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Children in Crisis: Accountability for D.C. Schools

District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority
November 12, 1996

Accountability for the Condition of DC's Public Education System

Ultimate authority and accountability for education rests with the District of Columbia Board of Education (the "Board"). Section 495 of the Home Rule Charter states, "The control of the public schools in the District of Columbia is vested in a Board of Education to consist of eleven elected members."26 While the charter does not go into great detail, it is clear that control and responsibility for the public schools lies with the Board.

The powers of the Board are further clarified in Title 31 of the DC Code which states the Board's responsibilities as the following:

  • Sect. 102 - determining all questions of general policy relating to the schools, appointing the executive officers hereinafter provided for, defining their duties, and directing expenditures
  • Sect. 106 - developing jointly with the Mayor procedures to assure maximum coordination of education and other municipal programs and services in achieving the most effective education system
  • Sect. 107 - appointing the Superintendent for a term of three (3) years, and authorizing any delegation of its authority to the Superintendent
  • Sect. 110 - removing the Superintendent at any time for adequate cause affecting his character and efficiency as Superintendent
While the Home Rule Charter empowers the Board to control the schools, Title 31 focuses that authority by assigning the Board responsibility for specific functions related to the school system. However, this does not mean that the Board should operate the school system. As President Karen Shook testified on September 4, 1996, "the responsibilities of the Board of Education are to conduct oversight and set policy. We are not the managers of the day-to-day operations of the school system."27 That responsibility rests with the Superintendent of Schools (the "Superintendent"), DCPS' educational leader and chief executive officer.

Both the Board and the Superintendent have failed to carry out their responsibilities.

Oversight and Policy

To carry out oversight and policy, the Board created four committees:
  • Facilities
  • Education
  • Special Programs and Compliance
  • Budget and Management
All committees report monthly to the Committee of the Whole and provide annual action plans and evaluations.

The committee structure is envisioned as providing effective policy guidance and oversight over the school system and the Superintendent. However, the reality is quite different.

Examining the two main roles of policymaking and oversight, one sees that the Board has failed to fully carry out its statutory functions as embodied in the DC Code. In every area examined, the Board has delegated its authority and responsibility for carrying out certain functions to the Superintendent. However, retaining its oversight functions, the Board created processes within each committee to oversee specific programs. As Board member Jay Silberman stated in an Authority hearing, "oversight is equally important or more important, in my opinion, than the policymaking itself."28 However, examining the specific oversight processes within the Board, it is evident that the Board's oversight processes are incapable of preventing the system from disintegrating even further.

Chapter 1 of this report outlined DCPS' management failures and the impact that they have had on the educational environment. The lack of oversight by the Board of Education is a primary cause of these failures. The Board's complicity is described in this chapter.

The Board's oversight processes contribute to ineffectiveness and lack of accountability in the public school system.

  • The Board has limited oversight of the procurement process

    The authority for entering into contracts does not lie with the Board. President Karen Shook made this clear in the September 4, 1996 Authority hearing when she said, "We [the Board] don't approve contracts."29 The authority has been delegated to the Superintendent. As Jay Silberman describes the contracting review process:

    "The Board rules provide, and practice of history have provided, that the Board has review of all contracts over $100,000. There is a monthly report, a list of the contracts, to whom it's being awarded, the subject or the nature of the contract and the amount of the contract and any Board member who wishes to research any background about the nature of the contract is free to request that information and in terms of the committees' oversight, individual committees' in any given area, in the monthly meetings, those Board members are free to raise . . . what is the impact of the contract, what is it for, is it cost effective."30
    However, how can the Board effectively carry out its oversight function in contract review, if the authority for contracts is delegated to the Superintendent and the information being provided to the Board is minimal?

    There is no automatic structural mechanism within the Board's process that requires review of certain types of contracts as, for example, sole source or high dollar contracts. Similarly, the review process is completely dependent upon board member initiative to ensure that any review takes place. If no one raises a question, researches any background about the contract, or generally takes the initiative in this process, no oversight in the contracting process will occur. Furthermore, the Board often does not see contract summaries until after the contracts have already been approved by the DCPS Procurement Office. As a result, when the Board does take an interest in a particular contract, the vendor has already begun to draw funds against the contract. In many cases, the oversight process, as structured, cannot declare an action or contract contrary to the interests of DCPS until it has already happened.

