U.S. vs. Microsoft
Navigation Bar
Navigation Bar

U.S. v. Microsoft
Latest Story
Trial Basics
Case Timeline
Key Players
Trial Archive
 Documents

Deposition of Bill Gates
August 28, 1998, Part A, Page 3

On Wednesday, April 28, 1999, the official transcript of the
deposition of Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates was released.

	1		Q.	In fact, the bottom of the e-mail
	2	talking about a proposed Apple-Microsoft deal, you
	3	say, "The deal would look like this," and then you've
	4	got a column "Apple gets" and a column "Microsoft
	5	gets" and a column "Both get"; right, sir?
	6		A.	I'm reading that.
	7		Q.	Now, in this e-mail of a page or a page
	8	and a half in which you are proposing this deal, you
	9	describe your two key goals as maintaining
10	Microsoft's applications share on the platform and
11	getting Apple to embrace Internet Explorer.  
12		A.	No, that's wrong.
13		Q.	That's wrong, okay.  
14		A.	The word "deal" and the word
15	"relationship" are not the same word.  This says, "I
16	have 2 key goals in investing in the Apple
17	relationship."  This down here is an agreement which
18	I thought we could reach with Apple.
19		Q.	Is it your testimony here today under
20	oath that your two key goals in investing in the
21	Apple relationship, which you mention in the second
22	paragraph of this e-mail, is different than your two
23	key goals in the proposed deal that you describe five
24	paragraphs later?
25		A.	I don't see anything in here about the 
				333 
	1	key goals -- two key goals in the deal.  I've told
	2	you that I'm certain that my primary goal in any deal
	3	was the patent cross license.
	4		Q.	Mr. Gates, my question is whether it is
	5	your testimony today here under oath that when you
	6	talk about your two key goals in investing in the
	7	Apple relationship in the second paragraph of this
	8	e-mail, that that is different than what your key
	9	goals were in the deal that you proposed five
10	paragraphs later?
11		A.	That's right.  Investing in a
12	relationship is different than the deal.
13		Q.	Now, you don't tell Mr. Maritz or
14	Mr. Silverberg that your goals for investing in the
15	Apple relationship are different than your goals in
16	the proposed deal, do you, sir?
17		A.	But the goals and the deal are quite
18	different, so obviously they would have known they
19	were quite different.
20		Q.	Well, sir, you say the goals and the
21	deal are quite different.  One of your two key goals
22	that you talk about in your second paragraph is to
23	get Apple to embrace Internet Explorer in some way. 
24	And the very first thing under what Microsoft gets in
25	your proposed deal is, "Apple endorses Microsoft
				334 
	1	Internet Explorer technology."  Do you see that, sir?
	2		A.	Uh-huh.
	3		Q.	Now, does that refresh your
	4	recollection that the deal that you were proposing
	5	had some relationship to the two key goals that you
	6	were identifying?
	7		A.	Some relationship, yes, but they aren't
	8	the same thing at all.
	9		Q.	All right, sir.  
10			Did you ever prepare any e-mail to
11	anyone, Mr. Maritz or Mr. Silverberg or anyone, in
12	which you said that your primary goal in an Apple
13	deal was obtaining a cross license?
14		A.	I don't remember a specific piece of
15	e-mail, but I'm sure I did with at least Mr. Maffei
16	and Mr. Maritz.
17		Q.	You're sure you sent them e-mail saying
18	that?
19		A.	I'm sure I communicated it to them in
20	some way.
21		Q.	Do you believe you sent them anything
22	in writing or an e-mail?
23		A.	I think it's likely, but I don't
24	remember a specific document.
25		Q.	You certainly haven't seen any such
				335 
	1	document in being prepared for your deposition; is
	2	that fair?  
	3			MR. HEINER:  Objection.  You're not
	4	seeking to intrude on the attorney-client privilege?
	5			MR. BOIES:  No.  I want to know if he
	6	has seen any such document, this document he says he
	7	thinks exists that wasn't produced in document
	8	production.  I want to see if he has ever seen it, if
	9	he recalls ever seeing it now or any other time.
10			THE WITNESS:  I didn't say anything
11	about what may or may not exist at this point.  I
12	said I'm sure I communicated to Mr. Maritz and
13	Mr. Maffei that our primary goal in doing the deal
14	with Apple was the patent cross license.
