The nomination of Appeals Court Judge Robert H. Bork to the Supreme Court has been marked by charge and countercharge. Last month, the White House distributed its briefing paper on the Bork nomination, and yesterday the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), released a report by committee consultants who were asked to respond to the administration paper. Following are excerpts from those reports.

A vacancy on the Supreme Court is always a national concern. But this particular vacancy -- occurring at this particular time -- carries historical weight. In this year of its bicentennial, the Constitution is more than the object of celebration; it is the focus of a critical national debate about what it is, what it means and what it requires . . . .

Neither the Constitution nor judicial practice enshrines any particular philosophical balance on the Supreme Court. And the president must have some latitude to select Supreme Court nominees who generally share his philosophical perspective.

That latitude is exceeded when a president attempts to remake the Supreme Court in his own image by selecting nominees whose extensive expressions of views on major, specific issues clearly parallel his own; when the president and the Senate are divided deeply on the great issues of the day, and when the court itself is closely divided philosophically, and a determined president could bend it to political ends that he cannot achieve through the legislative process . . . .

Contrary to the assertions of the White House position paper, the direction of the Supreme Court is very much at stake. Civil Rights

Judge Bork's extensive record shows that he has opposed virtually every major civil rights advance on which he has taken a position, including such issues as the public accommodations bill, open housing, restrictive covenants, literacy tests, poll taxes and affirmative action.In 1963, Judge Bork opposed the public accommodations bill on the ground that it would mean "a loss in a vital area of personal liberty" . . . .

In 1968, the nominee attacked a Supreme Court decision striking down a referendum that revoked a state open-housing statute . . . .

In 1968, 1971 and 1973, Judge Bork sharply criticized the decisions establishing the principle of one-person, one vote . . . .

In 1971, he challenged the decision striking down racially restrictive covenants in housing . . . .

In 1972 and 1981, he criticized decisions banning literacy tests in voting . . . .

In 1973 and 1985, he attacked the decision outlawing poll taxes as a prerequisite to voting . . . .

In 1978, he rejected the {Bakke} decision upholding affirmative action . . . .

In 1987, he stated that "I do think the Equal Protection Clause probably should be kept to things like race and ethnicity," indicating that he would not extend protection, for example, to women . . . .

Judge Bork has opposed the Equal Rights Amendment because it would, in his view, constitutionalize issues of gender equality . . . .

Commenting generally on the Bill of Rights, Judge Bork says that it was "a hastily drafted document on which little thought was expended." Social Issues

Judge Bork has repeatedly and consistently rejected the right to be free from governmental interference {in} one's private life . . . . .

The nominee has repeatedly rejected the decision upholding the right of married couples to use contraceptives . . . .

Judge Bork described as "unconstitutional" the decision upholding the right of a woman to decide with her doctor the question of abortion . . . . The Bork Record

The {White House} compilation of statistics seriously distorts Judge Bork's record.

The statistical analysis is uninformative since the nominee, as a circuit court judge, has been constitutionally and institutionally bound to follow Supreme Court precedent . . . .

Since Judge Bork concedes that 90 percent of his docket has been nonideological . . . his Circuit Court record says little about his suitability for the Supreme Court . . . . First Amendment

Judge Bork's record on First Amendment issues demonstrates that he would narrow many well-established First Amendment protections.

{His} criticism of landmark Supreme Court decisions suggests that he would tolerate far broader prior restraints on the press than have historically been deemed constitutional, as well as permitted far more governmental punishment of speech than has traditionally been protected . . . .

Judge Bork's writings show that he would protect only speech that is tied to the political process, and that he would not protect artistic and literary expression such as Shakespeare's plays, Rubens' paintings and Baryshnikov's ballet . . . .