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Special Section: One Year Later
Special Report: America at War
Live Online Special Coverage: Sept. 11, One Year Later
Talk: National News message boards
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One Year Later:
Military

WIth William L. Nash (MG, USA-Ret.)
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Preventive Action,
The Council on Foreign Relations

Wednesday, Sept. 11, 2002; Noon ET

After the unprecedented attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the U.S. military undertook operations in Afghanistan to dislodge the ruling Taliban regime and locate Osama bin Laden. With the Taliban now gone, an interim government in place and no sign of bin Laden, have the military objectives changed? How long will American troops remain in Afghanistan and will possible operations in Iraq stretch the military too thin?

William L. Nash (MG, USA-Ret.), senior fellow and director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, was online Wednesday, Sept. 11 at Noon ET, to discuss the status of military operations in response to the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.

Nash has extensive experience in peacekeeping operations, both as a military commander in Bosnia as a civilian administrator for the United Nations in Kosovo. He served in the Army for 34 years, and is a veteran of Vietnam and Operation Desert Storm in Iraq. Since his retirement in 1998, Nash has been a fellow and visiting lecturer at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and director of Civil-Military Programs at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. In April 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Nash to the UN fact-finding team to develop accurate information regarding recent events in the Jenin refugee camp.

The transcript follows.

Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.



washingtonpost.com: Gen. Nash, thank you for joining us today. How would you characterize the current American military operations in Afghanistan?

William L. Nash: Thank you for having me. A short answer is impossible, I think we need to first emphasize the positive in terms of the defeat of the Taliban regime and the capture and destruction of the al Qaeda network and the establishment of a new government in Afghanistan that will continue to mature and evolve.

The work in Afghanistan is not completed. Aside from the many issues of nation building its obvious that significant numbers of Taliban and al Qaeda are still in the region and can harm us. Much work needs to be done.



Los Angeles, Calif.: Do you really think catching bin Laden will make a difference in the war against terrorism, ultimately?

William L. Nash: Yes and no. It would make a difference in a symbolic nature that we have captured or killed the senior leader of al Qaeda. At the same time, it would be imprudent to think his demise would terminate the threat to America or American interests. The network is much larger than one person.


Catalina Island, Calif.: What will it take to create a stable government in Afghanistan that has popular support? What role should the United States have in creating such a stable governance?

William L. Nash: I'll take the second one first. Its my judgment that the U.S. must provide political, economic and security leadership in the rebuilding. The most important ingredient is time. Time in terms of development programs that address the democratic issues in a country that has little tradition of democracy. In terms of the economic infrastructure. In terms of indigenous security by and for the people of Afghanistan. Associated with time is patience because all will not be smooth and we must be determined to succeed.

When I say time, I think we should think in terms of five to 10 years as a minimum. We've been in Bosnia for nearly seven years now. Building democracy and a secure environment is not a quick fix.


Cumberland, Md.: What do you think the U.S. strategy vis-a-vis al Qaeda should be? Are we doing all that we can both in the U.S. and abroad to capture and terminate al Qaeda members?

William L. Nash: Overall I think we're doing well. However, I think I would place more emphasis on some of the non-military aspects of defeating al Qaeda. I would address the diplomatic, economic and social aspects with greater intensity. We need to continue to build the various coalitions fighting this battle with us.

The fact is, if we can't overwhelm al Qaeda's message to a large part of the world we will be unable to solve the problem.


Virginia: Why would a military man like yourself be preventing war rather than being proactive/reactive?

William L. Nash: I guess I would have to begin by saying that if you've ever been shot at you too would probably be interested in preventing a reoccurrence. But I also look at it in a much larger sense that as the United States that can use our influence to prevent civil strife, it advances the interests and the prosperity of the United States. Making the world less of a threat. The purpose of the Armed Forces is to defend the U.S. -- an active conflict prevention strategy may well be the best way to achieve those goals.


Piscataway, N.J.: Welcome.
Do you believe chemical weapons will be used by the Republican Guard?

William L. Nash: There is no reason to believe that Saddam Hussein won't deploy chemical weapons in the defense of his regime.


Clarksville, Tenn.: Sir, I'd like your opinion.

I read an article in Rolling Stone Magazine that was not very complimentary of what's going on in Afghanistan. In short the article claims:

1. the U.S. military leadership in Afghanistan is being compelled to work with the various warlords and wasting as these warlords promise, then renege on their promise to produce al Qaeda members.

2. The ground level commanders don't trust these warlords, yet are being told by their commanders, some of them further away -- i.e. Tampa -- to keep working with them.

3. The U.S. forces don't have any significant control of areas outside of Kabul.

4. Our troops in Afghanistan are tired and need to be replaced with fresh troops but there are insufficient troops available to replace them.

I got Rolling Stone's article from my grandson who reads this stuff. Frankly, it's the ONLY magazine article I read by reporters on the ground who are traveling with the troops in Afghanistan.