15		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  And I had thought, and
16	perhaps I misunderstood, I thought that you had said
17	that you believed that you actually communicated that
18	not merely orally but by e-mail or in writing.  
19		A.	I think it's likely that I communicated
20	it in e-mail.
21		Q.	And if you had communicated it in
22	e-mail, would that e-mail have been preserved?
23		A.	Not necessarily.
24		Q.	A lot of these e-mails were preserved
25	because we now have copies of them; right?
				336 
	1		A.	That's right.
	2		Q.	How did Microsoft decide what e-mails
	3	would be preserved and what e-mails would not be
	4	preserved?
	5		A.	Individuals get e-mail into their
	6	mailbox and they decide.
	7		Q.	Do you have any explanation as to why
	8	people would have decided to keep the e-mail that
	9	described your two key goals in the Apple
10	relationship as being what they are stated to be here
11	and not have preserved your e-mail that you say you
12	sent saying you had a primary goal of a cross
13	license?  
14			MR. HEINER:  Objection.  Lack of
15	foundation.
16			THE WITNESS:  You're missing --
17			MR. HEINER:  Hold it.  Objection. 
18	Those facts are not established.  There could be 100
19	e-mails that talk about a patent cross license and
20	you may have them or you may not have them or they
21	may not have been called for.  There is a range of
22	possibilities.  That question is unfair and I object.
23			MR. BOIES:  Okay, you've made your
24	objection.  The witness will now answer the question.  
25			MR. HEINER:  Let's have it read back.
				337 
	1		MR. BOIES:  And if you come up with
	2	those hundred e-mails, we will read them with
	3	interest.  I don't think you're going to and you
	4	don't think you're going to either.  
	5		MR. HEINER:  I disagree with that.
	6		MR. BOIES:  Okay.
	7	       Q.	I'll restate the question to just be
	8	absolutely certain that it's a fair question,
	9	Mr. Gates.  
10		If it were the case that neither your
11	counsel nor myself, after diligent search, can find
12	an e-mail that says your primary goal in dealing with
13	Apple was a patent cross license, do you have any
14	explanation as to why that e-mail that you say you
15	think exists would not have been saved, whereas the
16	e-mail that describes one of your two key goals as
17	getting Apple to embrace Internet Explorer was
18	preserved?  
19		MR. HEINER:  Objection.  It's not a
20	sensible question.  You asked a hypothetical.  How
21	can the witness explain what the facts might be in
22	your hypothetical?  
23		MR. BOIES:  He is not being asked to
24	explain what the facts are in a hypothetical, I think
25	that's clear.  If the witness tells me he cannot
			338 
	1	answer the question, he can do so and we will go on
	2	and take that up with everything else we'll take up
	3	at a subsequent time.
	4			THE WITNESS:  When you say "dealing
	5	with Apple," there were a lot of things we were
	6	dealing with Apple on.  I've told you in terms of the
	7	deal, the deal I was involved in discussing in '96
	8	and under another management at Apple in '97, there's
	9	no doubt the primary goal was the patent cross
10	license.  
11		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  And by "the primary
12	goal," what you mean is the primary goal that you,
13	Mr. Gates, had; is that correct?
14		A.	I don't think I'm the only one who had
15	it, but certainly yes, that was the primary goal of
16	myself and for the company.   
17		Q.	And when you said in your June 23, 1996
18	e-mail, "I have 2 key goals in investing in the Apple
19	relationship," you were talking about yourself
20	personally; is that correct?  
21		A.	Yeah.  When I say "investing in the
22	Apple relationship," that means spending time with
23	Apple and growing the relationship.
24		Q.	And when in describing the deal five
25	paragraphs later the very first thing that Microsoft
				339 
	1	gets is, "Apple endorses Microsoft Internet Explorer
	2	technology," did that indicate to you that that was
	3	an important part of what you were getting in terms
	4	of the deal?  
	5		A.	No such deal was ever struck, so I'm
	6	not sure what you're saying.
	7		Q.	Was that an important part of the deal
	8	that you were trying to get, sir?
	9		A.	We never got as far as trying to get
10	that deal, unfortunately.
11		Q.	You never got as far as trying to get
12	that deal; is that what you're saying?
