| NOVA:
'Dirty Bomb'
Kirk Wolfinger
Producer
Matthew Collins
Writer/Producer
Wednesday, Feb. 26, 2003; 1 p.m. ET This summer, an American al Qaeda sympathizer, Jose Padilla, was arrested on suspicion of planning a "dirty bomb" attack on the United States. Suddenly, one of the ultimate nightmare terrorist scenarios seemed a step closer to reality. But few know what a "dirty bomb" really is or what devastation it would cause. A new NOVA film explains how easy is it to acquire materials and manufacture a "dirty bomb," how it differs from a conventional nuclear one, and how destructive would it could be. Producer Kirk Wolfinger and producer/writer Matthew Collins were online Wednesday, Feb. 26 at 1 p.m. ET, to discuss risk of a "dirty bomb" attack and the NOVA film. Wolfinger has produced and directed a variety of critically acclaimed television programs for networks such as PBS, NBC, Turner Broadcasting System, the Discovery Channel, The History Channel and National Geographic. Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.
washingtonpost.com: Hi there, there's been a change in the guests today. We're joined by Kirk Wolfinger and writer/producer Matthew Collins. Let's get started.
Kent, Ohio: How does a dirty bomb work? Matthew Collins: A dirty bomb is a radiological dispersal device. Because basically all it does is disperse some kind of radioactive material and conceivably it doesn't even have to be a bomb, but the most common way to disperse is with a bomb -- could be tiny or huge that blows apart a radioactive source and disperses it over as wide an area as possible. So there's no technical secret to a dirty bomb.
Wheaton, Md.: Has such a device ever been used or known to have been manufactured? Kirk Wolfinger: To the best of my knowledge, one was manufactured but not used by Chechen rebels in a park in Moscow in 1995. The BBC reported recently that they had intelligence that suggested al Qaeda might have in their possession materials to build one and might have built it, but that has not been confirmed. Matthew Collins: But no one's ever used one.
Minneapolis, Minn.: How much Cesium 137 is currently unaccounted for? Matthew Collins: I don't know... I really have no idea how to answer that except that there seems to be a lot of it in the former Soviet Union, but i don't think anyone really knows. In this country, there might be -- somebody probably knows, but not me. There are a lot of tiny sources. One list said 30,000 lost sources. Kirk Wolfinger: Cesium 137 is in many devices -- medical and is a by product of nuclear reactions, so there's a lot of it around.
Arlington, Va.: Terrific program last night -- very informative. You managed to be chilling and somewhat reassuring at the same time. How do we deal with the fact that there is so much radioactive material that would be easy to use in a dirty bomb that is not carefully monitored in the world? In just the last week there have been two reported incidents of stolen materials, in Nigeria and Georgia. Also, since the anthrax cleanup at Brentwood is still not done after 16 months, how many years would a cleanup after a dirty bomb take? That's one enclosed space that can be cordoned off effectively. Your program would seem to indicate that cleanup in a public area would be nearly impossible, and probably would take many years. If an attack were to take place in the Metro, as you portrayed, it seems like the whole system would have to be shut down, unless it was caught immediately. Somehow if Metro can't run in an inch of snow without delays, I can't imagine they have state of the art radiation detectors deployed in all the stations. Kirk Wolfinger: How can we begin to account for this -- as far as Matthew and I could tell, the government is beginning a very aggressive policy to begin accounting for all the potential sources. They realize in a way they didn't before the potential for this type of material. As the show says, lots of medical facilities kept this under lock and key to keep employees safe from accidents. Now it's so no one will walk off with it. So it's going to be a very large and long process to begin to catalog all this material. Matthew Collins: The reassuring thing about radioactive material sort of self-policing because it's really easy to detect. Detection devices are in use and are easy and inexpensive. They work and its simple to put them up in bridges and tunnels and subways. Kirk Wolfinger: Also, if you get a hold of a piece of some radioactive source that's large enough to do damage -- to keep it from being detected or exposing yourself, you have to shield it inside a lead container -- which weighs several tons. It depends on the type of material, of course. So it is self-policing in that sense. The shielding is a mac truck size for a bic lighter sized source.
Kirk Wolfinger: How much clean up would it take? That's dependent on the amount of material. We discussed that in the program last night. Someone -- I would liken it to the anthrax attacks last year. Someone was out to create mischief and make a point that it could be done. But in the grand scheme of things, not a lot of people were affected.
