The United States should encourage the shah of Iran to move quickly toward a broadly based civilian government before a new upheaval destroys any chance he may have to survive, George W. Ball has reportedly concluded after surveying U.S. options on Iran for Prosident Carter.

Ball presented his still-secret findings-which in part run against the grain of the White House policy of sticking totally with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi-at a special Cabinet-level meeting at the White House Wednesday, The Washington Post learned yesterday.

The submission of the report could touch off a spirited policy battle within the adminsitration, which thus far has refused to back any alternative to the shah's total control for fear of undermining the Iranian ruler's authroity.

Ball declined to talk to The Washington Post about his report, and a National Security Council spokesman said yesterday that Ball's findings would be handled as "an internal document that considers many options and possibilities" on which he could not comment.

But questions and comments put by Ball to more than a score of U.S. officials and other experts on the Persian Gulf over the past 10 days in Washington point to a set of conclusions that were reportedly reflected in the White House briefing Wednesday.

Chairing the meeting of the Special Coordination Committee was Carter's national security affeirs adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who is believed to have successfully argued to the president thus far that nny moves to dilute the shah's authority by backing an opening to the Moslem-led opposition could undermine the Iranian ruler and simultaneously drag the United States deeply into the political queagmire that would follow.

Ball, however, is known to have concluded that the peaceful nature of last weekend's demonstrations does not indicate that the military government the shah appointed on Nov. 5 cannot stabilize a still deteriorating situation, even in the short term.

His conclusion on the military government is known to be in sharp conflict with the view of Brzezinski, who was responsible for the appointment of the former undersecretary of state in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations as a special temporary consultant on the Persian Gulf to the NSC.

The views of the State Department, represented at the SCC meeting by Acting Secretary Warren Christopher, and the Defense Department represented by Secretary Harold Brown, were reported to be closer to Ball's than to Brzezinski's, according to an official source.

Apprised of the outline of some of Ball's findings as indicated to several of the officials with whom he discussed Iran and of the apparent differences in views within the administration the NSC spokesman said the account sketched for him "does not accurately reflect the contents of the Ball report."

In othe developments:

President Carter confirmed in an ABC television interview that he has sent private messages to Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev "in the last few weeks" making it "very clear to the Soviets that . . . we have no intention of permitting others to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran."

U.S. officials said that the Pentagon had flown five water control trucks tohat the Pentagon had flown five water cannon riot-control trucks to Iran from West Germany in two C5 transport over the weekend to provide emergency help for the shah. Iran purchased the equipment from Australia. The diplomatic activity surrounding this transaction freflects European sensitivity to close identificatiin with the shah, according to reliable sources.

The trucks were reportedly transported to West Germany after it became apparent that Austria's Socialist-led government would not permit the U.S. Air Force to land in Austria and ferry the heavy equipment to Iran.

Washington then turned to Bonn but, according to a relaable report on which the State Department and Pentagon spokesmen declined to comment yesterday, West Germany hesitated in responding to the request while considering the impact of public disclosure of its participating in helping the shan now.

Bonn agreed after the United States stressed the urgency of the request, according to sources. In confirming yesterday that the United States had deliverd riot-control water cannon to the Iranians in the past week, Pentagon spokesman Thomas B. Ross declined to name who sold the equipment to Iran.

Ball, who was one of the earliest in-government critics of the Vietnam war, appeared to some of those he interviewed in preparing nis study to have come to conclusions that differ sharply with many of the assumptions on which the White House has based its repeated public statements of full support for the shah.

Ball has reportedly concluded that the shah cannot hope to maintain total power and must now bargain with a moderate segment of the opposition to form a government quickly, before new rioting erupts from the mourning processions for those killed in upheavals last month and this month.

He appears to part company with Brzezinski and other shah supporters in having concluded that a politicized opposition can be split off from the Moslem holymen who have become the opposition's principal spokesmen in a year of turmoil.

Ball is known to have discussed various alternatives that would effectively ease the shah out of total power. One would be to turn the country over to a regency council that would rule on behalf of the shah's 18-year-old son after the shah abdicates.

This idea was discussed and approved in theory by a leading member of the opposition National Front with a U.S. embassy official last week in Tehran, according to an official source who pointed out that this represents a splitting off of part of the leadership from Ayatollah Rulloha Khoemeini, who has said he would not accept a continuation of the shah's dynasty in a futrure power-sharing arrangement.

Another alternative Ball reportedly suggests is the role of a constitutional monarch for the shah with a council of respected, senior Iranian political figures naming a civilian government to rule the country. One of his most important recommendations concerns a U.S. role in settling the crucial outstanding difference that exists between the shah and those opposition leaders who are ready to negotiate a coalition government.

That point is control of the defense boudget. The shah has adamntly refused so far ot consider turning the budget or control of the armed forces over to a civilian government.

The U.S. role in coalition-building for a new government is likely to be the most controversial point in the debate that the Ball report is expected to spark in the administration. At this point it is not clear that the shah would oppose such a role, since it might enable him to invoke stronger U.S. embassy official last week in Tehran, according to an official source who pointed out that this represents a splitting off of part of the leadership from Ayatollah Rulloha Khomeini, who has said he would not accept a continuation of the shah's dynasty in a future power-sharing arrangement.

Another alternative Ball reportedly suggests is the role of a constitutional monarch for the shah with a council of respected, senior Iranian political figures naming a civilian government to rule the country. One of his most important recommendations concerns a U.S. role in settling the crucial outstanding difference that exists between the shah and those opposition leaders who are ready to negotiate a coalition government.

That point is control of the defense budget. The shah has adamantly refused so far to consider turning the budget or control of the armed forces over to a civilian government.

The U.S. role in coalition-building for a new government is likely to be the most controversial point in the debate that the Ball report is expected to spark in the administration. At this point it is not clear that the shah would opose such a role, since it might enable him to invoke stronger U.S. involvement in what Ball and virtually every other administration planner agree will be a messy after math to the current crisis, no matter who emerges with power.

But some of the officials who were encouraged by Ball's general comments on Iran believe that some U.S. imprimatur is needed for the process now if the opposition is to be convinced that the shah is serious about negotiating an edn to his dictatorial rule. Otherwise, these officials fear, new demonstrations, rioting and destruction of the shah's authority are inevitable.

Ball's report also includes recommendations for long-term U.S. economic involvement in Iran to help put the country back to its feet after the current crisis resides, and a broad overview of American options in the Persian Gulf.