PARIS -- The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) missile treaty signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev creates two major problems for the United States and its allies. But both of these problems are beyond the reach of any amendments or reservations that could be brought in a treaty ratification process. The U.S. Senate should move quickly to approve the treaty as it stands and avoid a lengthy, partisan debate that would leave new scars on the Atlantic alliance.

Problem One: Amendments or reservations will not restore the military advantage that the United States gives up by agreeing to remove the Pershing II missile from NATO's arsenal as part of the deal that requires the Russians to eliminate their older, less useful SS20s. To preserve U. S. advantage, the treaty would have to be rejected outright, at enormous global political cost.

Anyone who has ever heard Gen. Bernard Rogers, the retired former NATO military commander, speak in awe of the Pershing II understands immediately why it is the military planner's dream. It provides apparent answers to the problems created by the theory of nuclear deterrence and particularly to the dilemmas addressed in MC-143, the NATO document that outlines the "flexible response" doctrine.

Launched from European soil, a single Pershing II would have a 95 percent chance of penetrating Soviet defenses and striking a vital Soviet target within eight to 13 minutes after launch, the planners believe. Rogers and others feel the Soviets would blink as a result of being hit by one such rocket, and a conventional attack would be halted without the two superpowers having loosed their strategic arsenals against each other.

Western analysts have never understood the military role of the SS20 in Soviet doctrine, and some believe that it was deployed on such a large scale simply because the Soviet military-industrial complex wanted to keep its production lines busy. But in the larger political context, it is a tradeoff worth making.

Problem Two: The treaty intensifies West German concern about carrying a much higher share of the nuclear risk than other alliance members. It leaves in place thousands of tactical battlefield nuclear weapons that have a range of less than 300 miles. If they are ever used, it almost certainly will be on German soil and German soil alone. This fear of "singularity" has been at the core of German concern about the treaty and the next phase of negotations.

"One of {Secretary of State} George Shultz's major jobs now will be making it clear to the Germans they are not singularized," a U.S. policy expert observed. "And we have to recognize that the German government will continue to note the need for negotiations on these battlefield nuclear weapons, even though we oppose it now."

In beginning his campaign for ratification of the treaty, President Reagan has been forced to build a wall around these short-range systems and say they are not up for negotiation.

He is doing this in part to reassure Britain and France, which fear that any more negotiated reductions in NATO's nuclear weapons will focus pressure on them to halt their ambitious expansion of their own arsenals. But even more urgently, Reagan appears to be answering conservative critics who argue that the INF treaty weakens American ability to withstand a Soviet conventional assault in Europe.

In his public statements last week, he hammered at the theme that "battlefield nuclear weapons have evened up" the Soviet conventional superiority and would be brought into negotiations only when "parity {is} achieved in arms reduction in the conventional state."

To German ears, such statements have the effect of fingernails scratching across a blackboard. "It will do no good to direct the deterrent against the victim of aggression" by exploding battlefield nuclear weapons in West Germany, said a senior figure in Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Union.

The people who are calling Reagan a "useful idiot" for the Soviets or worse have drawn him into a public debate on the remaining weapons systems in Europe that cries out to be finessed at this point. Increasing tensions within Kohl's coaltion government and between Washington and Bonn by focusing sharply on this issue can only harm the alliance in the long run. The Senate should rapidly approve the treaty and avoid contributing to the harm.