Monday, April 26, 1999

The U.S. Air Force is disgruntled with how the war in Yugoslavia is being conducted. William Arkin, military analyst and washingtonpost.com DOT.MIL columnist, discussed the U.S.A.F., the NATO bombing campaign and the alliance's information warfare strategy.

Read the transcript below.

Washingtonpost.com: In your Sunday article for The Washington Post (Outlook, April 25), your sources imply that unlike the air war over Iraq, the U.S. Air Force has taken a back seat in the bombing campaign over Yugoslavia. How is the Air Force's role in Operation Desert Storm different from its involvement in NATO airstrikes?

William Arkin: In Desert Storm, the Air Force was in charge of targeting and strategy for the air war. Their targets were approved but the day-to-day was controlled by the air commander, that is, as long as the air guys didn't get Schwarzkopf or Washington into trouble. When there was a mistake, such as the bombing of the Amiriyah shelter in Baghdad, Washington did intervene. And sometimes, Washington had to "remind" the Air Force that IT WANTED Scud missiles or other things to be a higher priority, so there was some tension, but overall the Air Force got an opportunity to pursue their strategy.

Rosslyn, Va.: Why has the Air Force been left out of the planning and strategy in the Kosovo conflict?

William Arkin: In some ways it's official: The Air Force per se is not in the chain of command, which runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the theater commander (Gen. Clark) to the air combat commander. I think though that General Short, that final commander, ends up being merely an administrator, because at that level, so many political decisions have already been made that there is little input in terms of strategy or emphasis.

Bethesda, Md.: Let's talk numbers. How many sorties have been flown and how many targets have been hit? In your opinion, is the air war a success or failure? Why?

William Arkin: So far, it looks as if some 7,000 sorties have been flown, of which about 20-30 percent are actual strikes. Over 200 targets have been hit, including targets in Kosovo.

Is it a success? The bombing has been successful, that is, the planes have worked, the weapons have worked, there hasn't been too much collateral damage.

But the constraints on what can be hit, and the slow pace of the start seems to have hampered the impact of air power overall.

Will it be a success in the end? Well, my prediction will be that there will be increased agitation in the next couple of weeks for a negotiated settlement, so air power will have either achieved forcing that, or it will be seen as a big failure for not getting the utter capitulation of Milosevic. It depends on how you look at things.

Arlington, Va.: The Army's Apache choppers are poised to strike Yugoslav forces. If the air war has been as disorganized and ineffectual as everyone says, why is NATO waiting around to use the Apaches?

William Arkin: The Army has truly had a hard time bringing the Apaches in, which also argues for how difficult it would be to mobilize and deploy the ground troops.

But I also imagine that there's a lot of disagreements on the risks involved, and the targets, given that the Yugoslav Army is using the Kosovars and their villages as shields.

Roseville, CA: What restrictions are there on the air campaign? Attack altitude? What types of targets are excluded or must receive approval?

William Arkin: The restrictions are so many, what can be hit, with what types of weapons, etc. These are to be expected in any air war. But the three target groups that have been the most restricted are the national electrical grid, Serb Radio/TV and the Yugoslav "Leadership."

For each, there is a reason why someone doesn't want them methodically attacked.

ocean, MD: Why are we bombing those bridges so far from the conflict? People there are stupefied and angry saying that it took them 50 years to build them and Milosevic had nothing to do with that.

William Arkin: The bridges in Novi Sad in the north are a mystery to me. WHen NATO says they are being bombed to stop supplies, it sounds lame.

I think that bridges should be directly related to the movement of VJ forces, and so far that doesn't seem to be the sole concentration.

Colorado Springs CO: The US relies heavily on GPS for navigation and guidance of weapons and platforms. Have the Serbs been using GPS or have they tried to exploit commonly known GPS vulnerabilites?

William Arkin: As far as I know, there haven't been problems with GPS, though I also know that there has been a strong electronic warfare effort to diminish VJ capabilities to interfere with NATO's operations.

Minneapolis, MN: Why is it that they are so worried about using low-flying aircraft to attack the troops in Kosovo? It seems that the quickest way to resolve the conflict would be to directly assault these targets.

William Arkin: The answer is simple: This is a war that is not about our fundamental national interest, it is a "policy" war. Therefore, as the Air Force says, no target is worth a pilot. In fact, the only risk that people are willing to take is in rescuing fellow downed pilots.

None of which is to say that flying into harms way doesn't entail its own enormous risk.

Toronto ,Canada: The public at large, both in UK and in Yugoslavia, are unaware that 30 mm bullets being fired by A-10 anti-tank aircraft and probably all Tomahawk Cruise missiles in this action contain depleted uranium -DU-.

