, inside Microsoft the context of
10	the various pieces of Java, including in a lot more
11	detail than I've had a chance to explain to you so
12	far, is well understood.  And so we use a lot of
13	shorthands for a lot of things that confuse people
14	who just look at the e-mails.
15			MR. BOIES:  Can I have the question
16	read back, please.
17			(Record read.) 
18			THE WITNESS:  Under the scenario I
19	described, it's possible that people would do that in
20	e-mail.
21		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  When you say "under the
22	scenario that I described," what scenario are you
23	talking about?
24		A.	The scenario is people inside Microsoft
25	who have an understanding of the various pieces of
	1	Java who are communicating with each other.
	2		Q.	Let me try to be clear.  My question
	3	does not encompass any scenario.  My question is
	4	simply have you received e-mail from people within
	5	Microsoft that described Java as a competitive threat
	6	or assert that Java is a competitive threat to
	7	Microsoft?  
	8			MR. HEINER:  Objection.  You have a
	9	very full answer, precise and clear, to that
10	question.  The witness may answer again.
11			THE WITNESS:  Yeah, I've described the
12	circumstances under which it's possible I've gotten
13	an e-mail like that.
14		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  My question is not what
15	are the circumstances under which it is possible that
16	that happened.  My question is have you received
17	e-mail from people in Microsoft that assert that Java
18	is a competitive threat to Microsoft?
19		A.	It's possible there is someone who,
20	having the right context about the pieces that are
21	entailed in Java, may have used that as a shorthand
22	for the piece we consider a competitive threat.
23		Q.	My question is not what is possible but
24	what you recall.  If you don't recall ever receiving
25	an e-mail in which somebody from Microsoft asserted
	1	that Java was a competitive threat, that's an answer
	2	to my question.  You can say "Yes," "No," "I don't
	3	recall," but --
	4		A.	I don't recall a specific piece of
	5	mail.  I think there is a good chance I've received
	6	mail where somebody used that kind of shorthand.
	7		Q.	Now, have you used that kind of
	8	shorthand, that is, have you personally asserted that
	9	Java is a competitive threat to Microsoft?
10		A.	Well, I always object to -- you're
11	acting like the assertion stands by itself.  There is
12	a shorthand that I've told you about, so no, I've
13	never asserted that statement.  We use the term Java
14	in a variety of contexts and if you want to show me a
15	context, I'll answer.  But the assertion on the face
16	of it is wrong unless somebody is using the term Java
17	in a very special way.
18		Q.	What I'm asking you, Mr. Gates, is
19	whether you have used Java in what you described as
20	the very special way to refer, as a shorthand, to
21	whatever it is that you believe constitutes a
22	competitive threat to Microsoft?
23		A.	I don't remember a specific document
24	where I did, but I think it's quite likely that with
25	certain people I used that shorthand.
	1		Q.	Okay.  When you use Java as a shorthand
	2	in describing Java as a competitive threat to
	3	Microsoft, am I to understand that what you mean in
	4	that context is to refer to what you have described
	5	here as the Java runtime activities?
	6		A.	If you want to get into what we mean by
	7	the shorthand, you'll have to show me a specific
	8	context because sometimes it might mean EJB,
	9	sometimes it might just mean the VM, sometimes it
10	might mean AWT, sometimes it might mean JFC.  I mean
11	I'll be glad to clarify any particular case.  You
12	have to have the context.
13		Q.	If necessary we'll go through each one
14	context by context, although that's obviously a
15	lengthy procedure, but let me see if I can try to get
16	some general principles.  
17			When you refer to Java as a competitive
18	threat to Microsoft, what do you mean?
19		A.	I've told you it depends on the
20	context.
21		Q.	Why don't you list each of the
22	different things that you mean when you describe Java
23	as a competitive threat to Microsoft.  
24		A.	I don't know what you mean.  You're
25	asking me to recall every context where I might have
	1	ever used that shorthand?
	2		Q.	Well, I'm asking you to tell me every
	3	context that you do recall.
