Petraeus, Crocker Testify at House Foreign Relations Committee on Iraq

SPEAKERS: REP. HOWARD L. BERMAN, D-CALIF. CHAIRMAN REP. GARY L. ACKERMAN, D-N.Y. DEL. ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, D-A.S. REP. DONALD M. PAYNE, D-N.J. REP. BRAD SHERMAN, D-CALIF. REP. ROBERT WEXLER, D-FLA. REP. ELIOT L. ENGEL, D-N.Y. REP. BILL DELAHUNT, D-MASS. REP. GREGORY W. MEEKS, D-N.Y. REP. DIANE WATSON, D-CALIF. REP. ADAM SMITH, D-WASH. REP. RUSS CARNAHAN, D-MO. REP. JOHN TANNER, D-TENN. REP. GENE GREEN, D-TEXAS REP. LYNN WOOLSEY, D-CALIF. REP. SHEILA JACKSON LEE, D-TEXAS REP. RUBEN HINOJOSA, D-TEXAS REP. JOSEPH CROWLEY, D-N.Y. REP. DAVID WU, D-ORE. REP. BRAD MILLER, D-N.C. REP. LINDA T. SANCHEZ, D-CALIF. REP. DAVID SCOTT, D-GA. REP. JIM COSTA, D-CALIF. REP. ALBIO SIRES, D-N.J. REP. GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, D-ARIZ. REP. RON KLEIN, D-FLA. REP. BARBARA LEE, D-CALIF.

REP. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, R-FLA. RANKING MEMBER REP. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, R-N.J. REP. DAN BURTON, R-IND. REP. ELTON GALLEGLY, R-CALIF. REP. DANA ROHRABACHER, R-CALIF. REP. DONALD MANZULLO, R-ILL. REP. ED ROYCE, R-CALIF. REP. STEVE CHABOT, R-OHIO REP. TOM TANCREDO, R-COLO. REP. RON PAUL, R-TEXAS REP. JEFF FLAKE, R-ARIZ. REP. MIKE PENCE, R-IND. REP. JOE WILSON, R-S.C. REP. JOHN BOOZMAN, R-ARK. REP. J. GRESHAM BARRETT, R-S.C. REP. CONNIE MACK, R-FLA. REP. JEFF FORTENBERRY, R-NEB. REP. MICHAEL MCCAUL, R-TEXAS REP. TED POE, R-TEXAS REP. BOB INGLIS, R-S.C. RES. COMMISSIONER LUIS FORTUNO, R-P.R. REP. GUS BILIRAKIS, R-FLA.

WITNESSES: GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS (USA), COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ RYAN CROCKER

[*] BERMAN: The committee will come to order. Committee will come to order.

Before we begin, let's -- let me outline today's proceedings. And welcome to our refurbished committee room.

After my opening statement and that of our distinguished colleague, Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, we'll hear the witnesses' opening statement. I'll recognize committee members for five minutes each, based on seniority, for those who were here at the opening of the hearing -- that was 30 seconds ago -- and in order of arrival for those joining us later.

Secondly, I'd like to make it clear that our committee's policy, what it is on handling protests. We have no objection to audience members wearing T-shirts and hats expressing their views. But to maintain order in the hearing room, we request that audience members do not hold up or wave signs, make gestures to attract attention, stand up and protest, shout or yell your views, or otherwise disrupt the hearing.

We'll ask the Capitol Police to remove anyone from the room who violates this policy.

And I should let people know that it is the policy of the Capitol Police to arrest anyone ejected from the hearing room.

Our witnesses are in the home stretch of a congressional testimony marathon. To some, this hearing may even seen like the fourth time around an endless loop.

That's why we're asking both Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus to more or less summarize the main points of their testimony at their discretion, a report to Congress that has been heard once in the House and twice in the Senate already.

This way we'll move more -- we'll move along more quickly to the questions posed by members of the committee.

To make sure that as many members of the committee as possible are yielded time, I intend to use the gavel at the five-minute mark exactly. In other words, a member can use his or her time to give a speech or to question the witnesses, but no backloading, no four-and- a-half-minute speech with then the questions coming. You're not going to -- the witnesses will not be answering those kinds of questions.

Now that these housekeeping points have been made, I recognize myself for some opening remarks to our distinguished witnesses.

The committee has great respect, Mr. Ambassador, General Petraeus, for your accomplishments and deeply appreciate your service.

We're also keenly aware of the sacrifices being made by the U.S. military and our dedicated diplomatic corps in Iraq, along with their families.

But our respect and appreciation for you and the people you lead does not mean that we should yield in our oversight responsibilities.

Quite the opposite. We have to make a tough-minded assessment that is fact-based and not ideologically driven. It is right and appropriate to question the reports of progress that the executive branch offers to Congress.

BERMAN: Congress and the people who sent us to Washington want to see the years of effort in Iraq end with a positive, meaningful and lasting result; a stable, cohesive, Iraqi government, democratic in nature; an Iraq that does not threaten its neighbors and is able to resist domination by them; a country living under the rule of law with protection for individual and minority rights.

This would be good for Iraq, of course, but most importantly, it would be good for American interests.

But are we there yet? Hardly. Can we get there at a cost appropriate to that benefit? I'm not convinced. In fact, in some areas, we seem to be slipping backwards.

General Petraeus, when you last came before this committee, you argued that the surge would allow U.S. troops to help their Iraq counterparts seize and hold areas that were then under the control of anti-American forces.

How effective could this effort have been when mortars and rockets can rain on the green zone, launched from the Sadr City district of Baghdad directly across the Tigris? Our diplomats and other civilian personnel are literally under fire. For more than two weeks, our embassy is bombarded.

In all, the past two-plus weeks have seen the worst violence in the green zone since the war began five years ago.

I have a clear memory that the seize and hold component of the surge strategy, as conceived in late 2006 and implemented in 2007, would eventually be directed at the most violent and unstable areas of Sadr City, yet we do not even seem to be close to seizing and holding Sadr City.

Why not? Are we focusing our efforts on securing this district for the long term, or must we rely on the whims of Muqtada al-Sadr to maintain the peace?

What can you tell us about how this situation came about? What is the source of this mortar and rocket fire? What is the reason for it? What, if anything, can be done to stop it? Some reports say the rockets were made in China. Is that the case? And if so, how have they made their way to Baghdad?

On another subject, the surge was intended to quell the violence, primarily in order to create political space for Iraqis to move on toward national reconciliation.

Two years ago, a key Iraqi leader with whom I met defined national reconciliation this way: moderate Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish leaders coming together across sectarian lines as Iraqis to join hands so that they could things done for the benefit of the whole country. The middle would rise in Iraq and lead the way in this process.

Gentlemen, the American sacrifices involved in creating the space for reconciliation have not brought us there yet. We haven't seen much progress.

General, you've acknowledged this in your own quote in the Washington Post a little while ago -- last month, conceding that "no one" in the U.S. or Iraqi government "feels that there has been sufficient progress by any means in the area of national reconciliation," I quote, "or the provision of basic services in Iraq."

You were both honest and obvious in those comments.

Ambassador Crocker, we'd appreciate you addressing this point in your testimony.

BERMAN: The most disturbing strategic development of the war is that Iran, the most dangerous state in the region, so far has emerged as the winner.

Their enemy, Saddam, is gone and in his place is a government seemingly very open to Iranian friendship and influence.

Iran's gains from the war were underscored again, in recent days, by the fact that representatives of Prime Minister Maliki traveled to Iran to negotiate a cease-fire with the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr.

The last time you two gentlemen came before this committee, Prime Minister Maliki had just told the world that, if American forces were to leave Iraq, he could, quote, "find new friends."

Well, we haven't left, but he seems to be cementing his friendship with Iran.

Ambassador Crocker, what is the nature and level of Iranian influence in Iraq today?

And what is the U.S. doing to limit it?

To what extent was the cease-fire in Basra the result of an Iranian initiative?

To what extent does our ultimate success in Iraq depend on decisions in Tehran?

General Petraeus, without giving our enemies operational details, can you provide the American people with your plan to eliminate the Iranian anti-coalition presence in Iraq?

The surge produced a number of tactical successes and a few opportunities to achieve political progress as well. But strategically, it seems to me that we're treading water.

The surge was meant to buy time for Mr. Maliki and other Iraqi leaders to move toward ending this civil conflict with a political settlement. Unfortunately, they seem not to have much availed themselves of this opportunity.

And in the meantime, we've strained U.S. military readiness, sacrificed precious lives, and billions of hard-earned dollars, and curtailed our ability to address our country's other needs and priorities, all in the name of creating a more stable and secure Iraq that would in turn bring more security to the Middle East.

Gentlemen, are we anywhere near there yet?

This committee awaits your answers.

I now have the pleasure of recognizing my friend, the ranking member, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, thank you so much. I extend our warm welcome to you and our profound gratitude for your commitment and your leadership and for the dedication of all who serve with you.

ROS-LEHTINEN: My stepson and daughter-in-law continue to wear our nation's uniform, and we're proud to serve our country in Iraq.

Today, on the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Iraq, in Baghdad especially and the Iraqi people, by the United States and our coalition partners, I want to reiterate how grateful we are for the sacrifices made.

We must continue to base our Iraq policy not upon short term domestic political considerations, but upon our enduring national security interests in Iraq and indeed throughout the Middle East.

We must consider the consequences of our policy decisions and recognize that immediate disengagement would only embolden the forces of radical Islam and leave an enormous power vacuum in Iraq, one to be filled by the regime in Iran, with its proxies in Iraq and throughout the region.

Our enemies have made clear their intentions both in words and deeds. In his most recent interview released on April 2nd, senior Al Qaida jihadist al-Zawahiri stated, and I quote, "The battalions of the Mujahedeen, after expelling the occupier from Iraq, shall make their way toward Jerusalem."

He further elaborated, "There is not doubt that the American collapse has begun and the raids on New York and Washington were identifying marks of this collapse."

Al Qaida has been, if nothing else, consistent in its message in this regard. In October of 2006, Al Qaida member Abu Hamza stated, "We will not rest from our jihad until we are under the olive trees and we have blown up the filthiest house, which is called the White House."

I'm willing to take them at their word, that they desire nothing more than the destruction of the United States and they are willing to stop at nothing to achieve it.

There are those in the United States who argue that the threat would disappear if the U.S. were not in Iraq. That is not only naive but dangerous.

There are those who look at Iraq and Afghanistan as two independent battles, calling for retreat from one as the recipe for success in the other. But they cannot be separated. We must look at them in an integrated manner, in the same way the radicals look at them as intertwined and as part of their broader effort to use their words to drive all unbelieving forces out from the land of the Muslims and to destroy the United States, the Great Satan.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Some in the U.S. are becoming impatient. They say we have done enough for Iraq. However, they failure to fully comprehend the critical strategic interests that are at stake for us over there and the great sacrifices which Iraqis are making for their own freedom.

While throughout Iraq the jihadists are losing, losing militarily, losing the support of the local Sunni population, they are by no means defeated.

And you, General Petraeus, testified in the Senate yesterday, and I'm quoting you, you said, "Al Qaida's senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy, send funding, direction and foreign fighters to Iraq."

We must also recognize that Iran is engaged in a proxy war against us in Iraq, that Iranian agents and military forces are actively providing training, expertise and weapons to attack U.S. forces and the government of Iraq.

Last week, a U.S. major said, "We have seen the continued use of Iranian-manufactured and -supplied rockets, mortars and explosively formed penetrators, and in fact we have captured individuals who tell us that they have recently been to Iran and have been trained by the Quds Force operatives."

In the last year we have witnessed both important political progress, but we understand that we still face significant challenges on both of these fronts.

But there has been some progress. The recent passage of the pensions law, the de-Baathification law, the provincial powers legislation, the fiscal year 2008 budget, and consideration of the consumer protection law have clearly illustrated that they are up to the task.

It is critical that we lay the groundwork, not only for normalized bilateral relations between the United States and Iraq, but for Iraq to take its place among responsible nations.

To start, we must begin by recognizing Iraq as a sovereign nation and our ally. We must stop talking down to Iraq and start talking with Iraq as a partner.

Iraqis have volunteered in large numbers to fight for their freedom in their armed forces. Many have died in the struggle against radicalism and for freedom. Iraqi casualties in this struggle far exceed our lamentable American causalities.

LEHTINEN: But we're not fighting their war for them; we are assisting them in their fight, which is both ours, as well, and the fight of every freedom-loving people everywhere.

Your work, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, has given our Iraqi ally a hope for freedom, a strategy for success. We must not fail where they have succeeded.

As former President Ronald Reagan stated in his first inaugural address, the American people are ready for peace. We will negotiate for it, we will sacrifice for it, but we will not surrender for it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your time.

BERMAN: Our witnesses today are well-known to all of us.

Ambassador Ryan Crocker is one of the most distinguished members of our Diplomatic Corps. He has been in Basra, Iraq since March of last year. His assignment to Iraq is his fifth ambassadorship.

He has previously been our chief diplomat in Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria and Pakistan.

BERMAN: He has received the Presidential Distinguished Service Award and the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Civilian Service.

In 2004, the president elevated him to the rank of career ambassador, the highest rank in the Foreign Service.

General David Petraeus is, likewise, one of our most distinguished military officers. He has been in his current post as commanding general of the Multi-National Forces in Iraq since February of last year.

This is his third command in Iraq. He commanded the 101st Airborne Division during the initial phase of the war. He was in charge of training Iraqi security forces in 2004 and 2005. And, as I indicated, he returned to Iraq as our top commander last year.

Gentlemen, you've testified before this committee seven months ago. We do look forward to hearing your testimony again today.

And, Ambassador?

CROCKER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have circulated my full statement and ask that that be submitted for the record.

BERMAN: It will be.

CROCKER: Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, members of the committee, I must start by noting with genuine sadness the absence in the room today -- the absence of Chairman Tom Lantos.

I first met Chairman Lantos in Lebanon in 1982. And he is someone that I have had the honor of working with, off and on, for the quarter of a century that followed. He is -- he was truly a great American. We all mourn his loss. And I know we are all deeply grateful for the contributions he made to this great country.

BERMAN: Thank you.

(APPLAUSE)

CROCKER: It is an honor to appear before you today to provide my assessment of political, economic and diplomatic developments in Iraq.

Last September, I said that the cumulative trajectory of these developments was upwards, although the slope of that line was not steep.

The developments over the last seven months have strengthened my sense of a positive trend. Immense challenges remain, and progress is uneven and often frustratingly slow, but there is progress.

Sustaining that progress will require continuing U.S. resolve and commitment.

Five years ago, the statue of Saddam Hussein was toppled in Baghdad. The euphoria of that moment evaporated long ago. But as Iraq emerges from the shattering violence of 2006 and the early part of 2007, there is reason to sustain that commitment and the enormous investments we have made, both in the lives of our young, brave men and women, and our resources.

Let me describe briefly some developments upon which I base such a judgment.

The first is at the national level in the form of legislation and the development of Iraq's parliament. In the last several months, Iraq's parliament has formulated, debated vigorously, and in many cases passed legislation dealing with vital issues of reconciliation and nation building.

A pension law extended benefits to individuals who had previously been denied them because of their service under the former regime.

The accountability and justice law, de-Baathification reform, reflects a strengthened spirit of reconciliation, as does a far- reaching amnesty law.

The provincial powers law is a major step forward in defining the relationship between the federal and provincial governments and involved debate about the fundamental nature of the state similar in its complexity to our own lengthy and difficult debate over states' rights.

The provincial powers law also calls for provincial elections by October 1. And an electoral law is now under discussion that will set the parameter for those elections.

All major parties have announced their support for elections, which will be a major step forward in Iraq's political development and will set the stage for national elections in late 2009.

CROCKER: The passage of the 2008 budget, with record amounts for capital expenditures, ensures that the federal and provincial governments will have the resources for public spending.

All of this, Mr. Chairman, has been done since I came before you in September. These laws are not perfect and much depends on their implementation, but they are important steps.

Also important has been the development of Iraq's Council of Representatives as a national institution.

Last summer, the council suffered from persistent and often paralyzing disputes over leadership and procedure. Now it is successfully grappling with complex issues and producing viable trade- offs and compromise packages.

Coalitions have formed around issues. And sectarian political groupings, which often were barriers to progress, have become more flexible.

Let me also talk about the intangibles: attitudes among the Iraqi people.

In 2006 and 2007, many of us understandably questioned whether hatred between Iraqis of different sectarian backgrounds was so deep that a civil war was inevitable.

The Sunni Awakening movement in Al Anbar, which so courageously confronted Al Qaida, continues to keep the peace in the area and to keep Al Qaida out.

Fallujah, once a symbol for violence and terror, is now one of Iraq's safest cities.

The Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala are enjoying security and growing prosperity in the wake of popular rejection of extremist militia activity.

The Shia clerical leadership, the marjiya, based in Najaf, has played a quiet but important role in support of moderation and reconciliation.

In Baghdad, we can see that Iraqis are not pitted against each other purely on the basis of sectarian affiliation. The security improvements of the past months have diminished the atmosphere of suspicion. News from Iraq in recent weeks has been dominated by the situation in Basra. The Iraqi decision to combat extremist militias has had major significance.

First, a Shia majority government, led by Prime Minister Maliki, has demonstrated its commitment to taking on criminals and extremists regardless of sectarian identity.

Second, Iraqi security forces led these operations in Basra and in towns and cities throughout the south. British and U.S. elements played supporting roles, as they should.

The operation in Basra has also shaken up Iraqi politics. The prime minister is confident in his decision and determined to press the fight against illegal groups, but also determined to take a hard look at lessons learned.

CROCKER: The efforts of the government against these extremis elements have broad political support, as a statement April 5th by virtually all of Iraq's main political leaders -- Sunni, Shia and Kurd -- made clear.

One conclusion I draw from these signs of progress is that the strategy that began with the surge is working. This does not mean, however, that U.S. support should be open-ended or that the level and nature of our engagement should not diminish over time. It is in this context that we have begun negotiating a bilateral relationship and agreement between Iraq and the United States.

In August, Iraq's five principal leaders requested a long-term relationship to include economic, political, diplomatic and security cooperation. The heart of this relationship will be a legal framework for the presence of American troops, similar to that which exists in nearly 80 countries around the world.

The agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq, and we anticipate that it will expressly forswear them. The agreement will not specify troop levels, and it will not tie the hands of the next administration.

Our aim is to ensure that the next president arrives in office with a stable foundation upon which to base policy decisions, and that is what this agreement will do. Congress will remain fully informed as these negotiations proceed in the coming weeks and months.

In terms of economics, since September, we've seen a revival of marketplaces across Iraq and the re-opening of long-shuttered businesses. According to a Center for International Private Enterprise poll last month, 78 percent of Iraqi business owners expect the Iraqi economy to continue to grow in the next two years.

With the improving security and rising government expenditures, the IMF projects that Iraq's GDP will grow 7 percent in real terms this year, and inflation has been tamed.

Iraq's 2008 budget has allocated $13 billion for capital investment and reconstruction. And a $5 billion supplemental budget this summer will further invest export revenues in building infrastructure and providing services.

This spending also benefits the United States. Iraq recently announced its decision to purchase 40 commercial aircraft from the U.S. at an estimated cost of $5 billion.

CROCKER: The era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over. Our assistance focus has shifted to capacity development and an emphasis on local development to our network administerial advisors and 25 provincial reconstruction teams, PRTs.

We are seeking to ensure that our assistance, in partnership with the Iraqis, leverages Iraq's own resources.

Iraq is increasingly is using these resources to support projects and programs that we have helped develop. It has committed nearly $200 million in support of a program to provide vocational training for concerned local citizens who stood up with us against Al Qaida in the awakening.

We developed the technical specifications from which Iraq's state-owned oil company will build new oil export platforms and pipelines worth over $1 billion.

And in Baghdad, the municipality has stepped up to take over labor contracts worth $100 million that we had been covering under the Community Stabilization Program.

Iraq will need to continue to improve governmental capacity, pass national-level hydrocarbon legislation, improve electrical production and distribution, improve the climate for foreign and domestic investment and take a number of other steps.

We, along with other international partners, including the United Nations and the World Bank, will be assisting the Iraqis as they move forward with this challenging agenda.

In the region and the international community, under dynamic new leadership, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq has increased the scope of its activities and the size of its staff.

It is playing a key role in preparations for provincial elections and in providing technical assistance to resolve disputed internal boundaries.

UNHCR has returned international staff to Iraq to assist with the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

CROCKER: Regionally, support from Arab capitals for Iraq must improve, for the sake of Iraq and the sake of the region. Bahrain's recent announcement that it will return an ambassador to Baghdad is welcome, and other Arab states should follow suit.

Iraq is a multi-ethnic state, but it is also a founding member of the Arab League and an integral part of the Arab world. We encourage more active Arab engagement with Iraq, and we expect that Prime Minister Maliki's effort against Shia extremist militias in Basra will receive Arab support.

Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi government to establish a stable, secure state through the arming and training of militia elements engaged in violence against Iraqi security forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians.

The extent of Iran's malign influence was dramatically demonstrated when these elements clashed with Iraqi government forces in Basra and Baghdad.

We know more than ever about Iranian-supported lethal networks inside Iraq and their Quds Force sponsors, and we will continue to aggressively uproot and destroy them.

At the same time, we support constructive relations between Iran and Iraq and are participating in a tripartite process to discuss the security situation in Iraq. Iran has a choice to make.

Mr. Chairman, almost everything about Iraq is hard. It will continue to be hard as Iraqis struggle with the damage and trauma inflicted by 35 years of totalitarian Baathist rule.

But hard does not mean hopeless, and the political and economic progress of the past few months is significant.

I must underscore, however, that these gains are fragile and they are reversible.

Americans have invested a great deal in Iraq, in blood, as well as treasure, and they have the right to ask whether this is worth it, whether it is now time to walk away and let the Iraqis fend for themselves.

Iraq has the potential to develop into a stable, secure, multi- ethnic, multi-sectarian democracy under the rule of law. Whether it realizes that potential is ultimately up to the Iraqi people. Our support, however, will continue to be critical.

CROCKER: I said in September that I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. That is still the case, although I think now we are closer. I remain convinced that a major departure from our current engagement would bring failure, and we have to be clear with ourselves about what failure could mean.

Al Qaida is in retreat in Iraq, but it is not yet defeated. Al Qaida's leaders are looking for every opportunity they can to hang on.

Osama bin Laden has called Iraq the perfect base, and along with the comments from Ayman al-Zawahiri, it reminds us that a fundamental aim of Al Qaida is to establish itself in the Arab world. It almost succeeded in Iraq; we cannot allow it a second chance.

And it is not only Al Qaida that would benefit. Iran has said publicly it will fill any vacuum in Iraq, and extremist Shia militias would reassert themselves. We saw them try in Basra and Baghdad.

And in all of this, the Iraqi people would suffer on a scale far beyond what we have already seen. Spiraling conflict could draw in neighbors, with devastating consequences for the region and the world.

Mr. Chairman, as monumental as the events of the last five years have been in Iraq, Iraqis, Americans and the world, ultimately, will judge us far more on the basis of what will happen than what has happened. In the end, how we leave and what we leave behind will be more important than how we came.

Our current course is hard, but it is working. Progress is real, although fragile. We need to stay with it.

In the months ahead, we will continue to assist Iraq as it pursues further steps toward reconciliation and economic development. Over time, this will become increasingly an Iraqi process, as it should be.

Our efforts will focus on increasing Iraq's integration regionally and internationally, assisting Iraqi institutions to strengthen the political process and promote economic activity, and supporting U.N. efforts as Iraq carries out local elections this year.

CROCKER: These efforts will require an enhanced civilian commitment and continued support from the Congress and the American people.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize and thank all those who serve our country in Iraq, both military and civilian.

Their courage and commitment, at great sacrifice, has earned the admiration of all Americans. They certainly have mine, and it is an honor for me to serve there with them.

Thank you, sir.

BERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

General Petraeus?

PETRAEUS: Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, I too want to begin by saluting your former chairman, Congressman Lantos.

Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you seven months ago, there has been significant but uneven security progress in Iraq. Levels of violence and civilian deaths have been reduced substantially.

Al Qaida-Iraq and a number of other extremist elements have been dealt serious blows. The capabilities of Iraqi forces have grown. And there has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis in local security.

Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain.

Moreover, as events in the past two weeks have reminded us, the progress made since last spring is fragile and reversible.

Still, security in Iraq is better than it was when we reported to you last September, and it is significantly better than it was 15 months ago, when Iraq was on the brink of civil war.

A number of factors have contributed to the progress. First has been the impact of increased numbers of coalition and Iraqi forces.

PETRAEUS: You're well aware of the U.S. surge. Less recognized is that Iraq has also conducted a surge, adding well over 100,000 additional soldiers and police to its security forces in 2007.

The second factor has been the employment of coalition and Iraqi forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations across the country, deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi people, to pursue Al Qaida-Iraq, to combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local reconciliation, and to enable political and economic progress.

Another important factor has been the attitudinal shift among certain elements of the Iraqi population. Since the first Sunni Awakening in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq increasingly have rejected Al Qaida in Iraq's indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology.

Over time, Awakenings have prompted tens of thousands of Iraqis to contribute to local security as so-called Sons of Iraq. With their assistance, the threat posed by Al Qaida-Iraq, while still lethal and substantial, has been reduced significantly.

The recent flare-up in Basra, southern Iraq, and Baghdad underscored the importance of the cease-fire declared by Muqtada al- Sadr last fall as another factor in the overall reduction in violence.

Recently, of course, some militia elements became active again. Though a Sadr stand-down order resolved the situation to a degree, the flare-up also highlighted the destructive role Iran has played in funding, training, arming and directing the so-called special groups, and generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the special groups pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq.

In September, I described the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This completion continues, influenced heavily by outside actors. And its resolution remains the key to producing long-term stability in Iraq.

Various elements push Iraq's ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists and criminal gangs pose significant threats.

Al Qaida's senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy, send funding, direction and foreign fighters to Iraq. Actions by neighboring states compound the challenges. Syria has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters, but not enough to shut down the key network that supports Al Qaida-Iraq. And Iran has fueled the violence in a particularly damaging way, as I mentioned, through its lethal support to the special groups.

These challenges and recent weeks' violence notwithstanding, Iraq's ethno-sectarian competition in many areas is now taking place more through political dialogue, and less through violence.

In fact, the recent escalation of violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq was dealt with, temporarily, at least, by most parties acknowledging that the rational way ahead is talking, rather than street fighting.

Though Iraq obviously remains a violent country, we do see progress in the security arena.

PETRAEUS: As this chart illustrates, for nearly six months security incidents have been at a level not seen since early to mid- 2005, though the level did spike in recent weeks as a result of the violence in Basra and Baghdad, but has now begun to turn down again, though the period ahead will be a sensitive one.

As our primary mission is to help protect the population, we closely monitor the number of Iraqi civilians killed due to violence.

As this chart reflects, civilian deaths have decreased over the past year to a level not seen since the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing that set off the cycle of sectarian violence that tore the very fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early 2007.

Ethno-sectarian violence is of particular concern in Iraq, as it is a cancer that continues to spread if left unchecked.

As the box on the bottom left of this chart shows, the number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence has fallen since we testified last September.

A big factor has been the reduction in Baghdad.

Some of this is, to be sure, due to sectarian hardening of certain Baghdad neighborhoods. However, that is only a partial explanation, as numerous mixed neighborhoods still exist.

In fact, coalition and Iraqi forces have focused along the fault lines to reduce the violence and enable Sunni and Shia leaders to begin the long process of healing in their communities.

As this next chart shows, even though the number of high-profile attacks increased in March as Al Qaida lashed out, the current level of such attacks remains far below its height a year ago.

Moreover, as we have helped improve security and focused on enemy networks, we have seen a decrease in the effectiveness of such attacks.

The emergence of Iraqi volunteers helping to secure their local communities has been an important development. As this chart depicts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of Iraq, Shia as well as Sunni, under contract to help coalition and Iraqi forces protect their neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads.

These volunteers have contributed significantly in various areas, and the savings in vehicles not lost because of reduced violence, not to mention the priceless lives saved, have far outweighed the cost of their monthly contracts.

Sons of Iraq have also contributed to the discovery of improvised explosive devices and weapons and explosive caches. As this next chart shows, in fact, we have already found more caches in 2008 than we found in all of 2006.

Given the importance of the Sons of Iraq, we are working closely with the Iraqi government to transition them into the Iraqi security forces or other forms of employment, and over 21,000 have already been accepted into the police, army or other government jobs.

Al Qaida also recognizes the significance of the Sons of Iraq, and Al Qaida elements have targeted them repeatedly. However, these attacks, in addition to Al Qaida use of women, children and the handicapped as suicide bombers, have further alienated Al Qaida from the Iraqi people; and the tenacious pursuit of Al Qaida-Iraq, together with Al Qaida's loss of local support in many areas, has substantially reduced its capability, numbers and freedom of movement.

This chart displays the cumulative effect of the effort against Al Qaida and its insurgent allies in Iraq. As you can see, we have reduced considerably the areas in which Al Qaida-Iraq enjoys support and sanctuary, though there clearly is more to be done.

Having noted that progress, Al Qaida is still capable of lethal attacks in Iraq, and we must maintain relentless pressure on the organization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it and on the resource flows that sustain it.

PETRAEUS: This chart lays out the comprehensive strategy that we, the Iraqis and our inter-agency and international partners are employing to reduce what Al Qaida needs in Iraq.

As you can see, defeating Al Qaida in Iraq requires not just actions by our elite counterterrorist forces but also major operations by coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated intelligence effort, political reconciliation, economic and social programs, information operations initiatives, diplomatic activity, the employment of counterinsurgency principles in detainee operations, and many other actions.

As we combat Al Qaida in Iraq, we must remember that doing so not only reduces a major source of instability in Iraq, it also weakens an organization that Al Qaida's senior leaders view as a tool to spread its influence and foment regional instability.

Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also seen AQI involved in destabilizing activities in the wider Mideast region.

Together with the Iraqi security forces, we have also focused on the so-called "special groups." These elements are funded, trained, armed and directed by Iran's Quds Force with help from Lebanese Hezbollah.

It is these groups that have launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at Iraq's seat of government in the International Zone.

Iraqi and coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their desire that Iran live up to promises made by President Ahmadinejad and other senior Iranian leaders to stop their support for the "special groups."

However, nefarious activities by the Quds Force have continued, and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize the threat they pose to Iraq.

We should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and months ahead, as they will show the kind of relationship Iran wishes to have with its neighbor and the character of future Iranian involvement in Iraq.

We have transferred responsibilities to Iraqi forces as their capabilities and the conditions on the ground have permitted. Currently, as this chart shows, half of Iraq's 18 provinces are under provincial Iraqi control. Many of these provinces, not just the successful ones in the Kurdish regional government area, but also a number of southern provinces, have done well. Challenges have emerged in some others, including, of course, Basra.

Nonetheless, this process will continue, and we expect Anbar and Qadisiyah provinces to transition in the months ahead.

Iraqi forces have grown significantly since September, and over 540,000 individuals now serve in the Iraqi security forces. The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well over 100.

These units are bearing an increasing share of the burden, as evidenced by the fact that Iraqi security force losses have recently been three times our own.

We will, of course, conduct careful after-action reviews with our Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were units and leaders found wanting in some cases, and some of our assessments may be downgraded as a result.

PETRAEUS: Nonetheless, the performance of many units was solid, especially once they got their footing and gained a degree of confidence. And certain Iraqi elements proved very capable.

Iraq's security ministries are steadily improving their ability to execute their budgets. As this chart shows, in 2007, as in 2006, Iraq's security ministries spent more on their forces than the United States provided through the Iraqi security forces fund.

We anticipate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year, and this projection recently enabled us to reduce significantly our Iraqi security forces fund the request for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion.

While improved, Iraqi security forces are not yet ready to defend Iraq or maintain security throughout the entire country on their own. Recent operations in Basra highlight improvements in the ability of the Iraqi security forces to deploy substantial numbers of units, supplies and replacements on short notice.

They certainly could not have deployed a division's worth of army and police units on such short notice a year ago.

On the other hand, the recent operations also underscored the considerable work still to be done in the area of expeditionary logistics, force enablers, staff development, and command and control.

We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign military sales program. As of March 2008, the Iraqi government had purchased over $2 billion worth of equipment and services of American origin through FMS. Since September, and with your encouragement of the organizations in the process, FMS deliveries have improved.

While security has improved in many areas and the Iraqi security forces are shouldering more of the load, the situation in Iraq remains exceeding complex and challenging. Iraq could face a resurgence of Al Qaida in Iraq or additional Shia groups could violate Sadr's cease- fire order.

External actors like Iran could stoke violence within Iraq, and actions by other neighbors could undermine the security situation, as well.

The Commanders' Emergency Response Program, the State Department's quick response fund, and USAID programs enable our commanders and troopers to help Iraq deal with its challenges. To that end, I respectfully ask that you provide us by June the additional CERP funds requested in the supplemental.

PETRAEUS: Encouragingly, the Iraqi government recently allocated $300 million for us to manage, as Iraqi CERP, to perform projects for their people while building their own capacity to do so.

The Iraqi government has also committed $163 million to gradually assume Sons of Iraq contracts; $510 million for small business loans; and $196 million for a joint training, education and reintegration program.

The Iraqi government pledges to provide more as they execute the budget passed two months ago.

Last month, I provided my chain of command recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq. During that process, I noted the objective of retaining and building on our hard-fought security gains while we draw down to the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams, also redeploying two Marine battalions and the Marine expeditionary unit.

I emphasized the need to continue work with our Iraqi partners to secure the population and to transition responsibilities to the Iraqis as quickly as conditions permit, but without jeopardizing the security gains that have been made.

As in September, my recommendations are informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that the military surge has achieved progress, but that the progress is reversible. Iraqi security forces have strengthened their capabilities, but still must grow further.

The provincial elections in the fall, refugee returns, detainee releases, and efforts to resolve provincial boundary disputes will be very challenging.

