| Iraq Weapons Inspections
With David Kay
Senior Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
Monday, Dec. 16, 2002; 11 a.m. ET With war hanging in the balance, UN inspectors continue their search of Iraq for weapons of mass destruction. Will inspections be successful in preventing the proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and is a U.S. conflict with Iraq inevitable? Former UN weapons inspector David Kay, senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies with a concentration on counterterrorism and homeland security issues, was online Monday, Dec. 16 at 11 a.m. ET, to discuss the latest developments in the Iraq weapons inspections. Kay served as the UN's chief nuclear weapons inspector, leading numerous inspections into Iraq following the end of the Gulf War to determine Iraqi nuclear weapons production capability. He led teams that found and identified the scope and extent of Iraqi uranium enrichment activities, located the major Iraqi center for assembly of nuclear weapons, and seized large amounts of documents on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, spending four days as a Saddam hostage in a Baghdad parking lot. He also led the analysis of the nature of the Iraqi nuclear program and its implications for non-proliferation and arms control activities. Kay has frequently testified before Congress, and his articles have appeared in The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Christian Science Monitor, The Washington Quarterly and The New Republic. He also has appeared on Nightline, McNeal-Lehrer, Today, Good Morning America, CNN and the evening news programs of PBS, ABC, CBS and NBC and has been a frequent BBC commentator on nuclear and defense matters. A transcript follows. Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.
Gaithersburg, Md.: I hope my confusion reflects what a great many others may experience. From a strictly logical perspective, the inspection and declarations provisions of the enabling UN resolution appear to be asking the Iraqis to "prove a negative," which as we all know is impossible to do. As a practical matter, it seems that regardless of the number of inspectors and their freedom to move about, the Iraqis could hide whatever they choose. Finally, if the U.S. has actual hard evidence of violations, that is, the very thing the inspectors are attempting to find, why has the evidence not been made public or at least shown to Security Council members or the leadership of allied countries? I know the history of documented bad behavior -- I'm talking about current material. My own, tentative answer is that the resolution, inspections and withheld evidence are all really part of a greater and more complex approach and I comfort myself with the thought that all the loose ends afford the U.S. a flexibility we might not have otherwise. But, that's just my tortured opinion. How best to understand and set a context for these matters? Thank you very much. David Kay: You are correct that from a strictly logical point of view "proving a negative" is a dead-end trap. In this case, Iraq was told exactly what information was required to fill in the gaps that remained at the end of 1998. There answer is in and seems to be "we destroyed the evidence and the documents about the destruction as well."
Your are right about the ease with which Iraq can outmanuver inspectors. That is one reason that interviews with Iraqi scientists are so important.
I believe that the US and other states will start to share their evidence with the inspectors now that the Iraqi declaration has been submitted. Sharing intelligence in never easy, but it is one of the keys to effective inspections.
All good questions!
Glenmont,, Md.: If the inspectors find hard evidence of a chemical, biological, or nuclear program, will the world community be anymore supportive of the U.S. led effort to strike Iraq? David Kay: I think some would, while no doubt others would not. All the permanent members of the Security Council know that Saddam has continued his WMD program. For the French, Russians and Chinese the issue is not lack of evidence.
Ocean City, Md.: When the Iraqis refuse the inspectors access to certain areas, why not just assume these areas are for the production of weapons of mass destruction and deal with these areas accordingly? David Kay: There were certainly times when I was in Iraq that this seemed like a great idea. The problem with it as a solution is that it would almost certainly put an end to inspections - Iraq would insist that the inspectors leave after the first facility was bombed. This leaves you with the problem we have struggled with for 10 years. Bombing the sites you know about does nothing about those you do not know about and leaves the regime free to continue its WMD program.
Harrisburg, Pa.: How accurate are inspections capabilities? How possible is it that weapons of mass destruction can exist and remain kept without detection? David Kay: Good question. Chemical and biological programs can easily be embedded in peaceful activities. The same plant that makes pesticides can with very little new effort produce nerve agent and then switched back to pesticide production. Our inspection technologies continue to lag. This is the reason that defectors and interviews are so important to unmasking these programs. Nuclear programs are harder to hide, but it is not impossible.
