Following are excerpts from the prepared testimony and the appendix to it submitted by Alexander M. Haig Jr. to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday:

Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to appear before this distinguished committee as the nominee of President-elect Ronald Reagan to be secretary of state.

I am prepared to answer any questions you may have concerning my qualifications for this office, my views on foreign policy, and my service to my country during the past three decades.

There could be no more critical time at which to assume the post of secretary of state, and I am honored that the president-elect has chosen me as his designate. Over the past 200 years, the United States has stood as a beacon of liberty for the world . . . .

Our record in this century is not perfect, but it should be a source of great pride. Our successes were founded on a firm commitment to our ideals combined with a sense of the realities of human nature and international politics. It is that combination that we must bring to bear in the decade ahead. If we do, I believe that America and its people will stand once again as an example for the peoples of the world and merit the highest judgment of history . . . .

It would be premature here to set forth definitive policies, or offer detailed programs. Both tasks require analysis and thoughtful consideration by the president-elect and his advisers. But President-elect Reagan and I firmly believe that American foreign policy should have some permanent bedrock. The United States has been most effective in the world arena when the solid foundations of its foreign policy have been recognized and by the nations with which we must deal. Prior Public Service

Before outlining them for you, Mr. Chairman, let me briefly discuss my prior government service. As most of you know, I have spent 35 of the last 37 years in public service. That service has spanned several presidential administrations, including those of presidents Nixon, Ford, and most recently President Carter who extended for two years my term of duty as NATO commander in Europe. Nevertheless, my nomination has stimulated renewed interest among some in a few events during that service -- events that occurred during the four years that I served on the staff of the National Security Council from January 1969 to January 1973, and during the time that I served as chief of staff in the White House from May 1973, to September 1974.

Most of these events have been thoroughly investigated in general, and my role in particular has been scrutinized meticulously. I have testified at length under oath eight times concerning my role in many of these incidents.

I testified before this committee on July 30, 1974, concerning the 1969-70 national security wiretaps.

I testified about those wiretaps in a lengthy deposition in the lawsuit of Halperin v. Kissinger.

I testified before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities on May 15, 1974, during its investigation of the $100,000 Hughes campaign contribution given to [Charles G.] Bebe Rebozo.

I testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on Aug. 15, 1975, in its examination of covert operations in Chile.

I testified before Judge John Sirica on Dec. 5 and 6, 1973, on the question of the 18 1/2-minute gap in one of the Nixon tapes.

And I testified on three occasions before Watergate grand juries, answering all their questions.

Others, including former president Gerald Ford and former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, have also testified on these and other issues at length.

None of these investigations have found any culpability of my part . . . . Watergate

I would, however, like to underscore how I viewed Watergate while I was White House chief of staff.

I believe that President Nixon, the duly elected and duly constituted head of the executive branch, was entitled to the presumption of innocence, until proven otherwise, accorded as a constitutional right to every American citizen. In that context, I worked hard within the boundaries of the law and the advice of the lawyers to support him.

I also believe passionately in the office of the presidency and the awesome ability of that office to inspire its occupant to consider constantly the judgment of history and to work for the broad public interest. The influence of that office on its occupant provides a critically important institutional safeguard for our democracy. I viewed my overriding duty as one to preserve that office in the national interest.

Although Watergate was obviously important during my tenure as chief of staff, I spent 90 percent of my time trying to assure that the other business of the presidency was properly conducted.

I believe my work on the National Security Council under Dr. Kissinger and service as White House chief of staff provided experience that, when combined with my service in the Army, and as NATO commander, will help me as secretary of state. The Global Environment

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me move to the present and the future, and describe the global environment in which our national interest must be pursued.

Every generation views its own perils as unprecedented. Even so, there is now widespread agreement that the years immediately ahead will be unusually dangerous . . . .

. . . The 1980s have been called a decade of crisis. Yet, it is precisely that sort of appraisal which I believe we must reject. The very term "crisis" implies that events are out of control, and that our nation can only react.

But the task of statesmanship is not simply to react to events . . . . The task of statesmanship is to master these problems, and thus minimize the necessity for richocheting from crisis to crisis.

. . . The United States has a clear choice. We can continue, if we wish, to react to events as they occur -- serially, unselectively, and increasingly in the final analysis, unilaterally. One lesson of Afghanistan is certainly that few symptomatic crises are capable of effectively rallying the collective energies of the free world. We may wish it were otherwise, but wishing will not make it so.