The transition of Sons of Iraq will require time and careful monitoring. Withdrawing too many forces too quickly could jeopardize the progress of the past year. And performing the necessary tasks in Iraq will require sizable conventional forces, as well as special operations forces and adviser teams.

The strategic considerations include recognition that the strain on the U.S. military, especially on its ground forces, has been considerable.

A number of the security challenges inside Iraq are also related to significant regional and global threats. And a failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences for the greater fight against Al Qaida, for regional stability, for the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for the effort to counter malign Iranian influence.

PETRAEUS: After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of command that we continue the drawdown of the surge combat forces and that upon the withdrawal of the last surge brigade combat team in July, we undertake a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation.

At the end of that period, we will assess the conditions on the ground, much as we have done as we have looked at where we could redeploy the surge forces, determine where and when we can make recommendations for further reductions.

This process will be continuous, with recommendations for further reductions made as conditions permit.

This approach does not, to be sure, allow establishment of a set withdrawal timeline. However, it does provide the flexibility those of us on the ground need to preserve the still-fragile security gains our troopers have fought so far and sacrificed so much to achieve.

With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and early 2008 can form a foundation for the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq. This is not only important to the 27 million citizens of Iraq, it is also vitally important to those in the Gulf region, to the citizens of the United States, and to the global community.

It is clearly in our national interests to help Iraq prevent the resurgence of Al Qaida in the heart of the Arab world, to help Iraq resist Iranian encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed ethno-sectarian violence that could spill over Iraq's borders and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq to expand its role in the regional and global economies.

In closing, I want to comment briefly on those serving our nation in Iraq as well. We've asked a great deal of them and of their families, and they have made enormous sacrifices.

My keen personal awareness of the strain on them and on the force as a whole has been an important factor in my recommendations.

The Congress, the executive branch and our fellow citizens have done an enormous amount to support our troopers and their loved ones. And all of us are very grateful for that.

Nothing means more to those in harm's way than the knowledge that their country appreciates their sacrifices and those of their families. Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the civilian and military men and women serving our nation in Iraq.

PETRAEUS: It remains the greatest of honors to soldier with them.

Thank you very much.

BERMAN: Thank you very much, General.

And I will now recognize myself for five minutes.

Ambassador Crocker, General Petraeus, I'd be grateful if both of you would respond.

The American people will decide the future direction of our troops presence in Iraq for themselves this November. They may very well decide in favor of a presidential candidate who favors a relatively rapid withdrawal of our troops from Iraq. Just as there are consequences and costs, negative, in pursuing our current strategy, there will be consequences of such a withdrawal, some of them potentially very negative.

How do we minimize those consequences, military and diplomatically? How could we most effectively transition to a significantly reduced presence in Iraq? What would be the essential tasks that such a reduced force could perform?

I'd like your answers, understanding very well it doesn't mean your support for that strategy, but that is a realistic alternative and I think we here and the American people have a right to better understand how to cope with the consequences you fear.

CROCKER: Mr. Chairman, of course the whole premise of what General Petraeus and I have been involved in since we arrived is looking at conditions rather than timelines.

CROCKER: And I just would say it straight -- I don't see a good way to manage the situation in Iraq that is not conditions-based.

Now, I can't predict what the conditions will be in January, 2009. They could be substantially different and they could want substantial reductions of forces.

But, still, in my view, it would be taking into account an assessment of the conditions and then making recommendations accordingly.

BERMAN: Well, let me just pursue that further with either of you.

There are costs -- you are not here to answer the larger question of choices that have to be made and you aren't expect to.

But if those choices are made, you surely have ideas and thoughts on how best to minimize, mitigate the consequences that you think will flow from those decisions.

And don't we have -- isn't fair of us to ask you to help us work through how best with a different strategy we might deal with them?

CROCKER: It's a legitimate question, Mr. Chairman, and I am not trying to dodge it. I would characterize as kind of a, you know, plan B approach. And I have been fully focused on making the current plan A try to work.

It's also extremely difficult, as I'm sure you would appreciate, to answer that in a vacuum -- what are the conditions at the time and what levels are we talking about?

BERMAN: Well, then, I'm not going to beat that horse anymore. Let me just ask General Petraeus, I am quite curious about the issue I raised in my opening statement regarding seize and hold and Sadr City. And what is it that allows mortars and the rockets to, up through today, hit our Green Zone.

And am I wrong in thinking that part of seize-and-hold was going to be at least eventually if not initial directed toward Sadr City?

PETRAEUS: Eventually. And, again, our focus was -- has always been primarily on what we term the "wolf closest to the sled," which was Al Qaida in Iraq, which of course carried out the most horrific attacks, which ignited the ethno-sectarian violence that engulfed the country in 2006 and created that situation of near civil war, if not actual civil war; that the surge in fact was intended to address; and that has also carried out the most damaging attacks on infrastructure and just innocent civilians of any ethno-sectarian grouping.

That has been the focus. There has been activity in effort to split the -- to address the Sadr movement, if you will, which is a very legitimate political movement and a large one in Iraq.

In fact, it's 30 seats helped vote -- helped elect Prime Minister Maliki as part of the overall Shia coalition.

And, in fact, in a number of neighborhoods this effort has worked, where there has been, in various locations, even with...

BERMAN: General, I hate to interrupt you, but if I don't do it for me...

PETRAEUS: I'm sorry.

BERMAN: ... everybody else will get very mad if I do it for them.

PETRAEUS: Fair enough, sir. Sorry.

BERMAN: I recognize the ranking member, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen for five minutes.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the way you're handling this hearing.

Because I have other opportunities to interact, I would like to yield my time to Mr. Chabot of Ohio. CHABOT: I thank the gentlelady for yielding.

And General Petraeus, first of all, thank you very much for your distinguished service to our country.

CHABOT: And I'd like to begin by reading a few excerpts from the Wall Street Journal in their editorial yesterday: "Sixteen months after President Bush ordered the change in strategy, the surge has earned a place among the most important counteroffensives in U.S. military annals.

"When it began, Al Qaida dominated large swathes of central Iraq. Baghdad was a killing zone. Sunni and Shiites were heading toward civil war. And the Iraqi government was seen as a failure.

"Today, Al Qaida has been cleared from all but the northern reaches of Anbar and Diyala provinces. Sunni sheiks are working with coalition forces. And the long process of Sunni-Shiite political reconciliation has begun.

"The surge seized the offensive from the enemy so rapidly that it deserves to be studied for years as an example of effective counterinsurgency.

"None of this would have been possible if Iraqis had not seen that the U.S. was committed to protect them. Americans are understandably impatient with war, but we have sacrificed too much and made too much progress in the last year not to finish the task.

"The surge has prevented a humiliating military defeat, and now is the time to sustain that commitment to achieve a political victory.

"The question now is whether Washington will squander these gains by withdrawing so quickly that we could still lose politically."

General, would a precipitous withdrawal or a relatively rapid withdrawal, as the chairman just mentioned, would that jeopardize, would that risk the gains which have been made at such a high cost?

PETRAEUS: Congressman, as I said in my statement, the gains are, indeed, fragile and they are reversible. The pace of withdrawal, obviously -- the risk incurred by the pace of withdrawal obviously depends on the conditions.

PETRAEUS: If, suddenly, again, the conditions just turn out, perhaps, better than anticipated, or continue on a good glide slope, then it may be possible to withdraw more rapidly.

On the other hand, again, it may not. So, again, it does come down to the conditions.

And that's what the ambassador and I have stressed, in fact, is -- and it is understandable, I think, why commanders on the ground, diplomats on the ground, who have been through this process of fighting so hard and sacrificing so much to achieve gains, in particular against Al Qaida-Iraq, wanted to be sure that we can solidify those gains and not risk this reverse that...

CHABOT: Thank you very much, General. Thank you.

And, Ambassador Crocker, if I could turn you, one area of this administration's Iraqi policy that I, quite frankly, have found wanting is in not insisting that a considerable amount of the cost of rebuilding Iraq be paid from Iraqi oil reserves, you know, rather than from the American taxpayer.

And Iraq -- it's my understanding -- has the second highest known oil reserves in the world. And recent reports suggest that Iraq has about $30 billion in the bank from oil reserves, yet they've spent less than 3 percent of the $3.5 billion capital budget allocated to the Iraqi oil ministry. Only a very small portion was actually spent.

So, now, at a time when Americans are paying all-time high prices at the gas pump and the oil-producing countries like Iraq are able to demand over $100 a barrel for their oil, doesn't it just make sense that record-high oil should help pay for Iraq's rebuilding, rather than the hard-pressed U.S. taxpayers?

CROCKER: It does indeed, Congressman, and that is exactly the road that we are moving down.

As I said in my statement, we are out of the construction business in Iraq. We have a small number of projects that we are finishing up, but reconstruction from here on in is going to be an Iraqi financial responsibility.

And they are stepping up to that, both in terms of commitments, the amount of money that they are appropriating for this purpose; and their ability to actually spend it is also improving.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

And I now recognize the chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman, for five minutes.

ACKERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank both of you for your extraordinary service to our country, your patriotism and willingness to tackle probably the toughest job that our country has seen in a very long time.

All that being said, we seem to have gotten ourselves into a fix. Now, we don't really know how to get ourselves out of it or unfixed.

The reasons that we've gotten into this mess, and you could check them off from finding weapons of mass destruction, check; to getting rid of Saddam Hussein, check; to regime change and check it all the way down to a constitution, to an elected parliament, the people talking to each other.

It seems that we've achieved all of our goals, and every time we do that a new goal comes up, and now we're stuck on reducing the ethnic violence.

ACKERMAN: Well, good luck on that one. I don't know when you accomplish it -- that's the big problem.

And I know when we ask you certain questions, you're not there to determine policy, but you have to have that can-do attitude and accept the policy and push straight ahead and answer that question and say, "Yes, we can do it." And the brave men and women that you work with have been achieving quite a lot.

Our job is just the opposite. Our job is to question. Our job is to raise those points. Our job is to look at what the alternatives are, and if we can't do it this way, how we do it another way. And you really weren't expected to answer the question, you know, how do we pull out, when your mission is to stay in.

But it reminds of that old song after World War I that you probably know very well. The words are, "We're here because we're here." You know, when we're asked why the troops are there, well, we sent the troops over there and now we have to support them because they're there. Well, why are the troops there? Because we went them. And what do we have to do? We have to support them because they're there.

So, we're there because we're there, because we're there, because we're there, and it never ends. How do you get out of this mess, is the real question. How do you fix it?

I'd liken your job to that of Sisyphus pushing that great, huge stone up an endless hill. And when we ask you when can you stop pushing it, the answer is, you don't know, but you have to keep pushing it.

And, certainly, your answer is, "We've made progress today. We've had some setbacks, but we made some progress recently."

ACKERMANL: Well, are the setbacks irreversible? And the answer is, "Not necessarily, but maybe so. Maybe we're going to have setbacks again."

The surge seems to be working, at this moment, but it seems we've not killed enough terrorists or dissuaded enough people from becoming such that they're not going to be replaced.

When does this end? You know, when do you stop pushing that big stone up the hill?

And the answer is, you really can't see beyond that stone. You don't know what -- what a just settlement looks like, because you can't see around it. And you'll know it when you see it.

But maybe the hill is a little bit too steep.

With the surge, you've gotten a re-do. You know, we haven't had one of those since we played in the playground, but you get a re-do. Four thousand Americans who died don't get a re-do; 20,000, 30,000 whose lives have been dismembered don't get a re-do. Tens of thousands, scores of thousands of families who have been destroyed don't get a re-do.

The only thing we know for sure is there will be a lot more people who don't get re-dos.

How do you know we've won? Because at the end of this thing, unless we decide it's the end, nobody's going to hand you a revolver; nobody's going to hand you the sword and say, "We quit. We stopped."

How do we know the Iraqis can stand up for themselves? Nobody seems to be able to answer that question.

CROCKER: Sir, it's a question that we both ask ourselves constantly. And it's through asking that question and answering it on a localized basis that it is possible, in our judgment, to execute the redeployments that are currently under way.

CROCKER: And I think that that will continue to be the answer. It's going to be not one grand, sweeping moment in which we can say it's all fixed, but it's going to be area by area, circumstance by circumstance. It is complicated. It will continue to be complicated. But I think it's doable.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith.

C. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, thank you for your extraordinary leadership. You have really provided a leadership that the world has come to envy.

And I personally want to thank you because under the most difficult hardships you have carried -- both of you have carried yourself with tremendous class, and your incisive responses -- this is your fourth hearing.

I won't ask the most obvious questions because they've already been answered at least twice by both of you, but I do have a question about the empowerment of Concerned Local Citizens to take responsibility for security, the Sons of Iraq. It appears sound and workable, and the implementation of this initiative has clearly mitigated violence and helped transfer ownership of security issues to the Iraqis themselves.

And, of course, this is on top of the additional buildup. And, General Petraeus, you have suggested that by December 8th of this year, 187 Iraqi army combat battalions comprised of about 750 personnel each and 44 national police battalions will be up and running to combat the threat.

General Petraeus, you pointed out that the number of Sons of Iraq has grown from 21,000 to over 91,000, with an average monthly cost of $16 million. I'd like to give you an opportunity to respond to Wolf Blitzer's statement yesterday, and I quote him, "A lot of people fear that as quickly as these guys switched from being enemies, insurgents, terrorists killing Americans, killing Iraqi troops, and now being on the payroll, in effect, of the U.S. government, they could flip right back very quickly if they weren't on the payroll of the U.S. government."

C. SMITH: "It's my sense that payroll issues notwithstanding, the surge in the Sons of Iraq has much more to do with enlightened self-interest, a growing understanding and recognition and Awakening that Al Qaida and other militants are the people's enemy, a sense that an individual can play a constructive and coordinated role in protecting their families. And that surge in the Sons of Iraq is a direct result of diplomatic outreach by U.S. and coalition forces at the local level."

How do you respond to Wolf Blitzer's comments?

PETRAEUS: First of all, Congressman, it is the result of enlightened self-interest, and that's what we're trying to play on.

And we have reminded these newly enlightened Sunni Arabs of what they received from Al Qaida, which was indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology that on reflection they realized -- they'd wondered why they'd ever let these folks into their communities. They did it because they felt disrespected, dispossessed and a variety of other feelings in the wake of liberation, having run the country before.

But they then also came to recognize that they'd ruined business in the Euphrates River valley.

You know, we jokingly say sometimes that every tribe is a little bit like the guys that we see on the "Sopranos." They all have a trucking company, an import/export business, and a construction business.

It is about enlightened self-interest. And they realize now -- and we've helped them to that realization, as has the Iraqi government -- that you can't participate in the bounty that Iraq has if you don't play. They didn't vote in the elections in January 2005. They know that was a catastrophic error.

As a result, that's why the Sunni Arabs, in particular, and others want to see provincial elections in the fall, and that's ones of the reasons that that law was a benchmark, as the ambassador mentioned.

And, again, all we have tried to do is to play on that to help them to that realization, then they certainly help themselves and (inaudible) when others stood up and raised their hand to fight against these people that had brought these problems to their doorstep instead of solutions. Now, to move forward, they do have to be incorporated into legitimate institutions of the Iraqi government or the legitimate economy, local businesses and so forth.

And, in fact, as I mentioned, as the charts showed, over 21,000 have already been incorporated into the security forces or other governmental positions. And a lot of that started in Anbar.

And interestingly, the prime minister, Shia prime minister, who went to Anbar for the first time in some 20 years last year, and then has been back again a couple more times, he has provided more resources to that almost exclusively Sunni Arab province than the Iraqi government has provided to any other; again, trying to show them how important the government viewed the stand that they were taking against Al Qaida-Iraq.

PETRAEUS: And it allowed the reopening of the border crossing at Al Qaim with Syria. The lifeblood of the Euphrates River Valley starts to run back through it again.

And the sheiks who, again, are all businessmen, in addition to heads of tribes, can start to see business revive in cities like Ramadi and Fallujah, that, as late as the spring of last year, you couldn't drive through in an armored vehicle without getting hit. The other day we walked through without any body armor or Kevlar.

C. SMITH: Thank you very much.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired, and I recognize the chairman of the Africa and Global Health Subcommittee of our committee, Mr. Donald Payne of New Jersey.

PAYNE: It's so good to see you, General, and our ambassador. Let me just say how proud I am of you, General Petraeus, for the outstanding work that you do and the way that you carry your office.

Let me, though, say that, in October of 2002, I was one of the members who led the opposition on the floor of the House. As a matter of fact, I managed the bill on the resolution authorizing President Bush to attack Iraq.

As an early and staunch opponent of this war, I have watched every single prediction made by this administration proven wrong, from the duration of the war, the reception we would receive, the cost, the number of causalities, the existence of weapons of mass destruction, to the countless of Americans and Iraqis who have lost their lives -- every single one, wrong.

During my years of Congress, I've had the privilege, twice, to be appointed as the congressional delegate to the United Nations.

PAYNE: I strongly believe in the power of democracy and diplomacy. If we had allowed the United Nations inspectors to complete their work before this war started instead of suddenly ordering them out once Saddam Hussein said they could go anywhere, we would be in this predicament today.

There would have been no weapons of mass destruction; there would have been no biological weapons, and we would have had 4,000 Americans still alive.

Ironically, it was almost five years ago, on May 1st, 2003, that President Bush deemed the operation in Iraq as "Mission Accomplished," affirming an end to the major combat in Iraq.

By that time, approximately 175 brave Americans had lost their lives in combat. Yet, today, over 4,000 more confirmed deaths as this war continues; 67 fatalities from my home state of New Jersey.

The human cost of this war remains tragic. Tens of thousands of injured soldiers. Countless number of Iraqi lives have been destroyed by this war.

There's a great sense of sadness among those of us who foresaw over five years ago the tragedy that is now unfolding in Iraq, without an answer of how it can end.

The war that we were told would be swift and certain now continues to drain our tax dollars, as the cost of living rises, gas prices and all the rest -- 80,000 jobs lost in March; unemployment over 5 percent for the first time in years.

It's just draining. But the thing that was very, very scary, was that it was Osama bin Laden who said that we will win this war by bankrupting America.

And I might ask you, Ambassador Crocker, how are we going to continue to fund this war, which we must do, because we're in it. Some of the questions that was asked by Mr. Ackerman -- you know, we're spending $10.3 billion a month, $239 million a day. Eight thousand students could get Pell Grants. We could go on -- 2.6 Americans (sic) without adequate health care, and on and on.

PAYNE: But how do we continue to pay for this war? Of course, it's off-budget. But one day, off-budget has to be brought on the table.

And is there a projection, in your mind, about how long this will go on? It was once said that Saddam Hussein was responsible for 9/11. That was a part of this hoax, also. We knew Saddam Hussein -- but it was cleverly woven in.

How many years and what cost and, in your opinion, can we continue to sustain the financial cost in addition to the tremendous human cost?

PETRAEUS: Sir, my mission is in Iraq. I can't make those broader judgments.

What I can say is that I believe that we and the Iraqis are making progress, that the trajectory is moving up in the areas I described in my statement and that I believe the consequences -- the costs, if you will, of major failure in Iraq are so great that the two together require us to keep going. But I cannot answer that broad question.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton?

BURTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank both of you for your service. This country owes you both a great debt of gratitude, as well as all of our troops over there. And I hope you'll convey that, General, when you get back there.

Let me just say, Ambassador, you say that Osama bin Laden said that Iraq would be the perfect base of operation for the expansion of terrorism around the world, not just in the Middle East, as we've seen in New York on 9/11.

BURTON: I hate to put you on the spot, but we need some direct answers from you folks. This is very important, and I know politics is a tough thing for you to deal with.

But we're going to have a new president in a little over eight months, and one of the biggest issues in the presidential campaign is a precipitous withdrawal versus hanging in there and defeating Al Qaida and the terrorists.

Now, what I would like to know -- and I'm going to give you the time that you need to answer this, but I'd like for it to be as concise as possible -- what would happen if we had a very precipitous pull-out, number one, or if we hung in there to win this battle?

I want to know, and the American people really want to know, what would happen if we, with a new president, said we're going to jerk everybody out of there in six months?

And the American people want to know this because right now the war is very unpopular and the American people want to know the facts before we pick the next president.

CROCKER: Sir, as you know, I'm a career Foreign Service officer and I have proudly served both Democratic and Republican administrations, and I hope to do that loyally and to the best of my ability as long as I am in the service.

I tried to, in my statement, deal with the issue of a dramatic change in what we're doing in Iraq. But I'm not linking that to presidential campaigns or what happens in January or anything else.

I did say in my statement that if we decide that we just...

BURTON: We can't hear you. Is your mike on?

CROCKER: Yes, sir. Can you hear me now?

I did say that if we were to decide that we just do not want to be engaged in this anymore, if we make a precipitous change in our conditions-based approach, that we could risk failure in Iraq.

And I talked about what some of those consequences could be, including a base in the Arab world for Al Qaida.

BURTON: I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I want to make sure we understand. If there was a precipitous pull-out within a period of time, let's say four, five, six months, a vacuum would be created and Al Qaida would be the beneficiary, if they were aggressive, along with Iran's help, to make that a base of operation for expanded terrorism around the world.

CROCKER: My judgment is that where conditions are at this time, that you would see a spiral down. And that would lead to expanded sectarian conflict at levels we probably have not seen before. It would bring the neighbors, especially Iran, into the fight. And it would create space for Al Qaida to root itself on Arab soil.

BURTON: I hope that everybody in America gets the gist of your comments, because I think it's extremely important that they know between now and next November.

General, do you have anything you'd like to add?

PETRAEUS: Well, Congressman, the ambassador's captured my sentiment on that as well. And what I have sought to do is, again, keep coming back to the conditions at the time that any change is made in our force levels.

The reason that we have recommended conducting an assessment, just as we did, by the way, when we decided where and when to pull out surge forces, it's the same assessment methodology. It's sitting down with the commanders on the ground, with the local Iraqis, assessing the enemy and the friendly situations and determining where and when you can withdraw your forces without unacceptable risk.

It's about risk, and it's about the consequences that the ambassador talked about with respect to Al Qaida, sectarian conflict, regional stability, the humanitarian situation and so forth.

BURTON: Well, let me just say, I gather from your comments and I want to make sure that it's very, very clear, that if a vacuum is created, it's likely that Al Qaida and the neighbors, like Iran, would be the beneficiaries, and it could lead to a terrorist network base being established in Iraq when that void is created.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman?

SHERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As the chair pointed out, and I agree with him, it is possible that in our war with Saddam, the winner has been Iran. Not only has Iran increased its influence in Iraq, but it has received a reprieve from any serious diplomatic or economic pressure to stop its nuclear enrichment program.

SHERMAN: I fear that we will focus exclusively on the battle in Iraq and lose the war on terrorism.

As Mr. Ackerman pointed out, we have an obsessive concentration on Iraq. We're there because we're there.

Others have said that we are there because Saddam -- because bin Laden has told us that that is the central front in the war on terrorism. I would point out that Mr. bin Laden does not always tell us the truth.

The greatest cost of our effort in Iraq may be that we have made it impossible for press and our country to focus sufficiently on the real threats, nuclear threats to our country, from Iran, from North Korea and elsewhere.

Now, Ambassador Crocker, your testimony states that the agreement will not specify any particular troop level, which implies that it will specify some obligation on the United States.

What if the next president decides not to maintain a single soldier for a single day and decides to close our embassy immediately? Will there be anything in this agreement that ties the new president's hands should the new president adopt a radical change in our policy?

CROCKER: Congressman, in a word, no.

SHERMAN: Thank you for your answer.

General Petraeus, it's possible that the new president will be someone who has announced to the country that they want the most expeditious possible withdrawal. So you'll wake up November 5th, you'll know who your new boss is going to be January 21.

Will you begin on November 5th not only to carry out the operations that have to be carried out -- but of course you do a lot of long-term planning -- will you begin to prepare plans to execute the policies of the incoming president?

Or, alternatively, will the incoming president face a circumstance if -- and I realize we may get an incoming president that supports your policies even more fervently than the current president -- but if we get an incoming president who wants a new policy, will that president find on January 21 a dilemma where if they order immediate withdrawal, it will be an unplanned withdrawal, and if they don't order immediate withdrawal, then we continue to suffer casualties?

Will you start planning on November 5th to be the best possible servant for the new boss you're going to get January the 21st?

PETRAEUS: Congressman, I can only serve one boss at a time, and I can only execute one policy at a time.

I am sworn to the concept of civilian control of the military; I fully support it. And we execute the mission that we have at that time.

Now, as a transition approaches, obviously, there is going to be back-and-forth to facilitate and to try to get inside the head, I would assume.

PETRAEUS: And not me. This'll be the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs thinking their way through various contingencies. And, again, at some point there will be contingency planning directed. And, obviously, we would carry out the direction of the contingency planning.

SHERMAN: So you would expect to get contingency plans in a variety of different natures, some of them consistent with the incoming president...

PETRAEUS: Sir, you're very, very hypothetical on this. I'm actually very uncomfortable, candidly, with where the conversation is going as a military man, again, who subscribes to civilian control.

SHERMAN: I would hope that you would put yourself in a position to follow the new president, but I have one more question...

PETRAEUS: That's exactly right. And, again...

SHERMAN: ... for Ambassador Crocker and limited time.

PETRAEUS: OK. Yes, sir.

SHERMAN: We have a huge national budget deficit. The Iraqis are selling their oil for over $100 a barrel, and they have a $30 billion surplus. We are providing for their security with our troops and lives, and we're paying for their security forces. And, in fact, you've asked us to appropriate another $2.8 billion for the Iraqi security forces fund and billions for Iraqi reconstruction.

Iraq has that $20 billion to $30 billion surplus. They've got tens of billions of dollars of currency reserve. And they could be borrowing hundreds of billions of dollars if the Saudis carried out their promise to renounce the debt that Saddam incurred to them.

Why are we paying everything that we're paying? Why aren't you demanding that the Saudis follow through with their promise and that the Iraqis spend their reserves?

BERMAN: I'm sorry, but the time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher?

ROHRABACHER: Yes, I'll follow up with that specific question.

Why aren't they paying more? And let me invite my colleagues to join me when I tomorrow drop a piece of legislation that would require that any status of forces agreement with Iraq include a provision that the Iraqi government will be paying for the costs of that security that we're providing them.

And what is your reaction to that? As you can hear today, if there's any theme that's emerging it's the United States government and the people of the United States have paid an awful price, it's time for the Iraqis to pay that price for their own protection.

CROCKER: Congressman, I have certainly in the course of the last two days had that message emphasized loud and clear. I was aware of the...

ROHRABACHER: And would you make that part of the status of forces agreement so that if there is an agreement with the Iraqi government they know that they're going to be obligated to pay the expenses rather than have the hard-pressed American taxpayers to pay for this?

CROCKER: That's something we have to consult on within the interagency, consider...

ROHRABACHER: Let me make the suggestion that, next time we ask you the question and the answer is yes, that you've checked this. And if not, there's going to be trouble on the Republican side, as well as the Democratic side, of getting support for an ongoing conflict.

So I invite my colleagues to join me in that legislation, which I'll drop tomorrow.

General, have we had -- is it fair to say that there have been thousands of radical Islamic extremist terrorists who have been killed in Iraq, since our troops went in there -- non-Iraqis?

PETRAEUS: It probably is thousands, certainly, of foreign fighters. I think we estimate that, at this time, there's somewhere between 50,000 or 70,000 or so that come in, a month, typically through Syria.

At one time, it was probably as high as 100,000, perhaps to 120,000 in...

ROHRABACHER: OK. So, over these years that we've been fighting there, perhaps as many as 1,000 foreign fighters, terrorists have come in. This is what Al Qaida's supposed to be all about.

Let me note that I would like to thank you and the troops for killing as many of them as you were able to kill. Because they now are not alive to come here and kill my family, and kill the families of those of us who are sitting here and the American people.

That is a mission accomplished that we are grateful for.

In terms of getting the whole mission accomplished and getting us out of there, it seems to me what we're talking about is we need to -- the Iraqis need to step up, both financially and militarily.

Also, perhaps, we could use some help from countries. I understand Kosovo and Albania, in gratitude to our help in achieving peace and stability there, are willing to send more troops.

I would hope that we are searching out all the alternatives for having more people come in to help carry the burden.

And I'll ask the diplomat that. Is there any chance of that happening?

CROCKER: There is an ongoing effort to seek out additional coalition partners, to look for additional sources of troops. And indeed, General Petraeus is more qualified to speak on it.

ROHRABACHER: America does not mind leading the way, but we do mind it if we're carrying the entire load, whether it's a commitment of treasury, a commitment of blood. The American people deserve to be taken into consideration and can't be taken for granted by everybody else in the world.

And that's why I think we've sent the wrong message, that we will carry that burden no matter what in the future. It's time for the Iraqi people to step up, not only in terms of financially but in terms of their own personnel and taking care of their needs. And it's time for other people in the world to quit relying on Uncle Sam to carry the whole load.

And I think, General Petraeus, we're all behind you and we're grateful to you and our diplomats who've been trying to do -- you've been doing this for us, doing it for the American people. But the American people can't carry this load forever. So, we're looking forward to a time when someone else can pick up some of it.

PETRAEUS: Congressman, it is important to note, as I mentioned, I think, in my statement, that Iraqi security force members' losses are typically about three times our losses. And, interestingly, the Sons of Iraq losses, again out of their 91,000 or so, are also 2.5 to three times our losses in addition.

So Iraqis are very much stepping up to the plate in that regard, and they are certainly giving their lives for their country, as well.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler, for five minutes?

WEXLER: Thank you.

General Petraeus, last week, in anticipation of this hearing, I sent an urgent e-mail asking my constituents and other Americans, if they were serving on this committee, what is the one question they would pose to you?

There was an extraordinary response, with more than 5,000 questions submitted. These e-mails and phone calls expressed deeply held frustrations about the war in Iraq and reflect the concerns of millions across the nation who feel their opinions and concerns are cast aside by the Bush administration.

I want to thank everyone who responded and submitted a question for today's hearings.

While many of the respondents rightfully highlighted the bravery of our troops, the majority of the e-mails expressed a strong desire to see withdrawal of American soldiers from Iraq and an end to this five-year war that has cost our nation so dearly.

Most of the questions boiled down to this: General, we often hear President Bush and Senator McCain say we must win in Iraq. What is the definition of winning? What would a military victory look like that was sufficient enough to allow us to begin leaving?

WEXLER: Then, in a horrific turn of events, two of my constituents, Esther and Len Wolfer of Boca Raton, Florida, learned that this past Sunday there son had been killed for this war.

Major Stuart Wolfer was a 36-year old reservist on his second tour. He was married with three young children, ages five, three and 20 months. His family was relieved that he was in the green zone, for they hope he would be safe there. He was not.

I spoke to Mr. Wolfer yesterday last night, who asked me to ask you simply: For what? For what had he lost his son?

So, allow me to combine, if you will, the questions from the people that responded to me and Mr. Wolfer. What has all this been for? And please, respectfully, don't tell us, as you told Senator Warner yesterday, to remove a brutal dictator. That's not good enough. There are many dictators in the world.

For what did Stuart Wolfer and the other 4,024 sons and daughter die for, and how will we define history so that we can bring this never-ending war to a close?

And, if I will, when Mr. Burton asks for a definition of what is failure, we get a litany of items; but when Mr. Ackerman asks what's the definition of history, we get little.

Please tell us, General, what is winning?

PETRAEUS: Well, first of all -- first of all, Congress, let me tell you that what we are fighting for is national interest. It is interest that, as I stated, have to do with Al Qaida, a sworn enemy of the United States and the free world; it has to do with the possible spread of sectarian conflict in Iraq, conflict that had engulfed that country and had it on the bring of civil war; it has to do with region stability of a region that is of critical importance to the global economy; and it has to do with, certainly, the influence of Iran, another, obviously, very important element in that region.

In terms of what it is that we are trying to achieve, I think, simply, it is a country that is at piece with itself and its neighbors. It is a country that can defend itself, that has a government that is reasonably representative and broadly responsive to its citizens, and a country that is involved in, engaged in, again, the global economy.

Ambassador Crocker and I, for what it's worth, have typically seen ourselves as minimalists. We're not after the Holy Grail in Iraq, we're not after Jeffersonian democracy; we're after conditions that would allow our soldiers to disengage, and that is, in fact, what we are doing as we achieve progress, as we have with the surge, and that is what is indeed allowing us to withdraw the surge forces -- again, well over one-quarter of our ground combat power, five of 20 brigade combat teams, plus two Marine battalions and the Marine Expeditionary Unit by the end of July.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The bells mean a recess. May they recess for the next two hours.

Not us, the floor.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, is recognized for five minutes.

ROYCE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And through you two gentleman, I'd just like to express my gratitude to the men and women of the U.S. armed forces who have served so valiantly in Iraq and in Afghanistan. They deserve our deep appreciation and enduring support.

General Petraeus, there was a recent piece in the Christian Science Monitor that highlighted the withdrawal from public life of the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who had all but remained silent on the recent violence in Basra.

And this, of course, is in pretty stark contrast to his previous actions back in August of 2004 when he helped broker the cease-fire between the Iraqi government and the cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr.

ROYCE: And I was going to ask, in your opinion, does Sistani's lessening clout open the door for more radical clerics like Sadr to fill the vacuum?

I've heard that Sadr is on the fast track to becoming an Ayatollah. And that, I presume, would give him greater power and standing in his community. And I wanted to ask you about that.

Thank you, General.

PETRAEUS: First of all, Congressman, in fact, the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has actually just made a statement -- I think it was yesterday or the day before -- that weapons should only be in the hands of legitimate Iraqi security forces.

So he has very much retained his influence. But he exercises it in the tradition that is called the "quietist" tradition, rather than, say, the tradition in which clerics exercise political power in Iran, where there is a much more direct involvement in the government and its functions.

There are a variety of rumors about what Muqtada al-Sadr is doing in Iran. He certainly, apparently, is undertaking religious studies to try to get to the next step, which is not, by any means, Ayatollah.

And how long that will take -- again, there is some debate over this, whether there is a special fast-track or not.

Regardless of that, he has a name that is greatly respected in Iraqi society, "the martyr, Sadr," his father and uncle.