Who is legally responsible for use of depleted uranium -DU- ?

William Arkin: Depleted uranium is used in the 30mm bullets, as well as ballast in some Tomahawk missiles. There has been lots of promiscuous talk about the effects of DU, none of which I think has been substantiated from the experience in the Gulf War.

Sure I believe we should seek an alternative to the use of DU because of the potential human and environmental damage it causes, and also think that we should recognize that DU will never be able to be used in warfare without enormous political fallout, but that doesn't mean we should overstate the dangers. Frankly, I find the bombing of electricity a bigger threat to the civilian population.

San Diego, CA: Mr. Arkin,

I agree with your column that there is an overall lack of strategy for the IW (information warfare) campaign. Would you say that this is b-c of the difficulty in coordinating between 19 different governments, or of IW's general ineffectiveness as a primary strategy on the battlefield?
Thanks,

William Arkin: I've been hearing that the problem is a combination of the most exotic information warfare stuff being too highly classified and therefore not usable by the commander, and the speculation that it has been used, but because it is so highly classified, it hasn't been discussed.

To which I would say: If we have used IW, what effect has it has? I don't see much, though I've heard some rumor that the Yugoslav air defense system has been disrupted via fancy IW.

Madison, WI: Apaches are more vulnerable to anti-aircraft weapons then planes. Can 24 helicopters have enough military impact to justify the risk?

William Arkin: The Apaches are just thrown into the mix with the other planes. They should solely be seen as the best assets to go after individual vehicles on the ground. Anyone who sees them as the salvation is silly.

And on the other hand, it should also be understood that the number of Apaches deployed is based upon what the NATO political system could bear.

New York, NY: What is the estimate on total time needed to bomb all major military & gov't targets in Serbia? Given promises of rebuilding funds for Kosovo will NATO members also be pledging funds for the rebuilding of Serbian civilian infrastructure -power plants, refineries, etc-??

William Arkin: I think in some ways we are hitting pretty much all of what is to be hit, that is, with the exception of the three groups of targets I mentioned earlier. At some point, you just reach diminishing returns.

As for the damage caused, and the reconstruction costs and needs, I think here we can really quibble as to whether it is necessary to bomb northern bridges or factories. But I imagine certain things have also been bombed because other things that might have a more immediate and significant military effect are off-limits.

Calais, Vermont: I'm struck by the fact that no NATO planes have been shot down other than the Stealth fighter at the very beginning of the conflict. Are Serb antiaircraft operating at all? Don't they have sophisticated air defense systems?

William Arkin: Hello, fellow Vermonter!

The Yugoslavs do seem to have learned from Iraq, which is, you turn on your air defenses and they get destroyed. And then, maybe the electronic warfare and secret information warfare campaign is being so successful that that is why we don't see more of an aggressive effort on the part of Yugoslav's air defense.

Washingtonpost.com: Bill, just to follow up on your last answer to the question from Madison, WI ... What do you mean when you say "the number of Apaches deployed is based upon what the NATO political system could bear?" Does this mean that the numbers deployed to the region would be sending a certain message about the war's escalation?

William Arkin: I think that since NATO is so sensitive on this question of ground troops, the deployment of the Apaches, the accompanying missiles and artillery, and support forces, the number had to be kept small.

Remember, there will be no ground troops. Now repeat after me...

New York, NY: The Weinberger Doctrine specifies that public support be built before an intervention; that goals be specifically outlined beforehand; and that an exit strategy also be outlined. Every intervention since Vietnam has followed this -- except for Kosovo. Is this ignorance or arrogance on Clinton's part?

Washingtonpost.com: Bill, in what other instances has the doctrine been applied? And what's the word from Air Force top brass about Clinton's strategy in Kosovo?

William Arkin: The Weinberger Doctrine, articulated by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1983, could also be interpreted as a set of hesitant reasons why military force should not be used for political purposes. Weinberger was particularly against the use of the military in the "war" on drugs, and tried to articulate what is the reason to use military forces.

Of course, Weinberger is no longer Secretary, military forces are out there everyday "fighting" the war on drugs, and we now have the 1990's sensibility of the need to use military forces for humanitarian purposes. So I guess I would say the Weinberger doctrine is ancient history.

Sacramento, CA: Are any nations other than the US attacking targets on the ground? I've only heard of one set of British Harriers that attacked a convoy. Are the French, Dutch, Italians, or Germans attacking targets or are they mainly providing air cover?

William Arkin: I think Britain, France, Canada, Spain, Belgium, Italy and Turkey have all mounted ground attack missions. The U.S. is flying about 80 percent of all sorties.

