ON THE ROLE OF JUDGES:

"In a constitutional democracy, the moral content of law must be given by the morality of the framer or the legislator, never by the morality of the judge. The sole task of the latter -- and it is a task quite large enough for anyone's wisdom, skill, and virtue -- is to translate the framer's or the legislator's morality in into a rule to govern unforseen circumstances. That abstinence from giving his own desires free play, that continuing and self-counscious renunciation of power, that is the morality of the jurist." -- American Enterprise Institute Lecture, 1984.

ON ORIGINAL INTENT:

"It is necessary to establish the proposition that the framers' intentions with respect to freedoms are the sole legitimate premise from which constitutional analysis may proceed." -- AEI lecture

ON THE DEATH PENALTY:

"{T}he issue is almost concluded by the fact that the death penalty is specifically referred to, and assumed to be an available penalty, in the Constitution itself . . . . It is a little hard to understand how a penalty that the framers explicitly assumed to be available can somehow become unavailable because of the very Constitution the framers wrote." -- McGuigan interview

ON THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

"I have never been convinced by that argument {that "courts shouldn't soil their hands by allowing in" illegally-seized evidence} because it seems the conscience of the court ought to be at least equally shaken by the idea of turning a crminal loose upon society. The only good argument really rests on the deterrence rationale, and it's time we examine that with great care to see how much deterrence we are getting and at what cost." -- McGuigan interview

ON ABORTION

"I am convinced, as I think most legal scholars are, that Roe v. Wade {the court's 1973 abortion ruling} is, itself, an unconstitutional decision, a serious and wholly unjustifiable judicial usurpation of state legislative authority....{The case} is by no means the only example of such unconstitutional behavior by the Supreme Court."

-- Testimony before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee, 1981

ON OVERTURNING SUPRME COURT DECISIONS.

"Since the legislature can do nothing about the interpretation of the constituiton given by a court, the court ought to be always open to rethink constitutional problems."

Interview with District Lawyer Magazine, May/June 1985.

ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.

In a 1984 case dismissing a political science professors libel suit against newspaper columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Bork wrote in a concurring opinion:

"This case...arouses concern that a freshening stream of libel actions, whcih often seem as much designed to punish writers and publications as to recover damages for real injuries, may threaten the public and constitutional interest in free, and frequently rough, discussion. Those who step into areas of public dispute, who choose the pleasures and distractions of controversy, muyst be willing to bear criticism, disparagement, and even wounding assessments....

Perhaps the framers did not envision libel actions as a major threat to that freedom {of political expression}. ...But if, over time, the libel action becomes a threat to the central meaning of the first amendment, why should not judges adapt their doctrines."

Ollman v. Evans, 1984

ON ONE MAN, ONE VOTE.

"The principle of 'one man, one vote' runs counter to the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, the history surrounding its adoption and ratification, and the political practice of Americans from Colonial times up to the day the Court invented the new formula."

1971 speech.

ON ACCESS TO COURTS

Bork, dissenting, said "We ought to renounce outright the whole notion of congressional standing...those who drafted, proposed, and ratified the Constitution did not intend that the judiciary should entertain suits directly between the political branches of the national government. The judiciary they envisioned was to play no such dominant role in affairs of state."

Barnes v. Kline, 1985.