He is the face of a movement that is very important to the Iraqi people, traditionally was a nationalist movement, stayed in Iraq, actually, during the time of Saddam, when others went outside the country, and a movement that is dedicated to serving the poor and downtrodden of the Iraqi people.

And so it's a movement that, in a sense, has to be reckoned with. It has to be -- it cannot be discounted. And it is a movement that has to be incorporated into the political process...

ROYCE: Well, I thank you...

PETRAEUS: ... and so forth.

ROYCE: Well, I thank you for the observations, especially on al- Sistani and his recent comment. I had not heard that, and I am encouraged by that.

ROYCE: Let me ask Ambassador Crocker, because you testified yesterday that Iran is pursuing a "Lebanization" strategy by backing militias and other proxy groups in Iraq. That's a pretty striking statement, given what Lebanon has done in terms of the divisions it's -- that it's faced, as a result of Hezbollah as an arm of Iran.

It's also significant given that you saw Lebanon and Iranian machinations up close when you were stationed there back in the '80s. And can you compare the Iranian actions you're seeing in Iraq today with what you saw back in Lebanon when you were stationed there?

CROCKER: There are similarities and there are differences. The similarities are, again, Iranian support for extremist militia elements that they, to a large extent, control.

There are also differences. One of them has been a substantial Iraqi rejection of these militia influences. That's what prompted the Sadr declaration of a freeze on military actions in August and the recent fighting in Basra and Baghdad has also triggered, again, a broad, popular rejection.

There's a history between Iraq and Iran. They fought a eight- year bitter civil war. And it puts limits, I think, on Iran's influence in Iraq that they perhaps don't have in Lebanon.

ROYCE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from American Samoa, Mr. Faleomavaega.

FALEOMAVAEGA: Mr. Chairman, for the record, I want to associate myself with your opening statement and your sentiments and concerns concerning the issue that we're now debating.

FALEOMAVAEGA: General Petraeus, I received a call yesterday that one of my Samoan soldiers, while leading his platoon, patrolling a certain area in Baghdad, was hit by an IED and was critically wounded and was immediately transferred from Iraq to Germany. And now, after three serious operations, he is now at Walter Reed Hospital.

At this moment, as I speak, Sergeant 1st Class Senei Polu (ph), a proud Samoa warrior from Manu'a, American Samoa, is going through two additional serious operations.

Last night, I visited Sergeant Polu (ph) and his family at Walter Reed Hospital, and accompanying me was a relative of mine whom I believe served with you in Iraq. He is Command Sergeant Major Euni Savusa (ph) of U.S. Army Europe, and he sends his personal regards to you and to your family.

General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, we have all been sworn to defend the Constitution, to support and defend the Constitution. Our duties and responsibilities in serving the American people comes under the authority of this sacred document.

Under our Constitution, the power to declare war is vested in the Congress, not the president of the United States, even though he is the commander in chief of all of our armed forces.

Moreover, under the Constitution, the authority to establish an army and a navy is vested in the Congress, not the president.

We also believe and accept the unique concept that our military leaders and soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen come under civilian authority.

The decisions and policies that have unleashed the tremendous powers of our military forces to wage war against Saddam Hussein came from Congress and the White House and not by our military commanders.

And yet, when our military officers are given the opportunity to express their professional judgments as soldiers, they are condemned, criticized, vilified and scapegoated by civilian authority.

And a classic example of this, General Petraeus, is General Eric Shinseki, whose professional opinion on force structure requirements is a classic example of how badly we've conducted this war, doing it on the cheap, and now, after five years of mismanagement and bad decisions again from civilian authority, at the cost now of about $500 billion. Who puts a check on our civilian authority?

General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, we have accomplished our military mission by defeating Saddam Hussein, who supposedly had nuclear weapons. Supposedly an imminent danger imposed a serious risk to the defense of our nation. And of course we all know he did not have nuclear weapons.

We've just now built a $900 million embassy in Baghdad to establish our diplomatic presence with a country that has a population of 25 million and growing less because of all the some 2 million to 3 million refugees coming out of Iraq alone.

Isn't this matter of a political solution that should now be left to the Sunnis, the Kurds and the Shiites -- who, by the way, make up 60 percent of the country's population?

I would respectfully request your response to that, Ambassador Crocker. And by the way, I also want to pay my deepest respect for the tremendous that you've given to our country.

CROCKER: Thank you, sir.

CROCKER: It is certainly the case, in my view, that ultimately solutions in Iraq have to be political solutions. This cannot be a question of a military victory. There have to be political agreements.

But it's also very much the case, in my view, that our current engagement is necessary to create and sustain the conditions in which Iraqis can work their way through to sustainable stability.

And, as I said in my statement, this is -- this is what they are doing at both the local levels and at national levels.

It will be a difficult process, and it will take time, but it is my judgment that the Iraqis are moving this process in the right direction.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Tancredo?

TANCREDO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no speeches to make here, just a few questions, and I will make them brief, and would hope for the same in terms of the response.

First of all, also, thank you and congratulations, General, on the apparent success of the strategy that we refer to as the surge.

And thank you, Ambassador, for your efforts.

A couple of things. First of all, in January of last year, President Bush told us all in an address to the nation that, quote, "the Iraqi government would take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November of 2007."

Of course, that has not happened. I'm just wondering whether, General Petraeus, you have any idea of why he made that statement, especially such a definitive statement -- we will -- we will -- all Iraqi provinces will be under the control of the Iraqi government, that's what he said.

Why would he say a thing like that? What -- and that's one of the reasons why we get the kind of confusion around here that you see. That's number one.

Number two, there have been widespread reports about the development of gangs inside the military in Iraq, inside our military -- you know, MS-13 graffiti appearing in Baghdad, as weird as this sounds, but it was reported on national news. To what extent is this truly a problem? To what do you -- if it is a problem of a significant nature, to what do you attribute this?

Apparently, some of these people are coming back to the United States after having been trained by our own military, of course, and using military tactics in order to advance their own lawless activities here.

And, for Ambassador Crocker, there is a very specific law, U.S. Code Section 1253 that says that you may not -- you may not -- give visas to any country that refuses to accept their nationals back who have committed some crime in the United States.

Iraq is one of the countries that refuses to accept their nationals back who have committed crimes here. When we try to deport them, they are not citizens of the United States, we try to deport them, Iraq refuses to accept them.

TANCREDO: There is a law that says you must -- it doesn't say you may, it says you must, in fact, give the -- or stop giving visas to that country, any country that does this. Can you tell me why you are not following the law? When you will begin to follow the law, if you have any anticipation of doing it?

Those three things, and I would appreciate the answers as briefly as possible.

PETRAEUS: Congressman, first of all, I'm not aware of a problem with gangs, and that's one that I'll have to check on.

Second, I don't know why the statement was made that you quoted. Presumably it was because of a projection that was provided to him, I believe that was before the time that I was the Multi-National Force- Iraq commander.

If I could just take the opportunity to thank the congressman for conveying the message from Command Sergeant Major Savusa, who is a great noncommissioned officer. I personally awarded him the Bronze Star for Valor for an action when we were ambushed in the fight to Baghdad, outside the battle of Hillah.

CROCKER: Congressman, I'm just not aware of this particular instance or instances. Obviously, I'd be very grateful if I could get the details from you or your staff. And, obviously, we'll look into it.

TANCREDO: Mr. Ambassador, we have written, and I've asked the secretary of state about this question at least three times. We have written, we will continue to do so. I will provide you with more information and would appreciate it a definitive answer to the question.

While I have, actually, a minute, there is -- Mr. Manuel Miranda (ph), who's an employee of the Office of Legislative Statecraft (ph) in the U.S. embassy, came out with a list of charges. I'm sure you're aware of them. Charged that despite the excellent progress of the military, he believes that the State Department's efforts have been poorly managed, characterized them as woefully negligent, if not criminal.

What are your responses to Mr. Miranda's allegations?

CROCKER: These are Mr. Miranda's personal views, to which he's entitled. I absolutely do not agree with them. I think that the civilians out in Iraq, both the State Department and other agencies, are doing extremely good work under very difficult circumstances, both in Baghdad and out in our, now, 25 provincial reconstruction teams working at the local levels.

TANCREDO: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel, for five minutes?

ENGEL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, welcome to the committee. As you know, I spent Christmas in Iraq. And I had the opportunity to speak with both of you.

And I want to thank both of your for the service you provide to our country. What you're getting, obviously, is a sense of a lot of frustration from all of us, from many of us, from me, certainly, and others as well.

When you testified, both of you, before our committee, last September, you both talked about political benchmarks of the Iraqi government. That almost served as a framework for what you were saying to us.

The Iraqi government has obviously been unable to achieve all of that.

We talk about Iran. And we can all agree -- I don't think we disagree -- Iran is the biggest threat to the region right now.

To me, the worst part of the war in Iraq, besides the lives lost and the money it cost, is the fact that, because of our invasion, we've actually given Iran the upper hand in the region.

Maliki, as much as we try to make him to be a democratic figure, is propped up in parliament by the pro-Iranian factions. When we are talking about trying to broker things, like with the Sadr group, it seems that Iran, again, has the upper hand.

General, you said, and I agree with you, that Iran is funding, training, arming and protecting the insurgents. They're obviously doing that.

Ambassador Crocker, you said that you want to look at conditions rather than timelines. You also said that U.S. support should not be open-ended. The frustration with us is it seems like the support is open- ended. And every time we say that we want the Iraqis to do this, and that's why we had the surge, and we want to allow them to be able to do things, six months later or eight months later, when they haven't achieve that, we, sort of, change the rules. We say, well, you know, we're here for another reason.

So please address the frustration that you hear. Nobody questions the job that you're both doing, certainly not me. You have a very difficult situation.

But we, as members of Congress, are just frustrated. We don't want an open-ended war. We want the war to end. We don't see the goals that we say we are setting achievable.

And how can we know that six months from now, a year from now, or five years from now, we're not going to be here saying the same thing and moving the goal post, a little bit, and find that the Iraqi government has not achieved any of the things that we need?

CROCKER: Congressman, first, I have been very careful during my tenure in Iraq. I have not said in X months Y will be achieved. I've been very careful about that.

That said, there are achievements with respect to the benchmark legislation. The laws that I cited in my statement that were passed in the first few weeks of this year -- the first two months of this year constitute achievement of benchmarks, both deBaathification reform, amnesty, provincial powers -- the provincial powers law, which set a date for elections -- these are all benchmarks.

I have said previously that I think there's a risk of focusing too much attention on the benchmarks as an absolute measure of success or failure. I think you can get all the benchmarks and still not have sustainable security in Iraq.

ENGEL: But you can understand -- and I would like the general to answer -- the frustration that we have.

Both of you use the term that what's happening in Iraq is fragile and reversible. In fact, I would characterize both of your testimony last September as much more upbeat than your testimony now. Your testimony now is sober. It's not as upbeat as it was.

So, General, you know, again, we are all frustrated. You know, we want the war to end, we want it to end responsibly, and yet it seems to be never-ending.

PETRAEUS: Congressman, with respect, I believe the testimony of September was sober and forthright, as well. And then what we have tried to do today is top be forthright. It is why we have stated the facts as we see them in the way.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired and the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Paul.

PAUL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, I'd ask unanimous consent to submit a written statement for the record.

PAUL: Mr. Chairman, I want to submit several questions to the panel, and there won't be enough time to answer these, but I want these questions to be on the record.

First, I would like to ask, why should the American people continue to support a war that was justified by false information, since Saddam Hussein never aggressed against the United States, Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11, and Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction?

It is said that one must continue the war because we have already sacrificed so much, but what is moral about demanding even more needless sacrifice of American lives merely to save face with the mistake of invading and occupying Iraq?

Doesn't it seem awfully strange that the Iraqi government we support is an ally of the Iranians, who are our -- who are declared enemies? Are we not now supporting the Iranians by propping up their allies in Iraq?

If Maliki is our ally and he has diplomatic relations with Ahmadinejad, why can't we? Why must we continue to provoke Iran just looking for an excuse to bomb that country? Does our policy in Iraq not guarantee chaos in this region for years to come?

It is estimated that up to 2,000 Iraqi soldiers refused to fight against al-Sadr's militia. Why should we not expect many of the 80,000 Sunnis we have recently armed to someday turn their weapons against us since they, as well as the Mahdi Army, detest any and all foreign occupation?

Is it not true that our ally Maliki broke the declared by -- the cease-fire declared by al-Sadr by initiating the recent violence? Is it not true that the current cease-fire was brokered by the Iranians, who also condemned the attacks on the green zone? How can we blame all the violence on the Iranians?

Is it not true that with the recent surge in violence in Iraq that the March attacks are now back at the same level as they were in 2005.

PAUL: Does Iran not have a greater justification to be involved in neighboring Iraq than we do? Since it's 6,000 miles from our shores, if China or Russia were occupying Mexico, how would we react?

Since no one can define winning the war, just who do we expect to surrender? Does this not mean that this war will be endless, since our political leaders will not end it? That is, unit we go broke. And maybe that's not far off.

I do have one question -- even though there is not enough time to get all those questions answered -- I do have one question I do believe there's enough time to answer, probably rather briefly.

In your estimation, does the administration have the authority to bomb Iran without further congressional approval?

PETRAEUS: Congressman, I'm the commander for Iraq and I do not know the answer to that question and it's not within my purview.

CROCKER: Congressman, nor is it in mine. My job is Iraq and I'm just not competent to pronounce on an issue like that.

PAUL: Well, it just seems to me that we couldn't get an answer like, no, it seems pretty obvious that under our Constitution that's the way it works, that we're supposed to confer with the Congress, and it would be spreading the war. We know how the war spread in Vietnam without congressional approval and what that led to.

So, it seems to me that it's -- to not say, "No, the administration does not have authority to bomb another country without getting authority from the Congress." So, it disturbs me to no end that we can't get a flat out no on this question.

And I yield back the balance of my time.

BERMAN: Time of the gentleman has expired. His entire remarks will be put a part of the record.

And the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt.

DELAHUNT: Yes, Ambassador Crocker, I was extremely concerned about your response to a question that was posed to you yesterday by Senator Clinton -- specifically when she asked you whether the long- term agreements between the United States and Iraq, which I would note are being negotiated with minimal consultation with the U.S. Congress -- when she asked you whether it would be submitted to the Iraqi parliament, you said it was unclear whether they would bring it to a vote or whether they would simply read it to the members of the Iraqi parliament.

I'm sure you're aware, or maybe you aren't, but the Iraqi government has already committed to bringing this agreement before the Iraqi parliament.

This is what the Iraqi foreign minister had to say in a press conference with the secretary of state, Ms. Rice, on January 18th, 2008, and I'm quoting: "The final decision will rest with the representatives of Iraq, the Iraqi Council of Representatives." That's the formal name of their parliament.

Furthermore, according to the Iraqi constitution, international agreements must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Iraqi parliament.

In the so-called declaration of principles, which was signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki last November, the U.S. and Iraqi governments committed to, and I'm quoting from the declaration, "respecting and upholding the constitution as the expression of the will of the Iraqi people in standing against any attempt to impede, suspend or violate it," end quote.

If the Maliki government bypasses the Iraqi parliament and approves this agreement unilaterally, thus violating the Iraqi constitution, will the Bush administration respect the commitment it made in the declaration of principles and reject any agreement?

DELAHUNT: Because, from this particular perch, our acquiescence in such a clear violation of the Iraq constitution would further erode our credibility, not just in Iraq but elsewhere.

So, if you could give me an answer to that, after I pose this question to you.

It's a request, really. I would like you to convey to the Iraqi parliament, or Council of Representatives, and the Iraqi executive branch, the so-called Council of Ministers, that, should the United Nations mandate be allowed to expire at the end of this year, it's the view of many of us in Congress, with support from constitutional scholars, that the continued use of force in Iraq by U.N. armed forces will require authorization by the United States Congress.

Now, the administration position is different. But many of us in Congress feel vigorously and profoundly that, as one of my colleagues earlier read, the power and the authority has to come from the U.S. Congress.

The administration claims that the use of force against Iraq has two prongs, one to address the threat posed by the government of Saddam Hussein and one to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions.

The first prong is gone. And the administration's claim that it continues to be in effect because of an endless threat in Iraq, then the second prong would disappear with the U.N. mandate.

So I'm just simply making a request. I think, to be fair to the Iraqi government, both the legislative branch as well as the Council of Ministers, please inform them that there are strong feelings here in the United States that once, in this Congress, in this institution, that once that mandate expires, then it is this government -- the next administration has to come back to get authorization.

Could you please convey that to both Prime Minister Maliki and to the speaker of the Council of Representatives?

CROCKER: I can certainly do that, sir. But I would imagine that they have already heard you.

DELAHUNT: I hope they have. Can you answer my first question, then, which is...

CROCKER: Yes, sir, very quickly, the Iraqis -- the Iraqi government will determine its own procedures. And I'm sure they will do so with full respect for their constitution.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired. And the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake, is recognized for five minutes.

FLAKE: I thank the chairman.

I want to thank the witnesses, General and Ambassador, and thank you for your distinguished service.

FLAKE: I, myself, was somewhat -- or more than somewhat skeptical when the surge plan was presented that we would see the type of gains that we have seen. I think a lot of it is certainly due to your diligence and the diligence certainly of our troops.

I do have concerns for the long term, and I want to associate myself with the comments made by Mr. Ackerman. I still am, after hearing testimony, and hearing testimony before other bodies, and hearing the questions here, I still have a hard time seeing the big picture and what constitutes success.

That's not just one side of the aisle with those kind of concerns. Many on this side of the aisle have that as well. And I don't expect that you can say any more than you've said, but just to let you know that is a concern, the long term, in terms of what constitutes success.

And I think that there is a sincere effort, I know in this body, to exercise our Article I authority. We do have the power of the purse. And we desperately want to see success, but a lot of us are concerned that we don't see the framework that is -- that can be actually measured. And I'm still waiting for that. And if you have any quick thoughts on that, I would appreciate hearing them. If not, I'll pass it on the to the next questioner.

CROCKER: It's a very valid question, Congressman. There is not going to be, in my view, a, you know, a single moment when you have success border to border in Iraq. It's going to be a process.

CROCKER: And the fact that we are now in the process of redeploying back home because conditions permit it, I would term as a success.

And, as I said earlier, I think that's how this will proceed, that it will be area by area, issue by issue, that gradually moves us from an active role in combat in different places, eventually into overwatch and eventually into a more conventional role, such as assisting with the training of Iraqi forces.

But it's going to be an incremental process over time, not, you know, a single, dazzling moment.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

And the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Carnahan, is recognized for five minutes.

CARNAHAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank the gentlemen here before us today for their service.

I want to really just acknowledge what I'm sure you have heard over the last two days, and that is, a mounting backlash to the Iraqis not standing up sufficiently militarily, politically and, especially, financially.

The cost of this war -- in human terms; to our reputation and standing in the world; to our readiness; as Chairman Skelton has outlined eloquently; to our resources being diverted from our struggling economy, they're needed at home, and from the greater Al Qaida threat to the U.S. in Afghanistan.

As Ambassador Crocker acknowledged to Senator Biden yesterday, this war was sold on assurances that oil revenues would be used to help fund reconstruction of what is one of the most oil-rich nations in the world.

And during our last hearing, there were many stories about waste and mismanagement and corruption, in terms of use of U.S. funds. Now, we see the growing surplus in the Iraqi government that, frankly, we're paying for twice. We're paying in our tax funds and we're paying at the pump.

There was a bipartisan letter from Senators Levin and Warner asking the GAO why U.S. taxpayer money is being overwhelmingly used to fund Iraqi reconstruction.

What specific actions, gentlemen, are being taken to use the oil- rich Iraqi government surplus to pay for the war and reconstruction cost?

CROCKER: Sir, as I said earlier, we are getting out of the bricks-and-mortar construction business. The funds and the projects that were undertaken under the IRRF funding are coming to a close. And we have been clear, and the Iraqis themselves have been clear, that reconstruction -- construction and reconstruction going forward -- is an Iraqi responsibility.

And that's == that is best shown, I think, through decisions that the government has taken, just in the last few days, to provide $350 million, for example -- this was a decision yesterday -- for reconstruction in Basra, in Mosul and in parts of Baghdad that have been affected by the recent violence.

They are also talking about a separate $5 billion reconstruction fund to concentrate on key areas, such as health and education. This will all be their money.

CARNAHAN: Is this -- let me add it up, Ambassador -- is this an issue of the Iraqis just being overly dependent on us, using our budget as a crutch? Or are there other difficulties with them really dipping into their own vast resources to fund what's going on there?

CROCKER: One of the challenges they have faced is simple capacity, just the ability to execute. You know, we saw this, for example, in their 2006 budget, they only managed to actually execute something like 22 percent of their capital budget. They just, you know, could not spend the money in a productive way.

That percentage almost tripled in 2007 to about 63 percent. Still, obviously, short of ideal.

But they are developing the capacity not only to plan how they want to spend their money, but then to actually implement that. But it has been an incremental process.

CARNAHAN: Thank you both.

I yield back.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pence, recognized for five minutes.

PENCE: Thank you, Chairman.

I want to add my greetings and gratitude to both of these great public servants on behalf of the people of eastern Indiana.

Your leadership as a soldier and diplomat have been exceptional. And you represent and the very finest of this country, and I'm grateful for your service.

Thank you for your hospitality in my two most recent trips to Iraq. And I'm pleased to extend that hospitality to Capitol Hill for you all.

First question, Ambassador Crocker, Iran is in the news today. They recently announced the installation of some 6,000 new centrifuges for their allegedly peaceful nuclear program.

I was provoked by a question of a colleague in the Senate yesterday; Senator Barack Obama of Illinois told you we needed, quote, "a diplomatic surge that includes Iran," close quote.

Senator Obama also said we should be, quote, "talking to them, as well."

Ambassador Crocker, I'm under the impression we have been talking to Iran, particularly in 2007. I'm aware of several meetings that you, as the American ambassador to Iraq, have had with your counterpart from Iran.

Am I right in understanding -- are you talking to Iran? Are we engaged in a dialogue with Iran?

CROCKER: You are correct, Congressman, that we have had discussions on security in Iraq, with the Iranians, on three occasions.

These are trilateral discussions. The Iraqis are in the room, as well. But it is our one authorized...

PENCE: I'm remembering -- forgive me for interrupting -- I'm remembering a four-hour meeting, perhaps at the home of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Very serious issues were discussed with your counterpart from Iran?

CROCKER: That is correct. And we've also had talks at an expert's level. And we have -- the Iraqis, a few days ago, announced that they were seeking -- they would like to seek to arrange another round of these talks.

And we have said that, if that is what Iraq is requesting, we're prepared to sit down.

PENCE: The secretary of state and the administration said, we are talking to Iran; we're willing to continue to talk to Iran?

CROCKER: Yes, sir, on the issue of security in Iraq.

PENCE: Security in Iraq, precisely.

Have those talks -- very quickly, have those talks produced any results relative to Iran's direct involvement in violence against U.S. troops within Iraq, or enmity toward Israel or their nuclear weapons program?

Any concessions whatsoever from Iran?

CROCKER: To be perfectly frank, Congressman, thus far, I've seen no concrete results as a result of these discussions.

PENCE: Very good.

General Petraeus, I want you to know, in my visits to Iraq, over the last year and the evidence you've presented here today, and to many of us in this Congress and across the country, the surge is working. The strategy that you've brought to this heater of combat has achieved significant military progress. And I commend you for it.

You've made repeated references to the fragile nature of our success. I recognize that. I accept that it's not irreversible. But it has been substantial and dramatic progress.

In the minute I have left remaining, let me ask you what, other than the American soldier and their extraordinary professionalism, what accounts for the extraordinary progress in the last 15 months in Iraq, in the expansion of security and stability following the advent of the surge?

PETRAEUS: Well, as I mentioned, Congress, it was also the Iraqi surge, the increase of their armed forces and police forces of over 100,000; the increase, in a sense, of the Sons of Iraq, additional security forces, if you will, at the local level, and I think something that really has to be highlighted again and again, and that is the rejection by more and more Sunni Arab communities of Al Qaida- Iraq.

That is a very significant action. It is important. Of course, it took place in the heart of the Arab world. I'd like to think that that's something that others could take a lesson from as well.

PETRAEUS: Indeed, frankly, there are other countries in the region that have also become mightily concerned about the threat of that form of extremism and have taken a number of different actions to moderate various elements in their societies that produce the kind of feeling that can support Al Qaida and its affiliates.

PENCE: Thank you both.

Thank you, Chairman.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Woolsey?

WOOLSEY: Gentlemen, it's not easy to get two members to agree on anything up here, as I'm sure you see. It's even rarer when 92 members come together and agree on something, and that's exactly what has happened.

Ninety-two members of this House, including Foreign Affairs Committee members Congresswoman Lee, Chairman Payne, Chairman Delahunt, Representative Meeks, Vice Chair Watson, Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Representative Hinojosa, Representative Linda Sanchez, myself, Representative Scott and my colleague across the aisle Representative Paul, we have all gone on record opposed to this open-ended occupation.

We signed our names to a letter to the president stating that we will only support appropriating additional funds for U.S. military operations in Iraq during fiscal year 2008 and beyond for the protection and safe redeployment of our troops out of Iraq before President Bush leaves office.

And I would like, Mr. Chairman, to ask unanimous consent that that letter be included in the record.

Unanimous consent.

Polls show that up to...

BERMAN: Without objection.

WOOLSEY: Thank you.

(LAUGHTER) Gentlemen, polls show that up to 80 percent of the American public supports redeployment of our troops out of Iraq. When that statistic was presented with those staggering numbers, the vice president's response was, "So?"

WOOLSEY: Well, I want to tell you, that "so?" came from the same administration that got us into Iraq with misleading information in the first place.

And I don't feel that that's where you're coming from. I want to believe that you have more respect for the American people than our vice president.

So what we need to know -- and I'm absolutely certain that you have eventualities, you have contingencies, that you aren't truly waiting for conditions on the ground to tell us when we're going to come and go, because you have to be planning.

So how do you plan? How do you base the rate that troops could safely be redeployed? By the month? By the quarter? What funding stream would be necessary to accomplish this?

We have no idea. We cannot get that information here in the Congress.

What will it cost to bring our troops home, because we're going to have to pay for that, as well? And how long would it take for a complete troop redeployment?

PETRAEUS: Well, Congresswoman, as I explained earlier, the process of determining how rapidly we can bring forces home is really the process that we exercised when we determined the pace and also the location, really, of where we could reduce forces to bring down the force by the surge forces, the five brigade combat teams, two Marine battalions and the Marine Expeditionary Unit.

What we have done in those cases is we look at the security and the local governance conditions in an area, to determine where we can thin out our forces and thereby redeploy additional elements.

Obviously, we look at the enemy situation in the area, we look at the ability of Iraqi forces to deal with the threats that are present. That's what we've been doing. That's how we reworked the battlefield geometry to drawdown the surge forces.

WOOLSEY: But, then, General -- I mean, you've told us this, so I've heard it. And we've all heard this. You must be basing it on some numbers of, you know, what it would take to be safe in bringing our troops home, what it's going to cost to bring our troops home, what it will cost to be involved in reconciliation and capacity building within Iraq. Where do we get those numbers? Is it available to the public?

PETRAEUS: It's not arithmetic, Congresswoman.

As I mentioned yesterday, this is more akin to calculus than it is to arithmetic; it's more akin to the political-military calculus that the ambassador described earlier, I think, in this hearing today.

And it is the battlefield geometry. What we're trying to do is determine how quickly we can bring our forces -- look, again, we, very much, share the frustration. Those of us who have been at this for a long time obviously want the war to end as much as anybody else, perhaps maybe more.

It's sometimes said that the biggest peace activists are those who, of course, are actually downrange, risking it all.

But what we want to do is come home the right way, without jeopardizing the gains we've fought to achieve and achieving the important national efforts that we have.

BERMAN: I'm sorry, sir.

The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson?

WILSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, General and Ambassador, for your service. I've had the privilege of working with both of you over the years, from Mosul to Baghdad, from Islamabad to Baghdad. And every time I've just been so impressed by your leadership, and we're very grateful.

We're also grateful for the courageous service of our military and civilian personnel serving in Iraq and in the entire region, making a difference, protecting American families by defeating the terrorists overseas.

I'm particularly grateful as a 31-year veteran of the Army National Guard. I have currently four sons, thanks to my wife's training, who are serving in the U.S. military, and two have served in Iraq.

General Petraeus, I share a concern of Chairman Berman about the attacks on the green zone.

WILSON: This is truly a direct attack on the Iraqi government, the prime minister's quarters and office, the ministries, the parliament.

Additionally, it's an attack on American personnel. I was saddened to here, and my sympathy goes to the Wolfer family of Boca Raton, Florida for their loss.

I can particularly identify. I had a nephew serve in the green zone -- also a son serve in the green zone.

And on March 24th, 2008, General, you gave an interview with BBC. And then you stated the rockets that were launched at the green zone yesterday, for example, were "Iranian-provided, Iranian-made rockets, launched by special groups elements that are paid for, that are funded, that are trained, that had been equipped and been directed, by and large, by the Iranian Quds Force," end of quote.

What specific evidence do you have or could you tell us about that directly relates these rockets to Iran?

PETRAEUS: Well, we have found fragments of the different rockets that have come in. We have also found weapons caches that, again, clearly are of the type that come from Iran. And we've detained a number of special groups members over the last six months or so, including some very senior leaders and financiers who have been relatively talkative in explaining the whole process of how these individuals move to an from Iran, where they are trained, indoctrinated, how they're funded, how they bring weapons and so forth into the country.

And we'll lay that out for the public here at some point. We have a -- frankly, a press conference that is literally written and ready to go that can lay that out.

We've even detained, for example, four of what were called 16 master trainers -- individuals who had multiple trips back and then were brought into -- back into Iraq to help train others.

We do know these are the individuals that have been directing and launching these attacks. We have killed a number of them with armed UAVs ad attack helicopters and direct fire.

But it's a very, very difficult tactical problem because they think nothing of launching them from schoolyards, innocent civilians' backyards and so forth. WILSON: Additionally -- Ambassador Crocker, I'm going to give you an easy question because I asked it of you earlier in that -- because I want the American people to note this -- that Zawahiri, the Al Qaida spokesman for bin Laden, on July the 9th, 2005, made the goals of Al Qaida very clear.

First, expel the Americans from Iraq; the second stage, establish authority in Iraq; the third stage, extend the jihad wave to the secular countries around Iraq; the fourth stage is the clash with Israel, which is the extermination of the people who live in Israel.

Now, once they achieve -- if they achieve their four stages, would they be satisfied with what they have, or will they continue attacks on the United States?

CROCKER: Congressman, as you know, I've been focused on Al Qaida for quite some time. I opened our embassy in Afghanistan after 9/11, served two and a half years as our ambassador to Pakistan, and, of course, now I'm in Iraq.

It's my judgment that Al Qaida has been and remains a strategic enemy of the United States and that if they can find the means, they will attack us again.

I am familiar with the 2005 Zawahiri statements that you cite. The question I would have is whether this would indeed be sequential or whether if they can get that secure based, they will begin planning, more or less, immediately for that kind of attack.

WILSON: I thank you very much.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee, recognized for five minutes.

JACKSON LEE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And it's important to note our respect, mutually, for both of you gentlemen, and thank you for the courtesies shown to our delegation during the fifth year week, if you will, of the invasion of the United States into Iraq.

One of the senators in yesterday's hearing, I think, captured a lot of our sentiment without reflecting on the very fine and outstanding work of the United States military and our civilian support system through the State Department.

And he asked a simple question: How do we get out of this mess? I hope that this does not characterize all of my questions, but I, frankly, believe that you all are outstanding public servants and you are implementing the policies of this administration.

So you are in a difficult box. But I hope to pose some questions that really track what I believe will help us reach a solution.

First of all, I think I'd like to take note of some of the visual pictures of our trip.

JACKSON LEE: It is noteworthy that the Americans are armed and with helmets and flak jackets. Civilian population -- this little girl in a pink dress was trying to play on the streets. And we were walking through, and I have great gratitude to be able to do so.

General, none of these are classified shots, and so I want you to note that.

This is one of the streets that we were walking on -- certainly our weaponry and otherwise there.

Here's another one with -- here's a little boy, civilian, compared to Americans walking through the streets.

As I walked through these streets, I also saw a lot of quality of life needs -- trash and lack of clean water, in terms of conversation.

The Sunni men that were there were criticizing or complaining that they wished that they could have a government that would rid itself of sectarianism. That's what they view their leader, Mr. Maliki, as a sectarian who continues to promote divisions between the groups.

The good news is, Ambassador Crocker, is that they will be participating in the election.

We have spoken about the Iraqi security forces. I, frankly, believe we do not give them enough credit, and that is why we're in the plight that we are in today.

An outstanding general who, frankly, believes that his forces are getting ready and getting ready better -- one of the generals that we met, an Iraqi general. We decided to make sure that we'd let everyone know that the soldiers are well-dressed, but they're also, I believe, on the road of great competency.

What we are continuously presented with, however, is quite the contrary. And let me raise the points of the resolution of 2002, and I'll read from it, just to note that we were to deal with the United Nations resolutions and to rid ourselves from the Al Qaida.

Let me ask General Petraeus. Saddam Hussein is gone, is he not? I obviously need to get a quick answer because my time is running out.

PETRAEUS: Absolutely.

JACKSON LEE: There's been a democratic election.

PETRAEUS: Correct.

JACKSON LEE: Al Qaida, to your knowledge, is an amoeba; it's free flowing. It may be in Iraq; it may be in Afghanistan. Is that not true?

PETRAEUS: It is certainly in Iraq. It is less in Iraq than it was a year ago...

JACKSON LEE: But it finds itself in other places.

PETRAEUS: Not easily. Again, it has to find a place where it can break out.

JACKSON LEE: You would suggest that it is not in Afghanistan and...

PETRAEUS: I didn't say that. I'm not, obviously...

JACKSON LEE: Well, that's what my question is, does it find itself in other places, Al Qaida?

PETRAEUS: Certainly. Al Qaida in fact is throughout the region of the Middle East...

