By Bradley Graham
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, April 4, 1997; Page A04

Since the Soviet Union dissolved six years ago, the Defense Department has tried several times without lasting success to come up with a new model for shaping U.S. forces, and Pentagon officials are at it again.

Previous attempts in 1991, 1993 and 1995 to redefine the military's mission and reassess service roles shifted focus from the Soviet threat to regional ones such as Iraq and North Korea. But the reviews resulted in only limited adjustments to Cold War thinking about types of forces, ways of fighting and budget shares among the military branches.

The challenge now confronting Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, the former Republican senator from Maine in only his third month running the Pentagon, comes down to choosing among three basic courses of action that senior aides directing the current review have outlined for him.

One approach would keep largely to current plans to invest in new weapons and equipment at a moderate rate. It would probably require some marginal reduction in troop levels to help fund replacements for aircraft, ships and armored vehicles as they wear out.

An alternative course would jump the Pentagon full-bore into what has been dubbed the "Revolution in Military Affairs," or RMA, involving the accelerated integration of computer-age technologies into weapon systems and military command and control networks. This option carries the promise of greater military agility, precision and potency but would require large force reductions to finance. It also would ultimately mean radical adjustments in the way U.S. troops fight.

A third option would strike a balance between these two. It would incorporate RMA sensor, targeting and communication technologies into military hardware at a faster clip than now planned. But it would maintain a robust conventional force to meet the many operational requirements predicted by Pentagon strategists, particularly in peacekeeping and other noncombat missions.

This middle course, which could cut 50,000 to 100,000 service members from the current force of 1.45 million, is the one that senior Pentagon officials guiding the Quadrennial Defense Review have given the impression they favor, according to participants. It fits closest with the view of the world over the next 10 to 15 years outlined in a draft strategy document, although all three options were presented to Cohen as consistent with the revised strategy.

The strategy document affirms the need to increase spending on new military hardware, noting the Pentagon allowed purchases to dwindle in the 1990s as it lived off the fruits of enormous modernization investments in the 1970s and 1980s.

"Many weapons systems and platforms that were purchased in the 1970s and 1980s will soon reach the end of their useful lives," the report says. "It is now essential that the department increase procurement spending to historically sustainable levels so that we can ensure that tomorrow's forces are every bit as modern and capable as today's – even more so."

Moreover, the report stipulates that the Pentagon should "continue to exploit the Revolution in Military Affairs" to improve military capabilities. By concluding there is little likelihood another superpower will arise before 2010 to challenge the United States, the report suggests the Pentagon could afford the risks and disruptions associated with the accelerated RMA model.

But the document also seems to make the case for keeping force reductions to a minimum. It stresses that the world will remain filled with regional aggressors and nontraditional challenges to U.S. power such as terrorist attacks, use of biological or chemical agents and sabotage of American computer networks. It also concludes that U.S. forces will continue to face "high" demand to participate in peace operations and other "small scale contingencies."

This view of the future would appear to attach considerable risk to accepting the kind of substantial force cuts that advocates of the RMA concept say are necessary to cover the roughly $100 billion cost of turning it into a reality over the next 10 years.

The military chiefs are in fact resisting more than marginal cuts in force levels. And while they have welcomed some high-tech innovations in hopes of achieving greater efficiencies, none of the service leaders has stepped forward to embrace the structural and doctrinal changes that also compose the RMA model. More than simply advocating technological advances in aircraft, ships and tanks, RMA thinking envisions smaller, less hierarchical combat units that would work together more closely, operate at greater distances from an enemy and go after an enemy's strategic centers or "nodes" rather than pursue traditional attrition or maneuver warfare.

"RMA thinking is still just the parsley on the plate," said a senior civilian Pentagon official.

The draft report recommends simply that the Pentagon "strike the balance" between meeting near-term demands for U.S. forces and investing in new technologies sufficiently to ensure future military readiness.

Cohen, who has expressed interest in the potential of new technologies for increasing the lethality and reducing the vulnerability of U.S. forces, has nonetheless given little sign publicly of where he intends to lead the review process. But even he will not have the last word.

Congress has set up a nine-member National Defense Panel of retired military officers, businessmen and defense think tank members to monitor the Pentagon review, due May 15, and submit its own report later in the year.

"Part of the difficulty is that Congress itself is speaking out of both sides of its mouth," another senior Pentagon official said. "Some in the Senate want to use the review process for more radical approaches, while others in the House recently signaled they were not prepared to support cuts in force structure. All of this just adds to the general swirl."