So you have someone who might build one and say keep pushing us or someone could do, as we posit in the show, the subway scenario. Just to say I can do this and make a big mess with a very little of material. Someone who wants to cause mass devastation as Matthew was saying, that's going to require a tremendous effort -- to not only find the material, but disperse it without killing themselves. It would be incredibly complicated to turn this into a WMD. Matthew Collins: I think that the real hidden variable when we're talking about clean-up lengths -- like the Metro -- is the question of "how clean is clean?" How much radioactivity are we willing to accept and that is going to be a massive debate. For an accidental release, that could be pretty major. If you start changing the guidelines because of expense, you can imagine the debate that would ensue. I refer to this as the "talking head bomb" because that's what we would get afterwards.
Minneapolis, Minn.: There must be hundreds of radioactive materials that could be used in a dirty bomb. Why select Cesium 137 or CsCl as the likely material? Kirk Wolfinger: The easiest answer is that Cesium 137 is among the most easily dispersed. It's a powder in Cesium chloride form.
Washington, D.C.: Thank you for answering these questions today. I work in Washington, D.C. If a dirty bomb exploded in D.C., should I immediately try to evacuate or hole up in my office? To the best of your knowledge, are there systems in place that would quickly identify the type of bomb used and how the public should respond/react? Matthew Collins: To the best of my knowledge, the D.C. authorities are not always willing to say exactly where they have radiation detectors and what type -- for obvious reasons. But the indication we've got is that you can bet they're all over D.C. They are fairly easy to get -- they can pull cold war era geiger counters out of moth balls which can tell you , in some cases, what the source was.
So we can't be sure, but if they don't have it now, they will soon.
Basically, all experts seem to agree that more people are likely to be hurt by panic -- trying to flee the area -- than from the actual radiation. If you get sick, running away isn't going to help. If no one tells you anything else and you think you're close enough to have been exposed, you might want to go inside a building. If you think the radioactive material is airborne and wait to go somewhere else. Change your clothes, take a shower and put your clothes in a plastic bag. But it's not like a biological weapon where one germ can kill you. Radioactivity on this level is only dangerous if exposed for a long amount of time. It's like having motor oil on you. Kirk Wolfinger: Studies of the effects on exposure to low levels of radiation -- which most people think an attack would be -- there's nothing conclusive about how much damage to the human body would be caused. Exposure over long periods of time increases the risk of cancer. But because we have such a fear of the words nuclear and atomic, the fear level is ratcheted up.
What we're trying to convey is that there is so much question about exposure to low levels, that no one should panic or flee unless they know more about the attack.
Arlington, Va.: After Energy Secretary Abraham's statements at the IAEA in Vienna, there are expectations of large and widespread commitments to the protection of radiological source material both in the U.S. and security for such sources abroad (paid for by the U.S.). Why have we not heard about the progress of these efforts from DOE? What is the status of these programs and what do you think is their chance for success? Matthew Collins: The Bush administration and Sec. Abraham announced some new programs that more money would be invested in locking up some of these radioactive sources around the world. But they have not received unanimous praise from the IAEA or any other radiation experts because they are taking money from other programs to put into -- I don't know the details -- but I know there was some controversy about accusations that this was all talk and that they wouldn't do that. That's the gist of it. There's a lot of debate about whether the money will really do anything or if it's a bait and switch like the AIDS proposal which takes money away from malaria programs.
Idaho Falls, Idaho: Are there any protectants that one could take other than Potassium Iodide, which only works for radioactive Iodine releases? Iodine would be a highly unlikely material to use in such a "weapon of mass disruption." Both: No. Kirk Wolfinger: Duct tape and plastic are not the answer.
Washington, D.C.: The narrative message of the NOVA program seemed to be that dirty bombs are weapons of mass disruption rather than of mass destruction -- based on the potential for indecision on the part of the government and confusion and fear the part of the public. Yet you imagery remained ominous and provocative throughout -- including intermittent clips of nuclear detonations. Aren't you at all concerned that your style of presentation and choice of imagery incites fear among watchers and potentially reinforces the perceptions of would-be terrorists that a dirty bomb is will help achieve their goals? Kirk Wolfinger: No, we weren't trying to be unnecessarily provocative. We were trying to be realistic. We could've written an article and then there would be no images. We are making a TV program and we tried to realistically imagine what a detonation might look like. We kept a very tight reign on the music, sound effects, in order not to hype this.
