Sen. John Glenn plans to compete for presidential delegates in all 50 states in 1984, campaigning on the theme that as a middle-of-the-roader he is the most electable Democrat in the race, according to a 191-page strategy prepared by his chief adviser.

The document, two volumes and a lengthy appendix, notes that while the Ohio Democrat's natural base is the Midwest, his greatest strength is in the South and West. This is fortunate, it says, because state contests in those regions come relatively early in 1984.

The blueprint also says that Glenn should try to have Ohio's scheduled June primary held earlier, possibly opposite the Illinois or New York contests in March, to guarantee that he will have at least a big home-state victory in early days that might otherwise be troublesome.

His backers in Ohio are now looking into the possibility of doing that, perhaps by having a presidential caucus in March while keeping the primary for other offices in June.

The document also discusses political and personal strategies that Glenn should pursue. His image as a former astronaut and national hero is of incalculable value in attracting crowds and media coverage, it says.

But it is crucial that Glenn become known just as well for his positions on issues and that he be viewed nationally as a man of substance by people who know him now mainly as the man who orbited the earth.

The strategy was written by William R. White, Glenn's administrative assistant in the Senate and chief of staff of his presidential campaign.

The document was made available for inspection by a Glenn campaign official at a time when Glenn's presidential effort has been criticized by party professionals for being late-starting, disorganized or having no organization.

Actually, the John Glenn Presidential Committee began operating in a sizable way with little notice last month in a sprawling suite of offices in a modern building a few blocks from the Capitol and next door to the much more modest suite housing the presidential exploratory committee of Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.).

The Glenn committee has about 40 full-time employes, as many as the Walter F. Mondale presidential committee, considered by party pros to be the best organized so far.

One theme running through White's strategy is that, while Glenn attracts large and enthusiastic crowds around the country, this is due largely to his career as an astronaut. The nation must get to know Glenn as well as Ohio does, he emphasizes.

In 1970, the document notes, Glenn attracted huge crowds and autograph seekers in his first Ohio Democratic Senate primary campaign but was beaten by Howard M. Metzenbaum because Metzenbaum persuaded voters that Glenn was not qualified for the Senate.

In 1974, the blueprint continues, Glenn was elected to the Senate although polls still showed some of the same concerns. In 1980, Glenn won reelection overwhelmingly, and polls showed that concern was gone.

White notes one obvious debacle of the last presidential campaign--the way Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) fumbled and mumbled, unprepared and unsure of himself, when asked by Roger Mudd in a CBS television interview the most basic of questions: why did he want to be president?

It is important to be firm, consistent, organized and forceful when answering this type of question, perhaps even more important than the content of the answer, White writes.

White is candid and tactful in a section cautiously labeled: the Public Speaking Situation. Many consider Glenn a boring public speaker, in need of coaching.

The strategy says Glenn need not change his speaking style but suggests that he could improve his proficiency in the same way that a pilot improves his proficiency, by obtaining additional ratings, in this case learning a few new oratorical techniques. In fact, Glenn seems to have improved his speaking style in recent weeks, due to practice, not coaching, aides say.

The Glenn organization's slow start is due to the fact that he refused to allow any presidential campaign efforts on his behalf until he made his decision late last year to run, advisers say.

Glenn has yet to raise enough money this year to qualify for federal matching funds, as have former vice president Mondale and Sen. Alan Cranston (Calif.), even though his advisers had hoped to qualify early, knowing politicians and the press would take this as a sign of political strength.

He has yet to put field operatives into Iowa and New Hampshire and other states, as have several candidates.

Glenn has begun a fund-raising operation headed by treasurer Robert A. Farmer, who handled finances for John B. Anderson's 1980 independent presidential campaign and the recent campaign of Massachusetts Gov. Michael S. Dukakis (D) and had been signed up for Kennedy's aborted presidential campaign. Last week, 36 fund-raisers pledged to raise $1.1 million for the Glenn campaign.

Glenn officials say they expect to have raised enough funds in about a month to qualify for federal matching funds and that they can raise $18 million by June, 1984.

The politicking, too, has begun. The Glenn camp will send its first field operatives to Iowa and New Hampshire in a few days, and other aides will go to Florida by early spring, White said.

