The following are excerpts from the Tass English-language version of a major Soviet statement on U.S.-Soviet relations published in Moscow yesterday:

Recent facts indicate that changes dangerous to the cause of peace are taking place in the policy of the U.S.A. An acute struggle has been going on for quite a time now in the ruling circles of that country over questions of detente, relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. And as time goes on, there are more and more signs that the representatives of groupings that would like to undermine detente and return the world to the Cold War, to new confrontations and unrestrained military rivalry are beginning to take the upper hand.

Contrary to the aspirations of the peoples to put an end to the arms race, the U.S. is taking the course of whipping it up, is adopting new vast plans for building up its military power.At the same time negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation are being deliberately slowed down.

The U.S. government is undertaking also actions whose purpose it is difficult to evaluate in any other way than as the deliberate worsening of bilateral relations with the U.S.S.R.There is no end to attempts at interfering in our country's internal affairs. The ties and contacts between the two countries are being restricted by unilateral U.S. actions.

The opponents of good U.S.A.-U.S.S.R relations are seeking a common language with the aggressive anti-Sovietism of the Chinese rulers who loudly proclaim detente and peace to be a fraud, and war - the only real prospect.

The U.S. lastly, has become the main inspirer of a new colonialism in Africa - of a policy of armed interventions and open interference in the affairs of African states, of suppressing the national-liberation movements.

An attempt to clarify things was made in President James Carter's recent speech at Annapolis. However, the U.S. president obviously failed to introduce clarity into American policy, above all, into its policy in regard to the U.S.S.R.

This speech was read in the Soviet Union with attention and was objectively assessed. Rather than dispel, it increased the doubts about the course taken by the U.S.A.

It is apparently not fortuitous that, while enumerating in that same speech the United States' good works in favour of detente, the president omitted two very important documents: The principles of relationships between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., and the agreement on averting nuclear war. It is precisely in these documents that the fact that the two powers made their choice in favor of detente, and the mutual commitments stemming from it are stressed with special force.

At present, shaping out clearly in U.S. policy is a line towards whipping up the arms race, which has already assumed tremendous scope, and toward the steadfast buildup of military spending.

In accordance with long-standing practice, attempts were made to justify these measures by false references, as if they are merely a reply to the policy of the Soviet Union which, don't you see, is trying to attain a 'military superiority' over the West.

In fact, when it comes to an overall assessment of the balance of forces, whether speaking of strategic arms or armed forces and armaments in central Europe - assertions about a Soviet military threat, or Soviet superiority are absolutely groundless. This is testified not only by Soviet statements, but by official American documents and speeches by U.S. leaders themselves.

It is fitting here to examine an extremely important question - that of the attitude to disarmament negotiations, a matter that may be regarded as an acid test in clarifying the true intentions of the sides.

Let us now turn to the strategic arms limitation talks. These talks, aimed at working out a new agreement on limiting strategic arms, have been going on for many years, and agreement has already been reached on an overwhelming majority of questions.

However verbally recognizing the importance of concluding an agreement, the American leadership actually did not display readiness to discuss concretely the still unresolved issues.

Much is being said now in the United States, in the official circles . . . about the difficulties with which the ratification of a future agreement could meet in the Senate. But the government itself, obviously, does not hasten to assume a definite stand, to start upholding the agreement in Congress and in the eyes of public opinion by denying the various falsehoods, to which the arms limitation opponents resort in respect to the future agreement.

On the contrary, in this complicated situation many government leaders are busy stirring up mistrust towards on the Soviet Union, spreading lies about the "Soviet military threat."

Artificial complications are also being created in the other negotiations on disarmament. Despite official denials, a line is actually being pursued to link the disarmament negotiations with other absolutely unrelated questions.