We did feel the need to be graphic because we are a TV nation and you do want to get people's attention, but I feel strongly we did not do so in a sensational way. Matthew Collins: You can rest assured that we didn't use the images haphazardly. We discussed this a great deal in the editing room at NOVA and PBS. The nuclear explosions were used only at the beginning of the show because there was talk about was a dirty bomb a nuclear weapon. But it's become fashionable to refer to a dirty bomb as a psychological weapon, but it could cause cancer. But you'll cause more panic in the long run if you say there's nothing to be scared of if you see people in protection suits with geiger counters and tell people to move out of their houses for two years.
Connecticut: How much do we know about dirty bombs, and how do you know it? How there been anyone who has conducted scientific testing of such devices? Kirk Wolfinger: The issue of a dirty bomb per se, Matthew may know more about studies. Referring to an earlier question, the real issue is what do we know about exposure to low levels of radiation. There we don't know a great deal and everyone agrees we need to do more study about this. Matthew Collins: As with most of these pleasant weapons -- like chemical and biological -- the U.S. ARmy and the Soviet Union did lots of tests over the last 50 years. Militaries have decided they are not good weapons because they take 20 years to cause cancer, so ya, they have been studied quite a bit. The dirty bomb scenarios in our show were basically put together by computer modeling using very common standard wind conditions and blast factors from the explosion and pretty common. There's a wide error margin, but scientists are in agreement about how much and how far radioactivity could be spread.
Bellows Falls, Vt.: The New York Times Science reporter featured in the show mentioned x-ray machines in relations to the dirty bomb threat. He said something about radiation being a part of our culture like getting an x-ray I believe. Is it not true that x-rays are from a non-nuclear source at least as used in current medical practice? Matthew Collins: X-rays come from radiation. There are other devices... probably not enough in a standard x-ray machine to be used in a dirty bomb. Other devices do not use radiological materiel. Kirk Wolfinger: There's another point this question skirts on. We as a species have evolved with radiation. It is not foreign to the human body and condition. We're exposed to it every day from sunlight -- the ground. If you live in Denver, you're seven times more exposed to it. If you eat a banana, you're upping your radiation. So that's where the conundrum where what is the effect of low level radiation. Yes, we have radiological devices in airports, at the dentist, to sterilize food products. We have tremendous uses for these devices. So again we go back to the terms atomic, nuclear, radiation -- it's not all bad.
Castle Shannon, Pa.: Here's a chance for a shameless plug. I totally forgot this was on last night. When will it air again? Kirk Wolfinger: The original broadcast date was March 25. Two weeks ago as we were putting the final touches on the program -- because the country went on elevated alert the folks at NOVA thought this would be the ideal time to get this out. Not to get better ratings, but because there is a lot of public service in this program.
It will run again nationally on March 25. Matthew Collins: It's gonna air a lot.
Germantown, Md.: Holding a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering and being very concerned over the fears from a dirty bomb, a previous answer hits on the point that people must keep in mind. What levels do we set as "clean enough" after a possible dirty bomb or, for that matter, any accident involving a release of radioactive material? Cleanup could be costly and inconvenience many, however, I am not convinced that it would be "tens of billions of dollars" as some talking heads are saying. Establishing appropriate cleanup levels, since this sets the costs, for the various radionuclides like Cesium 137 would be an important first step by the Federal agencies that regulate radioactive material and implement emergency response. These could be not only the NRC and DOE, but EPA, FEMA, OSHA, and DOT. Is there any action being taken on establishing such guidance or requirements for appropriate, or safe, cleanup levels? Matthew Collins: The NRC is not on record yet, nor is the EPA, but we know they are talking about this issue and are treading very carefully figuring out how to introduce these issues. People realize it's better to talk about these guidelines now rather than after the fact.
Some are set on a local level. In California there are none in place right now because of a lawsuit from anti-nuclear activists who questioned them. So a court ordered California to rethink them. So that's a good example for the type of debate you're going to get at all sides. Some will think it's more dangerous than previously thought. Others think low levels of radiation are actually good for you.