  • The Board has limited oversight of facilities maintenance

    Facilities maintenance, especially fire code violations abatement, is another area in which the Board neglects its oversight responsibilities. Because it has responsibility for setting the policy on how to deal with fire code violations, the use of the committee process should facilitate the creation of such a plan. However, in this case as well, the Board delegated the responsibility for ensuring that schools comply with fire codes to the Superintendent. DCPS' basic stance on fire code violations was to fix only violations identified by the fire inspector. The Board at no time questioned this position, thus implicitly ratifying a "hands off" approach to the abatement of fire codes, a problem that has become quite serious within the school system. There was no collective decision by the Board on how to address the fire code problem. Instead, individual board members traveled from school to school, bringing along news crews and fire inspectors to cite additional violations in the school system.

  • The Board has limited oversight in personnel and financial management

    Similarly, minimal oversight occurs in personnel or financial management. Board members have testified that they were aware of critical failures in these management functions, but did little to fix them or to hold the Superintendent accountable for fixing them.

Performance Evaluation of the Superintendent of Schools31

With such complete delegation of functions to the Superintendent, an annual performance evaluation becomes a critical document for holding the Superintendent accountable for results.

The Board evaluates the Superintendent annually on eleven evaluation criteria.

  • Board relations.32 Prepares appropriate materials and recommendations for the Board. Keeps Board informed. Implements Board actions effectively. Responds to Board requests in a timely manner.
  • Overall management style. Develops and implements realistic and appropriate plans. Articulates objectives clearly. Chooses personnel effectively. Develops and implements resolutions to problems in a timely fashion.
  • Curriculum and instructional management. Initiates new programs to meet Board objectives. Modifies or discontinues instructional programs in need of change. Develops a curriculum which promotes multi-cultural education. Monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of current instructional programs.
  • Overall management style (personnel). Provides for the appropriate employment utilization and evaluation of personnel. Develops and administers personnel policies and procedures. Promotes co-operative employee relations. Plans for in-service and implements staff development.
  • Facilities management. Effectively provides, utilizes, and maintains physical facilities, buildings, and grounds. Provides for the security and safety of personnel, students, and property.
  • Business and fiscal management. Determines the educational needs of the system. Prepares realistic forecasts and budgets. Manages and controls fiscal resources effectively. Administers an effective procurement program. Provides appropriate and timely financial reports.
  • Comprehensive planning. Develops and implements realistic and appropriate short and long range plans. Develops and implements appropriate accountability procedures. Evaluates planning results.
  • Community-public relations. Interprets programs, policies, and concerns to the community and media. Responds to community concerns. Keeps the community and the media appropriately informed.
  • Management of student services. Manages enrollment and attendance policies and procedures. Provides for the health and safety of students. Coordinates with other state and community agencies concerned with student services. Develops, implements, and administers programs to manage student behavior and discipline.
  • Professional and personal development. Presents a professional appearance. Maintains physical and mental health. Participates effectively in related professional organizations. Maintains the respect of his professional peers.
  • Student achievement. Increase student performance as measured by the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills (CTBS). Decrease by five percent the number of students in the first quartile (1-25 % percentile). Increase by at least three percent the number of students who move from the second quartile (26-50 % percentile) to the third quartile (51-75 % percentile). Increase by one percent the number of students in the fourth quartile (76-99 % percentile).

Only one of these eleven criteria currently has any quantifiable performance measures that provide a measure of objectivity -- student achievement -- and it is listed last.

Performance Evaluation Process

With the delegation of much of the Board's authority to the Superintendent, the evaluation process becomes even more critical, requiring the full participation of every board member to be truly effective. In the latest round of evaluations, only seven members submitted evaluations of the Superintendent.

Beyond the evaluation tool, the evaluation process used by the Board also affects the effectiveness of its oversight process. In the current process, members are provided a blank evaluation form and asked to rate the Superintendent's performance numerically in each category and supply any written comments that they may have. These evaluations are then collected and the sum of the numerical scores comprise each individual board member' s rating of the Superintendent.33 These eleven scores, assuming that everyone provides an evaluation, serve as the basis for assessing the Superintendent's performance. If six or more board members rate the Superintendent with a cumulative score of 34 or more points out of 55, then a seven percent bonus of base salary is given to the Superintendent.34

There are several shortcomings with this process. In addition to the lack of quantifiable evaluation criteria, the Board' s evaluation is simply a collection of the individual evaluations that are submitted to the Committee of the Whole. There is no consensus evaluation. At no time do the board members discuss, as a group, their reasons for the ratings they give. Instead, individuals submit their personal evaluations of the Superintendent with the majority position becoming the "official" position of the Board. The wide range of scores between board members on particular criteria further complicates the process. This is the result of a lack of an internal reconciliation process to examine the reasons for these differences in opinion. The result is an evaluation process that fosters subjective individual action, not objective collective action.

Performance Evaluation Results

In general, the Board evaluated the Superintendent generously across most evaluation categories. Even when the sparse comments indicate otherwise, the Superintendent still received high scores. The majority of board members gave the Superintendent above average or excellent in most categories. Each year, the Superintendent received above average ratings from six or more board members. As a result, each year the Superintendent received a bonus.