Lorton, VA: If the loss of the F-117 stealth technology was insignificant from a military intelligence view point why is the USAF still handling the stealth coating materials for the F 117 as highly classified materials? Is this like the Administration response to the nuclear secrets lost to China--face saving at the cost of national safety-defense?

William Arkin: The F-117, as I understand, is 1970's technology. The plane is not really under the same security wraps of the 1980's anymore.

P.S. I should add the Germans, I think they have bombed as well.

Reston, Virginia: Mr. Arkin,
What is the value in targeting
oil refineries versus a full scale naval blockade of oil imports?

William Arkin: The thinking behind hitting the refineries and depots in country is to have a more immediate effect on the use of petroleum products in the short term.

And embargo is for show.

Edmonton Alberta Canada:
There seems to be some fundamental inconsistency NATOs reporting of the air war.

On one hand we are told air defenses are dramatically reduced. On the other, it seems our aircraft are still, after 30 days, at 15000 feet unable to offer effective protection to Kosovars below. The premier dog fighter the F-16 is used as a ground attack craft. The premier ground attack craft, the A-10, is nothing but forward air control!

William Arkin: The F-16 is a dual-use fighter and is being used for air defense, air defense suppression (F-16CJ), and bombing. But since the Yugoslav Air Force isn't really flying, the flexibility allows NATO to increase the number of F-16s bombing, allowing other aircraft that don't have that flexibility (such as the F-15C) to care for the air defense mission.

westminster maryland: why can't nato realize that it cannot have the perfect war to achieve its goals?
is nato ready to take responsibility if the air campaign fails?

William Arkin: Look, everyone realizes there isn't such a thing as a perfect war. They haven't done a particularly good job of conveying that to the public or the media, and each "mistake" is magnified if for no other reason than it is the most dramatic story of the day.

If NATO wanted the media to cover some other aspect of the air war, then all they would need to do is produce the pilots and the video and the stories to make those stories come alive. But instead, they've been happy to let the media chase and report the refugee story and not the air war.

Washingtonpost.com: We're roughly half-way through this live discussion with military analyst William Arkin. Submit your questions using the hyperlink below.

Washington, D.C.: Can you comment on what Air Force officers think about President Clinton's strategy in Kosovo?

William Arkin: The "Air Force" is a big place, but my sense, based upon those Air Force people I've talked to, is that they are frustrated with the slow start, unhappy with the ambiguous military objectives, nervous about air power being "blamed" if the political strategy fails.

Arlington, Va.: Was it a mistake for Clinton to start the air campaign with the declaration "no ground troops"? Was this a message to Milosevic to simply speed up ethnic cleansing while simply avoiding or withstanding the bombing?

William Arkin: War is war. We should call this one as well.

Limiting ground troops is a tremendous mistake because it makes believe this isn't war.

Sacramento, CA: We never hear about how attacks against convoys are carried out. We see and hear about attacks on convoys, but never if those attacks are 'pressed'. If a convoy is spotted with say 5 tanks 10 APCs (armored personnel carrier) and 15 trucks, are they only attacked by what is in the air at the time, or are more assets called in to at least attempt to hit all the vehicles?

William Arkin: The main thing that struck me in understanding the convoy bombing error of last week was the distances involved. These guys are basically bombing from about five nautical miles away. There is only so much you can see from that height.

Also, when a convoy is spotted, the location is called into the airborne assets, who call in more aircraft to the scene, which I what I understand happened on the seven mile road.

Elk Grove, CA: In terms of the oil embargo - why not bomb the ports and the equipment there rather than do something that another nation could take as an act of war -ie. stopping and searching ships-?

William Arkin: An act of war!

We are at war.

Bethesda, Md.: Until today, we have heard very little about the three captured U.S. soldiers? Why the media blackout?

William Arkin: The three unfortunate soldiers, pardon me, just aren't the story. If the Yugoslav government is now trying to position itself as complying with the Geneva Conventions, as part of its overall attempt to portray itself as the victim in this war, then that is why now we are again hearing of them (when the Red Cross is invited in). But the real purpose of the Red Cross visit, from the Yugoslav standpoint, was to showcase the damage done to the civil infrastructure in Yugoslavia, again as part of the renewed war for hearts and minds.

Little that Yugoslavia is doing will effect American public opinion, but we don't live in that neighborhood. This battle for public opinion is as much to influence what people think in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Western Europe.

Bethesda, Md.: Can you please say more about the information warfare campaign -- how is it conducted, for how long, etc.?

William Arkin: The information warfare effort is a combination of the traditional - leafleting, electronic warfare - and the new, such as hacking. And of course, how "information" is conveyed to the public in a coherent whole. I've been very critical of the government's success in waging information war, here and in Iraq.

