Wednesday, November 25, 1998

Following is the text of Attorney General Janet Reno's explanation of her decision not to seek an outside counsel probe to investigate whether Vice President Al Gore lied to investigators about his fund-raising activities. Reno submitted the 19-page filing to the special panel of three federal judges that oversees the independent counsel process on November 24.

On August 26, 1998, I notified this Court of the initiation of a preliminary investigation of Vice President of the United States Albert Gore, Jr. The preliminary investigation has now been concluded, and I have determined that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted of the matters that were under investigation. Therefore, appointment of an independent counsel is not being sought. In accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 592(b), this notification will summarize the information received and the results of the preliminary investigation.

This preliminary investigation explored the question of whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant further investigation into whether the Vice President violated federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, when he told attorneys and investigators last Fall that he did not know, at the time he made fundraising telephone calls from his West Wing Office, that the beneficiary of the solicitations, the media campaign run by the Democratic National Committee (DNC), was funded in part with federal money, and that he believed at the time of his telephone calls that federal money contributions to the DNC were limited to $2,000.⁽¹⁾

a. The 1997 Investigation

In the Fall of 1997, the Department conducted a preliminary investigation into the question of whether the Vice President may have violated 18 U.S.C. § 607 when he made fundraising telephone calls from his White House office (hereinafter, 1997 Investigation). The 1997 Investigation led to my conclusion that there were no grounds to seek appointment of an independent counsel for two independent reasons: first, the overwhelming weight of the evidence supported the Vice President's statement that he was soliciting soft money contributions, outside the scope of section 607's ban on political fundraising from the federal workplace, when he made the telephone calls, and second, established Departmental policy precluded prosecutions under section 607 in the absence of aggravating circumstances, such as coercion, that were absent there.⁽²⁾

In the course of the 1997 Investigation, we interviewed the Vice President. The Vice President explained that he believed he was soliciting soft money when he was making the telephone calls. The Vice President further explained that the telephone solicitations were intended to raise funds for the DNC's media fund, a series of so-called "issue advertisements" run during late 1995 and 1996. He further explained that he believed at the time he made the calls that the DNC media campaign was financed entirely with soft money, and that donors were limited to $2000 in hard money contributions. This belief was erroneous,⁽³⁾ but as a result, when he requested large contributions to the media fund, he believed that he could only have been requesting soft money contributions.⁽⁴⁾ The Vice President understood that there was a hard money component to the DNC's overall budget, and that some of its activities had to be financed with hard money, but believed that because the media fund involved so-called "issue ads," it could be financed entirely with soft money.

We explored this question further with the Vice President at the time, because we had obtained a number of memoranda addressed to the Vice President, among others, that mentioned the fact that the media campaign was funded with both hard and soft money, and we knew that a November 21, 1995 DNC budget meeting focused on the budget for the media fund. The agenda for the November 21 meeting suggested that the amount of funding for the media campaign and how to raise it was to have been a topic of discussion at the meeting, which we knew was attended by the Vice President.

The Vice President stated that he did not recall a discussion at this or any other meeting about the DNC's specific need for both hard and soft money in late 1995 to keep the advertisements on the air. The Vice President said that he believed that the fundraising phone calls probably were discussed during the meeting and that the general topic of the media fund budget being increased was raised and discussed. As for the memoranda that reflected a hard money component to the media fund, the Vice President said that as a rule he did not read memoranda on these topics, particularly from this author. This general practice was corroborated in the course of separate interviews with members of the Vice President's staff.

The Vice President's statements about his beliefs and intentions were a factor in my final conclusion in 1997 with respect to the alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 607, although a relatively minor one. Far more weighty was the substantial evidence derived from interviews of the donors themselves which substantiated my conclusion that they were in fact solicited for large soft money contributions to the DNC, to support the DNC's media campaign.

b. The New Information

On July 27, 1998, long after the conclusion of the 1997 Investigation, the Vice President's counsel provided the Department with a six-page set of newly discovered documents, responsive to document requests we had made during the 1997 Investigation. The documents were a copy of a set of documents already in our possession, which were distributed at the November 1995 meeting referenced above. The copies provided by the Vice President's counsel, however, included handwritten notes by a member of the Vice President's staff that strongly suggested that the hard money component to the media fund may have been expressly mentioned during the November 1995 meeting, which was attended by the Vice President.⁽⁵⁾