JACKSON LEE: With that in mind, let me say, General, that I frankly believe we are operating without authority. The 2002 resolution has been complete. The military has completed its task. I would declare it a military success. And I would ask that you convey to the president that we should now bring our troops home.

To Ambassador Crocker, even though there may be light being made of diplomacy, is it not important that we continue to work on a diplomatic end in giving technical assistance to Iraq to use its own money to help build up its country?

CROCKER: Yes, ma'am, it is. And we are very much involved in that. In fact, we're going to be bringing out a number of additional advisers from the Department of Treasury who will focus precisely on budget execution.

JACKSON LEE: With that in mind, then, we can use the diplomacy and technical assistance and complete our task and end the war, so we don't continue to have the loss of lives, as I did, with two soldiers being buried in my district. I believe there is no more authority for this war. I believe it is terminated. And I believe that our soldiers should come home, certainly to a welcoming and grateful nation.

I yield back my time.

BERMAN: The time of the gentlelady has expired.

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Gresham Barrett, for five minutes?

BARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, Ambassador, God bless you. Thank you for being here today. Please tell our heroes that we love them and we pray for them every day.

One quick statement: A lot of our colleagues over the last couple of days have talked about the cost of the war. The only thing I would ask them is think about the cost of actually losing this war.

General, in regards to the Basra operations, I know there were some good things and some bad things. But the leader of their country, a sovereign nation, took two brigades and 24 hours with special operations guys, took them to the field. Mixed results. But isn't that a success?

I mean, they couldn't have done that a year ago, could they, General?

PETRAEUS: They could not have, Congressman. And I did highlight that. And then they moved another brigade subsequent to that. And they had their C-130s turning several times a day with supplies, reinforcements, casualty backhaul and so forth.

And I think the more important point, if I could, is that Basra is by no means over. Basra is going to be ongoing for a number of months and will require a sustainable solution over time. And it's still very much the early days, actually, in Basra.

BARRETT: But in that sense of the action, the leader of the nation taking charge, a big success. Wouldn't you agree?

PETRAEUS: Well, we have talked repeatedly about wanting Iraq to be a sovereign country, wanting their leader of the sovereign country to make decisions.

PETRAEUS: And he made one. And, candidly, it was a bit of a surprise. It was much more sudden than the very deliberate process that, in fact, we were actually literally working on at the time that he made the decision based on his assessment of security issues there, and then gave orders to do that.

He did ask for our support. We said that we would provide support. Wouldn't be ground forces. It's advisers and close air support and ISR support and that type of thing.

BARRETT: Yes, sir.

Ambassador?

CROCKER: Yes, sir. Looking at the Basra operation from the political standpoint, vice the military, the prime minister's decisiveness in this, including going down personally to Basra for the opening phases of this operation, has garnered him widespread political support from almost all of Iraq's leaders -- Sunni, Kurd, as well as Shia -- because he is being perceived, as the Shia prime minister of Iraq, as willing and able to take on Shia extremist militias, that this is being perceived broadly in Iraq as a national effort against extremist groups.

And it's worth noting, as you consider the implications of the Basra operation, that you have Iraqi forces engaged with Shia extremist militias in Basra, at the same time up in Mosul they're engaged with us against Al Qaida and Al Qaida's extremist Sunni supporters.

So the perception increasingly is of a national endeavor against the extremes, whether Sunni or Shia, that threaten the state.

BARRETT: Got you.

Very quickly, Ambassador, when I was over there just a few weeks ago, I was very concerned about the level of corruption. I kept hearing the theme on and on again.

Got about a minute. Tell me what we're doing to stem that, because I think that is a major problem.

And, General, you, too, if you can.

CROCKER: It is a major problem. The Iraqis -- the Iraqi government is now publicly recognizing that it has a major problem. There have been two conferences to address this issue, one convened by the government itself and the other at the request of the government with the United Nations to try and develop a work plan.

We're engaged in doing everything we can to assist on this. We've recently reorganized our own anti-corruption effort within the embassy in coordination with MNF. I brought out a senior officer, a former ambassador, to head that up. We've got efforts under way to assist the various elements of the anti-corruption apparatus in the Iraqi government gain capacity and strength, in particular the Commission on Integrity, which has got a new and very promising head.

CROCKER: So -- sorry, sir.

BERMAN: I'm sorry, but the time of the gentleman has expired. And the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Wu, is recognized for five minutes.

WU: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I see it, the central foreign policy problem in Iraq is no longer really in Iraq -- the challenges, what's going on in the rest of the world in the following sense.

When our government is so mono-focused on one country, on Iraq, we are not able, in my view, to pay adequate attention to the rest of the world; to Russia, to China, to India, to Japan, to Europe, whether they are friends, adversaries, competitors or otherwise.

And as the world's lone superpower, well, great powers have great responsibilities. And the challenge is whether we have the bandwidth to deal with all the things that we need to deal with around the world.

And, General, I want to be very specific in this. I don't think that this is a military problem; I think the uniformed services have done absolutely everything that the civilian authority has asked it to do, and I thank you for that.

But I would like to ask both of you gentlemen, what are the metrics of success? What are the metrics by which we reach a point where we can begin to deploy our political, diplomatic and military resources to face the challenges that we face elsewhere in the world?

Ambassador, you answered an earlier question and you said that you deal with conditions and not with timelines. Well, let's put some metrics on the conditions that you're talking about.

And General, you -- in answer to an earlier question, you gave some fairly general answers to what constitutes, if you will, success.

I'd like to hear some metrics from both of you gentlemen about when we can begin to start paying attention -- adequate attention to the rest of the world.

CROCKER: Well, again, we approach this from the -- obviously, from the focus on Iraq. As you know, Congressman, redeployments are underway. The surge forces are coming home, and General Petraeus and I have both described the process by which we're able to make recommendations in that regard. You look at...

WU: Well, with all due respect, Ambassador, I'm asking you about metrics. What are identifiable criteria that we can measure against so that we can consider objectives achieved?

PETRAEUS: Congressman, if I could, the metrics are among those that I showed you today, that there's a subset of the overall metrics that we use to track, basically, how we're doing.

What we showed you was the -- all of them totalled up. But we also look at them by region. And so, let me give you an example...

WU: Excuse me, General. Excuse me.

WU: Based on the metrics that you put up, then at what point on those graphs do we reach the point where we can redeploy our military and our diplomatic resources?

PETRAEUS: At the point where those metrics for an area, such as Anbar province -- and I wish we had included that -- we have a provincial slide and it shows it going just like that in terms of violence.

And then we lay down the troop to task. We have to look at what it is that we're trying to accomplish, look at the local Iraqi security forces and the local governance, and that is what has enabled us to reduce -- we're in the process of reducing from 14 battalions in Anbar province down to about six.

That is a very substantial reduction to take place in the course of about, I guess, eight or nine months or so. And it is based on those time...

WU: Thank you, General. And perhaps, off line here, we can get both of you gentlemen to respond at what point on this charts we can define success. And, you know, I'd be happy to take that as a written response outside of this hearing.

PETRAEUS: Congressman, look, let me be, again, forthright with you, which is the spirit that we've been in.

There's not an arithmetical solution that says for Anbar province when you hit this number and this metric; it's much more about a number of different metrics that we look at.

And at the end of the day, this is about feel. This is what we pay our commanders to do, is it to make judgments and to asses a situation and to say, "I think that we can take this battalion out of here, this battalion out of here. We can leave these smaller elements. This is how we cobble together the response. By the way, we've got to make sure we have medevac within the golden hour," and all the rest of this.

And, again, a very complex endeavor, and then that's how you are able to determine how much you can come down over time.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

WU: Thank you, sir.

BERMAN: The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mack, is recognized for five minutes.

MACK: There's a legal dispute -- Mr. Chairman, I yield my time to...

BERMAN: Resolved in the favor of Mr. Fortenberry and with the agreement of Mr. Mack.

Mr. Fortenberry is recognized for five minutes.

FORTENBERRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, welcome. Thank you for joining us today. And on behalf of the people of the 1st District of Nebraska, let me thank you for your service and sacrifice on behalf of our nation.

General Petraeus, under current operational and policy assumptions, and recognizing the complexity and fluidity of the situation, what will Iraq look like in six months, your best judgment?

PETRAEUS: Well, in part, as we projected with the provincial Iraqi control, there will be a number of additional provinces that will be under Iraqi control.

Again, I think we had the projections on there. Sometimes those actually come forward, as in the case of, say, Anbar province; sometimes they move back, as has been the case with, say, Ninawa province.

In those provinces, there will be more robust Iraqi governance. Iraq forces will be shouldering more of the burden. We certainly intend to keep the heat on Al Qaida-Iraq and to try to reduce further the areas in which they have influence some degree -- I wouldn't call it safe-haven at this point, but operating space, and to continue to press that.

There clearly has to be both a military and a political solution with respect to the militia forces. Again, there is a huge political component to that, given their connection. And that will -- that is something that clearly has to be worked out and it is something, frankly, that the Iraqi political leaders are very much seized with right now.

There will have been provincial elections, and that will have enabled more representative governance in the various Iraq provinces.

PETRAEUS: We hope that that can satisfy the aspirations of those who made a bad decision in the last elections, back in January 2005, when large numbers of Sunni Arabs, for example, boycotted the vote.

Certainly hope that basic services have been improved in terms of electricity, water, sewerage, because there are projects ongoing in a variety of those different areas. They obviously depend to a considerable degree on the security situation, but again there have been improvements in those areas and that certainly the oil exporting continues as it is, if not perhaps even tuned up a bit more, although the north, I think, recently broke either its all-time record or certainly its post-liberation record.

We hope to get into a variety of different ministry activities. More of the health clinics that we have helped Iraq build will be open by that point in time. I think it's between a third and a half right now that are open, and, again, we hope to see several dozen more of those opened over time.

And, again, I'd just go on like that down the various lines of operation that are in our joint campaign plan. As you know, there's not a military campaign plan in Iraq or a separate embassy campaign plan. It's a joint campaign plan signed by the two of us. And we do link arms as we try to take this forward and try to make progress across the board.

FORTENBERRY: Thank you, General.

Briefly, switching to the ambassador.

Mr. Ambassador, I noted in your testimony you referred to a diplomatic surge. I was pleased to see that in that Congressman McCaul, my colleague, and I introduced a resolution last year calling for a diplomatic surge, to make it the stated objective of Congress to augment our security efforts by engaging international stakeholders in robust diplomacy to ensure -- help ensure their support for political, economic and humanitarian assistance toward the rapid stabilization of Iraq.

Thus far, we've -- you've talked about enhanced U.S. -- U.N. engagement in Iraq, the international compact and the neighbors conferences.

What specific outcomes do you seek to accomplish in this regard by the end of the year? CROCKER: Well, with respect to the neighbors, the Arab neighbors, what we would very much like to see is the Arabs reengaging with Iraq. There are no Arab ambassadors currently in Baghdad, and that is not good for Iraq and it's not good for the Arab states.

FORTENBERRY: Debt relief and economic assistance as well?

CROCKER: Certainly on debt relief. Some have granted it. Others have not. That needs to move forward.

FORTENBERRY: I think these are very important considerations.

Thank you, gentlemen.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Crowley, is recognized for five minutes.

CROWLEY: I thank the chairman and thank both Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus for being here this afternoon -- this morning, this afternoon for these past couple of days and your testimony that you've given before both the Senate and the House.

I also want to thank both of you for my recent trip to Iraq, where I was treated very warmly and protected very well and felt very secure and safe on that particular CODEL led by my good friend and colleague from California, Mr. Costa.

And I want to thank the men and women who are serving in our armed services over there, who are exemplary and I think are just fantastic and terrific people who are doing the best job that they can on what I think are extremely difficult, if not somewhat impossible, circumstances.

I never once doubted for a moment that our troops would be successful in the surge. I think that we can basically do whatever we want to do militarily. The really question really lies as to whether or not the Iraqis have the ability to do what they need to do politically to move forward.

And that really comes to, I think, the question for me, and that is, we have seen a steady decline in the coalition of the willing in Iraq. And I would ask both Ambassador Crocker and you, General Petraeus, whether or not that is disconcerting to you -- whether you have concern about the lack of involvement by the greater free world in what's happening in Iraq today -- their lack of involvement.

CROCKER: Congressman, that international involvement is very important, but it can take different forms. We have got good, strong coalition partners. Their roles may transform over time.

The Australians, for example, as they decrease their military role, are increasing their role in economic engagement with Iraq, and we welcome this.

It's also why the kinds of efforts that the congressman was just asking about I think are so important to have the Arabs more engaged with Iraq, again, not as military coalition partners, but at a political level.

CROWLEY: I'm very interested in the investments that are being made in an economic way to help in Iraq by our allies. But what I'm really concerned about is the fact that the U.S. is paying 95 percent of the cost of the military action and the occupation within Iraq today, and our allies -- in a reverse of the first Gulf War, where that was not the case, where most of the burden was placed on the rest of the world, we're paying certainly our fair share in that. That's not the case in this circumstance.

And that's, you know, it comes down to, for me, whether or not this is worth any additional American lives in keeping this effort going when there seems to be an intractable problem in getting the Iraqis to get their act together.

And we know how complicated the situation is. I mean, one doesn't have to look at the Senate and certainly Senator McCain and his time-to-time inability to understand exactly maybe and get the clear picture about what a Shia is and what a Sunnis is and who is involved in Al Qaida, who is not involved in Al Qaida.

But certainly the American people look at this as well, and say this is a very, very difficult situation. And they're questioning whether or not it is worth additional American lives to put on the line for something that is intractable for a long period.

CROCKER: Well, it's my view, Congressman, that there is -- there is political progress. And I tried to outline that in my testimony. We see it at local levels among both Sunnis and Shia, who are sick and tired of militia and terrorist activity, and making that clear.

We see it at the national level, where improving security has created an environment where the kinds of compromises on legislation that just could not be had, say six or nine months ago, are now achievable.

CROWLEY: Is it fair to describe the Iraqi legislature as dysfunctional?

CROCKER: No, sir, I don't believe it is. The Iraqi Council of Representatives, the parliament, showed us in the first couple of months of this year that they are able to come together and make the trade-offs across sectarian lines to get through some complex pieces of legislation like, again, an amnesty law.

Enormously important to the Sunnis, it required an atmosphere in which the Shia would not see that as threatening. And that's the atmosphere we're increasingly getting now.

CROWLEY: Ambassador, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I know my time is about to expire. I just want to congratulate our ally, Jordan, for the work that they're doing in terms of helping to train Iraqi police as well as extending themselves in terms of opening up their borders for refugees.

I think it's important to note and for our other allies in the Arab world to recognize them as well, and my colleagues as well.

(UNKNOWN): And counterterrorism, too.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman is expired.

We are now on the ten-minute bells for a series of eight votes. I am not going to ask General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker to hang around until that is over.

So what I am prepared to do is sit here and chair this until every member who wants to stay with me and give up the chance to be Mr. Natcher and set the record for consecutive votes made is willing to miss votes with me to ask questions. I, of course, am not opposed to the next election.

So each member will have to make...

(LAUGHTER)

... a decision, but I will be here as long as somebody is willing to be recognized to take their time. And for people who don't want to do that, would you be all right if we submit questions in writing?

(UNKNOWN): Thank you. Just to make sure that some of us who will be going to vote, the ones who stay, they will not be able to ask a second round of questions...

BERMAN: No.

(UNKNOWN): ... no longer than five minutes?

BERMAN: Of course not. It'll be just the five-minute rule...

(UNKNOWN): Thank you, sir. Thank you, sir.

BERMAN: ... no seconds rounds...

(UNKNOWN): That's wonderful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BERMAN: If we finish the first round it'll be a miracle.

(LAUGHTER)

OK.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, is recognized for five minutes.

MCCAUL: I thank the chairman. General, Ambassador, thank you for your extraordinary service to this country.

The Wall Street Journal today reported that, "As General David Petraeus briefs Congress this week on Iraq, it's clear his surge has achieved remarkable results. The most crucial is that the U.S. can no longer be defeated militarily in Iraq, which could not be said a year ago.

"The question now is whether Washington will squander these gains by withdrawing so quickly that we could still lose politically."

I think we all want our troops to come home, but I think we want this to be done in the most responsible, efficient way possible.

With respect to the cost of the war, there's been a lot of discussion about that, and I think that, actually, a lot of members on both sides of the aisle agree with the fact that the Iraqi people, with their oil revenues, a $50 billion surplus, and that the stakeholders in the region need to begin to step up to the plate in terms of financing this operation -- and I think you're going to see a growing -- again, a growing movement in the Congress toward that.

But as we talk about the cost, I think we also need to talk about what is the cost of failure. How much will that cost not only the American people, the world?

And my question is two-part.

One is, if we fail -- and I like to win, and I think most Americans like to win -- but what would that failure -- what will the consequences of failure be in the world?

And the second part of my question has to do with Iran.

MCCAUL: General, you've testified that Iranian caches have been captured, that agents of Iran have been found in Iraq.

It seems to me that Iran's influence is just as deep and as involved as Al Qaida, that in some respects that in and of itself is an act of war.

What, Ambassador, what can be done on the world stage in terms of the international response to what the Iranian government is now doing to us and to our troops in Iraq?

PETRAEUS: Congressman, perhaps I'll take the first one and the ambassador can take the second one. And if I could, just before -- just to recognize the tremendous job that was done by 3 Corps headquarters out of Fort Hood, 1st Cav Division, now 4th Infantry Division, others from Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, Fort Sam and other great military installations in Texas and also Air Force bases and so forth, all that played very key parts in the surge.

And really the operational level commander of that, of course, was Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, and he and his team did a magnificent job.

Sir, with respect to the consequences, of course, obviously they're unknowable. I mean, no one can predict the extent of what might happen, again, with respect to Al Qaida, how the -- whether or how the ethno-sectarian conflict might brew back up, whether that could lead to fragmentation of Iraq, bring other countries into it, produce a variety of different regional stability issues, or how it could lead, again, Iranian influence to expand and also perhaps to cause disruption in the global economy.

All of those are issues that I think are central to the national interests that we have in trying to get Iraq right, to get reasonable progress so that we can reasonably attain those very, very important national interests that we have.

CROCKER: If I could just add to that, Congressman. I mentioned, I think, in a previous hearing that I was in Lebanon in the early '80s at a time when we withdrew our Marines from Lebanon in 1984, following the Marine barracks bombing.

Other nations made calculations and came to conclusions as a result of that withdrawal, particularly Syria and Iran, as to what the U.S. would or would not be willing to do, and that still shapes the Middle Eastern environment.

CROCKER: Those same calculations would be made if we -- in my view, if we were to withdraw from Iraq, leaving behind a failed or failing state with the consequent -- the specific consequences we described, sectarian violence, Al Qaida's return and significant Iranian influence. Those would be the first order of consequences, if you will.

But there would be second and third order consequences that I don't have the power of imagination to predict that would be enormously negative for our national interests over the long term.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

And the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for five minutes.

SCOTT: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, thank you very much for your service. We're all very proud of you and we're very appreciative for what you're doing.

And my comments are -- I want them set within the tone of recognizing that you're here, doing your jobs. You're carrying out orders. It is the orders that I have troubles with.

My first order of concern as to why I believe we must immediately have a plan in place to immediately start redeploying is simply because of the breaking of the back of our military.

Our military is overstrained. It's overstretched. Significantly. Both General Casey, generals within the Army have already indicated that every one of our combat units for the Marines, for the Army, as well as for our National Guards, have already been used up. Our readiness levels are shot.

We've had our soldiers on three and four tours of duty.

You know, if you really want to get a taste of this war, I always advise my colleagues to make sure you go to Landstuhl air base. I've been over there three times, every time I go over into the war zone.

I've been over there three times at Landstuhl. You want to know the cost of this, you look in the eyes of these soldiers, and you know what that cost is. And I'm here to tell you, General, I am very concerned about the complete brutalization of our military in this process. And this is the elephant in the room that we continue to try to gloss over.

And I get tons of calls in my office, every one of my townhall meetings, where soldiers who have served their duty come back with grave complaints.

SCOTT: The way we treat our wounded warriors and our veterans is despicable. And as we talk about this surge -- even the generals have said the 30,000 surge that we've had in place has caused unsustainable stress on our military.

And then, secondly, with your offer and your extension, again, in all due respect -- because I respect you for the job that you're doing -- but our military advisers are saying to us, those who are in the Pentagon, those that are here now, not just the retirees, say this pause that you're asking for in the slow down in order to sustain it at the 140,000-troop level will cause immeasurable harm.

And I'm not just talking about the physical harm; I'm talking about the mental stress. We've had nearly 200,000 of the 516,000 soldiers that have served in Iraq -- nearly 200,000 have been over there on their second tour, 63,000 on their third tour and about 28,000 now moving onto their fourth tours of duty. I'm not touting anything that you don't know.

But one fact that's glaring out: 30 percent of every one of these troops that have served in Iraq are suffering from mental health problems. I'm not even counting the divorce rates that are there.

So when we evaluate going forward and what we're going to do in 100 years there or how long we're going to stay, we must take into consideration the tremendous damage that we're doing to our men and women in uniform, and it is for that reason that we need to plan a redeployment out.

The other reason is this. In six and a half months, you may not say we're going to end this war, I might not say it -- I'm saying I'm hoping we end it -- but the American people are going to end this war. And they're going to come to the polls in November and they're going to speak loudly.

We need to have a plan in order so that we can move out. I think one piece that is missing is this great reluctance to understand the impact of Iran. Iran is a major player in this.

I recall you're a student of history and you know full well what happened in World War II. A lot of us did not want to move with Russia. Russia was a problem. But we had to deal with other countries who we did not agree with in order to come to a conclusion.

SCOTT: This war must end for the sake of our military. Our military is weaker today than it was five years ago. Iran is stronger today than it was five years ago.

It is no wonder that in the recent action in Basra, where there was a settlement for peace, who negotiated it? Iran. Where was it negotiated? In Iran.

We've got civil war upon civil war here. These folks have been fighting for centuries. What are we going to do in the next six months to settle this? How are you as commander going to deal and look soldiers in the face to send them to their deaths knowing that this matter is coming to an end?

The American people are going to say it's coming to an end. There's going to be a change in the presidency. And we cannot continue with the brutalization and the back breaking that we're doing to our military.

I got 10 seconds.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

SCOTT: Thank you very much.

BERMAN: Gentleman from South Carolina, with my apologies for making him be here 10 minutes longer than he needed to be, Mr. Inglis?

INGLIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General and Ambassador, you know, our military is really the incredible race horse that will run its heart out for the American people. And really in sort of three phases you've been completely successful.

We asked you to go depose a madman who we thought was dangerous to us. Did that, it's complete success.

Second phase, disrupt terrorist networks, no further attacks on the United States, score that one as a success, too.

Third phase, I wasn't completely sold, but the idea of a surge seems to have worked in terms of the military consequences of creating a security zone, a space for them to decide questions.

Now, of course, you need to make those decisions. So in each phase our military's accomplished exactly what we asked you to do. And Ambassador Crocker said something very helpful in your testimony.

Sir, you said that essentially we are supporters of their democracy, of Iraq's democracy, but we're not guarantors of their democracy. Maybe that's my way of phrasing it, not yours.

But I wonder, General and Ambassador, what would be the warning signs that we are going from supporter status to guarantor status?

CROCKER: Congressman, I don't see us moving in that direction. We're trying to, as you rightly said, create the conditions where they can take the political decisions necessary to further reconciliation and get themselves on the track to a stable future.

CROCKER: But these have to be their decisions. We can't pass their laws for them. It would be impossible, and it would not have any effect, even if it were possible.

So I don't think I see the circumstances under which this would arise.

INGLIS: Well, it worries me, actually -- your answer worries me, because there would be no warning signals for you that we have gone from supporter to guarantor.

I think there is a point at which you clearly go from supporter to guarantor. In other words, you say that we will stay indefinitely. That would be the warning sign that, "Wait a minute. "No, we can't stay indefinitely." We can't stay -- at some point, you have to say: We supported you, but we're not going to guarantee you.

CROCKER: I've got you now.

Well, I think one way to frame that would be the effort we are beginning now, for a strategic framework agreement and a status of forces agreement.

As I noted in my testimony, to give our military the authorities and protections it will need when the Security Council resolution expires at the end of the year, we will need that kind of agreement.

It is our firm intention to negotiate it as an executive agreement, meaning that it will not contain within it the commitments or, I guess, in your term, the guarantees, that would require the advice and consent of the Senate.

INGLIS: General, is the recent call-off in the last two weeks by Sadr, is that a sign of weakness on his part, or strength? Weakness that he saw reinforcements coming his way and maybe he wasn't going to be able to withstand them and weakening of his position in cooperating in Iran?

Or is it strength in that he's able to show, listen, I can turn it on or turn it off?

PETRAEUS: As with all these, I think there were a number of factors that probably are at play.

One of them is probably related to the reason for the cease-fire in the first place, back after the violence that was precipitated in the holy city of Karbala by his militia forces, that that damaged the image of his movement. And I think there is concern over the political ramifications of continued violence that is clearly laid at the feet of the militia, which the population actually has begun to turn against.

PETRAEUS: There is not a blank check there just because he is cloaked in the name of the Sadr movement and has the lineage that he has, if you will.

And so, in that sense, I think, is very much based on concern and also a sense, frankly, that if it did play out, as well, they could sustain some pretty significant losses.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Costa, is recognized for give minutes.

COSTA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to thank Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus for the good work that you've done. Add to the kudos that the rest of my colleagues have given.

Your team, when our CODEL was in Iraq in March, the military did a great job of moving us where we wanted to go, when we wanted to go. And Rich Halton (ph) did a good job in making sure that we, more or less, stayed out of harm's way.

A couple of different questions -- a lot of them have been answered. We know that there a number of factors that have allowed us to reach the reduction in violence over the last year.

Among those, as you've stated, is the Sunni agreement that we've reached. And, obviously, that payment of some 90,000 strong, I guess, is militias -- Sons of Iraq is key to that.

PETRAEUS: 20,000 of those are Shia, by the way, sir. Just to be sure that we're...

COSTA: Right. Yet 70,000 plus the 20,000. My question is: How long are we going to be able, one, to continue to pay them?

And, two, what is the process, because there has been a reluctance on the part of the Maliki government to incorporate these into either the security force or to make them, you know -- to train with, you know, jobs that they can perform? How long can we pay them?

PETRAEUS: Congressman, again, the process is that we've already transitioned about 20,000 of these individuals over time into Iraqi security force jobs, other government positions. And there are a host of programs that are being -- some already established, many that are expanding that would have just tried pilot program are now moving.

There's a civilian-conservation-corps-kind-of-concept. There is the job training and reintegration program. There is basic education. There is skills...

COSTA: So you believe you have the resources to successfully mainstream all of these within the next 12 months?

PETRAEUS: We do, and we're now helped because of the Iraqi CERP that I mentioned and the funding, again, of...

COSTA: With the Maliki government.

PETRAEUS: ... top government support. Yes, sir.

I think I -- in the statement, if you just want to look at -- I think it's about three pages from the...

COSTA: I'll refer back to it. I don't have a lot of time and...

(CROSSTALK)

PETRAEUS: Because there's nearly a billion dollars total if you add it all up.

COSTA: All right. I think there have been a little more from the Basra situation. I think it is a good case study. And many of the questions I had about winners and losers and how well they performed and whether or not Maliki's credibility is increased as a result of this, I think you've answered.

PETRAEUS: Great.

COSTA: I'd like to go, Mr. Ambassador, to an issue that was raised, and it's been discussed over the last year, as to whether or not the right form of government exists to really bring these factions together.

I guess the national security adviser to Maliki, Rubaie -- is that how you pronounce his name?

CROCKER: Rubaie, yes.

COSTA: Rubaie wrote a column back in January -- I'm sure you're familiar with it -- asserting that "the current political framework is based on pluralistic democratic vision that, while admirable, is entirely unsuited to resolving the three-way divide. It ignores the underlying issues and expects that a consensus will emerge simply by enacting a liberal constitution legal order."

He goes on to say that "pluralistic democracy will not take root unless the national political compact recognizes and accommodates the fears and the aspirations of the Iraq community." And then he talks about some other factors in there.

I'd like you to comment whether or not -- the expectation level, it's got to be terribly frustrating doing what you guys do every day. But do we have the right mix here to have a expectation level that we can reach in the next year?

COSTA: Well, I think we do, Congressman.

What Dr. Rubaie was talking about -- what the thrust of that op- ed was was the creation of regions within Iraq.

CROCKER: There is already a Kurdish region.

COSTA: We were there. Seems to be doing well.

CROCKER: Exactly.

There is a regions law that comes into -- it was passed 18 months ago. There was a moratorium on its effective date. That will become effective actually this month. And that will permit a province or a grouping of provinces to begin a process of regionalization if they so choose.

COSTA: Included in that the five contracts that the Kurds signed on the oil leases, will they be observed by the government in Baghdad?

CROCKER: Well, this is, you know, some of the unfinished business...

COSTA: Right.

CROCKER: ... in determining who has authority to do what. And the validity of those oil contracts on a national resource, signed by a regional government, is contested now between the federal government and the regional government. It's one of the things they're going to have work out.

COSTA: Got more questions; don't have any more time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And keep up the good work, gentlemen.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

My metric is arithmetical, and it's down to one. And I recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee.

LEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for allowing the hearing to conclude with my final questions.

And good afternoon, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker.

Let me again thank you both for your service. Both of you, as well as our very brave troops, have made countless sacrifices.

I am one, however, who believes, like many, that there is no military solution in Iraq.

We're occupying a country that has descended really into a civil war, which our troops are basically called to referee. And this was very clear last week in Basra when American commanders felt obligated to risk American troops to rescue for the most part Iraqi forces from an unwise, ill-conceived and unilateral decision by the prime minister of Iraq. And it's reported that at least 1,000 Iraqi security forces refused to fight or abandoned their posts.

It appears also -- and we've heard this over and over today -- that Iran has gained a very strong stronghold in Iraq and that Al Qaida is still ever present.

So, Ambassador -- first, General Petraeus, can you explain Al Qaida's presence and Iran's role in Iraq prior to shock and awe five years ago, and is America safer now?

Secondly, General Petraeus, let me just say -- and some have mentioned -- that many see the signs that paralleled the march to war against Iraq now setting the stage for a preemptive military strike against Iran.

LEE: And you mentioned earlier that that is not within your authorization. But with regard to a flat-out yes or no, are you authorized to conduct military operations against Iran? And I'd just like, again, maybe a flat-out yes or not.

PETRAEUS: Could I just give you that answer in private later, because I don't want to tell -- it will reassure you, but I think that's probably a classified answer that...

LEE: Certainly, I would appreciate...

PETRAEUS: ... I'll be happy to answer it to you right after this, if that's OK.

LEE: OK. Certainly.

Ambassador Crocker, let me just ask you the question. We'll go back to General Petraeus. On six occasions, I just want to remind you, that President Bush did sign the legislation containing provisions relating to no permanent military bases in Iraq.

But in December, he issued a signing statement, in essence not especially approving of that policy. So now, with the SOFA agreement pending, let me ask you -- and you've said that we do not intend to seek permanent military bases in Iraq. The president, somehow, is not clear on that. So maybe you're defining military bases differently than what he is defining military bases.

But I think -- and I agree that the administration can't obligate the expenditure of public funds to guarantee the security of a sovereign country without congressional approval, especially now that the American people have spent over $500 billion in Iraq, which has contributed, significantly, to this recession that's hurting millions of Americans.

And so, could you, Ambassador Crocker, clarify this permanent military base issue and the confusion of either the president or the president's staff and appointees?

CROCKER: Yes, ma'am. The position is as I've stated it in my testimony. We are not seeking permanent military bases in Iraq. The Iraqis -- that's our position -- that is something the Iraqis are not seeking either.

And, as I said, it is our expectation that the status of forces agreement, when negotiated, will explicitly forswear permanent military bases.

So I think we are quite clear on that.

LEE: OK. Well, Ambassador Crocker, I would urge you to let the president know that, because that signing statement is really undermining exactly what you're saying.

General Petraeus, could you answer my question, I don't have much time left, with regard to the president's Al Qaida in Iran -- in Iraq -- prior to shock and awe?

PETRAEUS: I am not aware of a presence of Al Qaida in Iraq prior. There's some discussion of links with some extremist organizations. But, again, I'm not sure how much stock I would put in that either.

And in prior, of course, Iran and Iraq were not exactly kissing cousins in those days. In fact, they had, of course, had a lengthy eight-year war that dominated most of their relations between 1980 and 1988 or so.

LEE: Well, how could America be more secure now, five years later, if Iran and Iraq -- Iran and Al Qaida weren't present five years ago?

Is my time up?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General.

And thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

LEE: I look forward to your response.

BERMAN: Time of the gentlelady has expired.

Mr. Ambassador, General, we do thank you very much for being here. We do congratulate you for your and our forces' successes in the considerable areas where there has been success. Our hearts are with you. Our minds have some reservations. But thank you for your patience here, and good luck.

The hearing is adjourned.

END
.ETX

Apr 09, 2008 18:33 ET .EOF

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOLDS A HEARING ON THE CROCKER/PETRAEUS IRAQ REPORT

APRIL 9, 2008

SPEAKERS: REP. HOWARD L. BERMAN, D-CALIF. CHAIRMAN REP. GARY L. ACKERMAN, D-N.Y. DEL. ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, D-A.S. REP. DONALD M. PAYNE, D-N.J. REP. BRAD SHERMAN, D-CALIF. REP. ROBERT WEXLER, D-FLA. REP. ELIOT L. ENGEL, D-N.Y. REP. BILL DELAHUNT, D-MASS. REP. GREGORY W. MEEKS, D-N.Y. REP. DIANE WATSON, D-CALIF. REP. ADAM SMITH, D-WASH. REP. RUSS CARNAHAN, D-MO. REP. JOHN TANNER, D-TENN. REP. GENE GREEN, D-TEXAS REP. LYNN WOOLSEY, D-CALIF. REP. SHEILA JACKSON LEE, D-TEXAS REP. RUBEN HINOJOSA, D-TEXAS REP. JOSEPH CROWLEY, D-N.Y. REP. DAVID WU, D-ORE. REP. BRAD MILLER, D-N.C. REP. LINDA T. SANCHEZ, D-CALIF. REP. DAVID SCOTT, D-GA. REP. JIM COSTA, D-CALIF. REP. ALBIO SIRES, D-N.J. REP. GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, D-ARIZ. REP. RON KLEIN, D-FLA. REP. BARBARA LEE, D-CALIF.

