1. How has the division spread?
Rivalry between Qatar and its neighbors now extends well beyond the Middle East, and the countries for example find themselves on either side of a proxy war in Libya. Qatar has drawn closer to Turkey, which helped it weather the initial shock of the embargo. Meanwhile, Turkey’s ties to other Gulf states have soured; for example, the country has deployed troops to fight against U.A.E.-backed forces in Libya, and it released information implicating Saudi agents in the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul.
2. What’s the rift about?
The quartet complains about Qatar’s friendliness with Iran and accuses it of supporting terrorism, a charge its leaders deny. The crisis was sparked in 2017 when hackers published a story on Qatar’s news agency quoting Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani as criticizing mounting anti-Iran sentiment after a trip to the region by U.S. President Donald Trump. Qatari officials quickly deleted the comments, called the FBI to help investigate the hack, and appealed for calm as Saudi and U.A.E. newspapers, clerics and celebrities accused Qatar of trying to undermine efforts to isolate Iran.
3. How much damage has been done?
In 2016, the last full year before the embargo, Qatar’s trade with the U.A.E. amounted to $3.5 billion, according to the International Monetary Fund, while trade between Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Egypt totaled about $3.3 billion. That’s vanished. So too have virtually all tourists visiting Qatar from the boycotting countries: 1.3 million people in 2016, including three of the top five visiting nationalities. The decline in intra-Gulf business contributed to a slide in real estate prices and has weighed on economic growth. Still, Qataris argue that the embargo has helped them forge new business ties and foster emerging industries, especially food production, that the country wouldn’t have otherwise developed.
4. How widespread is the fallout?
The rift has not just hurt Qatar. The boycotting states, particularly the U.A.E., lost tourists and investors from Qatar and the dispute shook confidence in its regional business hub Dubai, which many companies use as a base for their Gulf and wider Middle East operations. More widely, the U.S. has voiced concern the row has complicated security cooperation in a region that hosts major U.S. bases and is a significant exporter and route for global oil supplies. Washington also sees Gulf unity as essential to combating the influence of its foe Iran, which U.S officials see as having benefited from the divisions.
5. Was it all a misunderstanding?
No. The conflict had been brewing for years. With its oil riches and custodianship of Islam’s holiest sites, Saudi Arabia has long seen itself as the natural leader of the Persian Gulf region, if not the entire Middle East. Its strongest competitor is Iran, with whom it has a testy relationship. Since Qatar began to grow wealthy from natural gas exports two decades ago, it has asserted its independence from the Saudis and sought cordial ties with Iran, with whom it shares a gigantic offshore gas field. At stake: almost 50 trillion cubic meters of proven gas reserves, according to Qatar Energy Minister Saad Sherida Al Kaabi.
6. What’s terrorism got to do with it?
The boycotting states accused Qatar of supporting al-Qaeda and Islamic State terrorists, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organization that several Gulf states have banned and designated as a terrorist group.
7. Does Qatar support al-Qaeda and Islamic State?
Some Qataris have provided support to al-Qaeda and its spinoffs, but the country says it has stepped up efforts to clamp down on terrorism financing, particularly since 2017. The U.S. State Department’s 2018 report on terrorism said Qatar has increased cooperation on counter-terrorism efforts and touted a new anti-money laundering law that was ultimately passed the following year. Still, this cooperation followed years of criticism from the U.S. that the country served as a key fund-raising locale for groups like al-Qaeda and the Taliban, particularly through then poorly regulated charities. The U.S. says a longtime government minister provided support for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, mastermind of the September 11 attacks, who lived in Qatar for several years during the 1990s. And in the disarray of the Syrian revolution, some Qatari support went to rebels who later went on to join Islamic State. Still, the U.S. has levied similar criticisms at other Gulf States.
8. Is the Muslim Brotherhood charge true?
Qatar’s government denies it supports the Muslim Brotherhood, or any political party, but rather says it helps governments and people who may at times be governed by the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Egypt from 2012 to 2013. Qatar’s accusers consider the Brotherhood to be a terrorist movement. Egyptian leader Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi banned the organization and has overseen a crackdown on its supporters after overthrowing an elected president from the group in 2013. Qatar has hosted prominent Brotherhood cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi since he fled Egypt in 1961, offering him a popular talk show on the state-backed Al Jazeera TV channel.
9. What have the boycotting states demanded?
Saudi Arabia and its allies initially produced a list of 13 requirements including shutting down Al Jazeera, cutting back diplomatic ties with Iran, severing relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and removing a base Turkey established in Qatar in 2014. Subsequently, the group recast its list as six “principles,” including that Qatar must suspend “all acts of provocation” and refrain from “interfering in the internal affairs of states.”
10. What reconciliation efforts have been made?
Kuwait and the U.S. have been attempting to broker a rapprochement between Qatar and the boycotting countries almost since the dispute began. A series of attacks on tankers near the Strait of Hormuz prompted Qatar’s then-prime minister to travel to Saudi Arabia’s holy city of Mecca to discuss the response to Iran with a group of regional leaders, but Qatar’s foreign minister later criticized the summit. Prospects of an end to the dispute appeared more likely toward the end of 2019, after Saudi Arabia agreed to send its national soccer team to compete in the Gulf Cup held in Doha, and Qatar’s foreign minister flew to Riyadh to discuss the rift. Speculation that the emir of Qatar might join a meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Saudi Arabia in December ultimately didn’t bear fruit, with the prime minister attending in his stead.
11. How has Qatar weathered the boycott?
Qatar is one of the world’s wealthiest nations, and its economy has proved resilient. Because the country has open shipping corridors, sales of gas and oil have continued uninterrupted. Saudi Arabia shocked Qatar by closing its only land border, halting shipments of food. But the smaller country quickly opened alternative trade routes and found substitute suppliers, notably Turkey, Iran and India. Denied overflight rights for Qatar Airways by the boycotting group, it negotiated them with Iran. Turkey has sent additional troops and conducted joint exercises with Qatar. The sheikhdom remains on good terms with the U.S., which bases thousands of troops and a regional air operations center there.
12. Why are these countries having so much trouble resolving the rift?
A deal that allows all sides to save face is challenging. Qatar categorically rejects many of the boycotting countries’ accusations and has argued that adhering to the bloc’s demands would infringe its sovereignty. Therefore, it’s not clear what compromises Qatar might be willing to offer nor what concessions might appease its critics. Sources close to the negotiations have said Saudi Arabia has appeared more willing to consider renewing ties, while the U.A.E. leadership has taken a harder line on the conflict.
--With assistance from Donna Abu-Nasr and Sylvia Westall.
To contact the reporter on this story: Simone Foxman in Doha at firstname.lastname@example.org
To contact the editors responsible for this story: Claudia Maedler at email@example.com, Lisa Beyer, Guy Collins
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