THE TAPES FROM the Dec. 3-4 Solidarity meeting in Radom, recorded either by a participant or by government agents, were played repeatedly over Poland's radio and television stations in the week leading up to last Sunday's crackdown. Western monitoring agencies made available the English translations from which the following excerpts are taken. The commentary and subject headings are from the Polish Communist Party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu: Is Confrontation Unavoidable?
Yes, Solidarity leaders say, it is unavoidable. Lech Walesa sees this more or less as follows:
"Confrontation is inevitable and it will take place. I wanted to get to this confrontation in a natural way, when virtually all social groups would be with us. However, I have miscalculated.... I thought that we would progress further and that we would then overthrow this parliament, those councils and so forth. It turns out that we will not move along this road any further. So we are picking a road for a lightning-speed maneuver ....
"Obviously, a general strike today would be a stupid act, and things should be done differently ... At the same time, I believe that we must not let ourselves be carried away by imagination and excitement, because if we did that we could again get a bloody nose.
"This occurred, for instance, in Warsaw yesterday (a reference to the clearing of the firefighting school). We could have started shouting loudly, organized another November insurrection and called for scythes. This would have certainly been very pretty, but we would have lost. The world would have said that this was the way things are everywhere.... It was a good thing that we did not let ourselves be carried away by excitement, but the community must now be told that a confrontation is indispensable and about the role we would like it to play ..."
Not everybody shared Walesa's skepticism with respect to a general strike. Seweryn Jaworski, for instance, believes that in the event of a law on a state of emergency being adopted it will be necessary to start strike action immediately, and his Mazowsze region will undoubtedly do so. "If you go back even one more step," he threatened Walesa, "I personally will cut your head off. If I do not do this, because I have been taken care of by them, someone else will do this." Saying One Thing and Doing Another
"Since 1970 I have trusted no one under this system, no one in power.... We really trust no one; they really want to outmaneuver us.... After all, let us realize that we are bringing this system down. Let us at last realize this. If we agree to have private storekeepers, buy up state farms and ensure complete self-management, this system will cease to exist.
"So let us not deceive ourselves. It has been obvious right from the beginning that a struggle would take place and it has merely been a question of choosing our methods to ensure that as many people as possible understood what this struggle is about. We should not say aloud that a confrontation is unavoidable. In such talks it is merely a question of who outsmarts whom, but we are outsmarting ourselves. We must say: We love you, we love socialism and the party and, obviously, the Soviet Union. But at the same time we must keep doing our work through faits accomplis and wait ...
"Let us not deceive ourselves: Right from the beginning it has been a question of thumbing our noses, and I was fully aware of this even though I kept quiet about it. But today things have reached such a point that I see no other way out: People must be taken into confidence to some extent and told what game we are playing. They should be told that we are playing for such high stakes that we are changing realities in general and this game can only end in one way. No change of system can take place without blows being exchanged....
"Obviously I am in favor of an accord, but this matter must be discussed. What kind of accord? Any 'National Unity Front,' any one- seventh share, is out of the question. I really believe that if it were a question of a threesome -- not a threesome as such, but three main streams which would appoint their representatives, a few advisers and a few activists, with a view to resolving various problems -- that solution would be accepted...."
The trade union's tactics emerged during this "creative" discussion. They were formulated by its adviser and leading strategist, Jacek Kuron. He stressed the view that the confrontation area should include the question of elections, of a new election procedure, of complete opposition to the so-called government provisional arrangement and a "state of emergency." Strong-Arm Squads Are Necessary
We need a force, the trade union leaders gathered in Radom stated. Grzegorz Palka said that in order to strengthen Solidarity it is necessary to set up workers' militia or workers' guards. He said: "The party can delay confrontation because it has power; Solidarity lacks such power. Therefore we must create a worker militia, which would be groups of 10, 100 or 1,000 people in workplaces, armed with helmets and clubs. The forerunners of such formations already exist in some regions."
Andrzej Sobieraj (chairman of Solidarity's Radom region) reported that the current conflict at the Radom Higher School of Engineering (WSI) will be resolved by a 200- strong group of workers who will be detailed from enterprises and will wheelbarrow Rector Hebda out of the WSI. Z. Bujak announced that the workers' militia's immediate activities will be aimed at "liberating" the headquarters of the national radio and TV system. Task: Provisional Government
It has finally become clear how some Solidarity leaders imagine the role of a so-called National Economic Social Council (SRGN). Despite all protestations, it is to be an organ of social control, Zbigniew Bujak stated openly: "It will be something like a provisional national government. The government must at last be overthrown, laid bare and stripped of all credibility."
Jan Rulewski (Solidarity leader from Bydgoszcz) explained his concepts quite openly: "We must ask ourselves how elections to the parliament can be soonest ensured, summarily.... We are fighting to set up a provisional government which would stabilize the country until elections are held, because without stabilization no elections will go the way we want them to go....
"The coming six months are needed to ensure a provisional arrangement in the country, but not in the form recently suggested by government circles. The coming six months of stabilization will make it possible to set up a provisional government which is to be a nonparty government. Such government should adopt the tactics of the Social Self-Defense Committee (KOR) ... based not on the openness of contrary political programs but on taking over, hindering and laying bare the party's activities...."
Rulewski even distributes seats in parliament. According to his concept, a newly elected parliament could be constituted as follows: The PZPR (the Polish United Workers -- that is, the Communist -- Party) would receive 30 percent of the seats, the ZSL (the United Peasant Party) and the SD (the Democratic Party) jointly 25 percent (these two puppet parties are controlled by the Communist Party), a homogeneous Solidarity 25 percent, and the remainder of the seats would be divided among the Confederation for an Independent Poland, Znak (the Polish Catholic Association) and "the rest." This would mean that the Communist Party would retain its leading role in the parliament, but in order to force through its policies would have to secure their acceptance by other groups ....
In short: skillful manipulation. As for the question of the probity of the methods used, that is unimportant. This was expressed most bluntly by Z. Bujak, who stated that it is necessary to prepare for a confrontation and select the ground on which it is to take place. Speaking ironically, he added that it is necessary to act according to the following principle: "An appropriate clause will always be found with respect to a guilty person, and a guilty person will always be found to whom an existing clause can be applied...."
You may wonder: What is the reason for such radicalization? You may find an answer to this question in, for instance, K. Modzelewski's speech:
"The trade union has not become stronger; it has become weaker. Much weaker, and all activists are aware of this.... There are several reasons for this: weariness as a result of the crisis, weariness experienced by people waiting at the end of a line. Some people blame us for the prolongation of this state of affairs and want us to reach an agreement. And some other people are against us for the same reasons: crisis-weariness, lack of prospects and political radicalization. These people say: Let us opt for action, go the whole way, we have no longer anything to consider. ..."
Is it necessary to reveal the real aims of some leading Solidarity activists more clearly than they themselves reveal them?