REP. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, R-FLA. RANKING MEMBER REP. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, R-N.J. REP. DAN BURTON, R-IND. REP. ELTON GALLEGLY, R-CALIF. REP. DANA ROHRABACHER, R-CALIF. REP. DONALD MANZULLO, R-ILL. REP. ED ROYCE, R-CALIF. REP. STEVE CHABOT, R-OHIO REP. TOM TANCREDO, R-COLO. REP. RON PAUL, R-TEXAS REP. JEFF FLAKE, R-ARIZ. REP. MIKE PENCE, R-IND. REP. JOE WILSON, R-S.C. REP. JOHN BOOZMAN, R-ARK. REP. J. GRESHAM BARRETT, R-S.C. REP. CONNIE MACK, R-FLA. REP. JEFF FORTENBERRY, R-NEB. REP. MICHAEL MCCAUL, R-TEXAS REP. TED POE, R-TEXAS REP. BOB INGLIS, R-S.C. RES. COMMISSIONER LUIS FORTUNO, R-P.R. REP. GUS BILIRAKIS, R-FLA.

WITNESSES: GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS (USA), COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ RYAN CROCKER

[*] BERMAN: The committee will come to order. Committee will come to order.

Before we begin, let's -- let me outline today's proceedings. And welcome to our refurbished committee room.

After my opening statement and that of our distinguished colleague, Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, we'll hear the witnesses' opening statement. I'll recognize committee members for five minutes each, based on seniority, for those who were here at the opening of the hearing -- that was 30 seconds ago -- and in order of arrival for those joining us later.

Secondly, I'd like to make it clear that our committee's policy, what it is on handling protests. We have no objection to audience members wearing T-shirts and hats expressing their views. But to maintain order in the hearing room, we request that audience members do not hold up or wave signs, make gestures to attract attention, stand up and protest, shout or yell your views, or otherwise disrupt the hearing.

We'll ask the Capitol Police to remove anyone from the room who violates this policy.

And I should let people know that it is the policy of the Capitol Police to arrest anyone ejected from the hearing room.

Our witnesses are in the home stretch of a congressional testimony marathon. To some, this hearing may even seen like the fourth time around an endless loop.

That's why we're asking both Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus to more or less summarize the main points of their testimony at their discretion, a report to Congress that has been heard once in the House and twice in the Senate already.

This way we'll move more -- we'll move along more quickly to the questions posed by members of the committee.

To make sure that as many members of the committee as possible are yielded time, I intend to use the gavel at the five-minute mark exactly. In other words, a member can use his or her time to give a speech or to question the witnesses, but no backloading, no four-and- a-half-minute speech with then the questions coming. You're not going to -- the witnesses will not be answering those kinds of questions.

Now that these housekeeping points have been made, I recognize myself for some opening remarks to our distinguished witnesses.

The committee has great respect, Mr. Ambassador, General Petraeus, for your accomplishments and deeply appreciate your service.

We're also keenly aware of the sacrifices being made by the U.S. military and our dedicated diplomatic corps in Iraq, along with their families.

But our respect and appreciation for you and the people you lead does not mean that we should yield in our oversight responsibilities.

Quite the opposite. We have to make a tough-minded assessment that is fact-based and not ideologically driven. It is right and appropriate to question the reports of progress that the executive branch offers to Congress.

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XXX offers to Congress.

BERMAN: Congress and the people who sent us to Washington want to see the years of effort in Iraq end with a positive, meaningful and lasting result; a stable, cohesive, Iraqi government, democratic in nature; an Iraq that does not threaten its neighbors and is able to resist domination by them; a country living under the rule of law with protection for individual and minority rights.

This would be good for Iraq, of course, but most importantly, it would be good for American interests.

But are we there yet? Hardly. Can we get there at a cost appropriate to that benefit? I'm not convinced. In fact, in some areas, we seem to be slipping backwards.

General Petraeus, when you last came before this committee, you argued that the surge would allow U.S. troops to help their Iraq counterparts seize and hold areas that were then under the control of anti-American forces.

How effective could this effort have been when mortars and rockets can rain on the green zone, launched from the Sadr City district of Baghdad directly across the Tigris? Our diplomats and other civilian personnel are literally under fire. For more than two weeks, our embassy is bombarded.

In all, the past two-plus weeks have seen the worst violence in the green zone since the war began five years ago.

I have a clear memory that the seize and hold component of the surge strategy, as conceived in late 2006 and implemented in 2007, would eventually be directed at the most violent and unstable areas of Sadr City, yet we do not even seem to be close to seizing and holding Sadr City.

Why not? Are we focusing our efforts on securing this district for the long term, or must we rely on the whims of Muqtada al-Sadr to maintain the peace?

What can you tell us about how this situation came about? What is the source of this mortar and rocket fire? What is the reason for it? What, if anything, can be done to stop it? Some reports say the rockets were made in China. Is that the case? And if so, how have they made their way to Baghdad?

On another subject, the surge was intended to quell the violence, primarily in order to create political space for Iraqis to move on toward national reconciliation.

Two years ago, a key Iraqi leader with whom I met defined national reconciliation this way: moderate Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish leaders coming together across sectarian lines as Iraqis to join hands so that they could things done for the benefit of the whole country. The middle would rise in Iraq and lead the way in this process.

Gentlemen, the American sacrifices involved in creating the space for reconciliation have not brought us there yet. We haven't seen much progress.

General, you've acknowledged this in your own quote in the Washington Post a little while ago -- last month, conceding that "no one" in the U.S. or Iraqi government "feels that there has been sufficient progress by any means in the area of national reconciliation," I quote, "or the provision of basic services in Iraq."

You were both honest and obvious in those comments.

Ambassador Crocker, we'd appreciate you addressing this point in your testimony.

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XXX in your testimony.

BERMAN: The most disturbing strategic development of the war is that Iran, the most dangerous state in the region, so far has emerged as the winner.

Their enemy, Saddam, is gone and in his place is a government seemingly very open to Iranian friendship and influence.

Iran's gains from the war were underscored again, in recent days, by the fact that representatives of Prime Minister Maliki traveled to Iran to negotiate a cease-fire with the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr.

The last time you two gentlemen came before this committee, Prime Minister Maliki had just told the world that, if American forces were to leave Iraq, he could, quote, "find new friends."

Well, we haven't left, but he seems to be cementing his friendship with Iran.

Ambassador Crocker, what is the nature and level of Iranian influence in Iraq today?

And what is the U.S. doing to limit it?

To what extent was the cease-fire in Basra the result of an Iranian initiative?

To what extent does our ultimate success in Iraq depend on decisions in Tehran?

General Petraeus, without giving our enemies operational details, can you provide the American people with your plan to eliminate the Iranian anti-coalition presence in Iraq?

The surge produced a number of tactical successes and a few opportunities to achieve political progress as well. But strategically, it seems to me that we're treading water.

The surge was meant to buy time for Mr. Maliki and other Iraqi leaders to move toward ending this civil conflict with a political settlement. Unfortunately, they seem not to have much availed themselves of this opportunity.

And in the meantime, we've strained U.S. military readiness, sacrificed precious lives, and billions of hard-earned dollars, and curtailed our ability to address our country's other needs and priorities, all in the name of creating a more stable and secure Iraq that would in turn bring more security to the Middle East.

Gentlemen, are we anywhere near there yet?

This committee awaits your answers.

I now have the pleasure of recognizing my friend, the ranking member, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, thank you so much. I extend our warm welcome to you and our profound gratitude for your commitment and your leadership and for the dedication of all who serve with you.

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ROS-LEHTINEN: My stepson and daughter-in-law continue to wear our nation's uniform, and we're proud to serve our country in Iraq.

Today, on the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Iraq, in Baghdad especially and the Iraqi people, by the United States and our coalition partners, I want to reiterate how grateful we are for the sacrifices made.

We must continue to base our Iraq policy not upon short term domestic political considerations, but upon our enduring national security interests in Iraq and indeed throughout the Middle East.

We must consider the consequences of our policy decisions and recognize that immediate disengagement would only embolden the forces of radical Islam and leave an enormous power vacuum in Iraq, one to be filled by the regime in Iran, with its proxies in Iraq and throughout the region.

Our enemies have made clear their intentions both in words and deeds. In his most recent interview released on April 2nd, senior Al Qaida jihadist al-Zawahiri stated, and I quote, "The battalions of the Mujahedeen, after expelling the occupier from Iraq, shall make their way toward Jerusalem."

He further elaborated, "There is not doubt that the American collapse has begun and the raids on New York and Washington were identifying marks of this collapse."

Al Qaida has been, if nothing else, consistent in its message in this regard. In October of 2006, Al Qaida member Abu Hamza stated, "We will not rest from our jihad until we are under the olive trees and we have blown up the filthiest house, which is called the White House."

I'm willing to take them at their word, that they desire nothing more than the destruction of the United States and they are willing to stop at nothing to achieve it.

There are those in the United States who argue that the threat would disappear if the U.S. were not in Iraq. That is not only naive but dangerous.

There are those who look at Iraq and Afghanistan as two independent battles, calling for retreat from one as the recipe for success in the other. But they cannot be separated. We must look at them in an integrated manner, in the same way the radicals look at them as intertwined and as part of their broader effort to use their words to drive all unbelieving forces out from the land of the Muslims and to destroy the United States, the Great Satan.

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XXX the Great Satan.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Some in the U.S. are becoming impatient. They say we have done enough for Iraq. However, they failure to fully comprehend the critical strategic interests that are at stake for us over there and the great sacrifices which Iraqis are making for their own freedom.

While throughout Iraq the jihadists are losing, losing militarily, losing the support of the local Sunni population, they are by no means defeated.

And you, General Petraeus, testified in the Senate yesterday, and I'm quoting you, you said, "Al Qaida's senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy, send funding, direction and foreign fighters to Iraq."

We must also recognize that Iran is engaged in a proxy war against us in Iraq, that Iranian agents and military forces are actively providing training, expertise and weapons to attack U.S. forces and the government of Iraq.

Last week, a U.S. major said, "We have seen the continued use of Iranian-manufactured and -supplied rockets, mortars and explosively formed penetrators, and in fact we have captured individuals who tell us that they have recently been to Iran and have been trained by the Quds Force operatives."

In the last year we have witnessed both important political progress, but we understand that we still face significant challenges on both of these fronts.

But there has been some progress. The recent passage of the pensions law, the de-Baathification law, the provincial powers legislation, the fiscal year 2008 budget, and consideration of the consumer protection law have clearly illustrated that they are up to the task.

It is critical that we lay the groundwork, not only for normalized bilateral relations between the United States and Iraq, but for Iraq to take its place among responsible nations.

To start, we must begin by recognizing Iraq as a sovereign nation and our ally. We must stop talking down to Iraq and start talking with Iraq as a partner.

Iraqis have volunteered in large numbers to fight for their freedom in their armed forces. Many have died in the struggle against radicalism and for freedom. Iraqi casualties in this struggle far exceed our lamentable American causalities.

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XXX lamentable American causalities.

LEHTINEN: But we're not fighting their war for them; we are assisting them in their fight, which is both ours, as well, and the fight of every freedom-loving people everywhere.

Your work, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, has given our Iraqi ally a hope for freedom, a strategy for success. We must not fail where they have succeeded.

As former President Ronald Reagan stated in his first inaugural address, the American people are ready for peace. We will negotiate for it, we will sacrifice for it, but we will not surrender for it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your time.

BERMAN: Our witnesses today are well-known to all of us.

Ambassador Ryan Crocker is one of the most distinguished members of our Diplomatic Corps. He has been in Basra, Iraq since March of last year. His assignment to Iraq is his fifth ambassadorship.

He has previously been our chief diplomat in Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria and Pakistan.

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XXX Syria and Pakistan.

BERMAN: He has received the Presidential Distinguished Service Award and the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Civilian Service.

In 2004, the president elevated him to the rank of career ambassador, the highest rank in the Foreign Service.

General David Petraeus is, likewise, one of our most distinguished military officers. He has been in his current post as commanding general of the Multi-National Forces in Iraq since February of last year.

This is his third command in Iraq. He commanded the 101st Airborne Division during the initial phase of the war. He was in charge of training Iraqi security forces in 2004 and 2005. And, as I indicated, he returned to Iraq as our top commander last year.

Gentlemen, you've testified before this committee seven months ago. We do look forward to hearing your testimony again today.

And, Ambassador?

CROCKER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have circulated my full statement and ask that that be submitted for the record.

BERMAN: It will be.

CROCKER: Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, members of the committee, I must start by noting with genuine sadness the absence in the room today -- the absence of Chairman Tom Lantos.

I first met Chairman Lantos in Lebanon in 1982. And he is someone that I have had the honor of working with, off and on, for the quarter of a century that followed. He is -- he was truly a great American. We all mourn his loss. And I know we are all deeply grateful for the contributions he made to this great country.

BERMAN: Thank you.

(APPLAUSE)

CROCKER: It is an honor to appear before you today to provide my assessment of political, economic and diplomatic developments in Iraq.

Last September, I said that the cumulative trajectory of these developments was upwards, although the slope of that line was not steep.

The developments over the last seven months have strengthened my sense of a positive trend. Immense challenges remain, and progress is uneven and often frustratingly slow, but there is progress.

Sustaining that progress will require continuing U.S. resolve and commitment.

Five years ago, the statue of Saddam Hussein was toppled in Baghdad. The euphoria of that moment evaporated long ago. But as Iraq emerges from the shattering violence of 2006 and the early part of 2007, there is reason to sustain that commitment and the enormous investments we have made, both in the lives of our young, brave men and women, and our resources.

Let me describe briefly some developments upon which I base such a judgment.

The first is at the national level in the form of legislation and the development of Iraq's parliament. In the last several months, Iraq's parliament has formulated, debated vigorously, and in many cases passed legislation dealing with vital issues of reconciliation and nation building.

A pension law extended benefits to individuals who had previously been denied them because of their service under the former regime.

The accountability and justice law, de-Baathification reform, reflects a strengthened spirit of reconciliation, as does a far- reaching amnesty law.

The provincial powers law is a major step forward in defining the relationship between the federal and provincial governments and involved debate about the fundamental nature of the state similar in its complexity to our own lengthy and difficult debate over states' rights.

The provincial powers law also calls for provincial elections by October 1. And an electoral law is now under discussion that will set the parameter for those elections.

All major parties have announced their support for elections, which will be a major step forward in Iraq's political development and will set the stage for national elections in late 2009.

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XXX in late 2009.

CROCKER: The passage of the 2008 budget, with record amounts for capital expenditures, ensures that the federal and provincial governments will have the resources for public spending.

All of this, Mr. Chairman, has been done since I came before you in September. These laws are not perfect and much depends on their implementation, but they are important steps.

Also important has been the development of Iraq's Council of Representatives as a national institution.

Last summer, the council suffered from persistent and often paralyzing disputes over leadership and procedure. Now it is successfully grappling with complex issues and producing viable trade- offs and compromise packages.

Coalitions have formed around issues. And sectarian political groupings, which often were barriers to progress, have become more flexible.

Let me also talk about the intangibles: attitudes among the Iraqi people.

In 2006 and 2007, many of us understandably questioned whether hatred between Iraqis of different sectarian backgrounds was so deep that a civil war was inevitable.

The Sunni Awakening movement in Al Anbar, which so courageously confronted Al Qaida, continues to keep the peace in the area and to keep Al Qaida out.

Fallujah, once a symbol for violence and terror, is now one of Iraq's safest cities.

The Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala are enjoying security and growing prosperity in the wake of popular rejection of extremist militia activity.

The Shia clerical leadership, the marjiya, based in Najaf, has played a quiet but important role in support of moderation and reconciliation.

In Baghdad, we can see that Iraqis are not pitted against each other purely on the basis of sectarian affiliation. The security improvements of the past months have diminished the atmosphere of suspicion. News from Iraq in recent weeks has been dominated by the situation in Basra. The Iraqi decision to combat extremist militias has had major significance.

First, a Shia majority government, led by Prime Minister Maliki, has demonstrated its commitment to taking on criminals and extremists regardless of sectarian identity.

Second, Iraqi security forces led these operations in Basra and in towns and cities throughout the south. British and U.S. elements played supporting roles, as they should.

The operation in Basra has also shaken up Iraqi politics. The prime minister is confident in his decision and determined to press the fight against illegal groups, but also determined to take a hard look at lessons learned.

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CROCKER: The efforts of the government against these extremis elements have broad political support, as a statement April 5th by virtually all of Iraq's main political leaders -- Sunni, Shia and Kurd -- made clear.

One conclusion I draw from these signs of progress is that the strategy that began with the surge is working. This does not mean, however, that U.S. support should be open-ended or that the level and nature of our engagement should not diminish over time. It is in this context that we have begun negotiating a bilateral relationship and agreement between Iraq and the United States.

In August, Iraq's five principal leaders requested a long-term relationship to include economic, political, diplomatic and security cooperation. The heart of this relationship will be a legal framework for the presence of American troops, similar to that which exists in nearly 80 countries around the world.

The agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq, and we anticipate that it will expressly forswear them. The agreement will not specify troop levels, and it will not tie the hands of the next administration.

Our aim is to ensure that the next president arrives in office with a stable foundation upon which to base policy decisions, and that is what this agreement will do. Congress will remain fully informed as these negotiations proceed in the coming weeks and months.

In terms of economics, since September, we've seen a revival of marketplaces across Iraq and the re-opening of long-shuttered businesses. According to a Center for International Private Enterprise poll last month, 78 percent of Iraqi business owners expect the Iraqi economy to continue to grow in the next two years.

With the improving security and rising government expenditures, the IMF projects that Iraq's GDP will grow 7 percent in real terms this year, and inflation has been tamed.

Iraq's 2008 budget has allocated $13 billion for capital investment and reconstruction. And a $5 billion supplemental budget this summer will further invest export revenues in building infrastructure and providing services.

This spending also benefits the United States. Iraq recently announced its decision to purchase 40 commercial aircraft from the U.S. at an estimated cost of $5 billion. MORE

XXX of $5 billion.

CROCKER: The era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over. Our assistance focus has shifted to capacity development and an emphasis on local development to our network administerial advisors and 25 provincial reconstruction teams, PRTs.

We are seeking to ensure that our assistance, in partnership with the Iraqis, leverages Iraq's own resources.

Iraq is increasingly is using these resources to support projects and programs that we have helped develop. It has committed nearly $200 million in support of a program to provide vocational training for concerned local citizens who stood up with us against Al Qaida in the awakening.

We developed the technical specifications from which Iraq's state-owned oil company will build new oil export platforms and pipelines worth over $1 billion.

And in Baghdad, the municipality has stepped up to take over labor contracts worth $100 million that we had been covering under the Community Stabilization Program.

Iraq will need to continue to improve governmental capacity, pass national-level hydrocarbon legislation, improve electrical production and distribution, improve the climate for foreign and domestic investment and take a number of other steps.

We, along with other international partners, including the United Nations and the World Bank, will be assisting the Iraqis as they move forward with this challenging agenda.

In the region and the international community, under dynamic new leadership, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq has increased the scope of its activities and the size of its staff.

It is playing a key role in preparations for provincial elections and in providing technical assistance to resolve disputed internal boundaries.

UNHCR has returned international staff to Iraq to assist with the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

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CROCKER: Regionally, support from Arab capitals for Iraq must improve, for the sake of Iraq and the sake of the region. Bahrain's recent announcement that it will return an ambassador to Baghdad is welcome, and other Arab states should follow suit.

Iraq is a multi-ethnic state, but it is also a founding member of the Arab League and an integral part of the Arab world. We encourage more active Arab engagement with Iraq, and we expect that Prime Minister Maliki's effort against Shia extremist militias in Basra will receive Arab support.

Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi government to establish a stable, secure state through the arming and training of militia elements engaged in violence against Iraqi security forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians.

The extent of Iran's malign influence was dramatically demonstrated when these elements clashed with Iraqi government forces in Basra and Baghdad.

We know more than ever about Iranian-supported lethal networks inside Iraq and their Quds Force sponsors, and we will continue to aggressively uproot and destroy them.

At the same time, we support constructive relations between Iran and Iraq and are participating in a tripartite process to discuss the security situation in Iraq. Iran has a choice to make.

Mr. Chairman, almost everything about Iraq is hard. It will continue to be hard as Iraqis struggle with the damage and trauma inflicted by 35 years of totalitarian Baathist rule.

But hard does not mean hopeless, and the political and economic progress of the past few months is significant.

I must underscore, however, that these gains are fragile and they are reversible.

Americans have invested a great deal in Iraq, in blood, as well as treasure, and they have the right to ask whether this is worth it, whether it is now time to walk away and let the Iraqis fend for themselves.

Iraq has the potential to develop into a stable, secure, multi- ethnic, multi-sectarian democracy under the rule of law. Whether it realizes that potential is ultimately up to the Iraqi people. Our support, however, will continue to be critical.

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CROCKER: I said in September that I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. That is still the case, although I think now we are closer. I remain convinced that a major departure from our current engagement would bring failure, and we have to be clear with ourselves about what failure could mean.

Al Qaida is in retreat in Iraq, but it is not yet defeated. Al Qaida's leaders are looking for every opportunity they can to hang on.

Osama bin Laden has called Iraq the perfect base, and along with the comments from Ayman al-Zawahiri, it reminds us that a fundamental aim of Al Qaida is to establish itself in the Arab world. It almost succeeded in Iraq; we cannot allow it a second chance.

And it is not only Al Qaida that would benefit. Iran has said publicly it will fill any vacuum in Iraq, and extremist Shia militias would reassert themselves. We saw them try in Basra and Baghdad.

And in all of this, the Iraqi people would suffer on a scale far beyond what we have already seen. Spiraling conflict could draw in neighbors, with devastating consequences for the region and the world.

Mr. Chairman, as monumental as the events of the last five years have been in Iraq, Iraqis, Americans and the world, ultimately, will judge us far more on the basis of what will happen than what has happened. In the end, how we leave and what we leave behind will be more important than how we came.

Our current course is hard, but it is working. Progress is real, although fragile. We need to stay with it.

In the months ahead, we will continue to assist Iraq as it pursues further steps toward reconciliation and economic development. Over time, this will become increasingly an Iraqi process, as it should be.

Our efforts will focus on increasing Iraq's integration regionally and internationally, assisting Iraqi institutions to strengthen the political process and promote economic activity, and supporting U.N. efforts as Iraq carries out local elections this year.

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CROCKER: These efforts will require an enhanced civilian commitment and continued support from the Congress and the American people.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize and thank all those who serve our country in Iraq, both military and civilian.

Their courage and commitment, at great sacrifice, has earned the admiration of all Americans. They certainly have mine, and it is an honor for me to serve there with them.

Thank you, sir.

BERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

General Petraeus?

PETRAEUS: Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, I too want to begin by saluting your former chairman, Congressman Lantos.

Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you seven months ago, there has been significant but uneven security progress in Iraq. Levels of violence and civilian deaths have been reduced substantially.

Al Qaida-Iraq and a number of other extremist elements have been dealt serious blows. The capabilities of Iraqi forces have grown. And there has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis in local security.

Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain.

Moreover, as events in the past two weeks have reminded us, the progress made since last spring is fragile and reversible.

Still, security in Iraq is better than it was when we reported to you last September, and it is significantly better than it was 15 months ago, when Iraq was on the brink of civil war.

A number of factors have contributed to the progress. First has been the impact of increased numbers of coalition and Iraqi forces.

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XXX and Iraqi forces.

PETRAEUS: You're well aware of the U.S. surge. Less recognized is that Iraq has also conducted a surge, adding well over 100,000 additional soldiers and police to its security forces in 2007.

The second factor has been the employment of coalition and Iraqi forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations across the country, deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi people, to pursue Al Qaida-Iraq, to combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local reconciliation, and to enable political and economic progress.

Another important factor has been the attitudinal shift among certain elements of the Iraqi population. Since the first Sunni Awakening in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq increasingly have rejected Al Qaida in Iraq's indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology.

Over time, Awakenings have prompted tens of thousands of Iraqis to contribute to local security as so-called Sons of Iraq. With their assistance, the threat posed by Al Qaida-Iraq, while still lethal and substantial, has been reduced significantly.

The recent flare-up in Basra, southern Iraq, and Baghdad underscored the importance of the cease-fire declared by Muqtada al- Sadr last fall as another factor in the overall reduction in violence.

Recently, of course, some militia elements became active again. Though a Sadr stand-down order resolved the situation to a degree, the flare-up also highlighted the destructive role Iran has played in funding, training, arming and directing the so-called special groups, and generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the special groups pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq.

In September, I described the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This completion continues, influenced heavily by outside actors. And its resolution remains the key to producing long-term stability in Iraq.

Various elements push Iraq's ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists and criminal gangs pose significant threats.

Al Qaida's senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy, send funding, direction and foreign fighters to Iraq. Actions by neighboring states compound the challenges. Syria has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters, but not enough to shut down the key network that supports Al Qaida-Iraq. And Iran has fueled the violence in a particularly damaging way, as I mentioned, through its lethal support to the special groups.

These challenges and recent weeks' violence notwithstanding, Iraq's ethno-sectarian competition in many areas is now taking place more through political dialogue, and less through violence.

In fact, the recent escalation of violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq was dealt with, temporarily, at least, by most parties acknowledging that the rational way ahead is talking, rather than street fighting.

Though Iraq obviously remains a violent country, we do see progress in the security arena.

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XXX the security arena.

PETRAEUS: As this chart illustrates, for nearly six months security incidents have been at a level not seen since early to mid- 2005, though the level did spike in recent weeks as a result of the violence in Basra and Baghdad, but has now begun to turn down again, though the period ahead will be a sensitive one.

As our primary mission is to help protect the population, we closely monitor the number of Iraqi civilians killed due to violence.

As this chart reflects, civilian deaths have decreased over the past year to a level not seen since the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing that set off the cycle of sectarian violence that tore the very fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early 2007.

Ethno-sectarian violence is of particular concern in Iraq, as it is a cancer that continues to spread if left unchecked.

As the box on the bottom left of this chart shows, the number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence has fallen since we testified last September.

A big factor has been the reduction in Baghdad.

Some of this is, to be sure, due to sectarian hardening of certain Baghdad neighborhoods. However, that is only a partial explanation, as numerous mixed neighborhoods still exist.

In fact, coalition and Iraqi forces have focused along the fault lines to reduce the violence and enable Sunni and Shia leaders to begin the long process of healing in their communities.

As this next chart shows, even though the number of high-profile attacks increased in March as Al Qaida lashed out, the current level of such attacks remains far below its height a year ago.

Moreover, as we have helped improve security and focused on enemy networks, we have seen a decrease in the effectiveness of such attacks.

The emergence of Iraqi volunteers helping to secure their local communities has been an important development. As this chart depicts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of Iraq, Shia as well as Sunni, under contract to help coalition and Iraqi forces protect their neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads.

These volunteers have contributed significantly in various areas, and the savings in vehicles not lost because of reduced violence, not to mention the priceless lives saved, have far outweighed the cost of their monthly contracts.

Sons of Iraq have also contributed to the discovery of improvised explosive devices and weapons and explosive caches. As this next chart shows, in fact, we have already found more caches in 2008 than we found in all of 2006.

Given the importance of the Sons of Iraq, we are working closely with the Iraqi government to transition them into the Iraqi security forces or other forms of employment, and over 21,000 have already been accepted into the police, army or other government jobs.

Al Qaida also recognizes the significance of the Sons of Iraq, and Al Qaida elements have targeted them repeatedly. However, these attacks, in addition to Al Qaida use of women, children and the handicapped as suicide bombers, have further alienated Al Qaida from the Iraqi people; and the tenacious pursuit of Al Qaida-Iraq, together with Al Qaida's loss of local support in many areas, has substantially reduced its capability, numbers and freedom of movement.

This chart displays the cumulative effect of the effort against Al Qaida and its insurgent allies in Iraq. As you can see, we have reduced considerably the areas in which Al Qaida-Iraq enjoys support and sanctuary, though there clearly is more to be done.

Having noted that progress, Al Qaida is still capable of lethal attacks in Iraq, and we must maintain relentless pressure on the organization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it and on the resource flows that sustain it.

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XXX that sustain it.

PETRAEUS: This chart lays out the comprehensive strategy that we, the Iraqis and our inter-agency and international partners are employing to reduce what Al Qaida needs in Iraq.

As you can see, defeating Al Qaida in Iraq requires not just actions by our elite counterterrorist forces but also major operations by coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated intelligence effort, political reconciliation, economic and social programs, information operations initiatives, diplomatic activity, the employment of counterinsurgency principles in detainee operations, and many other actions.

As we combat Al Qaida in Iraq, we must remember that doing so not only reduces a major source of instability in Iraq, it also weakens an organization that Al Qaida's senior leaders view as a tool to spread its influence and foment regional instability.

Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also seen AQI involved in destabilizing activities in the wider Mideast region.

Together with the Iraqi security forces, we have also focused on the so-called "special groups." These elements are funded, trained, armed and directed by Iran's Quds Force with help from Lebanese Hezbollah.

It is these groups that have launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at Iraq's seat of government in the International Zone.

Iraqi and coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their desire that Iran live up to promises made by President Ahmadinejad and other senior Iranian leaders to stop their support for the "special groups."

However, nefarious activities by the Quds Force have continued, and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize the threat they pose to Iraq.

We should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and months ahead, as they will show the kind of relationship Iran wishes to have with its neighbor and the character of future Iranian involvement in Iraq.

We have transferred responsibilities to Iraqi forces as their capabilities and the conditions on the ground have permitted. Currently, as this chart shows, half of Iraq's 18 provinces are under provincial Iraqi control. Many of these provinces, not just the successful ones in the Kurdish regional government area, but also a number of southern provinces, have done well. Challenges have emerged in some others, including, of course, Basra.

Nonetheless, this process will continue, and we expect Anbar and Qadisiyah provinces to transition in the months ahead.

Iraqi forces have grown significantly since September, and over 540,000 individuals now serve in the Iraqi security forces. The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well over 100.

These units are bearing an increasing share of the burden, as evidenced by the fact that Iraqi security force losses have recently been three times our own.

We will, of course, conduct careful after-action reviews with our Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were units and leaders found wanting in some cases, and some of our assessments may be downgraded as a result.

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XXX as a result.

PETRAEUS: Nonetheless, the performance of many units was solid, especially once they got their footing and gained a degree of confidence. And certain Iraqi elements proved very capable.

Iraq's security ministries are steadily improving their ability to execute their budgets. As this chart shows, in 2007, as in 2006, Iraq's security ministries spent more on their forces than the United States provided through the Iraqi security forces fund.

We anticipate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year, and this projection recently enabled us to reduce significantly our Iraqi security forces fund the request for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion.

While improved, Iraqi security forces are not yet ready to defend Iraq or maintain security throughout the entire country on their own. Recent operations in Basra highlight improvements in the ability of the Iraqi security forces to deploy substantial numbers of units, supplies and replacements on short notice.

They certainly could not have deployed a division's worth of army and police units on such short notice a year ago.

On the other hand, the recent operations also underscored the considerable work still to be done in the area of expeditionary logistics, force enablers, staff development, and command and control.

We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign military sales program. As of March 2008, the Iraqi government had purchased over $2 billion worth of equipment and services of American origin through FMS. Since September, and with your encouragement of the organizations in the process, FMS deliveries have improved.

While security has improved in many areas and the Iraqi security forces are shouldering more of the load, the situation in Iraq remains exceeding complex and challenging. Iraq could face a resurgence of Al Qaida in Iraq or additional Shia groups could violate Sadr's cease- fire order.

External actors like Iran could stoke violence within Iraq, and actions by other neighbors could undermine the security situation, as well.

The Commanders' Emergency Response Program, the State Department's quick response fund, and USAID programs enable our commanders and troopers to help Iraq deal with its challenges. To that end, I respectfully ask that you provide us by June the additional CERP funds requested in the supplemental.

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XXX in the supplemental.

PETRAEUS: Encouragingly, the Iraqi government recently allocated $300 million for us to manage, as Iraqi CERP, to perform projects for their people while building their own capacity to do so.

The Iraqi government has also committed $163 million to gradually assume Sons of Iraq contracts; $510 million for small business loans; and $196 million for a joint training, education and reintegration program.

The Iraqi government pledges to provide more as they execute the budget passed two months ago.

Last month, I provided my chain of command recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq. During that process, I noted the objective of retaining and building on our hard-fought security gains while we draw down to the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams, also redeploying two Marine battalions and the Marine expeditionary unit.

I emphasized the need to continue work with our Iraqi partners to secure the population and to transition responsibilities to the Iraqis as quickly as conditions permit, but without jeopardizing the security gains that have been made.

As in September, my recommendations are informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that the military surge has achieved progress, but that the progress is reversible. Iraqi security forces have strengthened their capabilities, but still must grow further.

The provincial elections in the fall, refugee returns, detainee releases, and efforts to resolve provincial boundary disputes will be very challenging.

The transition of Sons of Iraq will require time and careful monitoring. Withdrawing too many forces too quickly could jeopardize the progress of the past year. And performing the necessary tasks in Iraq will require sizable conventional forces, as well as special operations forces and adviser teams.

The strategic considerations include recognition that the strain on the U.S. military, especially on its ground forces, has been considerable.

A number of the security challenges inside Iraq are also related to significant regional and global threats. And a failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences for the greater fight against Al Qaida, for regional stability, for the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for the effort to counter malign Iranian influence.

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XXX malign Iranian influence.

PETRAEUS: After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of command that we continue the drawdown of the surge combat forces and that upon the withdrawal of the last surge brigade combat team in July, we undertake a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation.

