Pennsylvania House Bill No. 2533 (introduced Oct. 3 by House members Vereb, Marsico, Caltagirone, Turzai, Stephens, Kauffman, M.K. Keller, Masser, Millard, O’Neill, Thomas, Toepel, Barrar, and Corbin) provides,
It’s also clearly unconstitutional. The government can’t enjoin speech, or even authorize civil liability for speech, just because it is said by a convicted criminal (which is what “offender” presumably means here), or because it “perpetuates the continuing effect of the crime” by “caus[ing] a temporary or permanent state of mental anguish.” If it’s a threat, it can be punished. If it’s a face-to-face insult likely to cause a fight, it can be punished. If it’s libel, it can be punished. But speech can’t be enjoined, or subjected to liability, simply because it causes “mental anguish,” for instance because the criminal is saying bad things about the victim or the victim’s family, or is defending his legal or moral innocence, or getting acclaim or recognition that we think he shouldn’t be getting.
Note that prison inmates, and even convicts who are out on probation or parole, can indeed be subjected to special speech restrictions, and can be administratively disciplined (or have their probation or parole revoked) for their speech. But the law goes beyond that, both in the nature of the remedy (an injunction and damages, and not just administrative prison remedies) and in its application to all offenders, whether or not they are in prison.
Thanks to Robert Dittmer for the pointer.