You should read my column, DOT.MIL, at the Washington Post Web site, where I have discussed these matters in depth.

Stafford, VA: You imply that the cause of an ineffective bombing campaign is the lack of S Air Force planners in the chain of command. Gen Horner in Desert Storm was in the same position as the Air Force Component Commander under General Clark. Why not admit the difference is the ineffective, meddlesome influence of NATO political staffs and the Clinton administrations unwillingness to take any causalities. FYI air power, alone, will almost never will a war by itself, as the Clinton administration is trying to do.

William Arkin: No one argues in the Air Force, as far as I can tell, that air power can win by itself. They argue that air power should work with ground power (it is not). They argue that air power should follow doctrine and lessons learned (it is not). They argue for an air combat commander who is more than an administrator "servicing" a politically derived target list.

Amherst, Massachusetts: NATO has been charged with not having an exit strategy. I believe this is not an accident, it is a plan. The goal is to go and sit on the region to prevent ethnic warfare and general chaos. We will need to stay for generations, just like in Germany and South Korea. The only reason there had been peace in Yugoslavia during the cold war was Tito's heavy hand crushing any budding ethic pride. Everybody was a Yugoslavian or else.

Do agree with this assessment?

William Arkin: One could say that when President Roosevelt decided in 1942 to go to war, there wasn't an "exit strategy" either.

You impute far too much forward thinking and grand strategy to this than I think is true and real.

Clinton is a war because he and people in his administration felt bad about the killing.

NATO is at war because Milosevic has disrupted peace in Europe for almost a decade.

Lorton, Va: During Viet Nam in a small village a young Lt followed what he thought were his orders. The concept of "legal vs illegal orders" was then more fully thrashed out. Do the military consider an order directing an attack on a nation which is not an immediate direct threat to the US or which has not already attacked the US a legal order if there has been no formal "Declaration of war"? How does the US attack on Serbia without a formal Declaration of War differ from Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor? The US leadership was just as aware of Japan's intention as the Serbian leadership is Bill Clinton's.

William Arkin: In the 1990's there has been the slow move towards a new sensibility (and common legality) towards the use of force on behalf of humanitarian need. As a UN official put it to me, if you are on the street and someone is being beaten, do you intervene or wait for the "police" to arrive? It is a simple question with incredibly complex implications in which there is no right answers.

I'm very uncomfortable with anyone declaring this or that "war" legal or illegal. Have your lawyers call my lawyers. We will always be able to produce a variety of differing opinions on this matter. The bottom line is that when Russia introduced a resolution in the UN Security Council condemning NATO's action, it lost, 12-3.

Rockville MD: There had been some press during the Bosnian efforts in the past concerning UAVs unmanned aerial vehicle). Are UAV reserves getting as low as Cruise Missile reserves? Are there any successes by UAVs you can reveal?

William Arkin: There's been some news of UAV use, but not much. And given their theoretical capability to get to low levels to document or show the situation on the ground (refugees, mass graves, etc.) in Kosovo, I'm surprised we haven't "seen" more.

But then, NATO's information/PR effort has been horrible.

Fairfax, VA: Why aren't we either employing or hearing about the use of psychological operations against the Serbs? It would seem that the average Serb should have felt the effects of the bombing and would probably respond favorably to airborne delivery of "gifts" and messages from NATO to counter the propaganda from the Serb government.

William Arkin: My column today on Washingtonpost.com is about NATO leafletting.

Napa, California: Dear Mr. Arkin,

So far I have supported our "campaign" -I think we are not supposed to call it a "war"- because I would like NATO, and the US, to stop the "ethnic cleansing" -hideous term- of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. But if your analysis is correct, our strategy has little if any prospect of achieving that aim.

Put simply, if we do not have the will to win, that is, to force Milosevic to capitulate, can we justify the risks we are taking at all? Can we justify the loss of even a single pilot, or a single Yugoslav civilian?

William Arkin: A half a million Kosovars are alive today because of the use of force. Would they have been dead otherwise? Was there another way to conduct the war? These are important questions.

Rosslyn, Va.: What would be a viable next step in getting the Air Force more involved in making decisions and building consensus on NATO's Yugoslavia strategy?

William Arkin: It's too late at this point. I guess a sense that we are deep into the hearts and minds war and that this is close to the end of the bombing.

Maybe we can learn some lessons for the future. But our record there isn't very good.

If anyone out there has tips or gossip, you can always reach me at william_arkin@washingtonpost.com

Washingtonpost.com: That's all the time we have. Thanks to everyone who participated and thanks to William Arkin.