Along with stepped up military preparations, the changes in the U.S. course find expression also in transition to an openly interventionist, neocolonialist policy vis-a-vis the countries of Africa. This is borned out by the events in Zaire, armed interference in the internal affairs of this country by several Western states under the political and military leadership of Washington, plans to include these or other African states in the sphere of NATO activities and attempts to knock together imperialist collective armed forces to suppress the liberation struggle in that continent. And here again concoctions about the "Soviet threat" to Africa and about "Soviet-Cuban interference" in its affairs are resorted to as a diverting maneuver.

There are, indeed, real problems in Africa, not like the far-fetched "Soviet-Cuban interference" concoction. They include the liquidation of the consequences of colonial domination, strengthening of the statehood of their economic and social development.

However, people in Washington are now preoccupied with something else - struggle to lift the restrictions on U.S. armed interference in Africa, adopted by the Congress in 1975, to create a mechanism within the framework of a group of states, which have a liking for colonialism and racialism, that would allow them to exercise colonial gendarme's functions in that continent, recruit henchmen from among representatives of reactionary, corrupt, aggressive regimes under the hypocritical slogans of African solidarity.

Particularly disastrous for mutual (U.S.-Soviet) confidence are the attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the other side. And such attempts have now been elevated in the United States to the level of state policy. Seemingly nice-sounding motives are being chosen for them: "Human Rights," "Humanism," "Defence of Freedom"; but actually we have here the selfsame designs to undermine the socialist system that our people were compelled to encounter in this or that form beginning with 1917.

Such actions engender ever new doubts in the true intentions of the leaders of the United States and certain nations allied to it, poison the political atmosphere, complicate cooperation.

The latest intrigues, to be more exact "petty intrigues," of Washington around China in no way serve to strengthen confidence. The desire in itself to use the "Chinese card" in the global game is not at all new for American politicians. However, up till now the U.S. leaders, it appeared, realized that this card could not be used without creating dangers to the cause of peace, and to themselves, for that matter, to the national interests of the United States proper.

However, certain leaders, who hold high posts in Washington, are so overwhelmed by anti-Soviet emotions that, judging by everything, they are now dismissing these dangers. Such leaders close their eyes to the fact that alignment with China on an anti-Soviet basis would rule out the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union in the matter of reducing the danger of a nuclear war and, of course, of limiting armaments.

Soviet-American confrontation, and still better war - this is the cherished dream of Peking.

It seems that there are politicians in Washington who find this to be an acceptable tactic that can be replaced as time passes with other, more moderate and considered tactics. But by far not everything that one can get away with in American domestic politics is acceptable in foreign politics.

Here, as we see already today, the tough line has every chance to develop from a tactic into a dangerous and uncontrollable political course, acquire a force of inertia that it is difficult to overcome, and evoke in the world a corresponding counteraction.

And payment for error in the event of such a turn in events will be measured not simply by the drop of somebody's popularity. It threatens to take the form of new costly spirals of the arms race, political crises, growth of the tax burden, and maybe even worse consequences, including for the people of the United States.

The world public is concerned also by the following question: How will the Soviet Union respond to the toughening of the American policy? This question acquires the greater topicality, the more obvious becomes the insufficiently considered and at times openly provocative nature of many actions undertaken by the United States.

The plan of those who inspire such actions is very transparent: they would like not only to undermine detente, but also to do this as far as possible through others.

The Soviet Union is not intending to assist the authors of such plans. Our people have seen too much and experienced too much to give into pressure, to retreat before sabre ratling. It chose the road of peace and will not allow anyone to push it off this road. We are not accepting the invitation to join the funeral of detente.

In the situation complicated by the policy of the United States, the Soviet Union confirms again its course at the relaxation of international tension and development of good, mutually advantageous relations with the United States, given that the United States also wants this.

It is impossible to press for such aims proclaimed by the United States president as strengthening peace, limiting armanents and normal relations with the Soviet Union and at the same time to whip up an anti-Soviet hysteria, to try by means of attacks on the U.S.S.R. to solve one's problems - both external and domestic and even personal ones. The present course of the United States is fraught with serious dangers. Dangers for the United States, for all countries interested in peace, for the entire coure of development of international relations. We hope for the speediest realization of this truth in Washington.