Specifically, the notes -- which set forth "65% soft/35% hard" opposite the term "media fund" -- appear to reflect a phrase that may have been used at the meeting to describe the approximate proportions of hard and soft money used by the DNC to purchase television ads during this period. The notes also include what may be a statement of the hard money limit for gifts to the DNC. Specifically, the note just below the "65%/35%" includes what appears to be an attempt to define soft money from the DNC's perspective as "corporate or anything over $20 k from an individual." In addition, while not clearly written, a second notation that appears to say "hard limit $20k" appears on page two of the set of documents.

These new documents, then, raised some new questions concerning the Vice President's statements about his understanding of the DNC's efforts to fund the media campaign. The notes suggested that during the November 1995 meeting, both the fact that the hard money limit on donations to the DNC was $20,000, and that the media campaign was funded by a mix of hard and soft money may have been discussed in the Vice President's presence. This could give rise to an inference that his subsequent statements that he believed at the time that hard money donations to the DNC were limited to $2,000 and that the media campaign was funded only by soft money may have been false.

I therefore initiated a preliminary investigation of this matter to fully explore the evidence concerning the Vice President's knowledge and intent.

The false statement statute provides, in pertinent part:

[w]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully . . . makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation shall be [guilty of a felony].

18 U.S.C. § 1001. To obtain a conviction under section 1001, the government must prove (1) a statement, (2) falsity, (3) materiality, (4) specific intent, and (5) agency jurisdiction. United States v. Herring, 916 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11^th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 946 (1991). The elements in issue here are falsity and criminal intent; the other elements of the offense are not in dispute.

The handwritten notes alone are not sufficient to warrant a conclusion that the Vice President made a false statement. In an effort to determine whether the apparent disparity between what the Vice President told us he believed at the time he made the calls and what the notes indicate may have been said at a meeting he attended on these topics warrants further investigation, we interviewed the attendees of the meeting and others involved with these topics. These witnesses included the Vice President, current and former members of his staff, other current and former White House officials, officials of the Clinton/Gore '96 Committee (Clinton/Gore '96), and various officers and employees of the DNC. Documents were also obtained from the White House, the DNC, Clinton/Gore '96, and others, including an affidavit from the Vice President's counsel. We also reviewed depositions and testimony provided by various witnesses in the course of previous congressional and task force inquiries into various campaign fundraising matters. Finally, we reviewed all other documents and evidence that might support an inference that the Vice President's statements were false.

We were seeking to determine whether there was any evidence from which one might reasonably infer that the Vice President actually knew about the funding of the media campaign or the $20,000 contribution limit. Such an inference might be supported, for example, by information that these facts were discussed in sufficient detail and focus at the meeting that many other attendees specifically recall them, that the Vice President made comments or asked questions in the course of the discussion that would seem to reflect an active understanding of the details, that the participants recall any affirmative discussion of a need to raise hard money for the media fund, that the Vice President read memoranda that made these points, or that anyone spoke directly to the Vice President on any occasion about the need to raise hard money for the media campaign.

As a threshold matter, the evidence we gathered during these interviews does support a conclusion that the Vice President attended a DNC budget meeting on November 21, 1995, and that at some point in the course of the meeting, the DNC media fund was discussed. The evidence also supports a conclusion that some reference was made in the course of the meeting to the fact that there was a hard money component to the financing of the media campaign.

Fifteen individuals, including the President and Vice President, attended the meeting. All fifteen were interviewed, with two exceptions: one who testified under oath in the course of a congressional investigation that he had no recollection of the meeting, and that if he attended at all, he likely would have left after just a few minutes; and the President, who provided us with a statement that he had no independent recollection of the meeting.

No attendees recall any particular questions or comments by the Vice President. No one who did not arrive at the meeting with a working knowledge of the DNC financing issues left with an accurate understanding of the fact that both hard and soft money were necessary to pay for the media campaign. Only two attendees of the meeting even recall the topic of a hard money component to the media fund being raised during the meeting.