Leesburg, Va.: If the weapons inspectors did find something showing Iraq to be in violation of the UN resolution, would we (the public) know about it right away or is it likely it would be kept quiet until a later date? David Kay: Probably not "right away". The UN remains fundamentally a diplomatic forum and caution and culture would require carefully checking and discussions with Iraq before the UN went public.
Wheaton, Md.: Can we really trust the UN, which is as corrupt and incompetent as most member states, to adequately inspect Iraq? After all, Syria, which is one of the largest sponsors of international terrorist organizations, is on the UN Security Council. Who are they fooling? David Kay: The insider as cheat is a common UN problem. Iraq was on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency at the time of the Gulf War. Iran continues to play an important role there, and you are correct about Syria. On the other hand, US leadership has played a strong role in bringing some rigor and transparency to these inspections. The insistence that all five Permanent members of the Security Council get the unedited Iraqi Declaration is one example of such pressure.
Savannah, Ga.: How hard has it been to get the interviews, and the people that we want to interview? Has Iraq been attempting to place any restrictions on letting people designated by the UN leave Iraq to be interviewed? David Kay: The difficulty has, at this point, been less Iraq than the UN. The head of UNMOVIC, Hans Blix, has only recently asked for Iraq to provide a list of personnel and given them until 31 Dec to produce such a list. Unfortunately, the UN has not required that know Iraqi weapons scientists appear for interviews. The information that you can get from such interviews are key to penetrating the Iraqi web of deception that surrounds their Declaration.
Washington, D.C.: Kennedy showed us pictures of actual missiles in Cuba. This administration insists that it knows more about Iraq's capabilities than the Iraqis apparently know (or are willing to say). Will Bush and Co. ever produce a smoking gun? David Kay: The Cuban missile crisis and the pictures of medium range rockets in Cuba were an exceptional case. After the fall of Communism and the Soviet Union we have learned how much of their military activities we missed because of their excellent deception efforts. Iraq learned from the 1981 Israeli attack on their nuclear reactor how important deception is to protecting programs. If by "smoking gun" you mean a picture or possession or an Iraqi weapon, you are holding out for a standard of proof that is unlikely to be met - prior to a regime change. The Administration needs, and I believe can, produce a compelling picture of Iraq's activities by putting the million piece puzzle together. Essentially you have a lot of "little and partial" pictures that individually seem insignificant, but when all put together leave little room for doubt.
Aspin Hill, Md.: Isn't it true that France created Iraq's nuclear program and continues to support it? David Kay: France played an important role, as did Italy, in the early Iraq weapons program. By the mid-80's Iraq had learned the importance of drawing their technology more widely. The final list of suppliers includes most of Europe, the US, the then Soviet Union and several Asian countries.
Dupont: Why are we worrying about this now? We were allies with Iraq -- indeed, sold them many weapons during our friendship -- and stayed silent when they used biological weapons domestically. The CIA has said that Iraq will probably only launch a strike against the United States or its neighbors if the U.S. and U.K. struck first. North Korea has said it will not allow inspectors, but we've no plans to attack there. And Saddam Hussein, while clearly a terrible human being, is probably not that much worse than other leaders, both in the region and around the world, the U.S. government so fervently supports. Why now? David Kay: Good Question! Iraq really is different. It lost a war and agreed to give these weapons up as part of the cease fire. It then refused to honor those provisions and defied the UN over a 10 year period. Also Saddam is such a bad risk taker with ambitions that call for domination of all of the region that leaving him with these weapons seems like a certain bet on a wider conflict and more suffering than to enforce the UN resolutions now. Saddam used chemical weapons, not biological weapons, on his own people and against Iran. If Saddam succeeds in defying the UN and continues his WMD program the prospect of serious WMD conflict in the region becomes a very significant risk. You are right that North Korea poses a serious problem, but it is not - at least yet - defying the Security Council.
Arlington, Va.: Does the European left's opposition to U.S. regime-change efforts in Iraq (unless WMD are found) signal new found tolerance of human rights abuses by dictators? If it doesn't, why do you think Bush, etc., have largely failed to make the regime-change argument on human rights grounds? If they supported a war crimes trial for Milosevic, why not for Hussein? David Kay: There is certainly a strong case to be made for war crime and crimes against humanity charges against Saddam. My feeling is that the European left is not really friendly to Saddam as much as they are repelled by what they see as US domination of global affairs. Some European governments, Germany comes to mind, actually find this a useful attitude to foster as it diverts attention away from major failures of these Governments to deal with their own domestic challenges.
