From remarks by former defense secretary James R. Schlesinger before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on Nov. 27:

{A}bout the durability of allied support for the multinational coalition . . . that coalition is likely to prove less durable if combat takes place. Particularly would this be the case if the objectives turn out to be the new and sterner demands of war policy, reflecting the decision that Iraq has become an outlaw state that must be dealt with now. Needless to say, the international coalition has yet to embrace that line of reasoning.

I close with observations regarding two inherent difficulties in the emerging situation.

First, if the United States conveys the impression that it has moved beyond the original international objectives to the sterner objectives that Saddam Hussein must go, that Iraq's military establishment and the threat to the region must be dismantled or eliminated, etc., then whatever incentive Saddam Hussein may presently have to acquiesce in the international community's present demands and to leave Kuwait will shrink toward zero. This may please those who have decided that the war option is the preferable one, but it makes it increasingly hard to hold together the international coalition, which we initially put together to bless our actions in the Gulf.

That brings us to the second observation: The more we rely on the image of Iraq as an outlaw state to justify taking military action, the more we make holding together the international coalition inherently difficult, if not impossible. International approval of our actions is something on which the administration has set great store. To abandon it would mean the undermining of any claim to establishing a new international order. . . .