While the author of the notes had no specific recollection of the meeting, he did confirm, based on his habit and practice, his belief that the words noted in his handwriting were things said during the meeting that he recorded as they were said. Reviewing his notes, this attendee could not recall who might have uttered the words "65% soft/35% hard"; "corporate or anything over $20k from an individual"; or "hard money limit $20k" during the meeting. He was also unable to provide an explanation about what each of the phrases might have meant within the context of the meeting. He did not recall the issue of "hard" and "soft" money being discussed by those attending but noted that these issues were often discussed at DNC budget meetings. He was also unable to say whether the words were used with regard to the media fund, the DNC's operating budget, or something else. Notably, this individual, who attended the meeting and was paying enough attention to what was being said to take verbatim notes of some points, also told us during his interview that he believed that the media campaign was financed entirely with soft money.

Two attendees specifically recall references to hard money in connection with the media fund being made at the meeting. The first, a White House official, recalls that the hard money component to the media fund was discussed. He also recalls a discussion of how much would have to be raised both in hard and in soft dollars for the media fund during the meeting. However, he has no specific recollection of any of the statements recorded in the notes.⁽⁶⁾

The other, a DNC official, was the individual who made one of the quoted statements. He recalls answering a question about the "spending side" of the media campaign by noting that the expenses were generally averaging "65% soft/35% hard".⁽⁷⁾ The answer, according to this attendee, was one sentence without any elaboration. He does not remember who asked the question but volunteered that he did not think it was the Vice President since the Vice President did not often get into "that level of detail". He had no memory of anyone else mentioning hard or federal money during this preliminary discussion of the "spending side" of the media campaign. He does not recall a specific use of the terms hard, soft, federal or non-federal money during the discussion that centered around the "spending side" of the DNC.

He did remember some discussion about the fact that the DNC had sufficient funds available to borrow on their hard money line of credit but no borrowing capacity on the soft money side. There was a discussion about direct mail contributions to the DNC operating budget -- all in hard money -- that were available, if needed, for the media purchases. He recalled that both of these facts were mentioned as reasons why there was sufficient hard money on hand to keep the advertisements on the air through the end of the year, but that soft money would need to be raised.⁽⁸⁾ According to this witness, after these points were made at the meeting, the ensuing conversation about the funding of the media campaign and the money needed to be raised by the President and Vice President would have been focused on the need for soft money.

As noted above, in order to prove a violation of Section 1001 in this case, the government would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the time he made the telephone calls that were at issue in the 1997 Investigation, the Vice President actually knew that the media campaign had a hard money component, or that the limit on hard money contributions was $20,000. In this case, there is no direct evidence of such knowledge. While the Vice President was present at the meeting, there is no evidence that he heard the statements or understood their implications, so as to suggest the falsity of his statement two years later that he believed the media fund was entirely soft money. Nor does anyone recall the Vice President asking any questions or making any comments at the meeting about the media fund, much less questions or comments indicating an understanding of the issue of the blend of hard and soft money needed for DNC media expenditures. Witnesses were also asked whether they recalled any other discussion with the Vice President about the hard money component of the media fund; none recalled any, nor did any recall the Vice President saying or doing anything at any other time that would indicate that indeed he knew, whether from the meeting or from some other source, that there was a hard money component to the media fund.

There is thus only weak circumstantial evidence of the Vice President's knowledge -- his presence at a meeting where the subject was briefly discussed -- that I do not believe provides reasonable grounds for proceeding further in this matter. Notably, others attending the meeting also left it with an inaccurate understanding of the funding of the media campaign. The range of impressions and vague misunderstandings among all the meeting attendees is striking, and undercuts any reasonable inference that mere attendance at the meeting should have served to communicate to the Vice President an accurate understanding of the facts.

In addition to the total lack of direct evidence suggesting that the Vice President was aware of the hard money component to the media fund, and the insubstantial nature of even the indirect evidence, I also find a lack of evidence to reasonably support a conclusion that he may have had a motive to falsely deny that he knew about the hard money component. The documentary evidence and the testimony from involved witnesses clearly establish that at the time, the DNC did not need to find ways of raising hard money in order to continue to run the advertisements. However, it was critically short of soft money, and had used up its soft money line of credit. Thus, when the Vice President was asked to help raise money by making telephone solicitations, the DNC's specific need was for soft money.