13		A.	No.  Well, in this time frame Gil
14	Amelio's total focus was on his new OS strategy, so
15	what I outlined here we never got them to consider.
16		Q.	Well, sir, your e-mail begins, "Last
17	Tuesday night I went down to address the top Apple
18	executives;" correct, sir?
19		A.	That's right.
20		Q.	And down at the bottom when you're
21	introducing the deal, you say, "I proposed."  Now,
22	you're referring to what you proposed to the Apple
23	top executives, are you not, sir?
24		A.	Yes.
25		Q.	Okay.  And what you proposed was 
				340 
	1	"the deal" that you then describe at the bottom of
	2	the first page and the top of the second page;
	3	correct, sir?
	4		A.	That's right.
	5		Q.	And that was a deal that you proposed
	6	the Tuesday night before June 23, 1996 to what you
	7	describe as the top Apple executives; correct, sir?
	8		A.	I put forward some of those points.
	9		Q.	Well, you put them forward and you
10	describe them as proposing a deal, correct, sir?
11		A.	That's how I describe it here, yes.
12		Q.	All right, sir.  Now, you'd said that
13	the deal that you were talking about never got done. 
14	Did you ever get Apple to endorse Microsoft Internet
15	Explorer technology?
16		A.	You're trying to just read part of
17	that?
18		Q.	I'm actually -- what I'm doing is
19	asking a question right now, sir.  I'm asking whether
20	in 1996 or otherwise, at any time did you get Apple
21	to endorse Microsoft Internet Explorer technology?
22		A.	Well, you can get a copy of the
23	agreement we reached with Apple and decide if in
24	reading that you think it meets that criteria or not.
25		Q.	Sir, I'm asking you, as the chief
				341 
	1	executive officer of Microsoft, I'm asking you
	2	whether you believe that you achieved that objective?
	3		A.	We did not get some exclusive
	4	endorsement.  We did get some -- there's some part of
	5	the deal that has to do with Internet Explorer
	6	technology.
	7		Q.	Do you know what that part of the deal
	8	is?
	9		A.	Not really.  It has something to do
10	with they will at least ship it along with other
11	browsers.
12		Q.	Does the deal prohibit them from
13	shipping Netscape's browser without also shipping
14	Internet Explorer?
15		A.	I'd have to look at the deal to
16	understand.
17		Q.	It is your testimony sitting here today
18	under oath that you simply don't know one way or the
19	other whether Apple is today free to ship Netscape's
20	browser without also shipping Internet Explorer?
21		A.	That's right.
22		Q.	When you identify things as key goals,
23	do you typically tend to follow up and see to what
24	extent those goals have been achieved?
25		A.	In a very general sense, yes.
				342 
	1		Q.	Did you ever follow up to see whether
	2	one of the two key goals that you identify in your
	3	1996 e-mail to Mr. Maritz and Mr. Silverberg and
	4	others of getting Apple to embrace Internet Explorer
	5	technology in some way had been achieved?
	6		A.	Well, certainly what I said here, 
	7	"I have 2 key goals in investing in the Apple
	8	relationship," that -- those weren't achieved because
	9	the investments I made were with Gil Amelio, who was
10	fired from Apple very soon thereafter.
11		Q.	Was there something about Mr. Amelio
12	getting fired that changed what your goals were for
13	the Apple relationship?
14		A.	I said, "I have 2 key goals in
15	investing in the Apple relationship."  The form that
16	investment took was spending time with Gil Amelio. 
17	That turned out to be wasted time because he was
18	fired from Apple rather abruptly within about, oh,
19	eight months of this.
20		Q.	When he was fired, did that change what
21	goals you had for the Apple relationship, Mr. Gates?
22		A.	It was basically a complete restart
23	because we had to understand what the new management,
24	what they were going to do with Apple and where they
25	were going.
				343 
	1		Q.	Did your goals change?
	2		A.	Goals for what?  For investing in the
	3	relationship?
	4		Q.	You say in this e-mail you have two key
	5	goals for investing in the Apple relationship.  One 
	6	of --
	7		A.	In investing in the Apple relationship.
	8		Q.	One of them is to get Apple to embrace
	9	Internet Explorer technology in some way.  What I'm
10	asking you is whether that changed after this person
11	got fired?
