From a July 16 report by the Committee on the Present Danger:
Since 1972 -- the period of SALT I and SALT II -- the Soviets have failed to reciprocate U.S. strategic restraint. Instead, the Soviet Union has accelerated its massive build-up of intercontinental and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and forged ahead with its strategic defense program. As a result, the United States finds itself in the position of having to rely on the uncertain development and deployment of future weapons systems in order to counter existing Soviet systems. The United States must make certain that the current negotiations do not result in an agreement that would in any way inhibit the capacity of the United States to restore the nuclear balance by unilateral means if the Soviet Union continues to reject all equitable agreements. The current negotiations also must not bring about the same paralysis of will or false sense of security that emanated from the SALT process.
The chances for successful completion of a sound arms control treaty are inversely proportional to the U.S. eagerness to attain such a treaty. Unless the United States demonstrates to the Soviet Union that it can live without an arms control treaty, it is unlikely to negotiate a sound agreement. . . .
Accepting an unsound agreement for the sake of agreement with the Soviets will not enhance U.S. national security. Furthermore, in view of the pervasive and expanding pattern of Soviet arms control violations, there remains the fundamental prerequisite of restoring Soviet compliance with existing agreements. Until the Soviets choose to honor the commitments already made, new agreements may only add further unilateral constraints upon the United States.