In other words, the Vice President did not need to deny knowledge of the fact that there was a hard money component to the fund in order to provide an innocent explanation for his telephone calls. His explanation would have been just as innocent if he had stated that while he knew there was a hard money component to the media campaign, soft money was what was needed at the time and therefore that was what he was raising. In fact, such an account, unlike the one he gave, would have been corroborated by the documentary evidence that was brought to the Vice President's attention.

It is also significant that there is evidence that this issue was specifically brought to the Vice President's attention before his interview with us during the 1997 Investigation. The Vice President's attorneys have provided us with their sworn statement that in the course of preparing him for his interview, the Vice President also told them that at the time he made the calls he believed that the media campaign was funded entirely with soft money. They explained to him that this belief was not accurate, and pointed out to him that there were documents, addressed to him, in conflict with his statement. Nevertheless, they averred, he stated that he would have to tell us that he believed the media fund was all soft money because it was the truth.

To summarize, it appears that at the time of his interview during the 1997 Investigation, the Vice President was expressly aware that he had little to gain and much to lose in admitting his misconception of the true facts. In fact, his explanation not only led to additional inquiries during the 1997 Investigation, because it was at odds with known documents, but led directly to this investigation as well. I can see no reasonable basis for concluding that he had a motive to tell this story if it were not true.

As mentioned above, the Vice President also told us in the course of the 1997 Investigation that he believed that the limit on hard money contributions was $2000, and some of the handwritten notes suggest that topic too may have been discussed at the November 1995 meeting. However, while some of the fifteen meeting attendees had a vague recollection of some of the topics of discussion, no one interviewed could remember the use of the note's terms "hard limit $20 k" and "corporate or anything over $20k from an individual" in this meeting. We thus have no evidence of what, if anything, was said, or in what context. Thus, with the exception of the notes themselves, the meaning of which is unclear, we are left with no evidence that the Vice President's statement that he believed the legal limit for hard money gifts to the DNC was the same as the limit for individual candidates -- $2,000 per election cycle -- is false. We found no independent evidence to suggest that the Vice President did not in fact believe that hard money contributions were so limited, and his belief is plausible in light of his previous experience with congressional campaigns.⁽⁹⁾ While it appears from the handwritten notes that some reference to the higher limit on hard money contributions to the DNC may have been made during the meeting, the fact that no one who attended the meeting recalled the statement -- and a number of other attendees reported the same or similar mistaken belief about the limitation on the size of hard money contributions -- leads me to the conclusion that I have insufficient evidence to warrant further investigation as to whether the Vice President made a false statement on this point.

As mentioned above, in the course of the 1997 Investigation, we obtained several memoranda addressed to the Vice President as one of several recipients, which contain brief internal references to the hard money component to the media fund. However, as we noted at the conclusion of the 1997 Investigation, the Vice President has stated, and several members of his staff have confirmed, that he did not read these types of memoranda that dealt with DNC budgetary issues. We discovered no new evidence during this investigation which contradicts this evidence or would lead me to revisit my previous conclusion that the mere existence of these memoranda, without any evidence that the Vice President actually read them, was not sufficient grounds to conclude that the Vice President might have been making a false statement about his knowledge of the hard money component to the media fund.

Finally, there were regular meetings held at the White House known as "Residence Meetings," because they were held in the White House. During the relevant period, the Residence Meetings were focused on political strategy and polling issues. Two Residence Meeting "agendas" -- one dated September 7, 1995 and the other dated September 13, 1995 -- have one line each that indicates that the DNC issue ads under consideration were going to be paid for, in part, with hard money.

