The following are excerpts from the Army inspector general's report on U.S. detainee operations in Iraq and Afghanistan:

"Based on our review and analysis of reports and case summaries of investigations and our observations and interviews conducted throughout this inspection, we could not identify a systemic cause for the abuse incidents. . . . In a few incidents, higher ranking individuals up to Lieutenant Colonel were involved; however, the chain of command took action when an allegation of detainee abuse was reported." -- Page 13.

"Although elimination of all abuse is the goal of DOD Law of War Training, several factors prevent the complete elimination of detainee abuse. These include: The psychological process that increases the likelihood of abusive behavior when one person has complete control over another. . . . Poor training in the handling of detainees increases the risk of abuse. . . . Ambiguous instructions concerning the handling of detainees also greatly increase the risk of abuse. Some Soldiers believed their command encouraged behavior at the harsher end of the acceptable range of behavior in the treatment of detainees." -- Page 20.

"In the few cases involving the progression to more serious abuse by Soldiers, tolerance of behavior by any level of the chain of command, even if minor, led to an increase in the frequency and intensity of abuse. In a few cases, the perception, accurate or not, that Other Government Agencies (OGA) conducted interrogations using harsher methods than allowed by Army Regulation, led to a belief that higher levels of command condoned such methods." -- Page 22.

"Of all facilities inspected, only Abu Ghraib was determined to be undesirable for housing detainees because it is located near an urban population and is under frequent hostile fire, placing Soldiers and detainees at risk. . . . Refuse and litter were seen within one of the Ganci compounds [within Abu Ghraib]. It could not be determined if the trash was actually refuse that had migrated to the surface from an old landfill site on which Camp Ganci was built. There was approximately one portable latrine per 25 detainees, and there was a contract in place to clean the latrines. There was, however, a bad smell throughout the area from sewage because disinfectant chemicals were not replaced in the latrines. According to sensing sessions, there were only 12 showerheads in each Ganci compound for 600 to 700 detainees." -- Pages 22 and 23.

"MPs can acquire important information through observation and insight even though they are not trained intelligence specialists. MP interaction with detainees is limited, however, to contact necessary for the management of a safe and secure living environment and for security escort functions during detainee movement. Thus, active participation by MPs in the intelligence exploitation process is not within the doctrinal scope of the MP mission." -- Pages 31 and 32.

"Tactical Military Intelligence officers are not adequately trained on how to manage the full spectrum of the collection and analysis of human intelligence." -- Page 36.

"[Interrogation] policies were not clear and contained ambiguities. . . . No confirmed instance of detainee abuse resulted from the approved [interrogation] policies. . . . The caution noted in [the Army's interrogation field manual] appears applicable. 'It may often be difficult to determine where lawful actions end and unlawful actions begin.' In a high-stress, high pressure combat environment, soldiers and subordinate leaders require clear, unambiguous guidance well within established parameters that they did not have in the policies we reviewed." -- Pages 38 and 39.