	4		A.	I've told you I don't recall any
	5	specific document where I've used the shorthand.  I
	6	can give you several contexts where it's very likely
	7	that I have.
	8		Q.	If that's the best you can do, let's
	9	start with that.
10		A.	Well, there's the context of server
11	middleware APIs and EJB discussion.  And people who
12	write three-tier applications, what APIs are they 
13	likely to develop their applications against.
14		Q.	And why does Java, in your view,
15	represent a competitive threat to Microsoft with
16	respect to server middleware or EJBs?
17		A.	I've told you that Java itself is not
18	the competitive threat.  I'm telling you the thing
19	that is the competitive threat, so when you rephrase
20	it to say Java is the competitive threat, that's just
21	the shorthand term.  The competitive threat is the
22	APIs and the EJB and the other middleware layers that
23	people are putting together.
24		Q.	Well, Mr. Gates, in your view does Java
25	play, itself, any role in what you view as a
	1	competitive threat to Microsoft?
	2		A.	Java the language?
	3		Q.	Yes, let's start with Java the
	4	language.  
	5		A.	No.
	6		Q.	When you refer to Java as a competitive
	7	threat, why do you use the word Java as shorthand for
	8	what you now say doesn't relate to Java?  
	9			MR. HEINER:  Objection.
10			THE WITNESS:  I didn't say that.  It
11	certainly relates to Java.  Java runtime relates to
12	Java.  I mean give me a break.
13			MR. BOIES:  Move to strike the answer
14	as nonresponsive.  
15			MR. HEINER:  Objection to the question 
16	as grossly misstating the prior testimony.  
17			MR. BOIES:  You can object all you
18	want, but if your object is to get this deposition
19	over with, I would suggest that you make your
20	objections before the question and not as a speech to
21	try to support the witness after the witness begins
22	to engage in that kind of colloquy.  
23			MR. HEINER:  It certainly was a short
24	speech, wasn't it?    
25		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  Mr. Gates, you know
	1	perfectly well that you and lots of other people
	2	within Microsoft describe Java, J-a-v-a, without
	3	talking about runtimes or EJBs or server middleware,
	4	but Java, J-a-v-a, as a competitive threat.  You know
	5	that, don't you?
	6		A.	I've told you that when we talk about
	7	the Java runtime threat, we often use Java as a
	8	shorthand for that.  We haven't come up with another
	9	term for the Java runtime competitive threat in its
10	various forms.
11		Q.	When did you first become concerned
12	about the Java runtime threat to Microsoft?
13		A.	Well, there have been a lot of changes
14	in the strategies of Sun and various people.  I know
15	there was talk about Java in the second half of '95
16	but, you know, I don't think we really understood
17	what the various people around were doing.  Sometime
18	in '96 when Sun was doing its promotion of writing
19	applications strictly to the Java runtime, to their
20	Java runtime, which is one of them, and in fact they
21	have multiple, then we would have looked at that as
22	something we needed to understand and decide how it
23	affected our strategy.
24		Q.	My question is not when you decided you
25	needed to look at Java to decide something.  My
	1	question is when did you first conclude that what you
	2	have referred to as the Java runtime threat was a
	3	competitive threat to Microsoft?  
	4		MR. HEINER:  Objection.
	5		THE WITNESS:  Well, it gets a little
	6	complicated because there's some even runtime pieces
	7	of Java that we support, but there are some things
	8	that people are doing in those runtimes that we have
	9	a different approach.  But that's all, you know, more
10	recent in terms of understanding how -- what our
11	products are going to do.
12	       Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  My question is when did
13	you first conclude that what you have described as
14	the Java runtime threat was a competitive threat to
15	Microsoft?
16	       A.	I think there was a lot of discussion
17	about what to do with Java and Java runtime things
18	and there was a part of what Sun was doing that by
19	late '96 we had decided not -- there were some
20	extensions they were doing in late '96 that we
21	thought of as competitive.
22	       Q.	Do I understand that last answer to be
23	that it would not have been until late 1996 that you
24	considered what you have described as the Java
25	runtime threat as a competitive threat to Microsoft?
