Former Defense Department arms control chief Richard N. Perle and three former Pentagon colleagues yesterday strongly criticized the U.S.-Soviet treaty eliminating Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and urged the Senate to demand treaty clarifications or amendments from Moscow.

Taking a stand sharply at odds with the views of current civilian and military Pentagon leaders, Perle and his colleagues said the treaty contains "drafting errors" and loopholes that could enable the Soviets to maintain a secret, illegal force of medium-range SS20 nuclear missiles after the accord takes effect.

Perle criticized senior Reagan administration officials for saying that amendments to the treaty would effectively kill it, and denounced what he called the Senate's casual approach in approving past arms treaties.

The group's 48-page report, issued yesterday, lists several dozen concerns about procedures for verifying treaty compliance, including many points Perle and others lost in earlier interagency disputes. Perle, an arms control critic, originated the INF Treaty's central provision eliminating all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles, but he and the others resigned before the treaty negotiations were completed late last year.

The report suggests the Soviets could hide SS20s at facilities not open to U.S. inspection under the treaty. Perle had sought wider inspection rights, but the administration rejected them because of intelligence community fears that reciprocal inspections in the United States would reveal secrets.

Perle's group also criticized treaty provisions allowing the Soviet Union to modify its missile launchers, instead of eliminate them; to destroy a limited number of SS20s by launching them over its own territory; and to destroy some of the missiles covered by the agreement without U.S. inspection before the treaty takes effect.

"Taken together such provisions mean that the Soviets, even without violating the treaty, can remain rather close to a militarily significant INF capability," the group charged.

Perle said after a news conference at the American Enterprise Institute that "many of {the treaty's ambiguities} can be sorted out quite readily, perhaps by an exchange of correspondence with the Soviet Union," or by the administration clearly defining the treaty's provisions, based on the INF negotiating record.

But others in the group, including Frank Gaffney and Douglas Feith, Perle's former deputies for nuclear forces and arms negotiations, suggested that the treaty's defects were severe enough to require renegotiation.

Acknowledging that Senate approval of the treaty appears certain, several members of the group said their objections were aimed in part at avoiding similar problems with the treaty reducing strategic or long-range nuclear arms presently under negotiation in Geneva.

"There are some lessons to be drawn" from the INF negotiations, Perle said, particularly involving the need for "far more intrusive" verification provisions in a strategic arms treaty.

Asked about the report, Maynard W. Glitman, the chief INF negotiator, said "I think we can defend the treaty against these arguments." Glitman denied that the treaty contained any "drafting errors."

Fred Hoffman, a Defense Department spokesman, said, "We have not seen the report, but we stand by the congressional testimony of Secretary of Defense {Frank C.} Carlucci" that the Senate should leave the treaty intact.