Egypt has succeeded in easing the Arab world's boycott against President Anwar Sadat's government by extending military aid to Morocco and by enlisting a controversial Saudi Arabian financier to bring new investment to Egypt, informed Arab and U.S. sources report.

Despite concern among his advisers that the move could cost him support from other Arab nations, Morocco's beleaguered King Hassan II has accepted shipments of ammunition, spare parts and armaments from Egypt to counter the escalating attacks on Morocco by Western Sahara guerrillas backed by Algeria, these sources report.

On the financial front, Egypt has benefited from efforts by Adnan Khashoggi of Saudi Arabia to arrange a $1.8 billion financing package for a new telephone system for Egypt, according to associates of the Saudi entrepreneur, international bankers and industry sources.

A European consortium with ties to Khashoggi last month unexpectedly took the lucrative telephone contract away from three U.S. firms. The American companies initially had approached Khashoggi to represent them in Egypt but then dropped him, fearing they would be unable to obtain U.S. government financing if they used the controversial Saudi businessman.

The sudden Egyptian decision to employ European firms linked to Khashoggi has triggered quiet but bitter recriminations within the industry and within the international investment banking community. The U.S. consortium stands to lose $400 million in equipment orders, up to 80,000 projected new jobs and at least $4 million in planning and negotiating fees already paid.

Khashoggi's associates blame the loss on the decision by the American companies to unhook from the Saudi businessman because of opposition from U.S. officials upset by reports from other American firms that Khashoggi had demanded bribes for Arab officials to get business.

Khashoggi's deep, but publicly unacknowledged, involvement in the project also will stir controversy in the Arab world. He is a key figure in Saudi Arabia, which joined other Arab countries in condemning Sadat for signing a peace treaty with Israel in March and in severing all official economic ties to Cairo.

Egyptian officials involved in the telephone project have said that they were told by Khashoggi that the financing package he was assembling ultimately would include $300 million in private Saudi investment that would be "laundered" through West German banks and firms to obscure the Saudi connection.

The Saudi position on significant new private investment in Egypt has been ambiguous, and Khashoggi's involvement in the telephone project bolstered Egyptian hopes that investment flows would quietly continue.

Confirmation that Saudi Arabia has decided not to interfere with private investment in Egypt was provided by Prince Saud Faisal in an interview with The Washington Post in New York last week.

Asked about investment policy, the Saudi foreign minister said the Arab economic measures "are not intended to affect relations between the peoples of Egypt and other Arab countries." Private investment "is not affected," he said.

But he said official Saudi aid, which amounted to several billion dollars a year, could be resumed only when Egypt again seeks "a comprehensive settlement rather than a separate peace treaty with Israel." Speaking in sorrow rather than anger, Saud termed the economic boycott "a reaction to a real danger [of a separate peace] rather than a policy."

Sadat has turned to the United States for much of the economic and military aid he has lost through the Arab boycott. At the end of the Camp David summit last year, he publicly referred to American help in rebuilding Egypt's collapsing telephone system as a valuable symbol of the new friendship between Cairo and Washington.

Officials in the American consortium, which had already been formed to seek telecommunications business in Egypt, began to portray the telephone contract as a potential "American Aswan" that would demonstrate friendship for Egypt as concretely as did the Russian-constructed high dam in the 1960s.

In protracted separate negotiations with the bureaucracies of Egypt and the United States, the American consortium was able to obtain tentative commitments for $400 million in U.S. aid and $100 million in Export-Import Bank financing for a five-year project.

It was during these negotiations that the controversy of huge agent fees like those garnered so successfully by Khashoggi came up often enough to cause the companies to have second thoughts.

Much of the controversy had been generated by the Saudi financier's lavish life style and by 1975 accusations from Northrop Corp. to the Securities Exchange Commission that Khashoggi channeled bribes from Northrop to Arab officials. Khashoggi denied bribing anyone.