	1		A.	Well, you use the word "conclude" and
	2	there's a long period of time where there is a lot of
	3	thinking about Java runtime inside Microsoft where
	4	people are going back and forth.  And some people
	5	will say hey, this is fine, it's not competitive and
	6	then somebody would say hey, maybe it is competitive. 
	7	So there's a lot of going back and forth.  So when
	8	you use the term "conclude," I assume you're talking
	9	about a point at which there is a clear opinion and
10	not just a lot of debate, you know, even -- you know,
11	my view being established.  And so then I think
12	you've got to go as late as late '96 before there's
13	much clarity at all.
14		Q.	I think you may have answered the
15	question, but I want to be sure because my question
16	relates not to what other people were saying within
17	Microsoft but what you believed.  And what I'm trying
18	to find out is when you, Bill Gates, first believed
19	that what you have described as the Java runtime
20	threat was a competitive threat to Microsoft?
21		A.	Well, you used the word "conclude"  
22	and --
23		Q.	Actually, in this last question I used
24	the word "believe."  
25		A.	So you're changing the question?
	1		Q.	Well, if believe and conclude is
	2	different for you, I'll ask it both ways.
	3		A.	Yeah, it's very different.  In late --
	4		Q.	Then let me ask the question so the
	5	record is clear what you're answering.  
	6		A.	You don't want to let me answer the
	7	last one?  
	8		Q.	If that's what you're going to answer,
	9	let's read the question back.  
10			Would you reincorporate the question so
11	the record is clear that what follows is intended to
12	be a response to this particular question.
13			(The record was read as follows:  
14			"Q.  I think you may have answered
15		the question but I want to be sure because my
16		question relates not to what other people were
17		saying within Microsoft but what you believed. 
18		And what I'm trying to find out is when you,
19		Bill Gates, first believed that what you have
20		described as the Java runtime threat was a
21		competitive threat to Microsoft?")
22			THE WITNESS:  In the first part of '96
23	there were -- I was getting a lot of different
24	opinions about Java runtime and what Sun was doing
25	and what we should do.  I wouldn't say that I
	1	believed firmly that it was a competitive threat
	2	because that all depended on what Sun was doing, what
	3	other companies were doing, and what we were going to
	4	do.  By late '96 I think we had -- or I had a view
	5	that what Sun was doing was a competitive activity.
	6		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  When you talk about
	7	having a view that what Sun was doing was a
	8	competitive activity, do you use the term "activity"
	9	to mean the same thing that you meant before when you
10	used the term "threat"?
11		A.	You were the one who used the term
12	"threat."  I'm not quite sure.  It was competitive. 
13	Is something that is competitive always a competitive
14	threat?  I'm not sure.
15		Q.	Mr. Gates, I think the record will
16	show, and if necessary we can go back to it, that you
17	used the term "Java runtime threat."  Do you recall
18	doing that?
19		A.	Yes.
20		Q.	Okay.  Now --
21		A.	That's not the same as competitive
22	threat.
23		Q.	Well, when you used the Java runtime
24	threat phrase, what did you mean by threat?
25		A.	I meant that it was competitive.
	1		Q.	And so you were using, in that context,
	2	threat and competitive to mean the same thing?
	3		A.	Yes.
	4		Q.	Okay.  Now, using threat in the same
	5	sense that you were using it to mean competitive, I
	6	want to ask what you said was the different question
	7	from what you believed.  When did you conclude that
	8	the Java runtime threat was a competitive threat to
	9	Microsoft?
10		A.	By late '96 I thought of it as
11	competitive.
12		Q.	And when you use the word "thought"
13	there, are you using it to mean what you have said
14	you meant by believe as well as what you said you
15	meant by conclude?
16		A.	I mean by then it was pretty clear to
17	me it was another thing we had to think of in terms
18	of the list of the competitors, as opposed to earlier
19	where I wasn't sure of that.
20		Q.	What did you do to try to respond to
21	what you have described as the Java runtime threat?
22		A.	The same thing we always do, just
23	innovate in our products and use the customer
24	feedback to delight them so that they choose to
25	license our products.