12		A.	We re-evaluated all of our thoughts
13	about working with Apple based on what the new
14	management was going to do, whether they were going
15	to target the machines, what they were going to do
16	with their machines.  Since they continued to say we
17	were in violation of their patents, it continued to
18	be our top goal to get some type of patent cross
19	license.
20			MR. BOIES:  Would you read the question
21	back, please.
22			(The record was read as follows: 
23			"Q.  One of them is to get Apple to
24		embrace Internet Explorer technology in some
25		way.  What I'm asking you is whether that
				344 
	1		changed after this person got fired?")
	2			MR. BOIES:  Better read the whole
	3	question.  And then again reincorporate it so that
	4	it's clear for the record.  
	5			(The record was read as follows: 
	6			"Q.  You say in this e-mail you have
	7		two key goals for investing in the Apple
	8		relationship.  One of --
	9			 A.  In investing in the Apple
10		relationship.
11			 Q.  One of them is to get Apple to
12		embrace Internet Explorer technology in some
13		way.  What I'm asking you is whether that
14		changed after this person got fired?")
15			The WITNESS:  You keep, either
16	intentionally or unintentionally, trying to confuse
17	my goals for investing in the relationship with the
18	goals we had overall for various dealings with Apple.  
19	Certainly the goals I had for investing in the
20	relationship, that I had to start over and rethink
21	because the investment was to spend time with the CEO
22	who had been fired.
23		Q.	Mr. Gates, neither in this e-mail nor
24	in any other document that either of us is aware of
25	do you make that distinction that you're making now,
				345 
	1	correct?  
	2			MR. HEINER:  Objection.
	3		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  Do you understand the
	4	question I'm asking?
	5		A.	This document does not say that my
	6	goals for dealing -- does not state my goals for
	7	dealing with Apple up here.  It states my goals in
	8	investing in the Apple relationship, so there is a
	9	clear distinction right there in that document.
10		Q.	Mr. Gates, this document deals with a
11	proposed deal that you made to top Apple executives;
12	correct?
13		A.	That's only one part of what is in the
14	document.  There's a part where it talks about -- you
15	never mentioned it, but the first goal is "Maintain
16	our applications share on the platform."  That's
17	something I'm doing in investing in the Apple
18	relationship and that's not related to the deal
19	that's given -- the proposed deal discussed below in
20	the e-mail, so those are clearly two separate things. 
21	Related, but separate.
22		Q.	What I think I've done is I think I
23	have mentioned the first goal a number of times.  
24		A.	I don't think so.
25		Q.	I think it's been read about three
				346 
	1	times in the record and the record will show it.  
	2		A.	Okay.  It's a point of disagreement.  
	3		Q.	Okay.  
	4			MR. HEINER:  But not an important one.  
	5			MR. NEUKOM:  But a time consuming one.
	6			MR. BOIES:  Exactly the point that I
	7	was making, which is why the witness makes those
	8	kinds of statements.  The --
	9			MR. HEINER:  It took two to tango just
10	there.
11			MR. BOIES:  Yes, it did.  And actually
12	it took four of us, three on that side of the table
13	and me.
14		Q.	My question, Mr. Gates, has to do with
15	what your goals were, what your stated goals were. 
16	Now, you say here, "I have two key goals in investing
17	in the Apple relationship, one of which is to get
18	Apple to embrace Internet Explorer technology in some
19	way."  
20			Did that continue to be a goal that you
21	had after 1996?
22		A.	It wasn't a goal in investing in the
23	Apple relationship in terms -- in the sense I meant
24	it here.  It was a goal for our overall dealing with
25	Apple.  One of many.
				347 
	1		Q.	Okay.  Was it a key goal?
	2		A.	I'm not sure what you mean by key goal. 
	3	It was a goal.
	4		Q.	What I mean by key goal is what you
	5	meant by key goal in your June 23, 1996 e-mail,
	6	Mr. Gates.  
	7		A.	That's about investing in the Apple
	8	relationship, which meant spending time with Gill
	9	Amelio, so I don't know why you can take the word out
10	of there and apply it to a completely different
11	context.
12		Q.	When you say "a completely different
13	context," let's be clear about what we're talking
14	about.  The completely different context that you're
15	talking about is the difference between investing in
16	the Apple relationship and doing a deal with Apple;
17	is that what you're saying?
