J. Nicholas Dowling.

Live!

Former National Security Council staff member J. Nicholas Dowling discussed the Balkans conflict and the future of NATO on the eve of its 50th anniversary summit. Read the transcript below.

Dowling is the former director for European Affairs at the National Security Council where he advised President Clinton on the Balkans and NATO and helped write the political-military plan on Kosovo. Currently, Dowling is a senior fellow at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies.

Washington, DC: Mr. Dowling, Should the Clinton n Administration decide that some sort of ground force is necessary in Kosovo, what kind of things do you think would be in the President's talking points? How would administration spokespersons define and frame this issue in order to sell it to the American People, and our Allies?

J. Nicholas Dowling: It is premature for the U.S. to propose a ground operation because of the severe military and political risks involved. Attacking into Serbia or Kosovo would present a tough and potentially bloody job involving hundreds of thousands of troops. The other NATO allies would not support it at this point and suggesting it would threaten to push the Russians over the edge. The better option at this point is to continue to prosecute the air campaign and take other measures to increase pressure on Milosevic. That said, I do believe NATO should continue to increase ground force levels in the region so that if a ground force is needed, we can move to that option quickly. As Milosevic sees more NATO troops on his borders, he will save his skin by accepting a deal on NATO's terms.

If the Administration does decide to proceed with ground forces, President Clinton will frame the decision in the same terms as the air campaign: fundamental American interests are at stake in preventing genocide and violence from destabilizing Europe. Two world wars this century have shown the dangers when we let violence and instability spread in Europe. America will be acting with its other 18 NATO allies to end the atrocities and return stability to the Balkans.

Las Vegas, NV: If Administration, as it claims, was not surprised by aggressive "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo after first strike, why was first strike not made against 40,000 troops and 300 tanks amassed on border at time of strike?

J. Nicholas Dowling: By the time airstrikes were initiated, the Serb offensive had already begun and the troops and tanks had already poured into Kosovo. The initial phase of the air campaign was focused on the Yugoslav air defense system, so few attacks were made at that time against ground targets. NATO has only lost one plane in Kosovo as a result of this strategy. Now we are starting to see substantial NATO strikes on vehicles and troops in Kosovo. But it is fair to ask whether NATO should have been more aggressive at the start.

Paris France: Mr. Dowling

Do you not think that a top-level effort to alleviate the plight of the Kosovo refugees should have been integrated into NATO planning from the start, and should be a factor in planning for any future US and-or NATO military intervention?

Thank you

J. Nicholas Dowling: There was some planning, but taking care of refugees is not something NATO can do by itself. The relief community is doing amazing work dealing with this crisis and NATO is helping where it can. I think NATO will take some lessons from this operation in terms of refugee planning for the future.

belgrade,yugoslavia : what do you think, for how long will this be going on,
and why is NATO so keen to get
into our country, no matter
how much it will cost them. I
mean of human lives,both yugoslav, albanian and lives of NATO soldiers whose number
will certainly cut off pretty,
if troops come in.

J. Nicholas Dowling: NATO has made clear its demands of Milosevic. You can find them in the NATO Foreign Ministers statement from about a week ago. In brief, Milosevic must:
1) agree to return autonomy to the Kosovar Albanians, as he said he would.
2) agree to the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in Kosovo. This force could include Russians.
3) agree to withdraw his military forces in Kosovo that are conducting repression.

Taunton,Massachusetts: Mr.Dowling, Russia sends ships,back the Serbs, and don't use any military force. I feel this is only making NATO look more unified and shows the world Russia is not as strong as they were in the past. If you feel this is true, do you think the threat of nuclear war is decreasing with the falling of Russia?-I feel they would fall if we stopped helping them.-

J. Nicholas Dowling: Russia remains an important strategic power in Europe. But they have enormous economic difficulties right now and a relatively weak central government. The Kosovo crisis has exacerbated Russian frustrations about their weakness and thus increased tensions with NATO. But they recognize that Russia has a more important and broader relationship with the West. The Clinton Administration has worked very closely with Russia to ensure responsible control over its nuclear weapons and materiel. So I think the risk of nuclear war is still much, much lower than it was during the cold war.

