In a little noticed article published very recently in (of all places!) a Belarusan foreign policy magazine, a respected member of the Russian political elite has laid out, for the first time in detail, Moscow's likely conditions for its acquiescence to NATO expansion. The writer, Sergei Rogov, heads the prestigious USA-Canada Studies Institute of the Russia Academy of Sciences and thus occupies a prominent place in the Russian policy-making community.
His article is forthright, realistic and develops a blueprint for a comprehensive accommodation between NATO and Russia that includes the expansion of the alliance. It belies the arguments of the various Western apologists for the Russian case against expansion, while confirming those who have maintained all along that a steady and firm course in favor of expansion would eventually convince Moscow that cooperation is preferable to self-isolation.
Rogov states at the outset that "if NATO is enlarged with no regard to the legitimate security interests of Russia, its alienation from the West will be inevitable." But he tempers that assertion by conceding that "the eastward expansion of NATO will soon take place." Accordingly, he urg\es that steps be taken to balance the foregoing with the development of genuine NATO-Russia cooperation.
He suggests several steps: NATO "guarantees of non-deployment of military bases and nuclear weapons in the countries of Eastern Europe" that would be joining the alliance; NATO guarantees for Russia's territorial integrity, including specifically for the exposed Kaliningrad salient; an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) role in coordinating peacekeeping operations in Europe; as well as also Russian guarantees not to increase its forces on Russia's western borders and Russia's commitment "not to resort to military threats against neighboring countries."
Most important, he endorses the idea advanced already several years ago of a special NATO-Russia treaty. He develops in some detail how that treaty could be defined, favoring specifically an agreement on mutual security and cooperation regarding "the European continent as a whole." He suggests that Russian top leadership might then be invited to participate also in the annual NATO summits.
All of the above, on the face of it, appear to be highly negotiable proposals, broadly in keeping with the views of those who have all along argued that NATO expansion, once it is firmly undertaken, could be made compatible with some accommodation with Russia. It is noteworthy that Rogov's article does not even make the case for the permanent exclusion of any particular countries from eventual membership in the alliance. The only immediately objectionable proposal is his recommendation that NATO pledges not to conduct any maneuvers in "the Baltic States and other republics of the former Soviet Union." Neither NATO nor Europe can accept the old Soviet concept of limited sovereignty for the Baltic countries as well as for Ukraine.
Rogov's argumentation indicates that reasonable and serious people in Moscow are beginning to think of a constructive agenda for negotiations, based on the premise that NATO expansion is inevitable. It is important not to refute them. Equivocation and lack of clarity only fortify those in Moscow who still hope that President Clinton, if reelected, might change his mind. The sooner target dates are defined and new NATO members-to-be are named, the sooner a genuinely positive dialogue with Moscow will begin. The writer was national security adviser to President Carter.