18		A.	No.  We have goals for our general
19	dealings with Apple, which came to a deal -- we
20	actually reached a deal in either late July, '97 or
21	early August.  But there's a separate thing of what
22	was that deal, what we were able to achieve, what we
23	were trying to achieve when we were dealing with the
24	previous management, and what I'm trying to do in
25	terms of spending my time investing in the Apple
				348 
	1	relationship.
	2		Q.	And what you're saying is it is your
	3	testimony under oath, although you can't recall
	4	actually having sent this e-mail, you're confident
	5	when you wrote this and referred to investing in the
	6	Apple relationship, you meant only what you expected
	7	to get out of spending time with the Apple
	8	executives; is that your testimony?
	9		A.	Yeah.  I was explaining why I was
10	spending time with Gill Amelio.
11		Q.	And that's all you meant to be saying
12	here is your testimony?
13		A.	That's what -- in reading this, that's
14	what I believe I was trying to communicate to the
15	recipients of the e-mail.
16		Q.	All right, sir.  
17			Let me ask you to look at a document
18	previously marked as Government Exhibit 370.  This
19	purports to be an e-mail, and the second item on the
20	e-mail is an e-mail from John Ludwig to Don Bradford
21	dated August 21, 1997.  And the subject is
22	"Conversations with BillG last night."  
23			And the BillG referred to there is you;
24	correct, sir?
25		A.	Yes.
				349 
	1			(The document referred to was marked
	2	by the court reporter as Government Exhibit 370 for
	3	identification and is attached hereto.) 
	4		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  And it begins, "I was at
	5	the exec staff meeting last night."  
	6			Can you explain for the record what the
	7	exec staff meeting was?
	8		A.	He is referring to a regular
	9	get-together four times a year of the Microsoft
10	executive staff.
11		Q.	And he goes on to say that, "There were
12	three interesting exchanges with Bill and the whole
13	group about Apple."  Do you see that?
14		A.	I see it.
15		Q.	And No. 1 is, "Bill's top priority is
16	for us to get the browser in the October OS release
17	from Apple.  We should do whatever it takes to make
18	this happen.  If we are getting shut out, we should
19	escalate to Bill.  You should make sure that we are
20	engaging deeply with Apple on this one and resolving
21	any and all issues."  
22			Do you recall conveying to your
23	executive staff in or about August of 1997 that your
24	top priority was to get Microsoft's browser in the
25	October OS release from Apple?
				350 
	1		A.	No, I don't recall that.
	2		Q.	The top e-mail, which is from Don
	3	Bradford to a number of people dated August 21, 1997
	4	and is also on the subject of "conversations with
	5	BillG last night," says that Mr. Bradford and someone
	6	else, Mohan Thomas, "will take the lead on working
	7	out the Apple bundle deal."  Do you see that?
	8		A.	Yes.
	9		Q.	Did you instruct your executive staff
10	in or about August of 1997 to work out an "Apple
11	bundle deal"?
12		A.	Well, I think this is post the August
13	agreement, late July or early August agreement we
14	reached with Apple.  And I think there were some
15	circumstances under which they would include or
16	bundle IE with some of their shipments.  I think
17	that's what that's referring to.
18		Q.	And is that what your present
19	recollection is that you told your executive staff in
20	August of 1997?
21		A.	Well, I don't recall specifically what
22	I said to the executive staff about Apple, but it
23	appears Ludwig took out of that that he was supposed
24	to make sure that whatever outs that Apple had under
25	the previous agreement for not shipping our
				351 
	1	technology, that we avoided those being a problem
	2	that prevented them from shipping our technology.
	3		Q.	Well, Apple wasn't prohibited from
	4	shipping your technology in August of 1997, was it,
	5	sir?
	6		A.	No, I actually think if we -- I don't
	7	know the Apple agreement, I haven't read it, but I
	8	think there is something in there that if we got
	9	certain things done and if there were no problems and
10	it passed tests and we were ready in time, that they
11	would actually affirmatively include some of our
12	technology in various OS releases.  And this appears
13	to be a discussion about whether or not we're going
14	to be able to meet the requirements on us related to
15	that.
16		Q.	It is clear that getting the browser in
17	the October OS release from Apple was something that
18	you, Bill Gates, and Microsoft wanted; correct, sir?