Alternatively, we can confront the fundamental issues I have discussed. We can seek actively to shape events and, in the process, attempt to forge consensus among like-minded peoples. Such a consensus will enable us to deal with the more fundamental task . . .: the management of Soviet power; the restablishment of an orderly international economic climate; the economic and political maturation of developing nations to the benefit of their people; and the achievement of a reasonable standard of international civility. Acting alone, each of these tasks is beyond even our power; acting together, all are within the capacity of free nations.

. . . If we are to succeed in this effort, the conduct of American foreign policy must be characterized above all by the three qualities:

First, we must act with consistency. Specific issues may furnish the occasion for action, but they cannot constitute the sole basis for policy. Once we accept that the specific issues facing us today are merely surface manifestations of more fundamental problems, it must also be clear that effective policy cannot be created anew daily, informed solely by the immediate need . . . .

Second, we must behave reliably. American power and prestige should not be lightly committed; but once made, a commitment must be honored. Our friends cannot be expected to share in the burdens and risks of collective action if they cannot count on the word of the United States. Our adversaries cannot be expected to exercise prudence if they perceive our resolve to be hostage to the exigencies of the moment. Those whose posture toward us remains to be determined cannot be expected to decide in favor of friendship if they cannot confidently assess the benefits of association with us . . .

Finally, and in some ways most important, American foreign policy must demonstrate balance, both in our approach to individual issues, and in the orchestration of policy generally. By balance, I mean recognizing that complex issues invariably require us to weigh, and somehow reconcile, a variety of pressures, often competing. Thus, for example:

I believe that equitable and verifiable arms control contributes to security. But restraint in the growth and proliferation of armaments will not be achieved by policies which increase the very insecurities that promote arms competition.

Domestic economic stability will not be enhanced by the establishment of short-sighted, economic barriers which undermine the multilateral cooperation essential to the prosperity of all.

The assurance of basic human liberties will not be improved by replacing friendly governments which incompletely satisfy our standards of democracy with hostile ones which are even less benign.

And our commitment to peace will not be furthered by abdicating the right to exercise military power to only the most ruthless members of the international community.

Balance must also be struck in the orchestration of policy generally: in our selection of the issues we choose to address; in the priority we accord them; and in understanding the relationship of individual issues, one to another, and each to our broad policy objectives. This form of balance has become known as linkage, and the pesident-elect has publicly stated his commitment to it . . . . Our Urgent Task'

. . . Our urgent task is to reestablish an effective foreign policy consensus. To do so, I believe three conditions must be met:

First, the constitutional and traditional responsibility of the president for the conduct of foreign affairs must be reaffirmed. The United States government must speak to other nations with a single voice. To say that is in no sense to argue for curtailing discussion or debate. On the contrary, I believe both are essential. But the authoritative voice must be the president's.

The president needs a single individual to serve as the general manager of American diplomacy. President-elect Reagan believes that the secretary of state should play this role. As secretary of state, I would function as a member of the president's team, but one with clear responsibility for formulating and conducting foreign policy, and for explaining it to the Congress, the public, and the world at large. The assistant to the president for national security would fill a staff role for the president.

Second, an effective partnership must be restored with the Congress. By partnership, I do not mean occasional retrospective reporting. I mean active consultation, exchange of ideas and proposals in a timely manner, in an atmosphere of mutual respect, trust and confidence, recognizing the special role of the Senate. The Congress can hardly be expected to allow the president the discretion he requires unless it is comfortable with the purposes toward which, and limits within which, that discretion will be exercised. The Constitution demands it, and good sense urges it. In turn, Congess must do its part. In a partneship, both sides must behave responsibly.

Finally, the most consistent articulation of policy is wasted if the professionals who must execute it are divorced from its formulation, and if their experience and skill are usurped in the name of confidentiality, haste, or political sensitivity. The career personnel of the State Department and the Foreign Service are an unmatched intellectual resource, and they will be around long after the president and the secretary of state are gone. If the United States is to act consistently and reliably in the world arena, it must use its career professionals. Their effective participation in policy-making is imperative . . . . APPENDIX

To assist the committee's review, I will describe briefly my activities during 1969-74 . . . . National Security Council (1969-1973)

Let me turn first to my years on the National Security Council Staff.

