Readers of the last posts will know that I think eliminating the California rule is sound, but a voter initiative amending the California Constitution may itself count as a “law impairing the obligation of contracts” and therefore be unconstitutional except as to future employees. (Legislature v. Eu (Cal. 1991) is a good example of a California amendment passed by initiative that was partially invalidated by the California Supreme Court for exactly this reason.) The result might be different with the Pension Reform Act because, rather than eliminating pension benefits, it changes the rules of how to interpret statutes to create contracts, so one could think of this as being analogous to a California Supreme Court decision reversing course on the ground rules of contract law. But I’m not sure.
This is all I have to say so far on the “California rule”. But I thought I’d close with a short discussion of a separate question that people are interested in when it comes to discussing public-sector employees: are public-sector employees “overpaid”, in the sense of being paid more than private-sector counterparts for comparable work? This hasn’t been relevant to my work — I don’t think it’s necessarily relevant to a policy analysis of whether the California rule is a good idea, and I expressed no opinion on the subject and didn’t rely on any view of the matter in my previous discussion. But it’s still an interesting question.
It turns out that it’s a hard question, much like other public-private cost comparison questions. For instance, does Medicare have higher or lower administrative costs than private insurance? Many advocates of public health financing say Medicare has (much) lower administrative costs, but Robert Book makes cogent arguments to the contrary, which I recommend.
Or: do private prisons cost more or less than public prisons? Most analysts seem to agree that private prisons cost less; pro-private-prison people cite this as an advantage, while anti-private-prison people argue that private prisons can save money by skimping on quality, so overall it’s a bad deal. But some recent meta-analyses purport to find the contrary: that private prisons are actually more expensive. Who’s right? In a forthcoming Emory Law Journal article which I’ll blog here soon, I argue that private prisons really do cost less, but whether the cost savings are on the order of 15% or on the order of 3% depends heavily on one’s assumptions. (While you’re waiting for my blog posts, I’ll direct you to an excellent survey article on private-prison research by Gerald Gaes.)
But back to public-sector employees. Here are three interesting sources to read for more information on the subject: (1) Out of Balance? Comparing Public and Private Sector Compensation Over 20 Years, a study from the Center for State and Local Government Excellence by Keith A. Bender and John S. Heywood; (2) Are State and Local Government Employees Paid Too Much? by Ford Fessenden in the New York Times; and (3) Comparing Private Sector and Government Worker Salaries by Adam Summers from the Reason Foundation.
First, note that public-sector jobs and private-sector jobs are different — for instance, public-sector jobs are more likely to require a college degree — so just looking at overall averages isn’t likely to tell you much. You have to find comparable jobs to compare. The Bender and Heywood study says that for workers with “comparable earnings determinants (e.g., education)”, public-sector workers make less in wages and salaries: state employees make 11% less than private-sector employees, and local workers make 12% less.
But these are wages and salaries, and there’s a lot of compensation that isn’t wages and salaries. One component is pensions, which are a greater share of compensation for public-sector workers. Why is that? I suggest an answer in my own paper: “governments, free from the ERISA regulations that govern private employers, find it easier to promise generous pensions and then underfund them, leaving future generations to pick up the bill. Underfunded public employee pensions are thus a form of deficit spending.” The Bender and Heywood study says the differences between public and private sectors are fairly slight, and considering it all together, public-sector workers still make less than the private-sector workers, by about 7%.
But the Fessenden piece in the New York Times raises a number of extra issues. For instance, public-sector workers typically work fewer hours, so comparing per-hour compensation makes public-sector wages look higher. (More accurately, one should count the extra leisure as a component of public-sector compensation, which isn’t the same as dividing by the number of hours.) Another confounding factor is that public-sector employees are more likely to be unionized, and one might want to disentangle any possible public-sector premium from a unionization premium (not that unionization necessarily increases wages). The piece continues with a discussion of the value of job security and the difficulties of correctly valuing pensions and health benefits: