Related Links • foreignpolicy 2000.org • Council on Foreign Relations: National Missile Defense • CFR Library: Foreign Policy 2000 issues • Gore on missile defense: May 27 | May 23 • Bush on missile defense: May 23 | May 23 • ABM Issue Unresolved as Summit Ends (June 5) • Clinton Addresses Russian Lawmakers in Historic Speech (June 5) • Audio: Clinton at the Duma on Missile Defense (June 5) • Campaign 2000 • Live: "Free Media" • Who do you want to talk to? E-mail us

Wednesday, June 7, 2000; 1 p.m. EDT

President Clinton's historic trip to Russia has vaulted national missile defense to the forefront of the foreign policy debate. Few expected Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin to resolve the question of whether to build missile defense systems. But Putin's new flexibility and Clinton's speech to the Duma signaled a new dialog on national security and foreign policy spurred by the spread of nuclear technology and weapons.

R. James Woolsey

R. James Woolsey is an expert on foreign affairs, defense, energy and intelligence. He served as director of Central Intelligence for the CIA from 1993-95, and was ambassador to the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe from 1989-91. Woolsey went to Geneva as delegate at large to the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Nuclear and Space Arms Talks from 1983-86. He was also Under Secretary of the Navy and advised the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

Since he left government service, Woolsey has been a partner at the law firm of Shea & Gardner in Washington, D.C., where he has practiced for 17 years. He also writes and speaks about foreign affairs and intelligence for organizations including the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations. Woolsey talked about national missile defense and Clinton's negotiations with Russia on Wednesday, June 7. The transcript follows:

Free Media: Good afternoon, Mr. Woolsey, and welcome. Were you surprised at Russian President Vladimir Putin's apparent flexibility on the issue of missile defense? From your perspective and experience with relations with Russia, what did you expect would happen during President Clinton's trip?

James Woolsey: I don't know how flexible he is in reality, because it depends on whether he is talking about truly effective boost phase intercept system that would intercept, for example, North Korean, Iranian or Iraqi missiles early in their flight. If that is where he's going, it's a very interesting, and in the short-term, a positive development.

If on the other hand he is just seeking to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies with vague suggestions, that's a different matter.

I certainly did not expect him to go along with the Clinton administration's system, and in the near term I would not expect him to go along with a more effective system such as Russian-American cooperation on space-based boost phase intercept. But President Yeltsin was very forthcoming about Russian-American cooperation in 1992, and extensive negotiations were begun on a global protection system on which the two countries would cooperate. That would have required huge changes to the ABM treaty of 1972. The Clinton administration rejected Yeltsin's efforts in early '93 and cancelled the talks. So we can hope that Mr. Putin is moving back toward the spirit of 1992, but it's not clear yet.

Council on Foreign Relations, N.Y.: Should the next administration move forward to deploy a national missile defense, and if so, how should it square these plans with existing arms control agreements such as the ABM treaty? Since this would cost tens of billions of dollars, where should the money come from?

James Woolsey: I believe that the next administration should move forward. My ideas on this are included in an article in The National Review dated June 19 and published yesterday. Briefly, I think the U.S. should move first to move on the AEGIS system for theater defense and boost phase intercept of North Korean missiles from the sea near North Korea. Later, I think we should move toward space-based, boost phase intercept of a limited type – a system on which we could cooperate with Russia. Because boost phase intercept is easier, not harder, than the administration's effort to hit a bullet with a bullet with its mid-course system, I believe that the right kind of space-based boost phase intercept will be cheaper than what the administration plans, not more expensive. Further, I believe that the 1972 U.S.-Soviet ABM treaty is only binding on the United States if the Senate votes in favor of the changes in it that have already been negotiated by a two-thirds vote. Therefore, I believe it needs to be replaced by a new type of treaty in which the U.S. and Russia are free to do research and to base interceptors any way they choose, as long as they do not negate one another's strategic offensive deterrent.

Herndon, Va.: Mr. Woolsey: Under current treaties which the U.S. has signed, what CAN'T we do unilaterally as far as missile defense is concerned?

James Woolsey: If the 1972 U.S.-Soviet treaty were binding on the United States after Russia and three other states have become the successor to the Soviet Union – and this would only be true if the Senate so approved by a two-thirds vote – then the United States could only build one ABM site with 100 interceptors in North Dakota that would not be able to protect the entire country. But because of the change, the substantial change, in the treaty that occurs when Russian, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan all become successor states to the Soviet Union, I believe that the treaty is only binding on the United States if our full constitutional processes are followed, and the full two-thirds vote of the Senate is attained for approval.

Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C.: Vice President Gore has suggested that Gov. Bush's proposals would constitute risky unilateralism, and that nuclear unilateralism will hinder, rather than help, arms control. President Kennedy used unilateral initiatives to help prompt a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere. President Bush used unilateral initiatives to remove from deployment the least safe and secure nuclear warheads when the Soviet Union was falling apart, and to facilitate the START II accord. Were these unilateral actions unwise? When are unilateral steps wise and when are they risky? Would the reduction in alert rates for U.S. nuclear forces – as proposed by Gov. Bush – be wise or risky?

James Woolsey: I don't think there is any single criterion for when unilateral steps are better or worse than treaties. But the key point is that treaties should be adjusted when strategic circumstances change. The Russians have understood this very well with respect to the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) treaty, which I negotiated. On more than one occasion, they have demanded that the treaty be changed to permit them more flexibility to deploy more military forces in the caucuses. I believe that some unilateral steps toward reducing offensive courses would be reasonable, and I also believe that we should inform the Russian government that the United States is not and will not be bound by the 1972 U.S.-Soviet treaty unless two-thirds of the Senate approves, and that our strategic circumstances require very substantial changes in any agreement between the United States and Russia today.

Council on Foreign Relations, N.Y.: The United States has to protect its basic strategic interests, such as nuclear deterrence and access to oil. Should the next administration restrict the use of U.S. military power to defending these traditional strategic interests, or should it expand its definition of strategic interests and use its military power to deal with civil and ethnic conflict? In your opinion, would NMD improve or weaken U.S. military power?

James Woolsey: I believe the NMD of the right kind would mean that the U.S. would be freer to use its military forces abroad if it so chose. The question is, when is this wise? Clearly, we need to be able to use forces to protect vital national interests, but sometimes the risk of humanitarian catastrophe may present a sound case for us to use forces in those circumstances as well, especially if we can do so together with our allies.

Washington, D.C.: In your opinion, do you feel the new missile defense system will become a reality? Additionally, do you feel that sharing this defense technology is in the best interest of the United States considering the impression that it it is portraying to the international community? I have read in various publications that our European allies are not viewing the missile defense system as a positive development, leaning more towards strengthening the impression of a newfound American isolationism. I would appreciate hearing your perspective on these issues. Thank you.

James Woolsey: I do not believe that the Clinton administration's proposed system will be deployed. There are several reasons. First, it will be extremely easy to penetrate using decoys and counter-measures, even for countries such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. It has even been designed to be easily penetrated in order to reassure the Russians that it is not going to be effective against their offensive systems. But these same steps also make it easy for rogue states to penetrate it. It has a further disadvantage, which is that it only protects the United States, and this helps lead to our allies being concerned about "fortress America." I believe that boost phase intercept systems, at first deployed on ships at sea such as AEGIS, and later boost phase interceptors deployed in space, would do a much better job of protecting both the United States and our allies. And ultimately will be the type of defensive systems that are deployed.

In a Washington Post editorial yesterday, it says that if missile defense is worth considering, we should rule out no options "simply because the 1972 ABM treaty disallows them." The editorial further criticized President Clinton because he called the system a "cornerstone" before he decided what missile defense system he wanted. And it says that this is "backward." The Post editorial is absolutely right, in my view. The president should not have designed the defensive system so that it would require only small changes in the treaty. Instead, he should have picked the best defensive system and then decided what changes, major or minor, were needed in the treaty to make it effective.

Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada: A couple of quick questions:
Do you see this as a realistic deterrent to "rogue" states, who would most likely use some method other than missiles to deliver a nuclear device to the U.S., or is it just another excuse to pour loads of taxpayers' cash into the military-industrial complex?

James Woolsey: We can't forego defending the country against terrorism and unconventional attacks. Missile defense does not solve all of the country's strategic problems. On the other hand, nothing solves all of any country's strategic problems. The basic problem is that countries such as North Korea and Iraq will feel freer to attack their neighbors such as South Korea and Kuwait if they can hold a ballistic missile sword over our heads. By deploying missile defenses, we take away this capacity of theirs to use blackmail in a crisis against us. This is the principle problem – not the risk that they will, on some June morning in a fit of pique, launch a ballistic missile at us.

Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C.: Current U.S. law requires the United States to maintain nuclear forces around START I levels of 6,000 deployed warheads until the START II accord enters into force. It is unlikely that START II will enter into force anytime soon. Should the Congress revise existing law to permit the phased, verifiable, mutual reduction of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces below START I levels?