We were unable to establish whether the Vice President attended these particular meetings; indeed, we have been unable to establish that those two meetings were even held. They do not appear on either the President's or the Vice President's daily calendars, while other Residence Meetings do appear. Regular attendees of the Residence Meetings who were interviewed do not recall whether these particular meetings were held, or if they were held, whether the Vice President attended or whether these particular agenda items were actually discussed. Many of the attendees specifically stated that they do not recall the hard money component to the media fund ever being discussed at the Residence Meetings.⁽¹⁰⁾ Given this state of the evidence, I conclude that there is insufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that the Vice President was put on notice as to the hard money component to the media fund during or because of any discussion that may have been held on the topic in the course of the Residence Meetings.

I considered with care the reasonable implications that might be drawn from all of this evidence -- the Vice President's attendance at the November 1995 meeting, the memoranda addressed to him, and the Residence meetings -- along with all other evidence and information available to us concerning the Vice President's understanding of the media fund and how it was financed, including the affidavit of the Vice President's counsel. Taken altogether, I find the evidence fails to provide any reasonable support for a conclusion that the Vice President may have lied. As explained above, there are no reasonable grounds to conclude that the November 1995 meeting would have put the Vice President on notice of the hard money component of the media fund, there is no evidence that the Vice President actually read the memoranda in which the topic is mentioned (and considerable evidence that he did not), and there is insufficient evidence that the topic was addressed at the Residence Meetings or that the Vice President attended the meetings where the topic might have been raised. As a result, I conclude that there is no reasonable prospect that these facts could support a successful prosecution. Furthermore, I am unable to identify any additional investigation that might reasonably be expected to provide sufficient evidence to support a successful prosecution.

I conclude that the evidence supporting a conclusion that the Vice President may have provided false statements to investigators and attorneys during an interview in the 1997 Investigation is so insubstantial that there are no reasonable grounds for further investigation. Therefore, based on the results of the above-described investigation, I hereby notify this Court that no independent counsel should be appointed.

Respectfully submitted,

________________________________

JANET RENO

Attorney General of the United States

DATE: ____________________

Footnotes

1. Two additional allegations were received during the course of the preliminary investigation that were related to the Vice President's fundraising calls, but not to the specific matter that was the subject of this preliminary investigation. An initial inquiry was conducted into these allegations to determine whether they were sufficiently specific and credible to warrant further investigation into whether the Vice President may have violated federal law. I have determined that they are not, and they have been closed.

2. These factual conclusions eliminated the necessity for me to reach a determination as to whether section 607 applied to the facts alleged.

3. In fact, the advertisements were financed pursuant to a regulatory formula apportioning their cost between hard and soft money, and individual donors are permitted to contribute up to $20,000 to the DNC in hard money per calendar year, so long as their total hard money contributions to all donees do not exceed $25,000 per calendar year.

4. As additional reasons why he intended to ask for soft money, the Vice President also pointed out that it was easier to raise soft money, especially corporate dollars, and that he believed that soft money is what the DNC needed at the time.

5. While these newly discovered documentscame from the Office of the Vice President, they did not come out of the Vice President's own files.

6. He also said that while he does not recall a specific conversation about the limit on hard money contributions to the DNC, it would not surprise him if it was discussed.

7. This phrase mirrors the handwritten note made on the first page of the packet.

8. He could not say who addressed these topics or how long the discussion lasted but, instead, characterized it as a "general discussion" involving more than one person.

9. The limit for contributions to an individual candidate is $1,000 or, in the case of a married couple, $2,000.

10. One attendee, in the course of a single interview, first stated that he was unaware that there was a hard money component to the media fund and that he had no idea there was hard money in the DNC. He believed any "hard money" advertising was paid for by Clinton/Gore '96. He stated he had no idea whether the Vice President knew there was a hard money component to the DNC media campaign. Later in the same interview, after being advised of the contents of the agendas for the September 7 and 13 meetings, he said he had been mistaken; that he did know all along that there was a hard money component, that it was discussed during the Residence meetings, and that he believed the Vice President also knew, though he had no specific knowledge on which he based that belief. He thought it was "likely" that the Vice President attended the September 7 and 13 meetings.
Given the inconsistencies within this witness's statements, the lack of any specific knowledge upon which he bases his stated beliefs about the Vice President's presence or knowledge, and the contradictory statements of other regular attendees at the Residence meetings, I do not find the statement of this one witness persuasive enough to warrant further investigation.