As to the billions of dollars question, there are so many variables. It depends on -- if you shut down the D.C. metro for a year and you're talking about lost tourism, expenses to get to work, busses, lost business, tearing down buildings, rebuilding. That's a worst case scenario, but those numbers could balloon pretty fast.
But the question is absolutely right in that probably most dirty bombs won't be anywhere near that bad. Kirk Wolfinger: One could ask the question... if someone decided to intentionally release a device around a national monument, would we tear it down.
Shreveport, La.: Do you consider it a risk to public safety that someone with an explosive could enter a cancer treatment center? Matthew Collins: No. It would be bad for the cancer patients. There's not enough radiation and the radioactive material is hidden and locked in the inner depths of the hospital and the chance that one big bomb would hit that tiny target and blow it up are very slim.
Idaho Falls, Idaho: I would have to disagree somewhat with one of your most recent responses. We have been studying the effects of low levels of radiation for nearly a century. To date, we have not identified ANY effects under acute exposures of 10 REM (a lot). What I think this says is that IF there is any effect at low levels (this is the point of controversy), it is quite low -- even trivial with respect to normal radiation background levels on this earth. Would you disagree? Matthew Collins: I personally do not feel qualified to argue your point, but I do know there are plenty of scientists that will. And all of our current govt regulations -- EPA and NRC -- and most locals, are based on the Linear No Threshhold assumption. Which means that if a lot of radiation is known to be carcinogenic, then a little radiation probably is too. These standards have been in place around the world and established by international scientific agencies. We're not making this up.
Boulder, Colo.: Shouldn't the U.S. agree to international inspection of nuclear, biological and chemical facilities just as the U.S. is demanding this of other countries? Both: Yes.
Omaha, Neb.: How much of a threat to public health is posed by the commercial use of cobalt-60 in the context of potential theft by terrorists. Matthew Collins: Cobalt 60 is being used in a lot of food irradiation plants and others -- mail facilities to kill anthrax, etc. -- and the thing that's constantly constant in a food long rod (tensiles). They would put out a lot of electricity, but you'd have to imagine blowing up a metal rod. It's not going to go anywhere unless you grind it up. It would kill quite a few terrorists in the process.
Kirk Wolfinger: It goes back to the question -- Cobalt 60 has a very valuable use right now. It's helping to feed people across the world because it prevents deaths from foodborne illness. So we really have to balance this whole argument. Autos kill many people each year, too, and we haven't outlawed them.
Washington, D.C.: Why did the NOVA program omit the Congressional testimony of the president of the Federation of American Scientists revealing the only practical, long term solution to the threat of dirty bombs: The movement towards a more just world -- reversing the deadly and growing disparity of wealth that produces people with nothing more to lose. How can a serious program on dirty bombs ignore any mention of the continuing, massive use of alpha emitting DU weapons by the U.S. against the citizens of Iraq, the Balkans and Afghanistan and for the threatened Desert Slaughter, Part 2. (DU has a half life of 4.5 billion years.) How can an honest citizen and an honest NOVA program ignore the U.S. blocking of the WHO's attempt to investigate the effects of DU on Iraqi civilians? Thomas J. Nagy, Ph.D.
Assoc. Prof. of Expert Systems
George Washington University Matthew Collins: The professor raises a lot of great points that would be fantastic for another show. But we did not feel it was in the scope of our one hour mission -- to inform Americans of the threat that put us on high alert. Unfortunately, we couldn't take the time to talk about the long-term solutions to the problems and how to create quality across the world. Kirk Wolfinger: I think that the professor raises terrific questions, ones that should be dealt with in another program. Matthew Collins: I somewhat resent being called dishonest. It's not dishonesty that makes a focused show. Kirk Wolfinger: You can't make a good show about everything and one of the things we found in the making of this show, even among scientific-minded well-read people there was confusion about dirty bombs and you need an hour to describe the basics even before you get into the other various and sundry issues -- the investigations, the military uses, etc. Matthew Collins: I would love to make a show about depleted uranium.
Minneapolis, Minn.: I am so concerned about this issue and I am almost afraid to ask this next question. Al Qaeda seems to like to plan multiple attacks at once. What is the likelyhood that they might attack several cities with several bombs over, say a one-day period? What kind of economic impact, let alone the health implications, do you think, this could this have on our country? Kirk Wolfinger: That is a great question. Matthew Collins: There could be anything. Sure, it's possible. It's not outside the realm of possibility.
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