The last name of Neil A. Lewis, one of the authors of "Betrayal, " a book about confessed spy Aldrich H. Ames, was incorrect in early editions in a story about Ames. (Published 6/13/95)

Three new books about confessed spy Aldrich H. Ames identify by name for the first time 10 Soviet agents working for U.S. intelligence who were exposed by the former CIA counterintelligence officer and later either killed or jailed by the Soviet government.

The list includes KGB colonels and lieutenant colonels who provided intelligence from foreign capitals including Moscow, Bonn and Lisbon; a disarmament specialist who delivered Soviet negotiating positions and the Kremlin's assessments of U.S. positions; and a KGB agent who disclosed that the Soviets were using spy dust to track U.S. intelligence officers in Moscow.

Although several of those named were described as providing information that became key to U.S. policymakers, most gave information primarily helpful in recruiting more Soviet or Warsaw Pact agents or in preventing Moscow's spies from being planted inside U.S. and allied intelligence agencies.

The three books, "Nightmover" by David Wise, "Killer Spy" by Peter Maas and "Betrayal" by David Johnston, Neil A. Lewis and Tim Weiner, three New York Times reporters, together present the broadest description of the spy intrigues during the Cold War carried out by U.S. and Soviet intelligence agencies in Washington, Moscow and around the world.

Before publication of the books, one Soviet military intelligence officer, Gen. Dimitri Fedorovich Polyakov, and two KGB officers, Lt. Col. Valery F. Martynov and Maj. Sergei M. Motorin, were the only U.S.-paid agents identified officially as exposed and subsequently executed because of Ames.

Added by the new books are: KGB Col. Gennady Smetanin, who provided intelligence information from Lisbon. KGB Lt. Col. Gennady G. Varennik, who gave data from Bonn. Soviet military intelligence Col. Sergei Bokhan, who provided information on Greeks working for the Soviets. KGB Lt. Col. Vladimir M. Piguzov, recruited in Indonesia, who disclosed a former CIA officer spying for the Soviets and then continued as an agent after becoming an official in the KGB training academy in Moscow. Military Col. Vladimir M. Vasilyev, recruited in Budapest and active in Moscow. KGB officer Leonid Polishchuk, who served in Africa. KGB officer Sergei Vorontsov, who disclosed Soviet use of spy dust, a material that helps trace the handling of secret documents. KGB Lt. Col. Boris Yuzhin, who described KGB West Coast operations. Vladimir V. Potashov, the disarmament specialist. Oleg Agraniants, Soviet consul in Tunis, who provided information about Moscow's activities in North Africa and contacts with Yasser Arafat.

All but four were executed following Ames's betrayal. Bokhan escaped with CIA assistance before he could be taken back to Moscow and Agraniants defected. Yuzhin and Potashov were tried and convicted of treason but were released under Russian President Boris Yeltsin's amnesty after both served six years of their sentences.

The books provide other new details about the case but no major disclosures. Each book reports that government investigators are not satisfied that Ames has told them all he knows, despite a promise to do so as part of his plea agreement. The three books also rekindle questions about how and when Ames became a spy and why it took so long for him to be uncovered.

"As damaging as the betrayals were," Wise writes about Ames, "in the end the greatest damage Ames did was to the agency itself. He made it look foolish, the butt of cartoonists, at the very time when the agency was at its most vulnerable, cast adrift by the end of the Cold War, desperately seeking new roles and missions."

In his volume, Maas confirms reports that the final bit of information that focused CIA and FBI mole hunters on Ames in early 1993 came from a source with access to former KGB files. He did not provide Ames's name, Maas writes, but gave his code name "Kolokol," which the CIA knew, and the fact that he had met his controller in Bogota, Colombia, and Rome, spots where Ames visited or lived.

According to Wise, during Ames's initial April 1994 debriefing by FBI and Justice Department officials after he pleaded guilty to espionage, the confessed spy made the startling disclosure that he tried in the late 1980s to divert the attention of mole hunters to veteran CIA officer Jeanne Vertefeuille.

While still spying for Moscow, Ames was asked by the KGB to provide the name of a CIA officer who could be framed for the loss of agents he had caused, according to Wise and federal officials who were present. Ames gave Vertefeuille's name as someone familiar with Soviet intelligence operations.

Vertefeuille at the time was heading the secret internal CIA search that years later would help lead to Ames's arrest and guilty plea.

The only CIA official in the debriefing when Ames made his statement was Vertefeuille. "You're not going to like this," Ames said. "I gave them your name." He added that later he believed he told the KGB that Vertefeuille was heading the mole hunt.

There was no indication that the KGB ever followed through by planting clues that would lead to Vertefeuille, although the Soviet intelligence service passed other false leads to CIA officers over the years in attempts to protect Ames. One of them was built around the Soviet mole being an agency employee who was born in Russia.

The authors agree the most important spy lost because of Ames was Polyakov, recruited in the early 1960s by the FBI. For more than 20 years, as he rose to be a general in Soviet army intelligence, Polyakov, under the code name "Tophat," provided varied information. He started, according to Wise, turning in the Soviet spies he had trained and who had infiltrated into the United States in the 1960s under assumed names, and later provided the names of four U.S. government employees spying for Moscow.

In the 1970s, according to Maas, Polyakov supplied crucial documents showing "the split between Communist rulers in Moscow and Beijing was permanent," and in the 1980s he gave data on Soviet missiles and nuclear war strategy.

Martynov, recruited in 1982, was developed to provide information on KGB agents inside the Soviet Embassy here and particularly which of them might be candidates for recruitment by the CIA or FBI. He also delivered information about targets in the United States of Soviet intelligence and goings on at KGB headquarters in Moscow. Martynov had more than 50 meetings in FBI safe houses over three years, according to Wise.

Maas, whose book was done with FBI cooperation, said the bureau supplied Martynov with information he could give his bosses to show he was a good spy, plus "one solid source {of U.S. intelligence} at any given time, with three others in development -- just enough to keep his superiors happy, but not excite their curiosity."

Maas wrote that the bureau paid Martynov $300 in cash for each meeting and set aside $1,500 a month in an escrow account to be paid him in the future.

In December 1994, Martynov's widow said in an interview she did not know her husband had been a spy until after he was exposed by Ames and executed. She also said she had never seen any of the money the FBI is supposed to have set aside for him.

Motorin, who operated in Washington as a correspondent for the Novosti press agency, collected for the KGB information on U.S. politics and foreign policy issues in Congress and the State Department. Wise wrote that Motorin, too, supplied names of KGB officers at the embassy in return for $100 to $200 a meeting and $500 in an escrow account.

He returned to Moscow under normal rotation in 1984, a year after his FBI recruitment. Six months later he was exposed by Ames, arrested and later executed.

Wise expands on earlier reports that Ames may have gotten the original idea for spying while working in Mexico City from 1981 to 1983. During that time he met his current wife, Rosario, and decided he would divorce his first wife -- a decision that forced him into debt.

It was also during this period he decided to attempt to recruit Igor I. Shurygin, then the KGB's chief of counterintelligence in Mexico.

According to Wise, Ames filed many reports on his meetings with Shurygin based on time they spent together at meals and drinking over a two-year period. When Ames selected Shurygin for recruitment, it was understood that Shurygin's job was to recruit him.

A top CIA counterintelligence analyst, who years later reviewed Ames's reports on his meetings with the KGB officer, "concluded that Ames had not been getting anywhere in developing Shurygin . . . it looked more like Shurygin was developing Ames rather than the other way around," Wise wrote. CAPTION: ALDRICH H. AMES