Virginia: Do the inspectors have their own cooks at their compound? Do they eat Iraqi foods or just burgers and hot dogs? David Kay: When in the field we relied on military style rations, MRE's [Meals Ready to Eat or as we called them Meals Rejected by Everyone]. In the evening, inspectors generally eat in their Iraqi-run hotel or at local restaurants.
NYC: Why do you call it inspections when you are on a search mission? David Kay: The original resolution, 687, envisaged that we would go to Iraq; the Iraqi's would bring their WMD to us and we would supervise the destruction of those weapons. Alas, that was not to be and we got caught up into the hide and seek game, but the "inspector" name stuck.
Kensington, Md.: If our allies, the Israelis, hadn't destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, how dangerous would Saddam Hussein be right now? David Kay: The Israeli strike certainly set back his program. Without this action Iraq would have almost certainly had nuclear weapons when the Gulf War began.
Baltimore, Md.: Just to clarify: For the French, Russians and Chinese the issue is not lack of evidence, but money (trade)? David Kay: Trade and political influence.
Washington, D.C.: Why would any Iraqi scientist agree to questioning, either inside or outside of Iraq? Based on what has happened to others, they, and their families, would most certainly be murdered. David Kay: Some genuinely want out. The new resolution allows the UN to remove their families. We have had during the last 10 years a number of brave scientists that ran this considerable risk. You are correct this would not be easy, and I have been amazed that the risk people will run for a life of freedom.
Washington, D.C.: What policies have kept Iraq's regional ambitions in check over the last ten years and what developments create a need to change those policies now, while we are fighting a war on terrorism? David Kay: Containment was quickly falling apart, because of several reasons. Iraq's main trading partners wanted to end sanctions and resume full trade, without restrictions. Even the weak sanctions that remained were routinely defeated by smuggling. The political costs of maintaining sanctions were rising for the US. Free of inspections, Iraq's WMD program was gaining speed. All of this pointed to a future of Saddam again free to threaten his neighbors, and the cost for us of coming to their aid looking like a full out WMD conflict. The future looked more dangerous and much less certain.
Washington, D.C.: Were the previous inspectors "kicked out" as the Bush Administration has frequently alleged, or were they ordered out by either the UN or U.S? David Kay: The inspectors left when the Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, concluded that Iraq would not honor its many promises and Security Council requests for full access. He decided that under these conditions inspections could not be conducted and withdrew the inspectors. Butler reported that the withdrawal was the result of Iraq not meeting its obligations.
Washington, D.C.: Strategic question: the inspectors make no-notice visits to various sites of interest. Surely they have an idea which are high-potential and low-potential for finding WMD evidence. Do they try to lull their Iraqi "tenders" to sleep with low priority sites and then slip into a higher priority site? Or do they approach every visit as a potential WMD site? It seems that raising the stakes by going to several high priority sites would force the Iraqi's hand and might shake out movement of evidence between sites. David Kay: Over the years a variety of inspections strategies have been used, including those you outline. There has been continued frustration with how easily Iraq seems to gain advance indication of what is to be inspected.
White Oak, Md.: Isn't it fairly obvious that Saddam Hussein will never give up his goal of possessing nuclear weapons? Why do we keep playing this game when we know the removal of Saddam Hussein and his brutal regime is the only way to bring peace and stability to the region? David Kay: One answer is that hope continues to dominate experience. At another level, some believe the costs of reaching your conclusion would result in action that for a variety of reasons they would not like to take. This is almost certainly the last attempt to stop him. If the world turns away at this point, the region is headed for a very dangerous future where the costs of ultimate conflict will be much greater than now.
Cumberland, Md.: Why did the US agree to accept Blix as head of UNMOVIC and not insist on his replacement before these inspections began? David Kay: At the time the Clinton Administration simply could not find enough allies to make this a battle they wanted to fight, and they were not willing to veto Blix.
Savannah, Ga.: That would seem to me to make the most sense, to do these interviews as soon as possible. What reasons does the UN give for not making them a priority? David Kay: Blix seems to want to avoid the inevitable hostile reaction from Iraq that would result from exercising the power given him by the SC.
| |
© Copyright 2003 The Washington Post Company | 
