Afghanistan: Measuring the effects of a new strategy

Afghanistan: Measuring strategy's effects

Inputs
Results
Case study: Nawa District

Fighting the war differently

It was not until this fall that Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top coalition commander, proclaimed that the United States finally had “all the inputs right” in Afghanistan. Although President Obama announced a surge of 30,000 troops last December, the final wave of new forces did not arrive until October. The military also has spent the past year bringing in more desperately needed equipment. On the civilian side, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development have sent hundreds more people to help rebuild the country and improve local government. Here is a closer look at what has been added:

U.S. TROOP LEVELS

Most of the new forces dispatched by Obama have been deployed to Helmand and Kandahar provinces in the south, and to bulk up the American presence in the east. Although the Dutch pulled out all of their combat forces this year and the United States has been unable to persuade most other allies to increase their contributions, the multinational, NATO-led mission still includes about 40,000 troops from 47 other countries.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Hundreds more Special Operations troops have been sent to Afghanistan this year, and they have been significantly more active. In the spring, they averaged about five missions a night. By the fall, they were averaging 17 raids a night. In a three-month period ending Nov. 11, they conducted 1,572 operations, resulting in 368 insurgent leaders killed or captured, and 968 lower-level insurgents killed and 2,477 of them captured, according to NATO statistics.

Other Special Operations units have been focused on recruiting and training Afghans to participate in armed village defense forces.

AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES

The Afghan army and national police force met the growth goals for the year three months ahead of schedule. But attrition, desertion, drug use and low morale remain problems. Although NATO allies pledged to send more trainers, more than 900 positions remain unfilled.

ANTI-CORRUPTION

More than $4.7 billion was appropriated for reconstruction and development in the 2010 fiscal year. Much of the money has gone to pay for the Afghan government’s basic operations and for assistance programs, including support for farmers. The contingent of U.S. diplomats, reconstruction specialists and other civilian experts has increased from 320 at the end of 2008 to about 1,100 now.

RECONSTRUCTION

Many U.S. officials think public anger over corruption is a principal reason why Afghans decide to support the Taliban. After President Hamid Karzai objected to the role of U.S. investigators in assembling a bribery case against one of his top aides, the American anti-graft effort has shifted its focus to corruption by lower-level officials whose actions directly impact the population. Petraeus has sought to limit the role U.S. funds play in fueling corruption by issuing new contracting rules.

What has—and has not—been accomplished

Petraeus contends the United States and its NATO partners have managed to regain momentum. Operations this fall to flush insurgents from areas around Kandahar have proceeded faster than expected. Coalition forces now control large swaths of Zhari, Panjwayi and Arghandab districts, which had been under the almost-total domination of insurgents, and Afghan forces are expanding their influence inside the city. Military officials say the situation also is improving in Marja, where schools and shops are now open and violence has dropped significantly. Military officials say intercepted communications indicate that insurgent leaders, many of whom operate from sanctuaries in Pakistan, are growing increasingly demoralized by their battlefield losses.

SECURITY

There were, on average, more than 75 insurgent attacks on U.S., NATO or Afghan forces every day this summer—a rate significantly higher than last year. Assassinations of government officials and people working with international troops and development firms are commonplace. Taliban activity has spread to the previously quiet northern and western parts of the country.

GOVERNANCE/CIVIL SOCIETY

U.S. officials remain concerned about the lack of meaningful improvement in national and local government. Karzai’s administration continues to be dogged by corruption allegations, and his ministries have been slow to send the necessary personnel to key districts in the south and east.

AFGHAN CONFIDENCE/DAILY LIFE

A recent Washington Post poll found that Afghans are more pessimistic about the direction of their country and less confident in the ability of the United States and its allies to provide security. Nearly three-quarters of Afghans now believe their government should pursue negotiations with the Taliban, and almost two-thirds are willing to accept a deal allowing Taliban leaders to hold political office.

Nawa District:
A Counterinsurgency case study

The following maps, from Petraeus’s “Proof of COIN Concept” slide, depict how incidents of violence in the central part of Nawa district peaked as the first Marines arrived in July 2009 but then reduced significantly as they began conducting counterinsurgency operations. The drop-off was particularly rapid because Afghan security forces in the area are unusually experienced and many insurgents decided to flee instead of fight.

SOURCES: Institute for the Study of War, Department of Defense, Associated Press, Congressional Research Service, NATO and International Security Assistance Force data, Washington Post/ABC News/ARD/BBC Afghanistan Poll

GRAPHIC: Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Alicia Parlapiano, Gene Thorp and Laura Stanton / The Washington Post - Dec. 11, 2010.