The poor state of the management functions at DCPS would appear to contradict the Board evaluations. Contributing to the confusion of the system is the following statement made by President Shook in the September 4, 1996 hearing: "There are still things that are broken. I don't want to give you the impression that I am satisfied with the procurement process or I think our budget and finance numbers are good."35 Yet, several members gave high ratings in these areas, implicitly ratifying the procurement, budget, and finance systems currently in operation. Even in facilities management, the Superintendent received several excellent ratings from individual board members in August 1996, yet six schools did not open on time for the school year.

On the single quantifiable criteria -- student test scores -- the evaluations do not reflect the available evidence. Board members gave the Superintendent an excellent rating in this category when it is obvious that the Superintendent has not met this criteria. Test scores have declined over the past five years, not improved. Thus, the positive evaluations of the Superintendent's performance contradict the available evidence, suggesting that the Board supports the Superintendent's ineffective policies and programs.

"I'd say we're doing about a C job, given the budget cuts, the fact that we can't generate money, the fact that we have a very fractured board, which l find unfortunate."
-- Karen Shook, from the transcript of public hearing before the Authority, on September 4, 1996, p.51.

"You know, I would probably put myself in the same category of a C. When I look at efforts in terms of trying to do what I want, obviously it gets much higher than that, but that doesn 't get you there. That only counts in horse shoes and this is not horse shoes, the closeness."
-- Franklin L. Smith, from the transcript of public hearing before the Authority on September 4, 1996, p. 157

Performance of the Board of Education

Examining Board voting patterns on key issues provides an example of its inability to collaborate and illustrates how divisive the Board has become. In the past several years, the Board has voted 6-5 on many key issues concerning education in the District. In a democracy, there is nothing inherently wrong with split votes. The problem with this Board, however, is the failure to make a serious attempt to reconcile differing positions and bring about a consensus. Such a failure often results in policies that are not fully implemented as a result of a deeply divided Board. For example, Board members are split philosophically on such educational and management issues as school closing, privatizing services, and bringing in a private firm to manage several schools. Similar 6-5 votes occurred between 1994 and 1996 on education policies such as:

  • Curriculum and Instruction Reform and Bring Educational Services to Students (BESST) in 1994
  • Management Services Contract Police in 1995
  • Closing six schools in 1996 and six more in 1997
  • FY 96-97 budget reduction package
  • Fees for Adult Education, teacher certification, and teacher accreditation programs in 1994, 1995, and 1996 respectively
To reiterate the point, an examination of voting patterns of the Board on key issues provides an example of the inherent lack of Board collaboration and illustrates how the political process and the organizational culture are undermining our children's ability to learn effectively.

Another interesting insight into the Board is their priorities. In several meetings with the Authority, the Board spent the majority of time discussing their salaries, health benefits, and parking spaces. Furthermore, substantive issues are not always the focus of Board meetings. In one four-hour public Board meeting, very little time was spent dealing with critical issues detracting from the educational experience. It was difficult to tell from the proceedings, including the awards handed out, whether the Board recognized that DCPS faces a serious educational crisis. The meeting left one student to ask, "Was anything important discussed tonight?"

Several conclusions about the Board's functions can be drawn.

  • The Board's oversight and policymaking process is weak and ineffective

    This is a result of processes that promote individual, rather than collective behavior. Furthermore, the oversight processes are triggered only through individual initiative on the part of a board member. Oversight should be routine and automatic. Consensus and collective action is difficult to achieve on the Board, and issues and actions are often uncoordinated because of a lack of agreement among the eleven members, further complicating what should be a simple process.

  • The Board is accountable for overseeing the performance of the Superintendent

    While it may have delegated the majority of its administrative authority to the Superintendent, the Board cannot abrogate its responsibility for ensuring that these duties are performed. Accountability, ultimately, rests with the Board. All eleven members collectively bear responsibility for the current condition of the school system and its component parts, even if they cannot act collectively. The evaluation of the Superintendent is the primary method of ensuring administrative accountability. As the Superintendent is to be held accountable for his management performance, the Board also must be held accountable for its failure to oversee his performance.

  • DCPS spends significantly more on its Board compared to peer and neighboring districts

    In FY 1995, DCPS spent over $ 1.4 million on the Office of the Board of Education -- more than three times the average of $454,000 spent by neighboring Fairfax and Montgomery counties. DCPS even outspent Chicago Public Schools by more than $200,000, despite the fact that the Chicago Board was responsible for overseeing a public school system with 400,000 students -- five times as many as DCPS. Figure 16 shows these differentials.

    Continue on to Part 4 of this report.

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