Pro There’s plenty of time.
Tom Udall (D-N.M.): “With regard to the 24-day requirement for undeclared sites: Given the half-life of uranium and plutonium and the resources needed to construct a parallel enrichment facility, would you say it is scientifically possible to hide such work in 24 days? Do you believe we have the technical capabilities to determine if enrichment is being done outside the JCPOA?”
Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz: “Once again, we have the historical example from 2003 of precisely that happening after six months easily finding uranium despite major efforts to disguise it. And in addition, we will have all of the containment and surveillance for 20 years of all the sensitive parts of every machine that they have.”
Udall: “And so people that have used the analogy that like in a drug crime you flush it down the toilet and its gone and you won’t be able to find it — that isn’t in fact been proven out, has it.”
Moniz: “If they try that, we’ll find it. Heh heh.”
Con Iran can hide its nuclear development with lead time.
Bob Corker (R-Tenn.): “I know they said this is the most comprehensive inspection regime that we’ve ever had. That’s not true. That is not true.”
“We have a process that they’re declaring is 24 days, but we all know that’s not right. 24 days begins after, by the way, the IAEA has found violations that they’re concerned about, and then you give Iran time to respond to that, and then by the time it kicks in, there is a 24-day process, but it could be months.”
“And as we know, in laboratories, when you’re developing a nuclear warhead that is about this big, it’s very easy to cover things up like that.”
“All the focus has been on finding uranium. There’s other aspects of this that are very difficult to find.”