	1		Q.	Did you do anything else to try to
	2	respond to what you described as the Java runtime
	3	threat?
	4		A.	Well, we try to understand from
	5	customers what they're doing and how our strategy
	6	might appeal versus someone else's strategy and then
	7	go back and look at our strategy to see if we can
	8	make it better.
	9		Q.	Did you do anything else?
10		A.	I'm not sure what you mean.  I mean our
11	whole activity here, everything we do really comes
12	under what I just described.
13		Q.	Everything Microsoft does comes under
14	what you've described; is that your testimony, sir?
15		A.	Uh-huh.
16		Q.	Well, sir, does trying to undermine Sun
17	come within the activity that you've just described?  
18			MR. HEINER:  Objection.
19			THE WITNESS:  I don't know what you
20	mean by that.
21		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  You don't?
22		A.	No.
23		Q.	Have you ever had discussions within
24	Microsoft about the desirability of trying to
25	undermine Sun because of what Sun was doing in Java?
	1	       A.	I said to you part of our activity is
	2	to go out and work with customers to see what it
	3	takes to have them choose to license our products. 
	4	And that's in competition with many other companies,
	5	including Sun.
	6		MR. BOIES:  Would you read back the
	7	question, please.
	8		(Record read.) 
	9		THE WITNESS:  We've certainly had
10	discussions about making our products better than
11	Sun's and other competitors in any area that people
12	might think of them as desirable.
13		MR. BOIES:  Would you read the question
14	back, please.
15		(Record read.) 
16		MR. HEINER:  Mr. Gates, there is no
17	question pending now.  Mr. Boies is having the court
18	reporter read back repeatedly the same question, but
19	there is no question actually pending at the moment.
20		MR. BOIES:  The question that was read
21	back is pending, Mr. Heiner.
22		THE WITNESS:  I answered that question.  
23		MR. BOIES:  Would you read back the
24	question and the answer.
25		(The record was read as follows:  
	1			"Q.  Have you ever had discussions
	2		within Microsoft about the desirability of
	3		trying to undermine Sun because of what Sun
	4		was doing in Java?
	5			A.   I said to you part of our activity
	6		is to go out and work with customers to see
	7		what it takes to have them choose to license
	8		our products.  And that's in competition with
	9		many other companies, including Sun.")
10		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  I'm not now talking
11	about what you do in competition with other products
12	or other companies.  What I'm talking about is
13	whether or not you've had discussions with people
14	within Microsoft in which you talked about the need
15	to undermine Sun, using those words, if that will
16	help you, within Microsoft?
17		A.	I don't remember using those words.
18		Q.	You don't?
19		A.	No.
20		Q.	Do you think you did use those words or
21	you just don't know one way or the other?
22		A.	I don't know.
23		Q.	Would it be consistent with the way you
24	felt about Java for you to have told people that you
25	wanted to undermine Sun?
	1		A.	As I've said, anything about Java
	2	you've got to show me a context before I can answer
	3	because just the term Java itself can mean different
	4	things.
	5		Q.	Well, let me try to approach it this
	6	way, Mr. Gates.  Have you ever told anyone,
	7	regardless of what you meant by it, that you wanted
	8	to undermine Java or undermine Sun or undermine Java
	9	because of Sun, any of those?  
10			MR. HEINER:  And to be completely
11	precise, the actual question is merely whether the
12	witness recalls using that particular word,
13	regardless of meaning, just that word?  
14			MR. BOIES:  Yes.  And if he does
15	recall, I'll ask him what he meant by it.  
16			MR. HEINER:  I understand.
17			THE WITNESS:  I said I don't recall
18	using that word.
19		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  Would it have been
20	consistent with the way that you felt about Sun and
21	about Java for you to have used that word?  
22			And if you don't understand the
23	question, I'll rephrase it.
24		A.	Well, Sun's message to the market and
25	ours aren't the same and so there is, as part of that
	1	competition, a desire to get people to understand our
	2	message and what we're providing versus their message
	3	and what they're providing.  So in that sense there
	4	could have been a discussion around that topic.  But
	5	I still don't know if the word "undermine" was ever
	6	used.