At the end of that period, we will assess the conditions on the ground, much as we have done as we have looked at where we could redeploy the surge forces, determine where and when we can make recommendations for further reductions.

This process will be continuous, with recommendations for further reductions made as conditions permit.

This approach does not, to be sure, allow establishment of a set withdrawal timeline. However, it does provide the flexibility those of us on the ground need to preserve the still-fragile security gains our troopers have fought so far and sacrificed so much to achieve.

With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and early 2008 can form a foundation for the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq. This is not only important to the 27 million citizens of Iraq, it is also vitally important to those in the Gulf region, to the citizens of the United States, and to the global community.

It is clearly in our national interests to help Iraq prevent the resurgence of Al Qaida in the heart of the Arab world, to help Iraq resist Iranian encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed ethno-sectarian violence that could spill over Iraq's borders and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq to expand its role in the regional and global economies.

In closing, I want to comment briefly on those serving our nation in Iraq as well. We've asked a great deal of them and of their families, and they have made enormous sacrifices.

My keen personal awareness of the strain on them and on the force as a whole has been an important factor in my recommendations.

The Congress, the executive branch and our fellow citizens have done an enormous amount to support our troopers and their loved ones. And all of us are very grateful for that.

Nothing means more to those in harm's way than the knowledge that their country appreciates their sacrifices and those of their families. Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the civilian and military men and women serving our nation in Iraq.

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XXX nation in Iraq.

PETRAEUS: It remains the greatest of honors to soldier with them.

Thank you very much.

BERMAN: Thank you very much, General.

And I will now recognize myself for five minutes.

Ambassador Crocker, General Petraeus, I'd be grateful if both of you would respond.

The American people will decide the future direction of our troops presence in Iraq for themselves this November. They may very well decide in favor of a presidential candidate who favors a relatively rapid withdrawal of our troops from Iraq. Just as there are consequences and costs, negative, in pursuing our current strategy, there will be consequences of such a withdrawal, some of them potentially very negative.

How do we minimize those consequences, military and diplomatically? How could we most effectively transition to a significantly reduced presence in Iraq? What would be the essential tasks that such a reduced force could perform?

I'd like your answers, understanding very well it doesn't mean your support for that strategy, but that is a realistic alternative and I think we here and the American people have a right to better understand how to cope with the consequences you fear.

CROCKER: Mr. Chairman, of course the whole premise of what General Petraeus and I have been involved in since we arrived is looking at conditions rather than timelines.

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XXX rather than timelines.

CROCKER: And I just would say it straight -- I don't see a good way to manage the situation in Iraq that is not conditions-based.

Now, I can't predict what the conditions will be in January, 2009. They could be substantially different and they could want substantial reductions of forces.

But, still, in my view, it would be taking into account an assessment of the conditions and then making recommendations accordingly.

BERMAN: Well, let me just pursue that further with either of you.

There are costs -- you are not here to answer the larger question of choices that have to be made and you aren't expect to.

But if those choices are made, you surely have ideas and thoughts on how best to minimize, mitigate the consequences that you think will flow from those decisions.

And don't we have -- isn't fair of us to ask you to help us work through how best with a different strategy we might deal with them?

CROCKER: It's a legitimate question, Mr. Chairman, and I am not trying to dodge it. I would characterize as kind of a, you know, plan B approach. And I have been fully focused on making the current plan A try to work.

It's also extremely difficult, as I'm sure you would appreciate, to answer that in a vacuum -- what are the conditions at the time and what levels are we talking about?

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XXX we talking about?

BERMAN: Well, then, I'm not going to beat that horse anymore. Let me just ask General Petraeus, I am quite curious about the issue I raised in my opening statement regarding seize and hold and Sadr City. And what is it that allows mortars and the rockets to, up through today, hit our Green Zone.

And am I wrong in thinking that part of seize-and-hold was going to be at least eventually if not initial directed toward Sadr City?

PETRAEUS: Eventually. And, again, our focus was -- has always been primarily on what we term the "wolf closest to the sled," which was Al Qaida in Iraq, which of course carried out the most horrific attacks, which ignited the ethno-sectarian violence that engulfed the country in 2006 and created that situation of near civil war, if not actual civil war; that the surge in fact was intended to address; and that has also carried out the most damaging attacks on infrastructure and just innocent civilians of any ethno-sectarian grouping.

That has been the focus. There has been activity in effort to split the -- to address the Sadr movement, if you will, which is a very legitimate political movement and a large one in Iraq.

In fact, it's 30 seats helped vote -- helped elect Prime Minister Maliki as part of the overall Shia coalition.

And, in fact, in a number of neighborhoods this effort has worked, where there has been, in various locations, even with...

BERMAN: General, I hate to interrupt you, but if I don't do it for me...

PETRAEUS: I'm sorry.

BERMAN: ... everybody else will get very mad if I do it for them.

PETRAEUS: Fair enough, sir. Sorry.

BERMAN: I recognize the ranking member, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen for five minutes.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the way you're handling this hearing.

Because I have other opportunities to interact, I would like to yield my time to Mr. Chabot of Ohio. CHABOT: I thank the gentlelady for yielding.

And General Petraeus, first of all, thank you very much for your distinguished service to our country.

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XXX to our country.

CHABOT: And I'd like to begin by reading a few excerpts from the Wall Street Journal in their editorial yesterday: "Sixteen months after President Bush ordered the change in strategy, the surge has earned a place among the most important counteroffensives in U.S. military annals.

"When it began, Al Qaida dominated large swathes of central Iraq. Baghdad was a killing zone. Sunni and Shiites were heading toward civil war. And the Iraqi government was seen as a failure.

"Today, Al Qaida has been cleared from all but the northern reaches of Anbar and Diyala provinces. Sunni sheiks are working with coalition forces. And the long process of Sunni-Shiite political reconciliation has begun.

"The surge seized the offensive from the enemy so rapidly that it deserves to be studied for years as an example of effective counterinsurgency.

"None of this would have been possible if Iraqis had not seen that the U.S. was committed to protect them. Americans are understandably impatient with war, but we have sacrificed too much and made too much progress in the last year not to finish the task.

"The surge has prevented a humiliating military defeat, and now is the time to sustain that commitment to achieve a political victory.

"The question now is whether Washington will squander these gains by withdrawing so quickly that we could still lose politically."

General, would a precipitous withdrawal or a relatively rapid withdrawal, as the chairman just mentioned, would that jeopardize, would that risk the gains which have been made at such a high cost?

PETRAEUS: Congressman, as I said in my statement, the gains are, indeed, fragile and they are reversible. The pace of withdrawal, obviously -- the risk incurred by the pace of withdrawal obviously depends on the conditions.

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XXX on the conditions.

PETRAEUS: If, suddenly, again, the conditions just turn out, perhaps, better than anticipated, or continue on a good glide slope, then it may be possible to withdraw more rapidly.

On the other hand, again, it may not. So, again, it does come down to the conditions.

And that's what the ambassador and I have stressed, in fact, is -- and it is understandable, I think, why commanders on the ground, diplomats on the ground, who have been through this process of fighting so hard and sacrificing so much to achieve gains, in particular against Al Qaida-Iraq, wanted to be sure that we can solidify those gains and not risk this reverse that...

CHABOT: Thank you very much, General. Thank you.

And, Ambassador Crocker, if I could turn you, one area of this administration's Iraqi policy that I, quite frankly, have found wanting is in not insisting that a considerable amount of the cost of rebuilding Iraq be paid from Iraqi oil reserves, you know, rather than from the American taxpayer.

And Iraq -- it's my understanding -- has the second highest known oil reserves in the world. And recent reports suggest that Iraq has about $30 billion in the bank from oil reserves, yet they've spent less than 3 percent of the $3.5 billion capital budget allocated to the Iraqi oil ministry. Only a very small portion was actually spent.

So, now, at a time when Americans are paying all-time high prices at the gas pump and the oil-producing countries like Iraq are able to demand over $100 a barrel for their oil, doesn't it just make sense that record-high oil should help pay for Iraq's rebuilding, rather than the hard-pressed U.S. taxpayers?

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XXX hard-pressed U.S. taxpayers?

CROCKER: It does indeed, Congressman, and that is exactly the road that we are moving down.

As I said in my statement, we are out of the construction business in Iraq. We have a small number of projects that we are finishing up, but reconstruction from here on in is going to be an Iraqi financial responsibility.

And they are stepping up to that, both in terms of commitments, the amount of money that they are appropriating for this purpose; and their ability to actually spend it is also improving.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

And I now recognize the chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman, for five minutes.

ACKERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank both of you for your extraordinary service to our country, your patriotism and willingness to tackle probably the toughest job that our country has seen in a very long time.

All that being said, we seem to have gotten ourselves into a fix. Now, we don't really know how to get ourselves out of it or unfixed.

The reasons that we've gotten into this mess, and you could check them off from finding weapons of mass destruction, check; to getting rid of Saddam Hussein, check; to regime change and check it all the way down to a constitution, to an elected parliament, the people talking to each other.

It seems that we've achieved all of our goals, and every time we do that a new goal comes up, and now we're stuck on reducing the ethnic violence.

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XXX the ethnic violence.

ACKERMAN: Well, good luck on that one. I don't know when you accomplish it -- that's the big problem.

And I know when we ask you certain questions, you're not there to determine policy, but you have to have that can-do attitude and accept the policy and push straight ahead and answer that question and say, "Yes, we can do it." And the brave men and women that you work with have been achieving quite a lot.

Our job is just the opposite. Our job is to question. Our job is to raise those points. Our job is to look at what the alternatives are, and if we can't do it this way, how we do it another way. And you really weren't expected to answer the question, you know, how do we pull out, when your mission is to stay in.

But it reminds of that old song after World War I that you probably know very well. The words are, "We're here because we're here." You know, when we're asked why the troops are there, well, we sent the troops over there and now we have to support them because they're there. Well, why are the troops there? Because we went them. And what do we have to do? We have to support them because they're there.

So, we're there because we're there, because we're there, because we're there, and it never ends. How do you get out of this mess, is the real question. How do you fix it?

I'd liken your job to that of Sisyphus pushing that great, huge stone up an endless hill. And when we ask you when can you stop pushing it, the answer is, you don't know, but you have to keep pushing it.

And, certainly, your answer is, "We've made progress today. We've had some setbacks, but we made some progress recently."

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XXX some progress recently."

ACKERMANL: Well, are the setbacks irreversible? And the answer is, "Not necessarily, but maybe so. Maybe we're going to have setbacks again."

The surge seems to be working, at this moment, but it seems we've not killed enough terrorists or dissuaded enough people from becoming such that they're not going to be replaced.

When does this end? You know, when do you stop pushing that big stone up the hill?

And the answer is, you really can't see beyond that stone. You don't know what -- what a just settlement looks like, because you can't see around it. And you'll know it when you see it.

But maybe the hill is a little bit too steep.

With the surge, you've gotten a re-do. You know, we haven't had one of those since we played in the playground, but you get a re-do. Four thousand Americans who died don't get a re-do; 20,000, 30,000 whose lives have been dismembered don't get a re-do. Tens of thousands, scores of thousands of families who have been destroyed don't get a re-do.

The only thing we know for sure is there will be a lot more people who don't get re-dos.

How do you know we've won? Because at the end of this thing, unless we decide it's the end, nobody's going to hand you a revolver; nobody's going to hand you the sword and say, "We quit. We stopped."

How do we know the Iraqis can stand up for themselves? Nobody seems to be able to answer that question.

CROCKER: Sir, it's a question that we both ask ourselves constantly. And it's through asking that question and answering it on a localized basis that it is possible, in our judgment, to execute the redeployments that are currently under way.

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XXX currently under way.

CROCKER: And I think that that will continue to be the answer. It's going to be not one grand, sweeping moment in which we can say it's all fixed, but it's going to be area by area, circumstance by circumstance. It is complicated. It will continue to be complicated. But I think it's doable.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith.

C. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, thank you for your extraordinary leadership. You have really provided a leadership that the world has come to envy.

And I personally want to thank you because under the most difficult hardships you have carried -- both of you have carried yourself with tremendous class, and your incisive responses -- this is your fourth hearing.

I won't ask the most obvious questions because they've already been answered at least twice by both of you, but I do have a question about the empowerment of Concerned Local Citizens to take responsibility for security, the Sons of Iraq. It appears sound and workable, and the implementation of this initiative has clearly mitigated violence and helped transfer ownership of security issues to the Iraqis themselves.

And, of course, this is on top of the additional buildup. And, General Petraeus, you have suggested that by December 8th of this year, 187 Iraqi army combat battalions comprised of about 750 personnel each and 44 national police battalions will be up and running to combat the threat.

General Petraeus, you pointed out that the number of Sons of Iraq has grown from 21,000 to over 91,000, with an average monthly cost of $16 million. I'd like to give you an opportunity to respond to Wolf Blitzer's statement yesterday, and I quote him, "A lot of people fear that as quickly as these guys switched from being enemies, insurgents, terrorists killing Americans, killing Iraqi troops, and now being on the payroll, in effect, of the U.S. government, they could flip right back very quickly if they weren't on the payroll of the U.S. government."

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XXX the U.S. government."

C. SMITH: "It's my sense that payroll issues notwithstanding, the surge in the Sons of Iraq has much more to do with enlightened self-interest, a growing understanding and recognition and Awakening that Al Qaida and other militants are the people's enemy, a sense that an individual can play a constructive and coordinated role in protecting their families. And that surge in the Sons of Iraq is a direct result of diplomatic outreach by U.S. and coalition forces at the local level."

How do you respond to Wolf Blitzer's comments?

PETRAEUS: First of all, Congressman, it is the result of enlightened self-interest, and that's what we're trying to play on.

And we have reminded these newly enlightened Sunni Arabs of what they received from Al Qaida, which was indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology that on reflection they realized -- they'd wondered why they'd ever let these folks into their communities. They did it because they felt disrespected, dispossessed and a variety of other feelings in the wake of liberation, having run the country before.

But they then also came to recognize that they'd ruined business in the Euphrates River valley.

You know, we jokingly say sometimes that every tribe is a little bit like the guys that we see on the "Sopranos." They all have a trucking company, an import/export business, and a construction business.

It is about enlightened self-interest. And they realize now -- and we've helped them to that realization, as has the Iraqi government -- that you can't participate in the bounty that Iraq has if you don't play. They didn't vote in the elections in January 2005. They know that was a catastrophic error.

As a result, that's why the Sunni Arabs, in particular, and others want to see provincial elections in the fall, and that's ones of the reasons that that law was a benchmark, as the ambassador mentioned.

And, again, all we have tried to do is to play on that to help them to that realization, then they certainly help themselves and (inaudible) when others stood up and raised their hand to fight against these people that had brought these problems to their doorstep instead of solutions. Now, to move forward, they do have to be incorporated into legitimate institutions of the Iraqi government or the legitimate economy, local businesses and so forth.

And, in fact, as I mentioned, as the charts showed, over 21,000 have already been incorporated into the security forces or other governmental positions. And a lot of that started in Anbar.

And interestingly, the prime minister, Shia prime minister, who went to Anbar for the first time in some 20 years last year, and then has been back again a couple more times, he has provided more resources to that almost exclusively Sunni Arab province than the Iraqi government has provided to any other; again, trying to show them how important the government viewed the stand that they were taking against Al Qaida-Iraq.

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XXX against Al Qaida-Iraq.

PETRAEUS: And it allowed the reopening of the border crossing at Al Qaim with Syria. The lifeblood of the Euphrates River Valley starts to run back through it again.

And the sheiks who, again, are all businessmen, in addition to heads of tribes, can start to see business revive in cities like Ramadi and Fallujah, that, as late as the spring of last year, you couldn't drive through in an armored vehicle without getting hit. The other day we walked through without any body armor or Kevlar.

C. SMITH: Thank you very much.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired, and I recognize the chairman of the Africa and Global Health Subcommittee of our committee, Mr. Donald Payne of New Jersey.

PAYNE: It's so good to see you, General, and our ambassador. Let me just say how proud I am of you, General Petraeus, for the outstanding work that you do and the way that you carry your office.

Let me, though, say that, in October of 2002, I was one of the members who led the opposition on the floor of the House. As a matter of fact, I managed the bill on the resolution authorizing President Bush to attack Iraq.

As an early and staunch opponent of this war, I have watched every single prediction made by this administration proven wrong, from the duration of the war, the reception we would receive, the cost, the number of causalities, the existence of weapons of mass destruction, to the countless of Americans and Iraqis who have lost their lives -- every single one, wrong.

During my years of Congress, I've had the privilege, twice, to be appointed as the congressional delegate to the United Nations.

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XXX to the United Nations.

PAYNE: I strongly believe in the power of democracy and diplomacy. If we had allowed the United Nations inspectors to complete their work before this war started instead of suddenly ordering them out once Saddam Hussein said they could go anywhere, we would be in this predicament today.

There would have been no weapons of mass destruction; there would have been no biological weapons, and we would have had 4,000 Americans still alive.

Ironically, it was almost five years ago, on May 1st, 2003, that President Bush deemed the operation in Iraq as "Mission Accomplished," affirming an end to the major combat in Iraq.

By that time, approximately 175 brave Americans had lost their lives in combat. Yet, today, over 4,000 more confirmed deaths as this war continues; 67 fatalities from my home state of New Jersey.

The human cost of this war remains tragic. Tens of thousands of injured soldiers. Countless number of Iraqi lives have been destroyed by this war.

There's a great sense of sadness among those of us who foresaw over five years ago the tragedy that is now unfolding in Iraq, without an answer of how it can end.

The war that we were told would be swift and certain now continues to drain our tax dollars, as the cost of living rises, gas prices and all the rest -- 80,000 jobs lost in March; unemployment over 5 percent for the first time in years.

It's just draining. But the thing that was very, very scary, was that it was Osama bin Laden who said that we will win this war by bankrupting America.

And I might ask you, Ambassador Crocker, how are we going to continue to fund this war, which we must do, because we're in it. Some of the questions that was asked by Mr. Ackerman -- you know, we're spending $10.3 billion a month, $239 million a day. Eight thousand students could get Pell Grants. We could go on -- 2.6 Americans (sic) without adequate health care, and on and on.

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XXX on and on.

PAYNE: But how do we continue to pay for this war? Of course, it's off-budget. But one day, off-budget has to be brought on the table.

And is there a projection, in your mind, about how long this will go on? It was once said that Saddam Hussein was responsible for 9/11. That was a part of this hoax, also. We knew Saddam Hussein -- but it was cleverly woven in.

How many years and what cost and, in your opinion, can we continue to sustain the financial cost in addition to the tremendous human cost?

PETRAEUS: Sir, my mission is in Iraq. I can't make those broader judgments.

What I can say is that I believe that we and the Iraqis are making progress, that the trajectory is moving up in the areas I described in my statement and that I believe the consequences -- the costs, if you will, of major failure in Iraq are so great that the two together require us to keep going. But I cannot answer that broad question.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton?

BURTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank both of you for your service. This country owes you both a great debt of gratitude, as well as all of our troops over there. And I hope you'll convey that, General, when you get back there.

Let me just say, Ambassador, you say that Osama bin Laden said that Iraq would be the perfect base of operation for the expansion of terrorism around the world, not just in the Middle East, as we've seen in New York on 9/11.

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XXX York on 9/11.

BURTON: I hate to put you on the spot, but we need some direct answers from you folks. This is very important, and I know politics is a tough thing for you to deal with.

But we're going to have a new president in a little over eight months, and one of the biggest issues in the presidential campaign is a precipitous withdrawal versus hanging in there and defeating Al Qaida and the terrorists.

Now, what I would like to know -- and I'm going to give you the time that you need to answer this, but I'd like for it to be as concise as possible -- what would happen if we had a very precipitous pull-out, number one, or if we hung in there to win this battle?

I want to know, and the American people really want to know, what would happen if we, with a new president, said we're going to jerk everybody out of there in six months?

And the American people want to know this because right now the war is very unpopular and the American people want to know the facts before we pick the next president.

CROCKER: Sir, as you know, I'm a career Foreign Service officer and I have proudly served both Democratic and Republican administrations, and I hope to do that loyally and to the best of my ability as long as I am in the service.

I tried to, in my statement, deal with the issue of a dramatic change in what we're doing in Iraq. But I'm not linking that to presidential campaigns or what happens in January or anything else.

I did say in my statement that if we decide that we just...

BURTON: We can't hear you. Is your mike on?

CROCKER: Yes, sir. Can you hear me now?

I did say that if we were to decide that we just do not want to be engaged in this anymore, if we make a precipitous change in our conditions-based approach, that we could risk failure in Iraq.

And I talked about what some of those consequences could be, including a base in the Arab world for Al Qaida.

BURTON: I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I want to make sure we understand. If there was a precipitous pull-out within a period of time, let's say four, five, six months, a vacuum would be created and Al Qaida would be the beneficiary, if they were aggressive, along with Iran's help, to make that a base of operation for expanded terrorism around the world.

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XXX around the world.

CROCKER: My judgment is that where conditions are at this time, that you would see a spiral down. And that would lead to expanded sectarian conflict at levels we probably have not seen before. It would bring the neighbors, especially Iran, into the fight. And it would create space for Al Qaida to root itself on Arab soil.

BURTON: I hope that everybody in America gets the gist of your comments, because I think it's extremely important that they know between now and next November.

General, do you have anything you'd like to add?

PETRAEUS: Well, Congressman, the ambassador's captured my sentiment on that as well. And what I have sought to do is, again, keep coming back to the conditions at the time that any change is made in our force levels.

The reason that we have recommended conducting an assessment, just as we did, by the way, when we decided where and when to pull out surge forces, it's the same assessment methodology. It's sitting down with the commanders on the ground, with the local Iraqis, assessing the enemy and the friendly situations and determining where and when you can withdraw your forces without unacceptable risk.

It's about risk, and it's about the consequences that the ambassador talked about with respect to Al Qaida, sectarian conflict, regional stability, the humanitarian situation and so forth.

BURTON: Well, let me just say, I gather from your comments and I want to make sure that it's very, very clear, that if a vacuum is created, it's likely that Al Qaida and the neighbors, like Iran, would be the beneficiaries, and it could lead to a terrorist network base being established in Iraq when that void is created.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman?

SHERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As the chair pointed out, and I agree with him, it is possible that in our war with Saddam, the winner has been Iran. Not only has Iran increased its influence in Iraq, but it has received a reprieve from any serious diplomatic or economic pressure to stop its nuclear enrichment program.

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XXX nuclear enrichment program.

SHERMAN: I fear that we will focus exclusively on the battle in Iraq and lose the war on terrorism.

As Mr. Ackerman pointed out, we have an obsessive concentration on Iraq. We're there because we're there.

Others have said that we are there because Saddam -- because bin Laden has told us that that is the central front in the war on terrorism. I would point out that Mr. bin Laden does not always tell us the truth.

The greatest cost of our effort in Iraq may be that we have made it impossible for press and our country to focus sufficiently on the real threats, nuclear threats to our country, from Iran, from North Korea and elsewhere.

Now, Ambassador Crocker, your testimony states that the agreement will not specify any particular troop level, which implies that it will specify some obligation on the United States.

What if the next president decides not to maintain a single soldier for a single day and decides to close our embassy immediately? Will there be anything in this agreement that ties the new president's hands should the new president adopt a radical change in our policy?

CROCKER: Congressman, in a word, no.

SHERMAN: Thank you for your answer.

General Petraeus, it's possible that the new president will be someone who has announced to the country that they want the most expeditious possible withdrawal. So you'll wake up November 5th, you'll know who your new boss is going to be January 21.

Will you begin on November 5th not only to carry out the operations that have to be carried out -- but of course you do a lot of long-term planning -- will you begin to prepare plans to execute the policies of the incoming president?

Or, alternatively, will the incoming president face a circumstance if -- and I realize we may get an incoming president that supports your policies even more fervently than the current president -- but if we get an incoming president who wants a new policy, will that president find on January 21 a dilemma where if they order immediate withdrawal, it will be an unplanned withdrawal, and if they don't order immediate withdrawal, then we continue to suffer casualties?

Will you start planning on November 5th to be the best possible servant for the new boss you're going to get January the 21st?

PETRAEUS: Congressman, I can only serve one boss at a time, and I can only execute one policy at a time.

I am sworn to the concept of civilian control of the military; I fully support it. And we execute the mission that we have at that time.

Now, as a transition approaches, obviously, there is going to be back-and-forth to facilitate and to try to get inside the head, I would assume.

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XXX I would assume.

PETRAEUS: And not me. This'll be the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs thinking their way through various contingencies. And, again, at some point there will be contingency planning directed. And, obviously, we would carry out the direction of the contingency planning.

SHERMAN: So you would expect to get contingency plans in a variety of different natures, some of them consistent with the incoming president...

PETRAEUS: Sir, you're very, very hypothetical on this. I'm actually very uncomfortable, candidly, with where the conversation is going as a military man, again, who subscribes to civilian control.

SHERMAN: I would hope that you would put yourself in a position to follow the new president, but I have one more question...

PETRAEUS: That's exactly right. And, again...

SHERMAN: ... for Ambassador Crocker and limited time.

PETRAEUS: OK. Yes, sir.

SHERMAN: We have a huge national budget deficit. The Iraqis are selling their oil for over $100 a barrel, and they have a $30 billion surplus. We are providing for their security with our troops and lives, and we're paying for their security forces. And, in fact, you've asked us to appropriate another $2.8 billion for the Iraqi security forces fund and billions for Iraqi reconstruction.

Iraq has that $20 billion to $30 billion surplus. They've got tens of billions of dollars of currency reserve. And they could be borrowing hundreds of billions of dollars if the Saudis carried out their promise to renounce the debt that Saddam incurred to them.

Why are we paying everything that we're paying? Why aren't you demanding that the Saudis follow through with their promise and that the Iraqis spend their reserves?

BERMAN: I'm sorry, but the time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher?

ROHRABACHER: Yes, I'll follow up with that specific question.

Why aren't they paying more? And let me invite my colleagues to join me when I tomorrow drop a piece of legislation that would require that any status of forces agreement with Iraq include a provision that the Iraqi government will be paying for the costs of that security that we're providing them.

And what is your reaction to that? As you can hear today, if there's any theme that's emerging it's the United States government and the people of the United States have paid an awful price, it's time for the Iraqis to pay that price for their own protection.

CROCKER: Congressman, I have certainly in the course of the last two days had that message emphasized loud and clear. I was aware of the...

ROHRABACHER: And would you make that part of the status of forces agreement so that if there is an agreement with the Iraqi government they know that they're going to be obligated to pay the expenses rather than have the hard-pressed American taxpayers to pay for this?

CROCKER: That's something we have to consult on within the interagency, consider...

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XXX the interagency, consider...

ROHRABACHER: Let me make the suggestion that, next time we ask you the question and the answer is yes, that you've checked this. And if not, there's going to be trouble on the Republican side, as well as the Democratic side, of getting support for an ongoing conflict.

So I invite my colleagues to join me in that legislation, which I'll drop tomorrow.

General, have we had -- is it fair to say that there have been thousands of radical Islamic extremist terrorists who have been killed in Iraq, since our troops went in there -- non-Iraqis?

PETRAEUS: It probably is thousands, certainly, of foreign fighters. I think we estimate that, at this time, there's somewhere between 50,000 or 70,000 or so that come in, a month, typically through Syria.

At one time, it was probably as high as 100,000, perhaps to 120,000 in...

ROHRABACHER: OK. So, over these years that we've been fighting there, perhaps as many as 1,000 foreign fighters, terrorists have come in. This is what Al Qaida's supposed to be all about.

Let me note that I would like to thank you and the troops for killing as many of them as you were able to kill. Because they now are not alive to come here and kill my family, and kill the families of those of us who are sitting here and the American people.

That is a mission accomplished that we are grateful for.

In terms of getting the whole mission accomplished and getting us out of there, it seems to me what we're talking about is we need to -- the Iraqis need to step up, both financially and militarily.

Also, perhaps, we could use some help from countries. I understand Kosovo and Albania, in gratitude to our help in achieving peace and stability there, are willing to send more troops.

I would hope that we are searching out all the alternatives for having more people come in to help carry the burden.

And I'll ask the diplomat that. Is there any chance of that happening?

CROCKER: There is an ongoing effort to seek out additional coalition partners, to look for additional sources of troops. And indeed, General Petraeus is more qualified to speak on it.

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XXX speak on it.

ROHRABACHER: America does not mind leading the way, but we do mind it if we're carrying the entire load, whether it's a commitment of treasury, a commitment of blood. The American people deserve to be taken into consideration and can't be taken for granted by everybody else in the world.

And that's why I think we've sent the wrong message, that we will carry that burden no matter what in the future. It's time for the Iraqi people to step up, not only in terms of financially but in terms of their own personnel and taking care of their needs. And it's time for other people in the world to quit relying on Uncle Sam to carry the whole load.

And I think, General Petraeus, we're all behind you and we're grateful to you and our diplomats who've been trying to do -- you've been doing this for us, doing it for the American people. But the American people can't carry this load forever. So, we're looking forward to a time when someone else can pick up some of it.

PETRAEUS: Congressman, it is important to note, as I mentioned, I think, in my statement, that Iraqi security force members' losses are typically about three times our losses. And, interestingly, the Sons of Iraq losses, again out of their 91,000 or so, are also 2.5 to three times our losses in addition.

So Iraqis are very much stepping up to the plate in that regard, and they are certainly giving their lives for their country, as well.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler, for five minutes?

WEXLER: Thank you.

General Petraeus, last week, in anticipation of this hearing, I sent an urgent e-mail asking my constituents and other Americans, if they were serving on this committee, what is the one question they would pose to you?

There was an extraordinary response, with more than 5,000 questions submitted. These e-mails and phone calls expressed deeply held frustrations about the war in Iraq and reflect the concerns of millions across the nation who feel their opinions and concerns are cast aside by the Bush administration.

I want to thank everyone who responded and submitted a question for today's hearings.

While many of the respondents rightfully highlighted the bravery of our troops, the majority of the e-mails expressed a strong desire to see withdrawal of American soldiers from Iraq and an end to this five-year war that has cost our nation so dearly.

Most of the questions boiled down to this: General, we often hear President Bush and Senator McCain say we must win in Iraq. What is the definition of winning? What would a military victory look like that was sufficient enough to allow us to begin leaving?

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WEXLER: Then, in a horrific turn of events, two of my constituents, Esther and Len Wolfer of Boca Raton, Florida, learned that this past Sunday there son had been killed for this war.

Major Stuart Wolfer was a 36-year old reservist on his second tour. He was married with three young children, ages five, three and 20 months. His family was relieved that he was in the green zone, for they hope he would be safe there. He was not.

I spoke to Mr. Wolfer yesterday last night, who asked me to ask you simply: For what? For what had he lost his son?

So, allow me to combine, if you will, the questions from the people that responded to me and Mr. Wolfer. What has all this been for? And please, respectfully, don't tell us, as you told Senator Warner yesterday, to remove a brutal dictator. That's not good enough. There are many dictators in the world.

For what did Stuart Wolfer and the other 4,024 sons and daughter die for, and how will we define history so that we can bring this never-ending war to a close?

And, if I will, when Mr. Burton asks for a definition of what is failure, we get a litany of items; but when Mr. Ackerman asks what's the definition of history, we get little.

Please tell us, General, what is winning?

PETRAEUS: Well, first of all -- first of all, Congress, let me tell you that what we are fighting for is national interest. It is interest that, as I stated, have to do with Al Qaida, a sworn enemy of the United States and the free world; it has to do with the possible spread of sectarian conflict in Iraq, conflict that had engulfed that country and had it on the bring of civil war; it has to do with region stability of a region that is of critical importance to the global economy; and it has to do with, certainly, the influence of Iran, another, obviously, very important element in that region.

In terms of what it is that we are trying to achieve, I think, simply, it is a country that is at piece with itself and its neighbors. It is a country that can defend itself, that has a government that is reasonably representative and broadly responsive to its citizens, and a country that is involved in, engaged in, again, the global economy.

Ambassador Crocker and I, for what it's worth, have typically seen ourselves as minimalists. We're not after the Holy Grail in Iraq, we're not after Jeffersonian democracy; we're after conditions that would allow our soldiers to disengage, and that is, in fact, what we are doing as we achieve progress, as we have with the surge, and that is what is indeed allowing us to withdraw the surge forces -- again, well over one-quarter of our ground combat power, five of 20 brigade combat teams, plus two Marine battalions and the Marine Expeditionary Unit by the end of July.

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XXX end of July.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The bells mean a recess. May they recess for the next two hours.

Not us, the floor.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, is recognized for five minutes.

ROYCE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And through you two gentleman, I'd just like to express my gratitude to the men and women of the U.S. armed forces who have served so valiantly in Iraq and in Afghanistan. They deserve our deep appreciation and enduring support.

General Petraeus, there was a recent piece in the Christian Science Monitor that highlighted the withdrawal from public life of the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who had all but remained silent on the recent violence in Basra.

And this, of course, is in pretty stark contrast to his previous actions back in August of 2004 when he helped broker the cease-fire between the Iraqi government and the cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr.

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XXX cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr.

ROYCE: And I was going to ask, in your opinion, does Sistani's lessening clout open the door for more radical clerics like Sadr to fill the vacuum?

I've heard that Sadr is on the fast track to becoming an Ayatollah. And that, I presume, would give him greater power and standing in his community. And I wanted to ask you about that.

Thank you, General.

PETRAEUS: First of all, Congressman, in fact, the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has actually just made a statement -- I think it was yesterday or the day before -- that weapons should only be in the hands of legitimate Iraqi security forces.

So he has very much retained his influence. But he exercises it in the tradition that is called the "quietist" tradition, rather than, say, the tradition in which clerics exercise political power in Iran, where there is a much more direct involvement in the government and its functions.

There are a variety of rumors about what Muqtada al-Sadr is doing in Iran. He certainly, apparently, is undertaking religious studies to try to get to the next step, which is not, by any means, Ayatollah.

And how long that will take -- again, there is some debate over this, whether there is a special fast-track or not.

Regardless of that, he has a name that is greatly respected in Iraqi society, "the martyr, Sadr," his father and uncle.