But industry sources report that the decisive comment about Khashoggi came not from disgruntled U.S. officials but from Sadat, who is sensitive to public notice of his connections to the Saudi financier. In the spring of 1978, Sadat is reliably reported to have warned visiting consortium officials that a visible agent's role for "our good friend Adnan" would be politically unacceptable in Egypt.

Sadat reportedly did not rule out a quieter arrangement. Shortly afterward, Khashoggi suggested that he become a silent partner in the U.S. consortium rather than an agent. Failure to reach agreement on this led to a break in January. By June, investment bankers learned that Khashoggi was helping to pull together the package deal awarded to the European consortium.

The U.S. consortium -- composed of Continental Telephone, General Telephone and Electronics and Western Electric, the manufacturing arm of A.T. & T. -- also was set back by banking reports that Saudi private investment would not be available because of the Arab boycott. They then sought greater U.S. government involvement, both in providing more "soft" financing and in encouraging Egypt to buy American. The companjected new jobs and at least $4 million in planning and negotiating fees already paid.

Khashoggi's associates blame the loss on the decision by the American companies to unhook from the Saudi businessman because of opposition from U.S. officials upset by reports from other American firms that Khashoggi had demanded bribes for Arab officials to get business.

Khashoggi's deep, but publicly unacknowledged, involvement in the project also will stir controversy in the Arab world. He is a key figure in Saudi Arabia, which joined other Arab countries in condemning Sadat for signing a peace treaty with Israel in March and in severing all official economic ties to Cairo.

Egyptian officials involved in the telephone project have said that they were told by Khashoggi that the financing package he was assembling ultimately would include $300 million in private Saudi investment that would be "laundered" through West German banks and firms to obscure the Saudi connection.

The Saudi position on significant new private investment in Egypt has been ambiguous, and Khashoggi's involvement in the telephone project bolstered Egyptian hopes that investment flows would quietly continue.

Confirmation that Saudi Arabia has decided not to interfere with private investment in Egypt was provided by Prince Saud Faisal in an interview with The Washington Post in New York last week.

Asked about investment policy, the Saudi foreign minister said the Arab economic measures "are not intended to affect relations between the peoples of Egypt and other Arab countries." Private investment "is not affected," he said.

But he said official Saudi aid, which amounted to several billion dollars a year, could be resumed only when Egypt again seeks "a comprehensive settlement rather than a separate peace treaty with Israel." Speaking in sorrow rather than anger, Saud termed the economic boycott "a reaction to a real danger [of a separate peace] rather than a policy."

Sadat has turned to the United States for much of the economic and military aid he has lost through the Arab boycott. At the end of the Camp David summit last year, he publicly referred to American help in rebuilding Egypt's collapsing telephone system as a valuable symbol of the new friendship between Cairo and Washington.

Officials in the American consortium, which had already been formed to seek telecommunications business in Egypt, began to portray the telephone contract as a potential "American Aswan" that would demonstrate friendship for Egypt as concretely as did the Russian-constructed high dam in the 1960s.

In protracted separate negotiations with the bureaucracies of Egypt and the United States, the American consortium was able to obtain tentative commitments for $400 million in U.S. aid and $100 million in Export-Import Bank financing for a five-year project.

It was during these negotiations that the controversy of huge agent fees like those garnered so successfully by Khashoggi came up often enough to cause the companies to have second thoughts.

Much of the controversy had been generated by the Saudi financier's lavish life style and by 1975 accusations from Northrop Corp. to the Securities Exchange Commission that Khashoggi channeled bribes from Northrop to Arab officials. Khashoggi denied bribing anyone.

But industry sources report that the decisive comment about Khashoggi came not from disgruntled U.S. officials but from Sadat, who is sensitive to public notice of his connections to the Saudi financier. In the spring of 1978, Sadat is reliably reported to have warned visiting consortium officials that a visible agent's role for "our good friend Adnan" would be politically unacceptable in Egypt.