Lorton, Virginia: Could you explain why Congress has not formally declared war on Yugoslavia? What are the implications of attacking the country while not declaring war in terms of international law regarding the treatment of prisoners and the killing of civilians as in the case of the bombing of the Albanian refugee column?

J. Nicholas Dowling: To my knowledge, the President has not asked Congress for a declaration of war and neither has Congress elected to make such a declaration. I'm not a lawyer so I cannot discuss all the implications, but the United States has many times used military force in certain circumstances without such a declaration. All the protections afforded by the Geneva conventions apply in all armed conflict, declaration of war notwithstanding.

Lansing, Michigan: What is the basis for your conclusion that Mr. Milosevic will accept NATO terms if troops are at his border -your response to Q #1-.

J. Nicholas Dowling: We cannot be assured of anything Milosevic does, but he does cut deals when his neck is on the line. His primary motivation is preserving his own political power. The air campaign is going to deprive him of an effective military and make his regime weaker. The prospect of a NATO ground invasion would certainly increase his self-preservation instinct.

washingtonpost.com: We're roughly half-way through this live discussion with Nicholas Dowling, former National Security Council staff member. Submit questions using the hyperlink below.

Bogota, colombia: Hey, Nick! Long time no talk to -going on 2 years-. I hope you are finding NDU to your liking.

My wife's question is: Assuming a peace accord with Milosevic, how long do you think it would hold? Especially if a peace accord now, given the devastation of his country, threatened his hold on power?

My question: In the spirit of the Powell doctrine, why did NATO begin bombing before it had all of its assets -such as a-10 Warthogs, etc.- in theatre and available deal with the main threat to the Kosovar population -- tanks and massed troops? What, if anything, forced NATO's hand?

Good talking to you!
- Mike Fitzpatrick
U.S. Embassy Bogota

J. Nicholas Dowling: Mike -- good to hear from you. I hope things in Bogota are more restful than clearing cables to NATO!

On your wife's question: we will only have long-term stability in the Balkans when we have democratic countries that are integrated into Europe. But that will take a long time. To get there, NATO and other peacekeeping forces will have to contain those like Milosevic who resort to violence. We need stability first, then integration over time.

On your question, I think NATO started with forces designed to take our air defense systems. As the air campaign progressed, more assets have been brought in to focus on other targets such as Serb forces in Kosovo.

Irvine, CA: Why don't we encourage
Bosnia and Croatia to open
a second front on Serbia --
by perhaps allowing the Bosnians to regain some of the lands that they lost to the Serbs.

J. Nicholas Dowling: NATO's objective is peace and stability. We don't want to undo the immense investment in Bosnia in trying to deal with Kosovo. Encouraging people to reclaim territory by force will only further the violence.

Manhattan, KS: Mr. Dowling--My question is two-fold:

First, it has been argued in some theoretical corners that the current regime of bilateral treaties -START I, II; SALT I, II; etc.- does more for to promote US interests in Europe's security than a Post-Cold War NATO ever could. This argument holds some water with respect to Russia -as seen by the increasingly fragile state of the '94 NATO Partnership for Peace-, but do you think it makes sense for Europe as a whole?

Second, do you think that the demands for a "European Defense Identity" can be best met under the auspices of NATO?

J. Nicholas Dowling: Arms control is certainly a key aspect of European security. But these agreements cannot substitute for collective defense and acting together with our allies to defend our common interests. NATO promotes confidence and stability among its members while serving as a means for we and our allies to take action when necessary. Both the success of Bosnia and, to some degree, the Gulf War were due to 50 years of NATO cooperation between the U.S. and Europe.

Washington D.C.: What economic interests are served by the NATO Attacks upon Yugoslavia? Who would profit the most should the Clinton plan prevail against Yugoslavia? Please address the issues, I know its a cold question.

J. Nicholas Dowling: Our interests in the Balkans go to broad strategic issues, not specific economic concerns. In this century, the U.S. fought two bloody wars in Europe, losing hundreds of thousands of American lives, because we recognized the immense value of our political, economic and security partnership with Europe. In Kosovo, NATO is trying to stop violence and genocide at the root, rather than let instability spread and the specter of broader war to return to the continent at large. This is a real long term risk.

Montreal Quebec: Wouldn't the safest option for a ground deployment be a quick attack on northern and central Serbia with the objective of surrender?

Since most of the Yugoslav army is busy in the south, attacking Serbia directly could quickly bring the war to an end.

J. Nicholas Dowling: General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has said that if NATO ground forces were employed, they would use multiple entry points. Certainly NATO could easily strike into northern Serbia and quickly take down Belgrade. The tough issues about such an operation would be the military and political risks involved. How long would NATO have to occupy Serbia? At this point, NATO is focusing on an air campaign strategy.

Annapolis Md: Sir:
Interdiction and strategic bombing have never substantially reduced the fighting effectiveness of a fielded force. If NATO is serious about close support and low level tank busting, doesn't it seem somewhat naive to expect 24 attack helicopters to make any substantial impact, especially if the Serbian armor is being hidden in mosques and other areas NATO will not target?

J. Nicholas Dowling: The NATO air campaign is certainly reducing the fighting effectiveness of the Serb military, just as Coalition aircraft severely reduced the fighting effectiveness of the Iraqi forces in Desert Storm. According to the NATO and Pentagon briefings, attacks on ground force targets are now a key focus of NATO operations. I doubt that most the Serb tanks are in Mosques or similar buildings and if they are, then they would be pinned down and useless.

Boston, Mass.: Could you please articulate the stated U.S. policy concerning armed groups -that is, those operating beyond the auspices of recognized governments-in the Balkans? Has this policy changed as conflict shifted from Bosnia to Kosovo or as the situation in Kosovo has developed?

J. Nicholas Dowling: To my knowledge, there is no general U.S. policy with regard to "armed groups." In the Kosovo context, the U.S. has been concerned with both the repression and violence of Serb security forces and the KLA insurgency. It was pretty clear that the KLA insurgency was a threat to stability, but it was also clear that it was Milosevic's continue repression that created the KLA.

Last year, U.S. officials and international monitors pressed both parties to adhere to agreed cease-fires. But once Serb security forces began to attack civilians, driving hundreds of thousands of civilians from their homes, and committing terrible atrocities, it became pretty clear who the primary threat to security was.

washingtonpost.com: Many of you have been wondering about the upcoming summit. This map provides details on road closings.

Lecco, Italy: It seems to me that the air strike is, military speaking, ineffective. After almost two months the core of Yugoslavia military power is still intact. Don't you think that all this will bring the issue to a stalemate, and Milosevic will have the upper hand?

Western public opinion is not used to war, and this could undermine Nato legittimacy?

J. Nicholas Dowling: It is too early to say how effective NATO strikes have been. There are certainly lots of reports of damaged or destroyed targets and the air campaign is still going. NATO resolve remains solid so as things continue, its only going to get worse for Milosevic. I agree that the NATO publics are not used to this -- it is an unprecedented operation. But the depth of Milosevic's evil has made people realize that NATO must continue until it prevails.

Rosslyn, Va.: Amid NATO's bombing campaign, the alliance's top representatives will gather in Washington D.C. to observe NATO's 50th anniversary. Can you explain how the bombing has changed NATO's original mission statement and give us a sense NATO's future?

J. Nicholas Dowling: The NATO Summit was intended to celebrate the 50th anniversary of NATO defending freedom. The focus would have been how NATO is changing to meet new threats and missions. With events in Kosovo, things have been toned down and focused on business matters at hand. NATO will still discuss these other issues, but I expect most discussion among NATO's leaders to be about Kosovo.

In many ways, Kosovo is a very difficult test case for NATO. It is not part of the original NATO mission of defending borders, but it is 19 democracies acting together to stand up to aggression and instability that threaten us all. This is what many of us feel should be NATO's future role. It will keep the Alliance relevant and therefore continue to be a stabilizing influence for all of Europe. This is why it is so important that NATO prevail in Kosovo.

washingtonpost.com: That's all the time we have. Thanks to everyone who participated and thanks to Nicholas Dowling.

Back to the top