During those four years, I served first as one of two executive assistants to Dr. Henry Kissinger, the assistant to the president for national security affairs, and then, beginning in June 1971, as deputy assistant to the president for the national security affairs.

In both positions I was responsible for reviewing materials before they reached Dr. Kissinger's desk, being familiar with the matters that he was working on, transmitting information to him, obtaining decisions from him, and seeing that those decisions were carried out . . . .

I also had specific responsibilities to work closely with Dr. Kissinger in his negotiations with the North Vietnamese seeking an end to the war in Vietnam and the return of U.S. prisoners of war, and to coordinate the extensive preparations for President Nixon's visit to China in 1972.

My involvement in any one of the countless issues that came to Dr. Kissinger during those four years therefore varied dramatically. At one extreme, I might quickly read and transmit a document to Dr. Kissinger or to the president. At the other, I would prepare a substantive analysis of a foreign problem for the president or Dr. Kissinger.

The three areas in which my role has been most intensely examined during my NSC days illustrate how different my participation could be. In two of these areas -- the FBI wiretaps and the Chilean covert activity -- my involvement was quite limited. In the third -- U.S. policy in Southeast Asia -- I had a much more substantial role.

With respect to wiretaps, during 1969 and 1970, the FBI conducted wiretaps and other surveillance on a number of individuals, primarily government officials and newsmen. President Nixon instituted this program in the spring of 1969 because of his concern about leaks of national security information, including disclosure of minutes of National Security meetings and U.S. bargaining options in upcoming SALT negotiations.

The facts about my role are straightforward:

The decision to use wiretaps and surveillance to detect the source of the leaks was made by the president, in consultation with the attorney general of the United States, and the director of the FBI. I was not involved.

I was assured that the program was legal.

I never decided which individuals were to be tapped. On several occasions, I was asked by Dr. Kissinger to identify individuals who had access to specific information, and I identified those who, to my knowledge, had such access. My responsibility was to convey to the FBI names of individuals that were provided to me either by the president or by Dr. Kissinger. On many occasions, the summaries of the results of the tapes were delivered to me for Dr. Kissinger . . . .

In Halperin v. Kissinger, a lawsuit for damages by one of the individuals who had been wiretapped, the federal District Court dismissed me as a defendant in the case because of my "inactive role and . . . lack of oversight authority."

I am aware that the legal rules governing wiretaps today differ dramatically from the rules in effect in 1970. The Supreme Court has now established stronger constitutional restrictions on wiretappings for national security reasons. The Congress has enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and the president has issued Executive Order 12036. As secretary of state, I will, of course, follow the law, just as I sought to do when in the White House 10 years ago.

Now, with respect to covert activities in Chile. As I indicated, I testified on this subject to the Senate Intelligence Committee in August of 1975 and that testimony is available to members of this committee. In essence, that testimony describes my limited involvement and confirms that Chile was not a special responsibility of mine and that I was not deeply involved in either overt or covert policies toward that country. In general, throughout my service on the National Security Guard staff, I had no responsibility to review or approve any CIA covert activities in Chile.

I am aware that the Congress has established procedures for informing the Senate Intelligence Committee "of all intelligence activities . . . including any significant anticiapted intelligence activity . . ." The Reagan administration intends to follow those procedures. U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia

1. Bombing of North Vietnamese sanctuaries on the Cambodian border.

President Nixon's decision to bomb the sanctuaries of North Vietnamese troops along the Cambodian border and to keep that bombing secret was made in March 1969. I supported the president's decision to order those raids, and I was involved in planning them. The bombing was focused on North Vietnamese troop encampments with five miles of the Vietnamese-Cambodian border where there was virtually no civilian population. vThis operation was carried out as a secret military mission. I was aware that congressional leaders were notified about it at the time although I had no personal responsibility for that process. I was aware of the subsequent inaccurate statements that may have been provided to the Congress.

2. Increased bombing of North Vietnam in December 1972:

During my four years at the National Security Council, the negotiations to end the Vietnam War gradually occupied more and more of my time -- particularly after I became Dr. Kissinger's deputy in June 1971. I worked closely with Dr. Kissinger as negotiations intensified in late 1972 seeking to end the war and obtain the return of U.S. prisoners of war.