And Glenn aides have just begun telephoning party officials around the country urging them to support the Ohioan's effort as the best way of wresting the White House from Republicans.

Since Kennedy's withdrawal, Glenn has run second to Mondale in polls of Democrats' presidential preferences. He has scored in the mid-teens, well behind Mondale's low 30s but way ahead of the rest.

Still, there are questions in the party about whether Glenn can put it all together in time to win the nomination.

So far, the best evidence as to how the campaign will coalesce comes from White's document. It is dated Nov. 24, 1982, just before Kennedy's defection, which has forced some changes in the strategy, among them the decision to go all out to win the Massachusetts primary.

The paper cites two overriding strategies. First, it says, Glenn must persuade party pros and Democratic voters that he can beat President Reagan or any other Republican and that this is the crucial political distinction between Glenn and the other Democrats.

Second, Glenn must be recognized as a hard-working, loyal Democrat who has paid party dues because, after the Carter years, the party will not turn again to someone considered outside the mainstream of loyal Democrats.

Glenn should lay claim to being the only middle-of-the-road Democrat in the field, and the media should be encouraged to compare Senate voting records, it says.

This will show Mondale, Cranston and Sen. Gary Hart (Colo.) to Glenn's left and Hollings to his right.

During 1983, they can be expected to try to position themselves closer to the middle of the party, and these efforts should be made as difficult and as obvious to the public as possible, the document concludes.

White's strategy rates Cranston's prospects as credible. "I guess I rate his chances better than most people in Washington do," White said in an interview.

The document reserves judgment on Hart's prospects but cautions that Hart devised and implemented the strategy by which George McGovern brought about the demise of Edmund S. Muskie's front-running presidential effort in 1972.

At this point, the memo says, Hollings and former Florida governor Reubin Askew seem to have only regional appeal.

In an interview, White conceded that the continued viability of these two southerners could hurt Glenn's prospects in a region where his strength is suposed to lie.

White writes that the campaign should begin early, that every primary and caucus should be entered and that Glenn should build an organization in each state.

The South and West are Glenn's strongest areas and the Northeast and Mideast his weakest, the document says. It says Glenn needs to do well in the South and West if he is to have a chance at the nomination.

And it adds that the Glenn camp should encourage the idea of having all southern state primaries and caucuses on a single day.

Of 21 state primaries and caucuses tentatively scheduled through March, 1984, the document says, eight would be targeted now for special, early efforts: Iowa, New Hampshire, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Illinois and New York. These account for 882 delegates, or about 22 percent of the convention total.

The paper says Massachusetts and Minnesota, Kennedy's and Mondale's home states, would receive special approaches aimed at securing pockets of centrist Democratic strength.

Massachusetts is popularly viewed as a liberal state, but centrist Democrats have done well there. In the 1976 primary, Sen. Henry M. Jackson (Wash.) came in first, George C. Wallace third and Jimmy Carter fourth.

Of the nine state contests in April, 1984, the plan says three would be targeted now: Pennsylvania, Missouri and Michigan, which account for 431 delegates.

Of the 15 contests in May, only Texas would now be targeted. Texas could be crucial, White says, and in fact could mean the end of at least one candidate's campaign.

Mondale and Glenn will also work the state heavily, it says. A victory there could make Glenn the front-runner, while a bad defeat could finish him. Those scheduled for early targeting by Glenn represent 38 percent of the convention total.

Endorsements from elected officials are more important in this campaign than before, the document says, in part because of the new party rules that will seat a number of party and elected officials as unpledged delegates to the convention. They will form a bloc the size of the delegations of Pennsylvania, Illinois and Texas combined, it says.

Part of the decision to run for president, the paper cautions, must be a commitment to campaign all out. Recent experience has shown that it has helped to be unemployed politically when seeking the presidency. Jimmy Carter in 1976 and Ronald Reagan and George Bush in 1980 are examples.

Those who tried to divide time between Senate and stump have fared poorly.

So, the document warns Glenn that he cannot win the nomination in Washington. It tells him that he will not be considered derelict in his duties if he bypasses some senatorial chores in the campaign.

The pursuit of the presidency, the plan explains, is a "noble endeavor." CAPTION: Picture, Glenn expects to be able to qualify for federal matching funds in a month and to raise $ 1.8 million by June, 1984. AP