He is the face of a movement that is very important to the Iraqi people, traditionally was a nationalist movement, stayed in Iraq, actually, during the time of Saddam, when others went outside the country, and a movement that is dedicated to serving the poor and downtrodden of the Iraqi people.

And so it's a movement that, in a sense, has to be reckoned with. It has to be -- it cannot be discounted. And it is a movement that has to be incorporated into the political process...

ROYCE: Well, I thank you...

PETRAEUS: ... and so forth.

ROYCE: Well, I thank you for the observations, especially on al- Sistani and his recent comment. I had not heard that, and I am encouraged by that.

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XXX encouraged by that.

ROYCE: Let me ask Ambassador Crocker, because you testified yesterday that Iran is pursuing a "Lebanization" strategy by backing militias and other proxy groups in Iraq. That's a pretty striking statement, given what Lebanon has done in terms of the divisions it's -- that it's faced, as a result of Hezbollah as an arm of Iran.

It's also significant given that you saw Lebanon and Iranian machinations up close when you were stationed there back in the '80s. And can you compare the Iranian actions you're seeing in Iraq today with what you saw back in Lebanon when you were stationed there?

CROCKER: There are similarities and there are differences. The similarities are, again, Iranian support for extremist militia elements that they, to a large extent, control.

There are also differences. One of them has been a substantial Iraqi rejection of these militia influences. That's what prompted the Sadr declaration of a freeze on military actions in August and the recent fighting in Basra and Baghdad has also triggered, again, a broad, popular rejection.

There's a history between Iraq and Iran. They fought a eight- year bitter civil war. And it puts limits, I think, on Iran's influence in Iraq that they perhaps don't have in Lebanon.

ROYCE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from American Samoa, Mr. Faleomavaega.

FALEOMAVAEGA: Mr. Chairman, for the record, I want to associate myself with your opening statement and your sentiments and concerns concerning the issue that we're now debating.

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XXX we're now debating.

FALEOMAVAEGA: General Petraeus, I received a call yesterday that one of my Samoan soldiers, while leading his platoon, patrolling a certain area in Baghdad, was hit by an IED and was critically wounded and was immediately transferred from Iraq to Germany. And now, after three serious operations, he is now at Walter Reed Hospital.

At this moment, as I speak, Sergeant 1st Class Senei Polu (ph), a proud Samoa warrior from Manu'a, American Samoa, is going through two additional serious operations.

Last night, I visited Sergeant Polu (ph) and his family at Walter Reed Hospital, and accompanying me was a relative of mine whom I believe served with you in Iraq. He is Command Sergeant Major Euni Savusa (ph) of U.S. Army Europe, and he sends his personal regards to you and to your family.

General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, we have all been sworn to defend the Constitution, to support and defend the Constitution. Our duties and responsibilities in serving the American people comes under the authority of this sacred document.

Under our Constitution, the power to declare war is vested in the Congress, not the president of the United States, even though he is the commander in chief of all of our armed forces.

Moreover, under the Constitution, the authority to establish an army and a navy is vested in the Congress, not the president.

We also believe and accept the unique concept that our military leaders and soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen come under civilian authority.

The decisions and policies that have unleashed the tremendous powers of our military forces to wage war against Saddam Hussein came from Congress and the White House and not by our military commanders.

And yet, when our military officers are given the opportunity to express their professional judgments as soldiers, they are condemned, criticized, vilified and scapegoated by civilian authority.

And a classic example of this, General Petraeus, is General Eric Shinseki, whose professional opinion on force structure requirements is a classic example of how badly we've conducted this war, doing it on the cheap, and now, after five years of mismanagement and bad decisions again from civilian authority, at the cost now of about $500 billion. Who puts a check on our civilian authority?

General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, we have accomplished our military mission by defeating Saddam Hussein, who supposedly had nuclear weapons. Supposedly an imminent danger imposed a serious risk to the defense of our nation. And of course we all know he did not have nuclear weapons.

We've just now built a $900 million embassy in Baghdad to establish our diplomatic presence with a country that has a population of 25 million and growing less because of all the some 2 million to 3 million refugees coming out of Iraq alone.

Isn't this matter of a political solution that should now be left to the Sunnis, the Kurds and the Shiites -- who, by the way, make up 60 percent of the country's population?

I would respectfully request your response to that, Ambassador Crocker. And by the way, I also want to pay my deepest respect for the tremendous that you've given to our country.

CROCKER: Thank you, sir.

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XXX Thank you, sir.

CROCKER: It is certainly the case, in my view, that ultimately solutions in Iraq have to be political solutions. This cannot be a question of a military victory. There have to be political agreements.

But it's also very much the case, in my view, that our current engagement is necessary to create and sustain the conditions in which Iraqis can work their way through to sustainable stability.

And, as I said in my statement, this is -- this is what they are doing at both the local levels and at national levels.

It will be a difficult process, and it will take time, but it is my judgment that the Iraqis are moving this process in the right direction.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Tancredo?

TANCREDO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no speeches to make here, just a few questions, and I will make them brief, and would hope for the same in terms of the response.

First of all, also, thank you and congratulations, General, on the apparent success of the strategy that we refer to as the surge.

And thank you, Ambassador, for your efforts.

A couple of things. First of all, in January of last year, President Bush told us all in an address to the nation that, quote, "the Iraqi government would take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November of 2007."

Of course, that has not happened. I'm just wondering whether, General Petraeus, you have any idea of why he made that statement, especially such a definitive statement -- we will -- we will -- all Iraqi provinces will be under the control of the Iraqi government, that's what he said.

Why would he say a thing like that? What -- and that's one of the reasons why we get the kind of confusion around here that you see. That's number one.

Number two, there have been widespread reports about the development of gangs inside the military in Iraq, inside our military -- you know, MS-13 graffiti appearing in Baghdad, as weird as this sounds, but it was reported on national news. To what extent is this truly a problem? To what do you -- if it is a problem of a significant nature, to what do you attribute this?

Apparently, some of these people are coming back to the United States after having been trained by our own military, of course, and using military tactics in order to advance their own lawless activities here.

And, for Ambassador Crocker, there is a very specific law, U.S. Code Section 1253 that says that you may not -- you may not -- give visas to any country that refuses to accept their nationals back who have committed some crime in the United States.

Iraq is one of the countries that refuses to accept their nationals back who have committed crimes here. When we try to deport them, they are not citizens of the United States, we try to deport them, Iraq refuses to accept them.

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XXX to accept them.

TANCREDO: There is a law that says you must -- it doesn't say you may, it says you must, in fact, give the -- or stop giving visas to that country, any country that does this. Can you tell me why you are not following the law? When you will begin to follow the law, if you have any anticipation of doing it?

Those three things, and I would appreciate the answers as briefly as possible.

PETRAEUS: Congressman, first of all, I'm not aware of a problem with gangs, and that's one that I'll have to check on.

Second, I don't know why the statement was made that you quoted. Presumably it was because of a projection that was provided to him, I believe that was before the time that I was the Multi-National Force- Iraq commander.

If I could just take the opportunity to thank the congressman for conveying the message from Command Sergeant Major Savusa, who is a great noncommissioned officer. I personally awarded him the Bronze Star for Valor for an action when we were ambushed in the fight to Baghdad, outside the battle of Hillah.

CROCKER: Congressman, I'm just not aware of this particular instance or instances. Obviously, I'd be very grateful if I could get the details from you or your staff. And, obviously, we'll look into it.

TANCREDO: Mr. Ambassador, we have written, and I've asked the secretary of state about this question at least three times. We have written, we will continue to do so. I will provide you with more information and would appreciate it a definitive answer to the question.

While I have, actually, a minute, there is -- Mr. Manuel Miranda (ph), who's an employee of the Office of Legislative Statecraft (ph) in the U.S. embassy, came out with a list of charges. I'm sure you're aware of them. Charged that despite the excellent progress of the military, he believes that the State Department's efforts have been poorly managed, characterized them as woefully negligent, if not criminal.

What are your responses to Mr. Miranda's allegations?

CROCKER: These are Mr. Miranda's personal views, to which he's entitled. I absolutely do not agree with them. I think that the civilians out in Iraq, both the State Department and other agencies, are doing extremely good work under very difficult circumstances, both in Baghdad and out in our, now, 25 provincial reconstruction teams working at the local levels.

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XXX the local levels.

TANCREDO: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel, for five minutes?

ENGEL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, welcome to the committee. As you know, I spent Christmas in Iraq. And I had the opportunity to speak with both of you.

And I want to thank both of your for the service you provide to our country. What you're getting, obviously, is a sense of a lot of frustration from all of us, from many of us, from me, certainly, and others as well.

When you testified, both of you, before our committee, last September, you both talked about political benchmarks of the Iraqi government. That almost served as a framework for what you were saying to us.

The Iraqi government has obviously been unable to achieve all of that.

We talk about Iran. And we can all agree -- I don't think we disagree -- Iran is the biggest threat to the region right now.

To me, the worst part of the war in Iraq, besides the lives lost and the money it cost, is the fact that, because of our invasion, we've actually given Iran the upper hand in the region.

Maliki, as much as we try to make him to be a democratic figure, is propped up in parliament by the pro-Iranian factions. When we are talking about trying to broker things, like with the Sadr group, it seems that Iran, again, has the upper hand.

General, you said, and I agree with you, that Iran is funding, training, arming and protecting the insurgents. They're obviously doing that.

Ambassador Crocker, you said that you want to look at conditions rather than timelines. You also said that U.S. support should not be open-ended. The frustration with us is it seems like the support is open- ended. And every time we say that we want the Iraqis to do this, and that's why we had the surge, and we want to allow them to be able to do things, six months later or eight months later, when they haven't achieve that, we, sort of, change the rules. We say, well, you know, we're here for another reason.

So please address the frustration that you hear. Nobody questions the job that you're both doing, certainly not me. You have a very difficult situation.

But we, as members of Congress, are just frustrated. We don't want an open-ended war. We want the war to end. We don't see the goals that we say we are setting achievable.

And how can we know that six months from now, a year from now, or five years from now, we're not going to be here saying the same thing and moving the goal post, a little bit, and find that the Iraqi government has not achieved any of the things that we need?

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CROCKER: Congressman, first, I have been very careful during my tenure in Iraq. I have not said in X months Y will be achieved. I've been very careful about that.

That said, there are achievements with respect to the benchmark legislation. The laws that I cited in my statement that were passed in the first few weeks of this year -- the first two months of this year constitute achievement of benchmarks, both deBaathification reform, amnesty, provincial powers -- the provincial powers law, which set a date for elections -- these are all benchmarks.

I have said previously that I think there's a risk of focusing too much attention on the benchmarks as an absolute measure of success or failure. I think you can get all the benchmarks and still not have sustainable security in Iraq.

ENGEL: But you can understand -- and I would like the general to answer -- the frustration that we have.

Both of you use the term that what's happening in Iraq is fragile and reversible. In fact, I would characterize both of your testimony last September as much more upbeat than your testimony now. Your testimony now is sober. It's not as upbeat as it was.

So, General, you know, again, we are all frustrated. You know, we want the war to end, we want it to end responsibly, and yet it seems to be never-ending.

PETRAEUS: Congressman, with respect, I believe the testimony of September was sober and forthright, as well. And then what we have tried to do today is top be forthright. It is why we have stated the facts as we see them in the way.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired and the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Paul.

PAUL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, I'd ask unanimous consent to submit a written statement for the record.

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XXX for the record.

PAUL: Mr. Chairman, I want to submit several questions to the panel, and there won't be enough time to answer these, but I want these questions to be on the record.

First, I would like to ask, why should the American people continue to support a war that was justified by false information, since Saddam Hussein never aggressed against the United States, Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11, and Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction?

It is said that one must continue the war because we have already sacrificed so much, but what is moral about demanding even more needless sacrifice of American lives merely to save face with the mistake of invading and occupying Iraq?

Doesn't it seem awfully strange that the Iraqi government we support is an ally of the Iranians, who are our -- who are declared enemies? Are we not now supporting the Iranians by propping up their allies in Iraq?

If Maliki is our ally and he has diplomatic relations with Ahmadinejad, why can't we? Why must we continue to provoke Iran just looking for an excuse to bomb that country? Does our policy in Iraq not guarantee chaos in this region for years to come?

It is estimated that up to 2,000 Iraqi soldiers refused to fight against al-Sadr's militia. Why should we not expect many of the 80,000 Sunnis we have recently armed to someday turn their weapons against us since they, as well as the Mahdi Army, detest any and all foreign occupation?

Is it not true that our ally Maliki broke the declared by -- the cease-fire declared by al-Sadr by initiating the recent violence? Is it not true that the current cease-fire was brokered by the Iranians, who also condemned the attacks on the green zone? How can we blame all the violence on the Iranians?

Is it not true that with the recent surge in violence in Iraq that the March attacks are now back at the same level as they were in 2005.

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XXX were in 2005.

PAUL: Does Iran not have a greater justification to be involved in neighboring Iraq than we do? Since it's 6,000 miles from our shores, if China or Russia were occupying Mexico, how would we react?

Since no one can define winning the war, just who do we expect to surrender? Does this not mean that this war will be endless, since our political leaders will not end it? That is, unit we go broke. And maybe that's not far off.

I do have one question -- even though there is not enough time to get all those questions answered -- I do have one question I do believe there's enough time to answer, probably rather briefly.

In your estimation, does the administration have the authority to bomb Iran without further congressional approval?

PETRAEUS: Congressman, I'm the commander for Iraq and I do not know the answer to that question and it's not within my purview.

CROCKER: Congressman, nor is it in mine. My job is Iraq and I'm just not competent to pronounce on an issue like that.

PAUL: Well, it just seems to me that we couldn't get an answer like, no, it seems pretty obvious that under our Constitution that's the way it works, that we're supposed to confer with the Congress, and it would be spreading the war. We know how the war spread in Vietnam without congressional approval and what that led to.

So, it seems to me that it's -- to not say, "No, the administration does not have authority to bomb another country without getting authority from the Congress." So, it disturbs me to no end that we can't get a flat out no on this question.

And I yield back the balance of my time.

BERMAN: Time of the gentleman has expired. His entire remarks will be put a part of the record.

And the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt.

DELAHUNT: Yes, Ambassador Crocker, I was extremely concerned about your response to a question that was posed to you yesterday by Senator Clinton -- specifically when she asked you whether the long- term agreements between the United States and Iraq, which I would note are being negotiated with minimal consultation with the U.S. Congress -- when she asked you whether it would be submitted to the Iraqi parliament, you said it was unclear whether they would bring it to a vote or whether they would simply read it to the members of the Iraqi parliament.

I'm sure you're aware, or maybe you aren't, but the Iraqi government has already committed to bringing this agreement before the Iraqi parliament.

This is what the Iraqi foreign minister had to say in a press conference with the secretary of state, Ms. Rice, on January 18th, 2008, and I'm quoting: "The final decision will rest with the representatives of Iraq, the Iraqi Council of Representatives." That's the formal name of their parliament.

Furthermore, according to the Iraqi constitution, international agreements must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Iraqi parliament.

In the so-called declaration of principles, which was signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki last November, the U.S. and Iraqi governments committed to, and I'm quoting from the declaration, "respecting and upholding the constitution as the expression of the will of the Iraqi people in standing against any attempt to impede, suspend or violate it," end quote.

If the Maliki government bypasses the Iraqi parliament and approves this agreement unilaterally, thus violating the Iraqi constitution, will the Bush administration respect the commitment it made in the declaration of principles and reject any agreement?

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XXX reject any agreement?

DELAHUNT: Because, from this particular perch, our acquiescence in such a clear violation of the Iraq constitution would further erode our credibility, not just in Iraq but elsewhere.

So, if you could give me an answer to that, after I pose this question to you.

It's a request, really. I would like you to convey to the Iraqi parliament, or Council of Representatives, and the Iraqi executive branch, the so-called Council of Ministers, that, should the United Nations mandate be allowed to expire at the end of this year, it's the view of many of us in Congress, with support from constitutional scholars, that the continued use of force in Iraq by U.N. armed forces will require authorization by the United States Congress.

Now, the administration position is different. But many of us in Congress feel vigorously and profoundly that, as one of my colleagues earlier read, the power and the authority has to come from the U.S. Congress.

The administration claims that the use of force against Iraq has two prongs, one to address the threat posed by the government of Saddam Hussein and one to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions.

The first prong is gone. And the administration's claim that it continues to be in effect because of an endless threat in Iraq, then the second prong would disappear with the U.N. mandate.

So I'm just simply making a request. I think, to be fair to the Iraqi government, both the legislative branch as well as the Council of Ministers, please inform them that there are strong feelings here in the United States that once, in this Congress, in this institution, that once that mandate expires, then it is this government -- the next administration has to come back to get authorization.

Could you please convey that to both Prime Minister Maliki and to the speaker of the Council of Representatives?

CROCKER: I can certainly do that, sir. But I would imagine that they have already heard you.

DELAHUNT: I hope they have. Can you answer my first question, then, which is...

CROCKER: Yes, sir, very quickly, the Iraqis -- the Iraqi government will determine its own procedures. And I'm sure they will do so with full respect for their constitution.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired. And the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake, is recognized for five minutes.

FLAKE: I thank the chairman.

I want to thank the witnesses, General and Ambassador, and thank you for your distinguished service.

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XXX your distinguished service.

FLAKE: I, myself, was somewhat -- or more than somewhat skeptical when the surge plan was presented that we would see the type of gains that we have seen. I think a lot of it is certainly due to your diligence and the diligence certainly of our troops.

I do have concerns for the long term, and I want to associate myself with the comments made by Mr. Ackerman. I still am, after hearing testimony, and hearing testimony before other bodies, and hearing the questions here, I still have a hard time seeing the big picture and what constitutes success.

That's not just one side of the aisle with those kind of concerns. Many on this side of the aisle have that as well. And I don't expect that you can say any more than you've said, but just to let you know that is a concern, the long term, in terms of what constitutes success.

And I think that there is a sincere effort, I know in this body, to exercise our Article I authority. We do have the power of the purse. And we desperately want to see success, but a lot of us are concerned that we don't see the framework that is -- that can be actually measured. And I'm still waiting for that. And if you have any quick thoughts on that, I would appreciate hearing them. If not, I'll pass it on the to the next questioner.

CROCKER: It's a very valid question, Congressman. There is not going to be, in my view, a, you know, a single moment when you have success border to border in Iraq. It's going to be a process.

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XXX be a process.

CROCKER: And the fact that we are now in the process of redeploying back home because conditions permit it, I would term as a success.

And, as I said earlier, I think that's how this will proceed, that it will be area by area, issue by issue, that gradually moves us from an active role in combat in different places, eventually into overwatch and eventually into a more conventional role, such as assisting with the training of Iraqi forces.

But it's going to be an incremental process over time, not, you know, a single, dazzling moment.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

And the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Carnahan, is recognized for five minutes.

CARNAHAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank the gentlemen here before us today for their service.

I want to really just acknowledge what I'm sure you have heard over the last two days, and that is, a mounting backlash to the Iraqis not standing up sufficiently militarily, politically and, especially, financially.

The cost of this war -- in human terms; to our reputation and standing in the world; to our readiness; as Chairman Skelton has outlined eloquently; to our resources being diverted from our struggling economy, they're needed at home, and from the greater Al Qaida threat to the U.S. in Afghanistan.

As Ambassador Crocker acknowledged to Senator Biden yesterday, this war was sold on assurances that oil revenues would be used to help fund reconstruction of what is one of the most oil-rich nations in the world.

And during our last hearing, there were many stories about waste and mismanagement and corruption, in terms of use of U.S. funds. Now, we see the growing surplus in the Iraqi government that, frankly, we're paying for twice. We're paying in our tax funds and we're paying at the pump.

There was a bipartisan letter from Senators Levin and Warner asking the GAO why U.S. taxpayer money is being overwhelmingly used to fund Iraqi reconstruction.

What specific actions, gentlemen, are being taken to use the oil- rich Iraqi government surplus to pay for the war and reconstruction cost?

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CROCKER: Sir, as I said earlier, we are getting out of the bricks-and-mortar construction business. The funds and the projects that were undertaken under the IRRF funding are coming to a close. And we have been clear, and the Iraqis themselves have been clear, that reconstruction -- construction and reconstruction going forward -- is an Iraqi responsibility.

And that's == that is best shown, I think, through decisions that the government has taken, just in the last few days, to provide $350 million, for example -- this was a decision yesterday -- for reconstruction in Basra, in Mosul and in parts of Baghdad that have been affected by the recent violence.

They are also talking about a separate $5 billion reconstruction fund to concentrate on key areas, such as health and education. This will all be their money.

CARNAHAN: Is this -- let me add it up, Ambassador -- is this an issue of the Iraqis just being overly dependent on us, using our budget as a crutch? Or are there other difficulties with them really dipping into their own vast resources to fund what's going on there?

CROCKER: One of the challenges they have faced is simple capacity, just the ability to execute. You know, we saw this, for example, in their 2006 budget, they only managed to actually execute something like 22 percent of their capital budget. They just, you know, could not spend the money in a productive way.

That percentage almost tripled in 2007 to about 63 percent. Still, obviously, short of ideal.

But they are developing the capacity not only to plan how they want to spend their money, but then to actually implement that. But it has been an incremental process.

CARNAHAN: Thank you both.

I yield back.

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XXX I yield back.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pence, recognized for five minutes.

PENCE: Thank you, Chairman.

I want to add my greetings and gratitude to both of these great public servants on behalf of the people of eastern Indiana.

Your leadership as a soldier and diplomat have been exceptional. And you represent and the very finest of this country, and I'm grateful for your service.

Thank you for your hospitality in my two most recent trips to Iraq. And I'm pleased to extend that hospitality to Capitol Hill for you all.

First question, Ambassador Crocker, Iran is in the news today. They recently announced the installation of some 6,000 new centrifuges for their allegedly peaceful nuclear program.

I was provoked by a question of a colleague in the Senate yesterday; Senator Barack Obama of Illinois told you we needed, quote, "a diplomatic surge that includes Iran," close quote.

Senator Obama also said we should be, quote, "talking to them, as well."

Ambassador Crocker, I'm under the impression we have been talking to Iran, particularly in 2007. I'm aware of several meetings that you, as the American ambassador to Iraq, have had with your counterpart from Iran.

Am I right in understanding -- are you talking to Iran? Are we engaged in a dialogue with Iran?

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CROCKER: You are correct, Congressman, that we have had discussions on security in Iraq, with the Iranians, on three occasions.

These are trilateral discussions. The Iraqis are in the room, as well. But it is our one authorized...

PENCE: I'm remembering -- forgive me for interrupting -- I'm remembering a four-hour meeting, perhaps at the home of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Very serious issues were discussed with your counterpart from Iran?

CROCKER: That is correct. And we've also had talks at an expert's level. And we have -- the Iraqis, a few days ago, announced that they were seeking -- they would like to seek to arrange another round of these talks.

And we have said that, if that is what Iraq is requesting, we're prepared to sit down.

PENCE: The secretary of state and the administration said, we are talking to Iran; we're willing to continue to talk to Iran?

CROCKER: Yes, sir, on the issue of security in Iraq.

PENCE: Security in Iraq, precisely.

Have those talks -- very quickly, have those talks produced any results relative to Iran's direct involvement in violence against U.S. troops within Iraq, or enmity toward Israel or their nuclear weapons program?

Any concessions whatsoever from Iran?

CROCKER: To be perfectly frank, Congressman, thus far, I've seen no concrete results as a result of these discussions.

PENCE: Very good.

General Petraeus, I want you to know, in my visits to Iraq, over the last year and the evidence you've presented here today, and to many of us in this Congress and across the country, the surge is working. The strategy that you've brought to this heater of combat has achieved significant military progress. And I commend you for it.

You've made repeated references to the fragile nature of our success. I recognize that. I accept that it's not irreversible. But it has been substantial and dramatic progress.

In the minute I have left remaining, let me ask you what, other than the American soldier and their extraordinary professionalism, what accounts for the extraordinary progress in the last 15 months in Iraq, in the expansion of security and stability following the advent of the surge?

PETRAEUS: Well, as I mentioned, Congress, it was also the Iraqi surge, the increase of their armed forces and police forces of over 100,000; the increase, in a sense, of the Sons of Iraq, additional security forces, if you will, at the local level, and I think something that really has to be highlighted again and again, and that is the rejection by more and more Sunni Arab communities of Al Qaida- Iraq.

That is a very significant action. It is important. Of course, it took place in the heart of the Arab world. I'd like to think that that's something that others could take a lesson from as well.

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XXX from as well.

PETRAEUS: Indeed, frankly, there are other countries in the region that have also become mightily concerned about the threat of that form of extremism and have taken a number of different actions to moderate various elements in their societies that produce the kind of feeling that can support Al Qaida and its affiliates.

PENCE: Thank you both.

Thank you, Chairman.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Woolsey?

WOOLSEY: Gentlemen, it's not easy to get two members to agree on anything up here, as I'm sure you see. It's even rarer when 92 members come together and agree on something, and that's exactly what has happened.

Ninety-two members of this House, including Foreign Affairs Committee members Congresswoman Lee, Chairman Payne, Chairman Delahunt, Representative Meeks, Vice Chair Watson, Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Representative Hinojosa, Representative Linda Sanchez, myself, Representative Scott and my colleague across the aisle Representative Paul, we have all gone on record opposed to this open-ended occupation.

We signed our names to a letter to the president stating that we will only support appropriating additional funds for U.S. military operations in Iraq during fiscal year 2008 and beyond for the protection and safe redeployment of our troops out of Iraq before President Bush leaves office.

And I would like, Mr. Chairman, to ask unanimous consent that that letter be included in the record.

Unanimous consent.

Polls show that up to...

BERMAN: Without objection.

WOOLSEY: Thank you.

(LAUGHTER) Gentlemen, polls show that up to 80 percent of the American public supports redeployment of our troops out of Iraq. When that statistic was presented with those staggering numbers, the vice president's response was, "So?"

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XXX response was, "So?"

WOOLSEY: Well, I want to tell you, that "so?" came from the same administration that got us into Iraq with misleading information in the first place.

And I don't feel that that's where you're coming from. I want to believe that you have more respect for the American people than our vice president.

So what we need to know -- and I'm absolutely certain that you have eventualities, you have contingencies, that you aren't truly waiting for conditions on the ground to tell us when we're going to come and go, because you have to be planning.

So how do you plan? How do you base the rate that troops could safely be redeployed? By the month? By the quarter? What funding stream would be necessary to accomplish this?

We have no idea. We cannot get that information here in the Congress.

What will it cost to bring our troops home, because we're going to have to pay for that, as well? And how long would it take for a complete troop redeployment?

PETRAEUS: Well, Congresswoman, as I explained earlier, the process of determining how rapidly we can bring forces home is really the process that we exercised when we determined the pace and also the location, really, of where we could reduce forces to bring down the force by the surge forces, the five brigade combat teams, two Marine battalions and the Marine Expeditionary Unit.

What we have done in those cases is we look at the security and the local governance conditions in an area, to determine where we can thin out our forces and thereby redeploy additional elements.

Obviously, we look at the enemy situation in the area, we look at the ability of Iraqi forces to deal with the threats that are present. That's what we've been doing. That's how we reworked the battlefield geometry to drawdown the surge forces.

WOOLSEY: But, then, General -- I mean, you've told us this, so I've heard it. And we've all heard this. You must be basing it on some numbers of, you know, what it would take to be safe in bringing our troops home, what it's going to cost to bring our troops home, what it will cost to be involved in reconciliation and capacity building within Iraq. Where do we get those numbers? Is it available to the public?

PETRAEUS: It's not arithmetic, Congresswoman.

As I mentioned yesterday, this is more akin to calculus than it is to arithmetic; it's more akin to the political-military calculus that the ambassador described earlier, I think, in this hearing today.

And it is the battlefield geometry. What we're trying to do is determine how quickly we can bring our forces -- look, again, we, very much, share the frustration. Those of us who have been at this for a long time obviously want the war to end as much as anybody else, perhaps maybe more.

It's sometimes said that the biggest peace activists are those who, of course, are actually downrange, risking it all.

But what we want to do is come home the right way, without jeopardizing the gains we've fought to achieve and achieving the important national efforts that we have.

BERMAN: I'm sorry, sir.

The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson?

WILSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, General and Ambassador, for your service. I've had the privilege of working with both of you over the years, from Mosul to Baghdad, from Islamabad to Baghdad. And every time I've just been so impressed by your leadership, and we're very grateful.

We're also grateful for the courageous service of our military and civilian personnel serving in Iraq and in the entire region, making a difference, protecting American families by defeating the terrorists overseas.

I'm particularly grateful as a 31-year veteran of the Army National Guard. I have currently four sons, thanks to my wife's training, who are serving in the U.S. military, and two have served in Iraq.

General Petraeus, I share a concern of Chairman Berman about the attacks on the green zone.

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XXX the green zone.

WILSON: This is truly a direct attack on the Iraqi government, the prime minister's quarters and office, the ministries, the parliament.

Additionally, it's an attack on American personnel. I was saddened to here, and my sympathy goes to the Wolfer family of Boca Raton, Florida for their loss.

I can particularly identify. I had a nephew serve in the green zone -- also a son serve in the green zone.

And on March 24th, 2008, General, you gave an interview with BBC. And then you stated the rockets that were launched at the green zone yesterday, for example, were "Iranian-provided, Iranian-made rockets, launched by special groups elements that are paid for, that are funded, that are trained, that had been equipped and been directed, by and large, by the Iranian Quds Force," end of quote.

What specific evidence do you have or could you tell us about that directly relates these rockets to Iran?

PETRAEUS: Well, we have found fragments of the different rockets that have come in. We have also found weapons caches that, again, clearly are of the type that come from Iran. And we've detained a number of special groups members over the last six months or so, including some very senior leaders and financiers who have been relatively talkative in explaining the whole process of how these individuals move to an from Iran, where they are trained, indoctrinated, how they're funded, how they bring weapons and so forth into the country.

And we'll lay that out for the public here at some point. We have a -- frankly, a press conference that is literally written and ready to go that can lay that out.

We've even detained, for example, four of what were called 16 master trainers -- individuals who had multiple trips back and then were brought into -- back into Iraq to help train others.

We do know these are the individuals that have been directing and launching these attacks. We have killed a number of them with armed UAVs ad attack helicopters and direct fire.

But it's a very, very difficult tactical problem because they think nothing of launching them from schoolyards, innocent civilians' backyards and so forth. WILSON: Additionally -- Ambassador Crocker, I'm going to give you an easy question because I asked it of you earlier in that -- because I want the American people to note this -- that Zawahiri, the Al Qaida spokesman for bin Laden, on July the 9th, 2005, made the goals of Al Qaida very clear.

First, expel the Americans from Iraq; the second stage, establish authority in Iraq; the third stage, extend the jihad wave to the secular countries around Iraq; the fourth stage is the clash with Israel, which is the extermination of the people who live in Israel.

Now, once they achieve -- if they achieve their four stages, would they be satisfied with what they have, or will they continue attacks on the United States?

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XXX the United States?

CROCKER: Congressman, as you know, I've been focused on Al Qaida for quite some time. I opened our embassy in Afghanistan after 9/11, served two and a half years as our ambassador to Pakistan, and, of course, now I'm in Iraq.

It's my judgment that Al Qaida has been and remains a strategic enemy of the United States and that if they can find the means, they will attack us again.

I am familiar with the 2005 Zawahiri statements that you cite. The question I would have is whether this would indeed be sequential or whether if they can get that secure based, they will begin planning, more or less, immediately for that kind of attack.

WILSON: I thank you very much.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee, recognized for five minutes.

JACKSON LEE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And it's important to note our respect, mutually, for both of you gentlemen, and thank you for the courtesies shown to our delegation during the fifth year week, if you will, of the invasion of the United States into Iraq.

One of the senators in yesterday's hearing, I think, captured a lot of our sentiment without reflecting on the very fine and outstanding work of the United States military and our civilian support system through the State Department.

And he asked a simple question: How do we get out of this mess? I hope that this does not characterize all of my questions, but I, frankly, believe that you all are outstanding public servants and you are implementing the policies of this administration.

So you are in a difficult box. But I hope to pose some questions that really track what I believe will help us reach a solution.

First of all, I think I'd like to take note of some of the visual pictures of our trip.

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XXX of our trip.

JACKSON LEE: It is noteworthy that the Americans are armed and with helmets and flak jackets. Civilian population -- this little girl in a pink dress was trying to play on the streets. And we were walking through, and I have great gratitude to be able to do so.

General, none of these are classified shots, and so I want you to note that.

This is one of the streets that we were walking on -- certainly our weaponry and otherwise there.

Here's another one with -- here's a little boy, civilian, compared to Americans walking through the streets.

As I walked through these streets, I also saw a lot of quality of life needs -- trash and lack of clean water, in terms of conversation.

The Sunni men that were there were criticizing or complaining that they wished that they could have a government that would rid itself of sectarianism. That's what they view their leader, Mr. Maliki, as a sectarian who continues to promote divisions between the groups.

The good news is, Ambassador Crocker, is that they will be participating in the election.

We have spoken about the Iraqi security forces. I, frankly, believe we do not give them enough credit, and that is why we're in the plight that we are in today.

An outstanding general who, frankly, believes that his forces are getting ready and getting ready better -- one of the generals that we met, an Iraqi general. We decided to make sure that we'd let everyone know that the soldiers are well-dressed, but they're also, I believe, on the road of great competency.

What we are continuously presented with, however, is quite the contrary. And let me raise the points of the resolution of 2002, and I'll read from it, just to note that we were to deal with the United Nations resolutions and to rid ourselves from the Al Qaida.

Let me ask General Petraeus. Saddam Hussein is gone, is he not? I obviously need to get a quick answer because my time is running out.

PETRAEUS: Absolutely.

JACKSON LEE: There's been a democratic election.

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XXX a democratic election.

PETRAEUS: Correct.

JACKSON LEE: Al Qaida, to your knowledge, is an amoeba; it's free flowing. It may be in Iraq; it may be in Afghanistan. Is that not true?

PETRAEUS: It is certainly in Iraq. It is less in Iraq than it was a year ago...