19		A.	Yes, that's something that we wanted.
20		Q.	The last sentence of the second
21	paragraph says, "Bill was clear that his whole goal
22	here is to keep Apple and Sun split.  He doesn't care
23	that much about being aligned with Apple, he just
24	wants them split from other potential allies."  
25			And that relates to Java, does it not,
				352 
	1	sir?
	2		A.	I don't have a direct recollection, but
	3	if you read the sentence in front of it, that
	4	paragraph seems to relate to Java runtime.
	5		Q.	Do you have a recollection of telling
	6	your executive staff in or about August 21 that your
	7	whole goal with respect to Apple related to Java
	8	runtime was to keep Apple and Sun split?
	9		A.	No.
10		Q.	Who was at this executive staff
11	meeting?
12		A.	Probably members of the executive
13	staff.
14		Q.	And who were they?
15		A.	It's about 40 to 50 people.  I doubt
16	you want to take the time for me to guess.  We
17	generally get about 70 percent attendance.  Looking
18	at this document, I think it's very likely that I was
19	there and John Ludwig was there, but as to the rest
20	of the executive staff, I'd just be guessing.  It's
21	very rare for us to have non-executive staff members
22	at those meetings, although sometimes it happens.
23		Q.	Is Mr. Ludwig somebody who you believe
24	is an honest and competent person?
25		A.	In general, yes.
				353 
	1		Q.	Do you have any reason to believe that
	2	he would make up anything about what your statements
	3	were?
	4		A.	No.
	5		Q.	Let me ask you to look at a document
	6	that has been previously marked as Government 
	7	Exhibit 371.  The portion I'm particularly interested
	8	in is in the second e-mail that is in this exhibit,
	9	which is on the first page.  And it is an e-mail from
10	you to Paul Maritz and others dated January 22, 1998. 
11			(The document referred to was marked
12	by the court reporter as Government Exhibit 371 for
13	identification and is attached hereto.)
14		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  Did you send this e-mail
15	on or about January 22, 1998?
16		A.	I don't remember doing so, but I have
17	no reason to doubt that I did.
18		Q.	The next to last sentence says, "I
19	think we can gain a lot of share with IE on Mac if we
20	do some modest things."  
21			Why were you interested in January,
22	1998, in increasing IE's share on Mac, as you
23	describe it?
24		A.	I'm not sure what I was thinking in
25	particular when I wrote this mail, but I can --
				354 
	1	sitting here now, I can give you some reasons that I
	2	think I would have had for saying that.
	3		Q.	Okay.  Would you do so, please.
	4		A.	Well, the use of IE on Macintosh was
	5	beneficial to us in terms of the APIs we had there
	6	and the content HTML extensions that we had there. 
	7	And when you go to people who do content, being able
	8	to say to them that those extensions are popular not
	9	only with PC users but Mac users, it makes it easier
10	to convince the content person to take unique
11	advantage of the innovations that we had made in HTML
12	as well as some of the innovations we had made in how
13	the browser was structured.  
14		Q.	I want to be sure I understand your
15	answer.  You mentioned APIs and you mentioned the
16	HTML extensions.  Are those two different things?
17		A.	Yes, sir.
18		Q.	Okay.  And am I correct that the
19	broader distribution of the APIs is something that
20	makes writing to those APIs more attractive to
21	independent software writers?
22		A.	If users are choosing to use the
23	software that those APIs are present in, it makes it
24	easier to convince software vendors to write to those
25	APIs.
				355 
	1		Q.	Let me ask the question this way.  Why
	2	were you interested in having Apple distribute your
	3	APIs?  
	4			MR. HEINER:  Objection.
	5			THE WITNESS:  Well, the key issue
	6	wasn't about distribution at all.  The key issue was
	7	usage share by Mac users of the various browsers that
	8	were available on the Macintosh.
	9		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  Why were you interested
10	in having the usage share of Mac users of your APIs
11	increase?
12		A.	You -- that question is nonsensical.
13		Q.	Okay.  You were asked earlier why you
14	wanted to increase your share of IE on Mac, do you
15	recall that?
16		A.	Yes.
17		Q.	And am I correct that you said that
18	there were two reasons, one dealt with APIs and one
19	dealt with HTML extensions?
20		A.	Yeah.  I've thought of a third reason
21	since then, but that's right.  