During this period, the North Vietnamese began to renounce earlier agreements and stall the negotiations for peace. As a result, Dr. Kissinger and I advocated the bombing of military targets in North Vietnam which occurred in later December 1972. I believed then it was only way to convince the North Vietnamese to resume serious negotiations. (I continue to believe today that judgment was correct.) Subsequent observers -- as well as aerial reconnaissance photos -- have confirmed that the bombing was focused on selective military targets and did not result in indiscriminate "carpet bombing" of civilian areas.

In my judgment, that course of action was in the best interest of the United States and it produced the intended result. The North Vietnamese quickly signaled their willingness to return to the negotiations, those negotiations did resume in January 1973, and led to the agreement that President Nixon announced on Jan. 23, 1973, and led to the return of U.S. prisoners of war in the spring of 1973. White House Chief of Staff (1973-74) Hughes' $100,000 Campaign Contribution

I have testified on this matter before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential campaign activities on May 15, 1974 . . . this issue also came to my attention shortly after I arrived at the White House. I took only one action of any significance. At the request of the president, I obtained the name of an attorney from White House counsel Leonard Garment, and transmitted the name of that attorney to Mr. Rebozo as a lawyer that he might retain in connection with IRS investigation. This incident may have occupied a small portion of my time on several scattered days during the first six months that I was at the White House. The Nixon Tapes

1. Transcription of tapes:

The responsibility for supervising the preparation of all transcripts that were to be released either to the courts, congressional committees or to the public rested completely in the hands of the White House legal staff, working with President Nixon.

I never personally listened to a tape (other than a brief portion of one that President Nixon played at a Cabinet meeting to demonstrate the poor quality of the recordings). I never participated in reviewing any transcript for accuracy or in deciding the relevancy to Watergate of portions of conversations. Those decisions were left to the lawyers and other members of the White House staff subject to review by President Nixon. . . .

2. The 18 1/2-minute gap:

I never physically had any tape in my possession, and I explained in two days of testimony before Judge Sirica my limited and arms' length actions in arranging on several occasions for President Nixon or his secretary to listen to tapes. I still have no knowledge of the origin of the 18 1/2-minute gap.

3. Transcript of June 4, 1973, meeting with President Nixon:

The transcript of a meeting between President Nixon and me on June 4, 1973, has been the repeated subject of speculation and innuendo.

This meeting occurred in the context of the president's decision to listen to his tapes at my urging based on the advice of the White House lawyers. I had been at the White House for less than a month and I knew little about the details of Watergate.

At this date I cannot reconstruct the precise June 4 conversation even with the transcript in front of me. But I do recall that I wanted President Nixon to finish listening to the tapes -- to complete a task that he did not find pleasant.

To turn specifically to the transcript: it shows the president saying to me that he will continue to review the tapes to "see what else is in" them. I agreed with him that he should continue to review the tapes, saying, "That's the thing for you to do, for your own, really your own peace of mind right now." And I continue: "You can't recall. It was a meeting . . . [unintelligible]."

In context I believe that I was emphasizing to him that he should -- for his own sake -- continue to listen to the tapes since he could not recall independently what had been said.

But, since the transcript shows so many parts of the conversation as unintelligible, it is impossible to say with certainty exactly what we were discussing in those two sentences. I do not have an independent recollection now of those sentences. But one thing I know with complete certainty is that I never suggested then or on any other occasion, that he should dissemble or pretend not to recall something. The Nixon Pardon

In Ocotober 1974, President Ford testified before the House Judiciary Committee about the circumstances surrounding his decision to pardon President Nixon. That testimony accords with my recollection of my conversations with Mr. Ford. But let me remove any lingering doubt: At no time did I ever suggest in any way an agreement or "deal" that Mr. Nixon would resign in exchange for a pardon from Mr. Ford.

When I met alone with Vice President Ford on Aug. 1, 1974, I went to that meeting to tell him of President Nixon's inclination to resign, and to emphasize to him that he had to be prepared to assume the presidency within a very short time. We discussed the views of members of the White House staff, various courses of action that had been developed by the White House lawyers, and a number of transition matters. As President Ford indicated in this testimony, the courses of action under discussion by the White House lawyers included: letting impeachment take its course through the House and a Senate trial, prompt resignation, temporary withdrawal from office under the 25th Amendment, a censure vote in lieu of impeachment, President Nixon pardoning himself, and a pardon from President Ford. As President Ford also testified, I did not advocate any course of action. My duty was to urge Ford to be prepared for a rapid transition, perhaps within a day, not to discuss any possible agreement.