What's your opinion of the jist of this article as I've described it?

William L. Nash: Well, first of all, Rolling Stone is not the only magazine with reporters on the ground. The problem with working with various warlord forces is that while they provide you the advantage of knowing the ground and the enemy they do not necessarily have identical objectives as U.S. forces have.

The warlords survival is dependent on them balancing a wide variety of factors -- not all of which relate to U.S. success. There is ample evidence that they have manipulated our forces on a number of occasions.

I disagree with the characterization of U.S. forces as being exhausted. Because we have in fact rotated troops into the region and have ample forces available to continue the operation for an extended period of time.

But it is also clear that the level of U.S. forces in the country require use of local forces to continue the fight.

U.S. forces are largely operating outside Kabul. It is the International Security Forces that are limited to the Kabul area.


Silver Spring, Md.: Gen. Nash,

Are the Saudis serious about not letting the United States use their territory as a staging area for attacks against Iraq or it is a public relations smoke screen to pacify the Saudi public?

Thanks,
RPM

William L. Nash: I'm not sure. But I think the Saudi reservations about the U.S. attacking Iraq are real. Its my judgment that we have not yet made the case to the international community as well as our own public that the urgency of the threat requires action in the near term. As you know the debate is growing in the U.S. on that issue and we expect President Bush to begin a wider dialogue on the international level in tomorrow night's speech to the United Nations.


Silver Spring, Md.: Gen. Nash,

What do you think should become of the detainees being held in Cuba?

Thank you.

William L. Nash: Some should be put on trial for their crimes against Americans and international citizens. In the long term, some may well be released back to their home country. But I don't think that will happen for some time because there's every reason to believe that if returned most will return to terrorist activities.

Regardless of the short term disposition its important that we a: Gain the maximum amount of intelligence they can provide and b: treat them within the parameters of due process and legitimate treatment.


Alexandria, Va.: Is there any difference between Jane Fonda travelling to Vietnam 30 years ago and American anti-war activists travelling to Iraq today? Isn't the United States fighting with Iraq over the no-fly zones right now?

William L. Nash: I guess that's a hard one, because like many Vietnam vets I retain a certain degree of resentment over Jane Fonda's trip to Hanoi.

But I think the difference today is that there are more people who are travelling to Iraq who are not going in any way to support the regime, but to report on the regime. Or in some cases in an attempt to resolve the issues confronting our two nations.

On the other hand, I'm really not sure what Scott Ritter's up to.


Washington, D.C.: I do have one question, How can the US feel comfortable about going after Saddam, when we have finished or have any clue where Bin Laden is? Should we not finish with Bin Laden first and then go after Saddam?

William L. Nash: On some levels I agree with you. On the other hand, on any front a commander has to address today's issues and tomorrow's issues at the same time. And so it is impossible to do things sequentially, many times you have to operate on various fronts simultaneously.

The third major consideration is some degree of stabilization in the Israeli/Palestinian situation.


Indianapolis, Ind.: Do you not think that instead of going after Iraq we should go after Pakistan and Saudi Arabia who have in fact contributed the most in the cultivation of terror? It seems ironic that we are sleeping with the enemy knowing about the ISI and General Musharraf's connections with the Taliban and bin Laden and the finance and spiritual support of the Saudi establishment.
Do we not face a greater threat from them and are we doing enough to neutralize this threat?

William L. Nash: No.

As I talked about in the previous answer, you've got to do things simultaneously. But our interests in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are best served by diplomacy and economic cooperation, while maintaining our positions vis a vis the opening of their societies and the economic development of their countries.

The priority should remain with fighting the al Qaeda and dealing with the potential threats from Iraq.


Philadelphia, Pa.: The recent briefing by the Rand Corp. on the Saudis suggests that they are definitely NOT our allies. These findings were then dismissed by the Bush administration. What do you think about that report and what is your opinion on the Saudis as a U.S. ally?

William L. Nash: In addition to serving in the gulf war, I was an adviser to the Saudi Arabian National Guard for two years in the mid-90s. And I have great personal respect for the Saudi people. Not knowing the details of the Rand briefing, from press reports I found it to be simplistic, naive and spurious.

At the same time we also see issues that our two countries need to address to our mutual benefit.


Kensington, Md.: In Vernon Loeb's article in yesterday's Washington Post, he quotes Barnett Rubin as saying the U.S. military "sees itself as a war-fighting military, fighting a low-level counter-insurgency war." Whether or not that is the case now, do you think it will come to pass as al Qaeda and Taliban remnants coalesce into more of a guerilla force?

washingtonpost.com: Story: U.S. Deploys Artillery to Afghanistan For 1st Time (Post, Sept. 10, 2002)

William L. Nash: Barnett Rubin's a good friend of mine and in fact he was my predecessor here at the CFR. I think his judgment that the war in Afghanistan will be characterized by guerrilla and anti-guerrila operations is a pretty sound assessment. He's the best expert on Afghanistan that I know.


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