	7		Q.	Did you have discussions with Apple
	8	that were directed towards attempting to reduce or
	9	eliminate competition, Mr. Gates?  
10			MR. HEINER:  Objection.  
11			THE WITNESS:  No.
12		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  Did you have discussions
13	with Apple in which you were trying to get Apple to
14	agree to help you undermine Sun?
15		A.	There was some discussion about what
16	runtime APIs Apple would support, whether they would
17	support some of ours or some of Sun's.  I don't think
18	I was involved in any discussions myself with Apple
19	about that.
20		Q.	Well, let me show you a document and
21	try to probe what you mean by being involved.  Let me
22	give you a copy of a document that has been
23	previously marked as Government Exhibit 365.  
24			A portion of this document is an e-mail
25	message from you to Paul Maritz and others and the
	1	portion I'm particularly interested in, and you can
	2	read as much of the three-line e-mail as you wish, is
	3	the last sentence, which reads, "Do we have a clear
	4	plan on what we want Apple to do to undermine Sun?" 
	5			 Did you send this e-mail, Mr. Gates,
	6	on or about August 8, 1997?
	7		A.	I don't remember sending it.  
	8			(The document referred to was marked
	9	by the court reporter as Government Exhibit 365 for
10	identification and is attached hereto.) 
11		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  Do you have any doubt
12	that you sent it?
13		A.	No.  It appears to be an e-mail I sent.
14		Q.	You recognize that this is a document
15	produced from Microsoft's files, do you not, sir?
16		A.	No.
17		Q.	You don't?
18		A.	Well, how would I know that?  
19		Q.	Do you see the document production
20	numbers down at the bottom?
21		A.	I have no idea what those numbers are.
22		Q.	Do you recognize this as the form in
23	which e-mail has been printed out by Microsoft?
24		A.	I don't know what that means.  It's --
25	all e-mail printed by anyone looks just like this, so
	1	the fact that it looks like this doesn't give you any
	2	clue as to who printed it.
	3		Q.	Let's begin with that, sir.  E-mail
	4	printed out by other people are not stamped with
	5	Microsoft confidential stamps and Microsoft document
	6	production numbers; you would agree with that, would
	7	you not?
	8		A.	That has nothing to do with printing
	9	out.
10		Q.	Do you understand my question, sir?
11		A.	No.
12		Q.	Do you see down at the bottom where
13	there are confidential stamps and a stamp that says
14	"Attorneys Only" and document production stamps?  Do
15	you see those?
16		A.	I see the stamps.  I can't characterize
17	whether they're document production stamps.  To me
18	they look more like what you'd see on a prisoner's
19	uniform.
20		Q.	So that you don't have any knowledge
21	about these stamps; is that your testimony?
22		A.	I've never seen a stamp like that. 
23	I've used a stamp like that.
24		Q.	Haven't you seen stamps like that on
25	every single one of the documents you've been shown
	1	during this deposition?
	2	       A.	Can you get me all the exhibits?  
	3		MR. NEUKOM:  Is this a good use of
	4	time, Counsel?  
	5		MR. BOIES:  Well, when he says he has
	6	never seen them before --
	7		THE WITNESS:  You asked about this
	8	stamp.
	9		MR. BOIES:  -- and, you know, that he
10	has never seen the stamp before and he's been shown
11	40 documents --
12		MR. NEUKOM:  It's just a waste of time. 
13		MR. BOIES:  It is a waste of time.  And
14	I think it's absolutely clear who the witness is --
15		MR. NEUKON:  Let's get on with it and
16	have a deposition, shall we?  
17		MR. BOIES:  We're trying to have a
18	deposition.  
19		THE WITNESS:  Can we look at that one?  
20	       Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  Yes.  The one that has
21	this document production stamp and the confidential
22	stamp in the bottom right-hand corner; is that the
23	one you mean, Mr. Gates?  
24	       A.	Is that a stamp?  To me that's not a
25	stamp.  

Continued on page 2 of 4

Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company

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