James Woolsey: Numbers of deployed warheads are not the main problem. We got into the business of limiting warhead numbers via arms control during the Cold War because we were worried that the Soviet ICBM threat against our Minuteman ICBMs and bombers was so substantial that it could put us at a serious strategic disadvantage. We were particularly worried about our European allies remaining steadfast in a crisis. For example, one over Berlin, if we faced much larger Soviet nuclear forces as well as facing the 22 divisions of Soviet ground forces stationed in East Germany about 100 miles from the Rhine. This world is gone with the wind. Our strategic deterrent now is largely based at sea in Trident submarines. Numbers of Russian warheads are irrelevant, because they cannot target Trident. The only crisis in Berlin is over real estate prices. And not only are there no Soviet land armies 100 miles from the Rhine, there are now no really effective Russian land armies anywhere at all. Our European allies have disagreements with us, but they're over banana tariffs, not caused by Russian strategic superiority. Our main concern with Russian nuclear weapons should be that they are well-guarded and under clear and firm command and control. And that they not be on a hair-trigger. Whether they have 6,000, 5,000, 4,000, 3,000 or 2,000 is of relatively minor importance, as far as I'm concerned.

New York, N.Y.: Most of the attention has been focused on the Russian reaction to NMD. How do the Chinese interpret it, and how is Beijing likely to respond if the U.S. goes ahead with NMD? Might Moscow and Beijing coordinate their response?

James Woolsey: Russia today is carrying China's water on the missile defense issue, because many senior Russian military officers, and perhaps President Putin, believe that they should work closely with China in order to thwart actions by the United States. Any effective missile defense is going to make it harder for China to attack the United States. Although we have a history of negotiations and treaties with the Soviet Union on strategic issues, and thus Russian leaders understandably expect us to discuss major strategic changes with them, in my opinion, we owe China nothing on this point. Russia is a democracy, albeit a troubled one. China is a Communist dictatorship that is trying to get a free ride across the Pacific for its ballistic missiles on the back of an old Soviet-American treaty. How do you say, "chutzpah" in Mandarin?

I think we ought to be able to cooperate with China on trade, protect ourselves against rogue states including to some extent, China, and criticize Chinese human rights violations such as arresting and even killing middle-aged people who like to do breathing exercises. In short, we ought to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time in dealing with China.

Arlington, Va.: In your opinion, what part of the world represents the most significant threat to not only U.S. security interests but to the safety of countries?

James Woolsey: Probably the Mideast, because at least two major rogue states, Iran and Iraq, are located there, and others, such as Libya, are also working on ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction. Further, the mideast will increasingly become the source of the world's oil, and this is a strategic problem for us and for many other countries.

On this point, you might see an article by Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and myself in the January 1999 issue of Foreign Affairs, titled, "The New Petroleum." Of course, it would be extremely dangerous for the United States if we fell into a major crisis or conflict with either Russia or China, but I believe that we will be able to avoid that with those two states if we manage our relations with them firmly but cordially. There is a serious risk that over Kashmir, India and Pakistan could fall into conflict, even nuclear conflict, but that is unlikely to even indirectly involve the United States.

Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C.: Every incoming administration has reviewed and modified the proposed missile defense architecture it inherited from its predecessor. President Nixon revised the NMD plans of President Johnson, and President Bush revised the NMD plans of President Reagan. Is a Gore presidency likely to proceed with the same NMD proposals that have not been agreed upon at the recent Moscow summit? Or would a review and possible changes in NMD architecture be carried out? How would a Gore administration secure bipartisan support for its NMD proposals in light of the strongly negative reaction by Republicans on Capitol Hill to President Clinton's proposals?

James Woolsey: It is not only the Republicans on Capitol Hill who have pointed out serious problems with the Clinton administration's NMD plans. The Union of Concerned Scientists, distinguished scientists such as Richard Garwin and distinguished senators such as Joe Biden (D-Del.) have all pointed out that the administration's mid-course intercept systems would be much less effective than boost-phase intercept defense. I would hope that a Gore administration would take this into consideration, and that they would move toward boost-phase intercept, perhaps initially from ships at sea, but would keep open the option of later basing such defenses in space.

New York, N.Y.: Under what conceivable scenario could you envision North Korea launching a missile in our direction, knowing the response would be, to say, the least, disproportionate?

James Woolsey: In the event of a North Korean attack against South Korea, in perhaps the death throes of a failing North Korean regime, I believe something like this might occur. One should not always assume that one is dealing with rationality in dealing with leaders such as Kim Jong-Il. His father, Kim Il-Sung, was essentially an old Stalinist – totalitarian, but, in many ways, cautious. Kim Jong-Il, on the other hand, is sort of a cross between Caligula and Baby Doc Duvalier. I would not plan on such individuals always being rational.

Free Media: That was our last question today for former CIA director R. James Woolsey. Thanks so much to Mr. Woolsey, and to everyone who joined us.

   |       |