Libyans face a thorny security dilemma: The absence of strong state institutions creates the need, opportunities and support for militias to provide security and play a role in the transition, but these groups undermine security and the development of strong state institutions. Libyans are well aware of the problem, but both citizens and elites are caught in the cycle. To exit the cycle to a better outcome, it is necessary to understand how citizens perceive the situation and the choices they make.
In Libya, many citizens live in daily fear. They feel unsafe in public and even in their own homes. More than one-third of Libyans report feeling unsafe going to the market, school or work, according to three nationally representative surveys, each of 1,200 Libyans. (We conducted these in May, September and November 2013 with the National Democratic Institute and JMW Consulting in collaboration with Diwan Market Research and funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) One in five people feel somewhat or very unsafe at home or in their neighborhood. The situation is particularly troubling for women; 40 percent of women feel unsafe going out. And, it is worse in rural areas and in the southern region of Fezzan, where half of residents feel unsafe going to school or work. Not surprisingly, security concerns top the national agenda for two-thirds of the population.
Political elites also reflect the tension between a demand for strong democratic institutions, on the one hand, and support for militias that undermine democracy, on the other. Many political elites recognize the value of strong institutions and proclaim commitment to democracy. Yet, weak state institutions coupled with the proliferation of arms prompt elites to hedge their bets, keeping or cooperating with a militia even as they found political parties and engage in the GNC. As one political leader explained during a political party workshop held in early 2013, today they were playing on the party field, but it didn’t mean they were getting rid of their militia.
Certainly, there have been ample times in Libya’s transition when arms on the street, not arguments in parliament, have decided political outcomes. To name but a few: the political exclusion law passed after militias surrounded key ministries; a militia’s abduction of then-Prime Minister Ali Zeidan; and the seizing of oil facilities effectively determining the state budget and economic policies. It is difficult — if not nearly impossible — for individual contenders to imagine unilaterally giving up their militias when bullets, not ballots, determine so many political outcomes.
The dilemma is clear. When citizens desperately need security and welfare and have nowhere else to turn, they will support militias. So, too, when political elites recognize that decision-making in weak state institutions can be trumped by arms on the street, they will be loath to get rid of their weapons and those of their allies. Both citizens and elites make these choices, even when the choices undermine a better future. All are stuck in a suboptimal equilibrium, and no one wants to be the first mover out of it.
The outcome is difficult to predict. Will Libya find a way out as Colombia has, rather than devolve into further conflict as in Somalia’s nightmare? One potential pathway for the international community and the central government is to focus on providing security and welfare to citizens at the local level by helping to bolster military and police capabilities and local conflict resolution mechanisms. This peels away support for militias but is also risky because supporting one group may inadvertently strengthen some actors at the expense of others. Third-party support for negotiated solutions also presents possibilities but runs the risk of supporting one side versus another, possibly helping it establish a new regime captured by a few. In the end, support for democratic processes and institutions, including electoral processes, may offer the greatest possibility for helping Libyans advance an inclusive process for negotiating agreements that give multiple sets of elites a say in the bargains that will diminish the power of militias and strengthen state institutions.
Lindsay Benstead is an assistant professor of political science in the Mark O. Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University. Ellen Lust is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Yale University and non-resident senior fellow at the Project on Middle East Democracy. Jakob Wichmann and Alexander Kjærum are consultants at JMW Consulting. This piece is based on polls conducted by the authors in May, September, and November 2013 in collaboration with the National Democratic Institute, JMW Consulting, and Diwan Market Research and funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.