22			MR. HEINER:  There was also a third
23	reason at the time.  You might not remember it.
24			THE WITNESS:  Now there might be three
25	or four.
				356 
	1		Q.	BY MR. BOIES:  Why don't you tell me
	2	the one you're thinking of and we'll see if it is the
	3	same one Mr. Heiner is thinking of.  
	4		A.	Well, I talked earlier about having
	5	traffic out of IE is always of value.
	6		Q.	So those are the three reasons that you
	7	can think of now; is that correct?  
	8		A.	Those are three reasons that are among
	9	the good reasons that raising usage share of IE on
10	Macintosh was a positive thing for Microsoft.
11		Q.	I'd like to know the other reasons you
12	can think of now, if there are other reasons.  
13		A.	That's all I can think of right now.
14		Q.	Okay.  Why does increasing IE share on
15	Mac help you with respect to APIs?
16		A.	Because the Mac IE had APIs.
17		Q.	And how does having that help
18	Microsoft?
19		A.	Because those APIs are in common with
20	some Windows APIs.
21		Q.	And why does that help Microsoft?
22		A.	If we do things that make our APIs in
23	Windows more attractive, it helps us in increasing
24	the volume of Windows that we license.
25		Q.	Are you saying that increasing IE share
				357 
	1	on Mac will help increase the number of Windows that
	2	you license?
	3		A.	Yeah.  I went through the chain of
	4	logic that explains that to you.  I don't know if you
	5	misunderstood some part of it.
	6		Q.	All I'm trying to do is get your
	7	answers on the record because if I begin to tell you
	8	what I think about your answers, we'll be here all
	9	day.  
10			So am I correct that it is your
11	testimony here that increasing your share of IE on
12	Mac will increase the distribution of Windows?
13		A.	I don't know what you mean by
14	distribution of Windows.
15		Q.	The usage of Windows.
16		A.	No.  The number of copies that we
17	license.
18		Q.	Will that be increased?
19		A.	Through the indirect factors that I
20	explained to you, yes, there is a positive effect
21	there.
22		Q.	So by increasing your share of IE on
23	Mac, you would expect to increase the number of
24	copies of Windows that you would license?
25		A.	Yes, increasing our usage share over
				358 
	1	time we think will help us to increase the number of
	2	copies of Windows we will license.
	3		Q.	Does increasing IE's share on Mac make
	4	it more likely that content providers will want to
	5	use IE?
	6		A.	I don't know what you mean by content
	7	providers using IE.  Content providers use servers,
	8	they don't use clients.
	9		Q.	Do you know what content providers are?
10		A.	Yes.
11		Q.	Give me an example of a content
12	provider.  
13			Disney?
14		A.	Disney.
15		Q.	Disney would be a content provider. 
16	Disney is an important content provider; correct,
17	sir?
18		A.	Now you're going to have to give me
19	some context.
20		Q.	Without me giving you some context, you
21	can't answer the question as to whether Disney is an
22	important content provider; is that your testimony
23	under oath?
24		A.	Important in what sense?  
25		Q.	Important in the everyday, common usage
				359 
	1	sense of what important means.  
	2	              MR. HEINER:  Mr. Boies, you're going
	3	down one of those trails that you really don't need
	4	to.  If you go back to -- let me finish the point.  
	5	If you go back to the original question and answer,
	6	Mr. Gates stated what part of the question he thought
	7	he needed some clarification on, and it wasn't this
	8	part.
	9	              MR. BOIES:  I understand that.  And I'm
10	trying to walk a balance between doing a number of
11	things, but this is somebody who won't tell me
12	whether he's going to come to trial and if he doesn't
13	come to trial, this is an evidentiary deposition and
14	if it's an evidentiary deposition, part of what I
15	need to do is make explicit on the record what I
16	think the credibility issues are.  And so when I
17	think we get into what I will characterize, and
18	without meaning to engender a debate, but something
19	that might be alleged to be word games, I think it is
20	appropriate for me to make explicit what's going on
21	on the record.  That's all I'm saying.  
22	              MR. HEINER:  Okay.  And I'm just saying
23	there was no question about content providers.  The
24	issue was clients and servers and use of IE and can
25	easily be cleared up.
		360 

Continued on page 4 of 4

Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company

Back to the top

Navigation Bar
Navigation Bar
yellow pages