JACKSON LEE: But it finds itself in other places.

PETRAEUS: Not easily. Again, it has to find a place where it can break out.

JACKSON LEE: You would suggest that it is not in Afghanistan and...

PETRAEUS: I didn't say that. I'm not, obviously...

JACKSON LEE: Well, that's what my question is, does it find itself in other places, Al Qaida?

PETRAEUS: Certainly. Al Qaida in fact is throughout the region of the Middle East...

JACKSON LEE: With that in mind, let me say, General, that I frankly believe we are operating without authority. The 2002 resolution has been complete. The military has completed its task. I would declare it a military success. And I would ask that you convey to the president that we should now bring our troops home.

To Ambassador Crocker, even though there may be light being made of diplomacy, is it not important that we continue to work on a diplomatic end in giving technical assistance to Iraq to use its own money to help build up its country?

CROCKER: Yes, ma'am, it is. And we are very much involved in that. In fact, we're going to be bringing out a number of additional advisers from the Department of Treasury who will focus precisely on budget execution.

JACKSON LEE: With that in mind, then, we can use the diplomacy and technical assistance and complete our task and end the war, so we don't continue to have the loss of lives, as I did, with two soldiers being buried in my district. I believe there is no more authority for this war. I believe it is terminated. And I believe that our soldiers should come home, certainly to a welcoming and grateful nation.

I yield back my time.

BERMAN: The time of the gentlelady has expired.

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Gresham Barrett, for five minutes?

BARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, Ambassador, God bless you. Thank you for being here today. Please tell our heroes that we love them and we pray for them every day.

One quick statement: A lot of our colleagues over the last couple of days have talked about the cost of the war. The only thing I would ask them is think about the cost of actually losing this war.

General, in regards to the Basra operations, I know there were some good things and some bad things. But the leader of their country, a sovereign nation, took two brigades and 24 hours with special operations guys, took them to the field. Mixed results. But isn't that a success?

I mean, they couldn't have done that a year ago, could they, General?

PETRAEUS: They could not have, Congressman. And I did highlight that. And then they moved another brigade subsequent to that. And they had their C-130s turning several times a day with supplies, reinforcements, casualty backhaul and so forth.

And I think the more important point, if I could, is that Basra is by no means over. Basra is going to be ongoing for a number of months and will require a sustainable solution over time. And it's still very much the early days, actually, in Basra.

BARRETT: But in that sense of the action, the leader of the nation taking charge, a big success. Wouldn't you agree?

PETRAEUS: Well, we have talked repeatedly about wanting Iraq to be a sovereign country, wanting their leader of the sovereign country to make decisions.

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XXX to make decisions.

PETRAEUS: And he made one. And, candidly, it was a bit of a surprise. It was much more sudden than the very deliberate process that, in fact, we were actually literally working on at the time that he made the decision based on his assessment of security issues there, and then gave orders to do that.

He did ask for our support. We said that we would provide support. Wouldn't be ground forces. It's advisers and close air support and ISR support and that type of thing.

BARRETT: Yes, sir.

Ambassador?

CROCKER: Yes, sir. Looking at the Basra operation from the political standpoint, vice the military, the prime minister's decisiveness in this, including going down personally to Basra for the opening phases of this operation, has garnered him widespread political support from almost all of Iraq's leaders -- Sunni, Kurd, as well as Shia -- because he is being perceived, as the Shia prime minister of Iraq, as willing and able to take on Shia extremist militias, that this is being perceived broadly in Iraq as a national effort against extremist groups.

And it's worth noting, as you consider the implications of the Basra operation, that you have Iraqi forces engaged with Shia extremist militias in Basra, at the same time up in Mosul they're engaged with us against Al Qaida and Al Qaida's extremist Sunni supporters.

So the perception increasingly is of a national endeavor against the extremes, whether Sunni or Shia, that threaten the state.

BARRETT: Got you.

Very quickly, Ambassador, when I was over there just a few weeks ago, I was very concerned about the level of corruption. I kept hearing the theme on and on again.

Got about a minute. Tell me what we're doing to stem that, because I think that is a major problem.

And, General, you, too, if you can.

CROCKER: It is a major problem. The Iraqis -- the Iraqi government is now publicly recognizing that it has a major problem. There have been two conferences to address this issue, one convened by the government itself and the other at the request of the government with the United Nations to try and develop a work plan.

We're engaged in doing everything we can to assist on this. We've recently reorganized our own anti-corruption effort within the embassy in coordination with MNF. I brought out a senior officer, a former ambassador, to head that up. We've got efforts under way to assist the various elements of the anti-corruption apparatus in the Iraqi government gain capacity and strength, in particular the Commission on Integrity, which has got a new and very promising head.

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XXX very promising head.

CROCKER: So -- sorry, sir.

BERMAN: I'm sorry, but the time of the gentleman has expired. And the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Wu, is recognized for five minutes.

WU: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I see it, the central foreign policy problem in Iraq is no longer really in Iraq -- the challenges, what's going on in the rest of the world in the following sense.

When our government is so mono-focused on one country, on Iraq, we are not able, in my view, to pay adequate attention to the rest of the world; to Russia, to China, to India, to Japan, to Europe, whether they are friends, adversaries, competitors or otherwise.

And as the world's lone superpower, well, great powers have great responsibilities. And the challenge is whether we have the bandwidth to deal with all the things that we need to deal with around the world.

And, General, I want to be very specific in this. I don't think that this is a military problem; I think the uniformed services have done absolutely everything that the civilian authority has asked it to do, and I thank you for that.

But I would like to ask both of you gentlemen, what are the metrics of success? What are the metrics by which we reach a point where we can begin to deploy our political, diplomatic and military resources to face the challenges that we face elsewhere in the world?

Ambassador, you answered an earlier question and you said that you deal with conditions and not with timelines. Well, let's put some metrics on the conditions that you're talking about.

And General, you -- in answer to an earlier question, you gave some fairly general answers to what constitutes, if you will, success.

I'd like to hear some metrics from both of you gentlemen about when we can begin to start paying attention -- adequate attention to the rest of the world.

CROCKER: Well, again, we approach this from the -- obviously, from the focus on Iraq. As you know, Congressman, redeployments are underway. The surge forces are coming home, and General Petraeus and I have both described the process by which we're able to make recommendations in that regard. You look at...

WU: Well, with all due respect, Ambassador, I'm asking you about metrics. What are identifiable criteria that we can measure against so that we can consider objectives achieved?

PETRAEUS: Congressman, if I could, the metrics are among those that I showed you today, that there's a subset of the overall metrics that we use to track, basically, how we're doing.

What we showed you was the -- all of them totalled up. But we also look at them by region. And so, let me give you an example...

WU: Excuse me, General. Excuse me.

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XXX General. Excuse me.

WU: Based on the metrics that you put up, then at what point on those graphs do we reach the point where we can redeploy our military and our diplomatic resources?

PETRAEUS: At the point where those metrics for an area, such as Anbar province -- and I wish we had included that -- we have a provincial slide and it shows it going just like that in terms of violence.

And then we lay down the troop to task. We have to look at what it is that we're trying to accomplish, look at the local Iraqi security forces and the local governance, and that is what has enabled us to reduce -- we're in the process of reducing from 14 battalions in Anbar province down to about six.

That is a very substantial reduction to take place in the course of about, I guess, eight or nine months or so. And it is based on those time...

WU: Thank you, General. And perhaps, off line here, we can get both of you gentlemen to respond at what point on this charts we can define success. And, you know, I'd be happy to take that as a written response outside of this hearing.

PETRAEUS: Congressman, look, let me be, again, forthright with you, which is the spirit that we've been in.

There's not an arithmetical solution that says for Anbar province when you hit this number and this metric; it's much more about a number of different metrics that we look at.

And at the end of the day, this is about feel. This is what we pay our commanders to do, is it to make judgments and to asses a situation and to say, "I think that we can take this battalion out of here, this battalion out of here. We can leave these smaller elements. This is how we cobble together the response. By the way, we've got to make sure we have medevac within the golden hour," and all the rest of this.

And, again, a very complex endeavor, and then that's how you are able to determine how much you can come down over time.

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XXX down over time.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

WU: Thank you, sir.

BERMAN: The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mack, is recognized for five minutes.

MACK: There's a legal dispute -- Mr. Chairman, I yield my time to...

BERMAN: Resolved in the favor of Mr. Fortenberry and with the agreement of Mr. Mack.

Mr. Fortenberry is recognized for five minutes.

FORTENBERRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, welcome. Thank you for joining us today. And on behalf of the people of the 1st District of Nebraska, let me thank you for your service and sacrifice on behalf of our nation.

General Petraeus, under current operational and policy assumptions, and recognizing the complexity and fluidity of the situation, what will Iraq look like in six months, your best judgment?

PETRAEUS: Well, in part, as we projected with the provincial Iraqi control, there will be a number of additional provinces that will be under Iraqi control.

Again, I think we had the projections on there. Sometimes those actually come forward, as in the case of, say, Anbar province; sometimes they move back, as has been the case with, say, Ninawa province.

In those provinces, there will be more robust Iraqi governance. Iraq forces will be shouldering more of the burden. We certainly intend to keep the heat on Al Qaida-Iraq and to try to reduce further the areas in which they have influence some degree -- I wouldn't call it safe-haven at this point, but operating space, and to continue to press that.

There clearly has to be both a military and a political solution with respect to the militia forces. Again, there is a huge political component to that, given their connection. And that will -- that is something that clearly has to be worked out and it is something, frankly, that the Iraqi political leaders are very much seized with right now.

There will have been provincial elections, and that will have enabled more representative governance in the various Iraq provinces.

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XXX various Iraqi provinces.

PETRAEUS: We hope that that can satisfy the aspirations of those who made a bad decision in the last elections, back in January 2005, when large numbers of Sunni Arabs, for example, boycotted the vote.

Certainly hope that basic services have been improved in terms of electricity, water, sewerage, because there are projects ongoing in a variety of those different areas. They obviously depend to a considerable degree on the security situation, but again there have been improvements in those areas and that certainly the oil exporting continues as it is, if not perhaps even tuned up a bit more, although the north, I think, recently broke either its all-time record or certainly its post-liberation record.

We hope to get into a variety of different ministry activities. More of the health clinics that we have helped Iraq build will be open by that point in time. I think it's between a third and a half right now that are open, and, again, we hope to see several dozen more of those opened over time.

And, again, I'd just go on like that down the various lines of operation that are in our joint campaign plan. As you know, there's not a military campaign plan in Iraq or a separate embassy campaign plan. It's a joint campaign plan signed by the two of us. And we do link arms as we try to take this forward and try to make progress across the board.

FORTENBERRY: Thank you, General.

Briefly, switching to the ambassador.

Mr. Ambassador, I noted in your testimony you referred to a diplomatic surge. I was pleased to see that in that Congressman McCaul, my colleague, and I introduced a resolution last year calling for a diplomatic surge, to make it the stated objective of Congress to augment our security efforts by engaging international stakeholders in robust diplomacy to ensure -- help ensure their support for political, economic and humanitarian assistance toward the rapid stabilization of Iraq.

Thus far, we've -- you've talked about enhanced U.S. -- U.N. engagement in Iraq, the international compact and the neighbors conferences.

What specific outcomes do you seek to accomplish in this regard by the end of the year? CROCKER: Well, with respect to the neighbors, the Arab neighbors, what we would very much like to see is the Arabs reengaging with Iraq. There are no Arab ambassadors currently in Baghdad, and that is not good for Iraq and it's not good for the Arab states.

FORTENBERRY: Debt relief and economic assistance as well?

CROCKER: Certainly on debt relief. Some have granted it. Others have not. That needs to move forward.

FORTENBERRY: I think these are very important considerations.

Thank you, gentlemen.

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XXX Thank you, gentlemen.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Crowley, is recognized for five minutes.

CROWLEY: I thank the chairman and thank both Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus for being here this afternoon -- this morning, this afternoon for these past couple of days and your testimony that you've given before both the Senate and the House.

I also want to thank both of you for my recent trip to Iraq, where I was treated very warmly and protected very well and felt very secure and safe on that particular CODEL led by my good friend and colleague from California, Mr. Costa.

And I want to thank the men and women who are serving in our armed services over there, who are exemplary and I think are just fantastic and terrific people who are doing the best job that they can on what I think are extremely difficult, if not somewhat impossible, circumstances.

I never once doubted for a moment that our troops would be successful in the surge. I think that we can basically do whatever we want to do militarily. The really question really lies as to whether or not the Iraqis have the ability to do what they need to do politically to move forward.

And that really comes to, I think, the question for me, and that is, we have seen a steady decline in the coalition of the willing in Iraq. And I would ask both Ambassador Crocker and you, General Petraeus, whether or not that is disconcerting to you -- whether you have concern about the lack of involvement by the greater free world in what's happening in Iraq today -- their lack of involvement.

CROCKER: Congressman, that international involvement is very important, but it can take different forms. We have got good, strong coalition partners. Their roles may transform over time.

The Australians, for example, as they decrease their military role, are increasing their role in economic engagement with Iraq, and we welcome this.

It's also why the kinds of efforts that the congressman was just asking about I think are so important to have the Arabs more engaged with Iraq, again, not as military coalition partners, but at a political level. MORE

XXX a political level.

CROWLEY: I'm very interested in the investments that are being made in an economic way to help in Iraq by our allies. But what I'm really concerned about is the fact that the U.S. is paying 95 percent of the cost of the military action and the occupation within Iraq today, and our allies -- in a reverse of the first Gulf War, where that was not the case, where most of the burden was placed on the rest of the world, we're paying certainly our fair share in that. That's not the case in this circumstance.

And that's, you know, it comes down to, for me, whether or not this is worth any additional American lives in keeping this effort going when there seems to be an intractable problem in getting the Iraqis to get their act together.

And we know how complicated the situation is. I mean, one doesn't have to look at the Senate and certainly Senator McCain and his time-to-time inability to understand exactly maybe and get the clear picture about what a Shia is and what a Sunnis is and who is involved in Al Qaida, who is not involved in Al Qaida.

But certainly the American people look at this as well, and say this is a very, very difficult situation. And they're questioning whether or not it is worth additional American lives to put on the line for something that is intractable for a long period.

CROCKER: Well, it's my view, Congressman, that there is -- there is political progress. And I tried to outline that in my testimony. We see it at local levels among both Sunnis and Shia, who are sick and tired of militia and terrorist activity, and making that clear.

We see it at the national level, where improving security has created an environment where the kinds of compromises on legislation that just could not be had, say six or nine months ago, are now achievable.

CROWLEY: Is it fair to describe the Iraqi legislature as dysfunctional?

CROCKER: No, sir, I don't believe it is. The Iraqi Council of Representatives, the parliament, showed us in the first couple of months of this year that they are able to come together and make the trade-offs across sectarian lines to get through some complex pieces of legislation like, again, an amnesty law.

Enormously important to the Sunnis, it required an atmosphere in which the Shia would not see that as threatening. And that's the atmosphere we're increasingly getting now.

CROWLEY: Ambassador, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I know my time is about to expire. I just want to congratulate our ally, Jordan, for the work that they're doing in terms of helping to train Iraqi police as well as extending themselves in terms of opening up their borders for refugees.

I think it's important to note and for our other allies in the Arab world to recognize them as well, and my colleagues as well.

(UNKNOWN): And counterterrorism, too.

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XXX And counterterrorism, too.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman is expired.

We are now on the ten-minute bells for a series of eight votes. I am not going to ask General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker to hang around until that is over.

So what I am prepared to do is sit here and chair this until every member who wants to stay with me and give up the chance to be Mr. Natcher and set the record for consecutive votes made is willing to miss votes with me to ask questions. I, of course, am not opposed to the next election.

So each member will have to make...

(LAUGHTER)

... a decision, but I will be here as long as somebody is willing to be recognized to take their time. And for people who don't want to do that, would you be all right if we submit questions in writing?

(UNKNOWN): Thank you. Just to make sure that some of us who will be going to vote, the ones who stay, they will not be able to ask a second round of questions...

BERMAN: No.

(UNKNOWN): ... no longer than five minutes?

BERMAN: Of course not. It'll be just the five-minute rule...

(UNKNOWN): Thank you, sir. Thank you, sir.

BERMAN: ... no seconds rounds...

(UNKNOWN): That's wonderful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BERMAN: If we finish the first round it'll be a miracle.

(LAUGHTER)

OK.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, is recognized for five minutes.

MCCAUL: I thank the chairman. General, Ambassador, thank you for your extraordinary service to this country.

The Wall Street Journal today reported that, "As General David Petraeus briefs Congress this week on Iraq, it's clear his surge has achieved remarkable results. The most crucial is that the U.S. can no longer be defeated militarily in Iraq, which could not be said a year ago.

"The question now is whether Washington will squander these gains by withdrawing so quickly that we could still lose politically."

I think we all want our troops to come home, but I think we want this to be done in the most responsible, efficient way possible.

With respect to the cost of the war, there's been a lot of discussion about that, and I think that, actually, a lot of members on both sides of the aisle agree with the fact that the Iraqi people, with their oil revenues, a $50 billion surplus, and that the stakeholders in the region need to begin to step up to the plate in terms of financing this operation -- and I think you're going to see a growing -- again, a growing movement in the Congress toward that.

But as we talk about the cost, I think we also need to talk about what is the cost of failure. How much will that cost not only the American people, the world?

And my question is two-part.

One is, if we fail -- and I like to win, and I think most Americans like to win -- but what would that failure -- what will the consequences of failure be in the world?

And the second part of my question has to do with Iran.

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XXX do with Iran.

MCCAUL: General, you've testified that Iranian caches have been captured, that agents of Iran have been found in Iraq.

It seems to me that Iran's influence is just as deep and as involved as Al Qaida, that in some respects that in and of itself is an act of war.

What, Ambassador, what can be done on the world stage in terms of the international response to what the Iranian government is now doing to us and to our troops in Iraq?

PETRAEUS: Congressman, perhaps I'll take the first one and the ambassador can take the second one. And if I could, just before -- just to recognize the tremendous job that was done by 3 Corps headquarters out of Fort Hood, 1st Cav Division, now 4th Infantry Division, others from Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, Fort Sam and other great military installations in Texas and also Air Force bases and so forth, all that played very key parts in the surge.

And really the operational level commander of that, of course, was Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, and he and his team did a magnificent job.

Sir, with respect to the consequences, of course, obviously they're unknowable. I mean, no one can predict the extent of what might happen, again, with respect to Al Qaida, how the -- whether or how the ethno-sectarian conflict might brew back up, whether that could lead to fragmentation of Iraq, bring other countries into it, produce a variety of different regional stability issues, or how it could lead, again, Iranian influence to expand and also perhaps to cause disruption in the global economy.

All of those are issues that I think are central to the national interests that we have in trying to get Iraq right, to get reasonable progress so that we can reasonably attain those very, very important national interests that we have.

CROCKER: If I could just add to that, Congressman. I mentioned, I think, in a previous hearing that I was in Lebanon in the early '80s at a time when we withdrew our Marines from Lebanon in 1984, following the Marine barracks bombing.

Other nations made calculations and came to conclusions as a result of that withdrawal, particularly Syria and Iran, as to what the U.S. would or would not be willing to do, and that still shapes the Middle Eastern environment. MORE

XXX Middle Eastern environment.

CROCKER: Those same calculations would be made if we -- in my view, if we were to withdraw from Iraq, leaving behind a failed or failing state with the consequent -- the specific consequences we described, sectarian violence, Al Qaida's return and significant Iranian influence. Those would be the first order of consequences, if you will.

But there would be second and third order consequences that I don't have the power of imagination to predict that would be enormously negative for our national interests over the long term.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

And the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for five minutes.

SCOTT: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, thank you very much for your service. We're all very proud of you and we're very appreciative for what you're doing.

And my comments are -- I want them set within the tone of recognizing that you're here, doing your jobs. You're carrying out orders. It is the orders that I have troubles with.

My first order of concern as to why I believe we must immediately have a plan in place to immediately start redeploying is simply because of the breaking of the back of our military.

Our military is overstrained. It's overstretched. Significantly. Both General Casey, generals within the Army have already indicated that every one of our combat units for the Marines, for the Army, as well as for our National Guards, have already been used up. Our readiness levels are shot.

We've had our soldiers on three and four tours of duty.

You know, if you really want to get a taste of this war, I always advise my colleagues to make sure you go to Landstuhl air base. I've been over there three times, every time I go over into the war zone.

I've been over there three times at Landstuhl. You want to know the cost of this, you look in the eyes of these soldiers, and you know what that cost is. And I'm here to tell you, General, I am very concerned about the complete brutalization of our military in this process. And this is the elephant in the room that we continue to try to gloss over.

And I get tons of calls in my office, every one of my townhall meetings, where soldiers who have served their duty come back with grave complaints.

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XXX with grave complaints.

SCOTT: The way we treat our wounded warriors and our veterans is despicable. And as we talk about this surge -- even the generals have said the 30,000 surge that we've had in place has caused unsustainable stress on our military.

And then, secondly, with your offer and your extension, again, in all due respect -- because I respect you for the job that you're doing -- but our military advisers are saying to us, those who are in the Pentagon, those that are here now, not just the retirees, say this pause that you're asking for in the slow down in order to sustain it at the 140,000-troop level will cause immeasurable harm.

And I'm not just talking about the physical harm; I'm talking about the mental stress. We've had nearly 200,000 of the 516,000 soldiers that have served in Iraq -- nearly 200,000 have been over there on their second tour, 63,000 on their third tour and about 28,000 now moving onto their fourth tours of duty. I'm not touting anything that you don't know.

But one fact that's glaring out: 30 percent of every one of these troops that have served in Iraq are suffering from mental health problems. I'm not even counting the divorce rates that are there.

So when we evaluate going forward and what we're going to do in 100 years there or how long we're going to stay, we must take into consideration the tremendous damage that we're doing to our men and women in uniform, and it is for that reason that we need to plan a redeployment out.

The other reason is this. In six and a half months, you may not say we're going to end this war, I might not say it -- I'm saying I'm hoping we end it -- but the American people are going to end this war. And they're going to come to the polls in November and they're going to speak loudly.

We need to have a plan in order so that we can move out. I think one piece that is missing is this great reluctance to understand the impact of Iran. Iran is a major player in this.

I recall you're a student of history and you know full well what happened in World War II. A lot of us did not want to move with Russia. Russia was a problem. But we had to deal with other countries who we did not agree with in order to come to a conclusion.

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XXX to a conclusion.

SCOTT: This war must end for the sake of our military. Our military is weaker today than it was five years ago. Iran is stronger today than it was five years ago.

It is no wonder that in the recent action in Basra, where there was a settlement for peace, who negotiated it? Iran. Where was it negotiated? In Iran.

We've got civil war upon civil war here. These folks have been fighting for centuries. What are we going to do in the next six months to settle this? How are you as commander going to deal and look soldiers in the face to send them to their deaths knowing that this matter is coming to an end?

The American people are going to say it's coming to an end. There's going to be a change in the presidency. And we cannot continue with the brutalization and the back breaking that we're doing to our military.

I got 10 seconds.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

SCOTT: Thank you very much.

BERMAN: Gentleman from South Carolina, with my apologies for making him be here 10 minutes longer than he needed to be, Mr. Inglis?

INGLIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General and Ambassador, you know, our military is really the incredible race horse that will run its heart out for the American people. And really in sort of three phases you've been completely successful.

We asked you to go depose a madman who we thought was dangerous to us. Did that, it's complete success.

Second phase, disrupt terrorist networks, no further attacks on the United States, score that one as a success, too.

Third phase, I wasn't completely sold, but the idea of a surge seems to have worked in terms of the military consequences of creating a security zone, a space for them to decide questions.

Now, of course, you need to make those decisions. So in each phase our military's accomplished exactly what we asked you to do. And Ambassador Crocker said something very helpful in your testimony.

Sir, you said that essentially we are supporters of their democracy, of Iraq's democracy, but we're not guarantors of their democracy. Maybe that's my way of phrasing it, not yours.

But I wonder, General and Ambassador, what would be the warning signs that we are going from supporter status to guarantor status?

CROCKER: Congressman, I don't see us moving in that direction. We're trying to, as you rightly said, create the conditions where they can take the political decisions necessary to further reconciliation and get themselves on the track to a stable future.

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XXX a stable future.

CROCKER: But these have to be their decisions. We can't pass their laws for them. It would be impossible, and it would not have any effect, even if it were possible.

So I don't think I see the circumstances under which this would arise.

INGLIS: Well, it worries me, actually -- your answer worries me, because there would be no warning signals for you that we have gone from supporter to guarantor.

I think there is a point at which you clearly go from supporter to guarantor. In other words, you say that we will stay indefinitely. That would be the warning sign that, "Wait a minute. "No, we can't stay indefinitely." We can't stay -- at some point, you have to say: We supported you, but we're not going to guarantee you.

CROCKER: I've got you now.

Well, I think one way to frame that would be the effort we are beginning now, for a strategic framework agreement and a status of forces agreement.

As I noted in my testimony, to give our military the authorities and protections it will need when the Security Council resolution expires at the end of the year, we will need that kind of agreement.

It is our firm intention to negotiate it as an executive agreement, meaning that it will not contain within it the commitments or, I guess, in your term, the guarantees, that would require the advice and consent of the Senate.

INGLIS: General, is the recent call-off in the last two weeks by Sadr, is that a sign of weakness on his part, or strength? Weakness that he saw reinforcements coming his way and maybe he wasn't going to be able to withstand them and weakening of his position in cooperating in Iran?

Or is it strength in that he's able to show, listen, I can turn it on or turn it off?

PETRAEUS: As with all these, I think there were a number of factors that probably are at play.

One of them is probably related to the reason for the cease-fire in the first place, back after the violence that was precipitated in the holy city of Karbala by his militia forces, that that damaged the image of his movement. And I think there is concern over the political ramifications of continued violence that is clearly laid at the feet of the militia, which the population actually has begun to turn against.

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XXX to turn against.

PETRAEUS: There is not a blank check there just because he is cloaked in the name of the Sadr movement and has the lineage that he has, if you will.

And so, in that sense, I think, is very much based on concern and also a sense, frankly, that if it did play out, as well, they could sustain some pretty significant losses.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Costa, is recognized for give minutes.

COSTA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to thank Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus for the good work that you've done. Add to the kudos that the rest of my colleagues have given.

Your team, when our CODEL was in Iraq in March, the military did a great job of moving us where we wanted to go, when we wanted to go. And Rich Halton (ph) did a good job in making sure that we, more or less, stayed out of harm's way.

A couple of different questions -- a lot of them have been answered. We know that there a number of factors that have allowed us to reach the reduction in violence over the last year.

Among those, as you've stated, is the Sunni agreement that we've reached. And, obviously, that payment of some 90,000 strong, I guess, is militias -- Sons of Iraq is key to that.

PETRAEUS: 20,000 of those are Shia, by the way, sir. Just to be sure that we're...

COSTA: Right. Yet 70,000 plus the 20,000. My question is: How long are we going to be able, one, to continue to pay them?

And, two, what is the process, because there has been a reluctance on the part of the Maliki government to incorporate these into either the security force or to make them, you know -- to train with, you know, jobs that they can perform? How long can we pay them?

PETRAEUS: Congressman, again, the process is that we've already transitioned about 20,000 of these individuals over time into Iraqi security force jobs, other government positions. And there are a host of programs that are being -- some already established, many that are expanding that would have just tried pilot program are now moving.

There's a civilian-conservation-corps-kind-of-concept. There is the job training and reintegration program. There is basic education. There is skills...

COSTA: So you believe you have the resources to successfully mainstream all of these within the next 12 months?

PETRAEUS: We do, and we're now helped because of the Iraqi CERP that I mentioned and the funding, again, of...

COSTA: With the Maliki government.

PETRAEUS: ... top government support. Yes, sir.

I think I -- in the statement, if you just want to look at -- I think it's about three pages from the...

COSTA: I'll refer back to it. I don't have a lot of time and...

(CROSSTALK)

PETRAEUS: Because there's nearly a billion dollars total if you add it all up.

COSTA: All right. I think there have been a little more from the Basra situation. I think it is a good case study. And many of the questions I had about winners and losers and how well they performed and whether or not Maliki's credibility is increased as a result of this, I think you've answered.

PETRAEUS: Great.

COSTA: I'd like to go, Mr. Ambassador, to an issue that was raised, and it's been discussed over the last year, as to whether or not the right form of government exists to really bring these factions together.

I guess the national security adviser to Maliki, Rubaie -- is that how you pronounce his name?

CROCKER: Rubaie, yes.

COSTA: Rubaie wrote a column back in January -- I'm sure you're familiar with it -- asserting that "the current political framework is based on pluralistic democratic vision that, while admirable, is entirely unsuited to resolving the three-way divide. It ignores the underlying issues and expects that a consensus will emerge simply by enacting a liberal constitution legal order."

He goes on to say that "pluralistic democracy will not take root unless the national political compact recognizes and accommodates the fears and the aspirations of the Iraq community." And then he talks about some other factors in there.

I'd like you to comment whether or not -- the expectation level, it's got to be terribly frustrating doing what you guys do every day. But do we have the right mix here to have a expectation level that we can reach in the next year?

COSTA: Well, I think we do, Congressman.

What Dr. Rubaie was talking about -- what the thrust of that op- ed was was the creation of regions within Iraq.

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XXX regions within Iraq.

CROCKER: There is already a Kurdish region.

COSTA: We were there. Seems to be doing well.

CROCKER: Exactly.

There is a regions law that comes into -- it was passed 18 months ago. There was a moratorium on its effective date. That will become effective actually this month. And that will permit a province or a grouping of provinces to begin a process of regionalization if they so choose.

COSTA: Included in that the five contracts that the Kurds signed on the oil leases, will they be observed by the government in Baghdad?

CROCKER: Well, this is, you know, some of the unfinished business...

COSTA: Right.

CROCKER: ... in determining who has authority to do what. And the validity of those oil contracts on a national resource, signed by a regional government, is contested now between the federal government and the regional government. It's one of the things they're going to have work out.

COSTA: Got more questions; don't have any more time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And keep up the good work, gentlemen.

BERMAN: The time of the gentleman has expired.

My metric is arithmetical, and it's down to one. And I recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee.

LEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for allowing the hearing to conclude with my final questions.

And good afternoon, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker.

Let me again thank you both for your service. Both of you, as well as our very brave troops, have made countless sacrifices.

I am one, however, who believes, like many, that there is no military solution in Iraq.

We're occupying a country that has descended really into a civil war, which our troops are basically called to referee. And this was very clear last week in Basra when American commanders felt obligated to risk American troops to rescue for the most part Iraqi forces from an unwise, ill-conceived and unilateral decision by the prime minister of Iraq. And it's reported that at least 1,000 Iraqi security forces refused to fight or abandoned their posts.

It appears also -- and we've heard this over and over today -- that Iran has gained a very strong stronghold in Iraq and that Al Qaida is still ever present.

So, Ambassador -- first, General Petraeus, can you explain Al Qaida's presence and Iran's role in Iraq prior to shock and awe five years ago, and is America safer now?

Secondly, General Petraeus, let me just say -- and some have mentioned -- that many see the signs that paralleled the march to war against Iraq now setting the stage for a preemptive military strike against Iran.

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XXX strike against Iran.

LEE: And you mentioned earlier that that is not within your authorization. But with regard to a flat-out yes or no, are you authorized to conduct military operations against Iran? And I'd just like, again, maybe a flat-out yes or not.

PETRAEUS: Could I just give you that answer in private later, because I don't want to tell -- it will reassure you, but I think that's probably a classified answer that...

LEE: Certainly, I would appreciate...

PETRAEUS: ... I'll be happy to answer it to you right after this, if that's OK.

LEE: OK. Certainly.

Ambassador Crocker, let me just ask you the question. We'll go back to General Petraeus. On six occasions, I just want to remind you, that President Bush did sign the legislation containing provisions relating to no permanent military bases in Iraq.

But in December, he issued a signing statement, in essence not especially approving of that policy. So now, with the SOFA agreement pending, let me ask you -- and you've said that we do not intend to seek permanent military bases in Iraq. The president, somehow, is not clear on that. So maybe you're defining military bases differently than what he is defining military bases.

But I think -- and I agree that the administration can't obligate the expenditure of public funds to guarantee the security of a sovereign country without congressional approval, especially now that the American people have spent over $500 billion in Iraq, which has contributed, significantly, to this recession that's hurting millions of Americans.

And so, could you, Ambassador Crocker, clarify this permanent military base issue and the confusion of either the president or the president's staff and appointees?

CROCKER: Yes, ma'am. The position is as I've stated it in my testimony. We are not seeking permanent military bases in Iraq. The Iraqis -- that's our position -- that is something the Iraqis are not seeking either.

And, as I said, it is our expectation that the status of forces agreement, when negotiated, will explicitly forswear permanent military bases.

So I think we are quite clear on that.

LEE: OK. Well, Ambassador Crocker, I would urge you to let the president know that, because that signing statement is really undermining exactly what you're saying.

General Petraeus, could you answer my question, I don't have much time left, with regard to the president's Al Qaida in Iran -- in Iraq -- prior to shock and awe?

PETRAEUS: I am not aware of a presence of Al Qaida in Iraq prior. There's some discussion of links with some extremist organizations. But, again, I'm not sure how much stock I would put in that either.

And in prior, of course, Iran and Iraq were not exactly kissing cousins in those days. In fact, they had, of course, had a lengthy eight-year war that dominated most of their relations between 1980 and 1988 or so.

LEE: Well, how could America be more secure now, five years later, if Iran and Iraq -- Iran and Al Qaida weren't present five years ago?

Is my time up?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General.

And thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

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XXX you, Mr. Ambassador.

LEE: I look forward to your response.

BERMAN: Time of the gentlelady has expired.

Mr. Ambassador, General, we do thank you very much for being here. We do congratulate you for your and our forces' successes in the considerable areas where there has been success. Our hearts are with you. Our minds have some reservations. But thank you for your patience here, and good luck.

The hearing is adjourned.

END
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Apr 09, 2008 18:33 ET .EOF