Poland is of vital concern to the national security of the United States and Western Europe . . . . The combined effect of this policy and cultural interst has created a special relationship between the United States and Poland to which there is nothing caparable in Eastern Europe. . . .

I firmly add my voice to those concerned officials of both the outgoing Carter and incoming Regan administrations regarding the possibility of Soviet military intervention in Poland. . . . Lest Moscow perceive strong talk to be cheap, in my view the United States would have to seriously consider a number of strong sanctions in the face of Soviet military action. An effective and complete trade embargo, the indefinite suspension of arms control discussions, the speending up of a number of military programs, and moratoria on existing scientific exchanges and the refusal to extend new ones would be examples of such sanctions. . . .

Strong Western sanctions would be dictated by Soviet intervention; but if the patter of Soviet aggression is reversed, possible steps toward cooperation in arms control, international trade and other areas could well develop. Even mutual cooperation in helping Poland to solve its problems in its own way could be developed. Threats and tension need not be the primary direction of U.S.-Soviet relations. The basic principle that the Soviet Union must clearly understand is that their moderation will bring U.S. moderationa and the prospect of cooperation. Extreme Soviet action, however, will bring strong U.S. reaction